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          1. PARAMETERS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE THAT INFLUENCE BUILDING OF A STABLE SYSTEM

          (BACKGROUND, THE PRESENT, THE FUTURE)

          1.1             Aspirations to state-building identity or state renewal have always been present in the territory of the Western Balkans.

          1.2             There have always been desires and strong forces aiming towards a high degree of commonality.

          1.3             In view of the conflict of interests, use of arms has been easily resorted to - the danger is latent. There is a high level of militarism among the citizens.

          1.4             Integrations are a reality and a need.

           

          2. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM THE ABOVE PARAMETERS ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

          2.1 Integrations have become a reality - resistance to integrations is diminishing. The requirements for integration should be made more easily identifiable to the citizens both with regard to their contents and to the timeframes.

          2.2 Aspirations to state-building identity or state renewal should not be thwarted - they should be supported in cases where there are historical, political, and legal grounds for them.

          2.3 The forces aspiring to a high degree of commonality should be supported:

          -         They should be identified,

          -         Profiled and guided.

          2.4. Resorting to the use of arms in the conflicts of interests should be resolved by implementation of three project tasks:

          -         High level of demilitarization of the territory of the Western Balkans,

          -         Abandoning of compulsory recruitment as a form of conscription,

          -         Building up of a joint defense system.

           

          2.4.1.  HIGH LEVEL OF DEMILITARIZATION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE WESTERN BALKANS

           INDICATORS:

          • In 1991, the SFRY’s YPA forces numbered 179,000 people organized in 24 corps.
          • The state policies of the newly formed states in the territory of the Ex Ex Yu are declaratively in favor of peace, cooperation, good-neighborly relations, integration, and reduction of military forces.
          • The actual status of the military forces in the territory of Ex Ex Yu expressed as equivalents of corps is as follows:

          -         The Republic of Slovenia - two corps,

          -         The Republic of Croatia - four military regions, Air Force and Air Defense and Navy, which is equivalent to six corps,

          -         B&H - a total of six corps,

          -         Serbia and Montenegro - nine corps (6 land forces corps, 2 Air Force and Air Defense corps, and one Navy corps),

          -         The Republic of Macedonia - two corps,

          In Kosovo - one Protective Corps.

          The above shows that the military forces are equivalent to 26 corps and include some 190,000 people.

          The international community forces should also be added to the above. 

           

          CONCLUSION

          • There is still a high level of mutual distrust in the territory of the Western Balkans.
          • State policies have not entirely broken free from bad practices (they say one thing and do another).
          • The global processes are insufficiently known and therefore the extent of adjustment to those processes is insufficient.

          -         For all forms of potential threat a highly trained professional army is required that can instantly respond.

          -         In Serbia and Montenegro, in a number of government authorities and institutions, an aggression from without is assessed as a possible form of a threat, which is a big mistake.

          -         Realistically possible forms of threats are not taken into account): 1. Terrorism, 2. Armed insurrections, 3. Economic and ecological threat (primarily by organized crime and operations of the mafia), and 4. Natural and artificially caused catastrophes.

          -         There is no possibility of a conflict between the states and their armies in the Western Balkans in a form of an armed conflict, but the relapses of the war daily burden the government institutions and the population.

           

          RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM - PROPOSAL

          • Serbia and Montenegro should bring a decision on downscaling of the Military to 25,000 personnel (excluding military education and health care).
          • The current number of the Military in the territory of Montenegro should be reduced to a size of some 3,000 people.
          • The Navy should be disbanded and instead a cost guard should be formed capable of carrying out three tasks:

          -         Surveillance at sea,

          -         Interception and bringing in of those in breach of the specified regulations at sea (as required, with the use of arms of limited calibers),

          -         Rendering assistance and rescue at sea and offshore zone.

           

          2.4.1.1. IN PARALLEL WITH ITEM 2.4.1, THE REFORM OF THE MILITARY OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT: 

          • Elaboration of doctrinal documents,
          • Selection of career-officers and non-commissioned officers,
          • Conversion to the model of professional armed forces,
          • English courses should cover the entire carrier personnel,
          • Learning and adoption of the NATO standards and rules of conduct,
          • Implementation of other reform goals.

           

          2.4.1.2. PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE MILITARY

          • Generals - completely (with certain exceptions in the transitional period),
          • High-ranking officers - radically,
          • Other ranks - to a major extent.

          Assessment: The Military of Serbia and Montenegro has some 20% of career officers.

           

          2.4.1.3. THE STABILITY PACT FOR THE SOUTHEAST EUROPE SHOULD SPEED UP THE CONVERSIONS OF:

          • Military careers for the non-career officers,
          • Military sites and installations/facilities,
          • Military industries.

           

          2.4.1.4. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION HAS:

          *Political impact:

          • The defense capacity of Serbia and Montenegro will not be reduced.
          • For a number of years, the Belgrade policy has been the disrupting factor in the region and by this Belgrade would indicate that it wants to act as a stabilizing factor instead.

          *Political and legal consequences:

          • The Dayton and Paris Peace Accords and the Florence Documents have defined the quotas of the armed forces of the FRY : the Republic of Croatia : B&H in the ratio of 5 : 2 : 2, which creates the obligatory effect of proportionate reductions of the respective military forces.

          * Economic effects:

          • Multiply lower material allocations for the military requirements.

           

          2.4.2. ABANDONING OF COMPULSORY RECRUITMENT AS A FORM OF CONSCRIPTION (MAKING THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY FORCES)

          • There is a high level of militarism among the citizens in the region.
          • The definite causes for the above, but not the only ones, are:

          -        The decades long system has, on a theory of armed people, built a system of the total national defense and social self-protection, which implied a general preparation of the population for the war. Putting together the arms and the people in the early years was and still is a systemic solution.

          -        The defense of the "original" social systems has been the ground rule of the state policy.

          -        The decades of the block confrontations have enabled justification and buttressing of the above.

           

          2.4.2.1. THE PRESENT INDICATORS ON THE ANNUAL RECRUITMENT POTENTIAL IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 

          • The Republic of Croatia - 30,000 draftees.
          • Bosnia and Herzegovina - 30,000 draftees.
          • Serbia and Montenegro - 82,000 out of which figure Kosovo has 31,000 draftees.
          • The Republic of Macedonia - 18,000 out of which figure 6,000 draftees are Albanians.
          • The Republic of Albania - 36,000 draftees.

          Further to the above it turns out that the annual recruiting potential in the states of the Western Balkans amounts to 196,000 young people out of whom the Albanians with 73,000 people make up the most numerous population.

           

          2.4.2.2. THE PARAMETERS FOR CONCLUSION

          • The assessed potential security risks demand instant response of highly professional armed forces.
          • The previous conflicts in the Balkans have caused possession of large quantities of armaments, ammo, and mines and explosive devices outside the state control.
          • The compulsory recruitment as a form of a compulsory universal state obligation systemically contributes to the militarism of the citizens.
          • The conflicts are not produced by military forces in regulated states but by insufficiently civilized civil societies, sufficiently militant but insufficiently democratic.

           

          CONCLUSION

          • The compulsory recruitment should be abandoned as a part of conscription.
          • A different form of obligations should be adopted (for example: on the state level or nation level or on the level of the civil society) by which, through several-days training, the population would be made more resilient to the relapses of the war, which will be transferred from the armed systems to the civil society.

           

          2.4.3. BUILDING OF A JOINT DEFENSE SYSTEM

          2.4.3.1. FORMATION OF A JOINT BATTALION

          • The battalion should be formed based on the demographic parity between the states.
          • Due to mutual distrust, the commanding staff on the battalion and company levels should be the NATO officers:

          -         In order to establish mutual trust;

          -         In order to learn and adopt the NATO standards and rules of conduct.

          • After the formation and equipping of the battalion, it should be made an integral part of KFOR and subordinated to the KFOR Command in Kosovo.
          • The battalion should be formed within as short time as possible.

          Assessment: The battalion will completely fulfill all the positive expectations.

           

          2.4.3.2.          FORMATION OF A JOINT BRIGADE

          • The brigade should be formed in the above manner.
          • The command staff on the upper brigade level should be the NATO officers.
          • The joint battalion would become a part of the brigade.
          • It will be possible to form a brigade a year after the formation of the battalion.

          Assessment: The brigade will completely fulfill all the positive expectations.

           

          2.4.3.4. FORMATION OF A JOINT CORPS

          • The commanding staff will be from the member states.
          • The inspections and supervision will be in the competence of the NATO.
          • The decision-making mechanisms should ensure exclusion of any possible abuse.
          • The joint brigade will become a part of the corps.
          • It is possible to form the corps before the end of 2007.

           

          2.5. NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES  NEW PERSPECTIVES OPENING EXPECTED EFFECTS ASSESSMENT

          • The member states may have their own national defense forces.
          • The overall size of all the national defense forces should be below the size of the joint corps.

            

          2.6.

          • The project should be opered to entry of region countries.
          • The NATO is the project coordinator.
          • Co-coordinators: The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Republic of Slovenia and Republic of Greece.

           

          2.7.

          • The Project would bring about the fastest mutual reconciliation.
          • The mutual disrupted trust would be established.
          • Major material and financial effects.
          • The achieved degree of integration in the region will approve the legitimacy of the member states and the region as a whole regarding the joining in the European and Transatlantic organizations.

           

          2.8.

          • At the initial stage, the majority will be against this idea.
          • By the mid of the period, the majority will support the idea.
          • By the end of the period, everybody will regret the fact that the idea has not been developed and implemented much earlier.

           

           

          *CONCLUSION: That is how things go in this region.

        • Tags: Defence, Security of Western Balkan, Western Balkans, Security, demilitarisation, army, Serbia and Montenegro, reform
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