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## Belgrade Centre for Security Policy



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## TOWARDS MISSION POSSIBLE: Using Serbian Experience To Address Egyptian Civil Society's Expectations Of Security Sector Reform

This paper results from a project of **learning and exchange among the peer civil society organisations from Egypt** (One World Foundation) and **Serbia** (Belgrade Centre for Security Policy) facilitated by PASOS. The co-operation took place over the period of a year starting in the second half of 2011, a few months after the overturn of the regime of Hosni Mubarak.

The joint initiatives comprised: a mentored research and needs assessment of Egyptian civil society organisations (CSOs) regarding their potential involvement in security sector reform (SSR), an introductory training for Egyptian civil society activists on SSR delivered by the BCSP team in Ismailia, Egypt, in May 2012, and a follow-up study visit by OWF's representative to Serbian public institutions and relevant civil society initiatives, including a public lecture on challenges of Egyptian transition hosted by BCSP.<sup>1</sup> While this partnership has enabled us to learn from each other, there are more questions

that remain open than those answered during this co-operation.

This paper is an attempt to share with the general public some salient points that arose from our discussions and collaboration. The paper does not aim to provide a detailed and holistic overview of opportunities and challenges faced by Egyptian civil society interested in democratisation and SSR, nor a ready-made formula on how to become an influential civil society actor in SSR.

It provides preliminary findings based on desk research and interviews with ten relevant CSO leaders in Egypt, and with 16 civil society activists and analysts working on SSR and SSR-related areas that took part in the Ismailia training. It does not seek to claim that the lessons learned by one Serbia-based CSO in pursuing an agenda of democratisation of security governance are applicable to other CSOs from the same country or transferable to

other contexts without adaptation. Through this paper, we want to provide inspiration and food for thought to anyone in Egyptian civil society and elsewhere in democratising countries, as well as to those providing them with the support to become more active as independent and credible actors in security sector reform.

The text comprises four sections. First, we introduce the concept of security sector reform (SSR) and the potential roles of civil society in the reform process. Second, a comparison between the current Egyptian and Serbian political contexts is provided to set out the explicit limitations and also opportunities for exchange among civil society in the two countries. It is supplemented with key findings on the expectations of Egyptian CSOs regarding SSR based on the desk research and interviews carried out by the OWF research team in the period February-May 2012 and discussions during the training delivered by BCSP in Ismailia from 11-15 May 2012.

The analysis is presented in two sub-sections: one on expectations from SSR and the other one on the capacity needs of Egyptian CSOs. In the third part, the BCSP director, Sonja Stojanović, shares the main lessons learned by BCSP on how to influence security governance for the purpose of democratisation. Last but not least, recommendations and proposals are put forward for CSOs and donors or others interested in supporting democratisation and SSR in Egypt.

## SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND CIVIL SOCIETY

One of the key functions of the state is to provide safety and security for its citizens. In order to accomplish this function, the state has at its disposal numerous technical, material and human resources, as well as the monopoly over the use of force. It uses all these mechanisms to pursue the goals and priorities of security policy. The policies and practices of state-

run security institutions have different priorities in different political, economic, and conflict contexts. Recognising that unaccountable and/or ineffective security institutions have been a key tool, or even the controlling arm, of governing regimes in numerous undemocratic, conflict-ridden and under-developed societies, the international community has developed a policy of security sector reform to deal with the role of security institutions in the countries in transition.

**Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a process through which security provision, management and oversight institutions are transformed with the goal of "the efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance".<sup>2</sup>** The added value of the SSR concept is that it promotes the idea that security institutions serve not only to provide defence to the state, but also to society and all its citizens (human security). Therefore, it is assumed that the role of managing, and oversight of, security for all must involve not only governments, but also society and its representatives.

### For whom is security?

- ✓ Not only **state**, but also **human security**
- ✓ Not only governments, but also societies

SSR has three features:

First, it is a *dynamic* concept because it is about the **process, not an end-state**.

Second, SSR is a *normative* concept. As such, it **doesn't refer to just any transformation, but to the one whose aim is to protect human rights, rule of law, and democracy**. Democratic governance refers to a governance process that is representative, inclusive, transparent, accountable, rules-based, and fair for all.

Third, SSR is a *holistic* concept. In other words, apart from traditional security providing actors such as military, police and intelligence,



it should also encompass private security providers, as well as relevant governmental or non-governmental management and oversight actors (see the table below).

Who is who in a security sector?			
USE FORCE			
STATUTORY ACTORS	Military, police, intelligence services, customs, border services...	Private security and military companies, tribal police...	NON-STATUTORY ACTORS
	Government, president, parliament, ministries of defence, interior, etc, independent state authorities (ombudsperson, anti-corruption agency...)	Civil society organisations, media, academia	
DO NOT USE FORCE			

### The roles of civil society in SSR

The participation of citizens and civil society organisations (CSOs) in security policy contributes to the development of a responsible and transparent security sector capable of responding adequately to the security needs of all social groups in the state. Civil society is usually defined as being located between the state and the market. It encompasses all voluntary associations and organisations that profess a public interest but do not intend to run for elections such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), syndicates, professional associations, social movements, educational institutions, faith-based communities, pressure groups, etc.

According to a wider definition, civil society is everything outside of the state, and thus may also include the business community.

### Three roles of CSOs in SSR<sup>3</sup>

1. Oversight of policy-making and implementation
2. Alternative source of information and civilian expertise
3. A channel for steering of wider societal interests

#### 1. The oversight of policy-making and implementation

Civil society's primary role is to conduct oversight of security policy-making and implementation. Although foreign, security and defence policies, as forms of high politics, often take place under the spotlight of media attention, it is often difficult for the general public to objectively assess their real impact. As these policies pertain directly to the "national interest", states will always try to portray the effects of those policies in a positive light. Moreover, it will feed the public with selective information painting a favourable image of its own actions, often despite serious costs and challenges involved.

Given the sensitive nature of the security and defence sector, and the deficit of alternative sources of non-state expertise in the field, objective information needed for an open public debate and sound analysis is often lacking. The media plays a key role in creating the space for open discussion about security and defence issues, while independent **think-tanks and research institutes provide a counterbalance to the state's monopoly on knowledge in the field**. As they represent the interests of groups that policies often affect directly or indirectly (including ordinary citizens), CSOs can inform security-sector institutions of deficiencies in the implementation of existing policies, and put pressure on them to implement policies consistently.

Furthermore, civil society - by performing public oversight of the work of security-sector actors - performs the function of ensuring that the money paid in taxes by citizens towards the financing of this sector is well spent. CSOs can conduct this oversight independently of the state bodies

in charge of oversight, or in co-operation with them through joint projects, participation in discussions at the parliamentary security and defence committees, or collaboration with independent oversight bodies (e.g. Ombudsperson, State Audit Office, etc.), or by bringing cases for judicial review.

## 2. The development and provision of alternative sources of civilian knowledge in the field of security and defence

The role of civil society is also to develop and offer alternative sources of civilian knowledge in the field of security and defence. It is no coincidence that security studies as an academic discipline emerged in democratic countries following the end of the Second World War.

The development of the discipline within civilian institutions, such as universities and research institutes, has ever since been a part and parcel of the democratisation process. Think-tanks, media and NGOs serve as a transmission-belt between universities and institutes on the one hand and state institutions on the other. While the role of universities and institutes is to develop independent theoretical knowledge about security and defence issues, the role of think-tanks, NGOs and media is to actively participate in **formulation, oversight, and evaluation of security policies in a democratic system.**

Public discussion and deliberation is not an end in itself, but should serve to shape better and smarter policies that will make the world a safer place for peace, democracy, and prosperity. Civil society organisations can provide security-sector institutions with relevant information and expertise when the development of practical policies in specific areas is concerned, such as the fight against sexual and gender-based violence, better safety of young people, etc. This gives legitimacy to policies and makes the security sector more sensitive to the security needs of different social groups.

In more open societies, by organising and conducting various educational activities (trainings, seminars, conferences, etc.), CSOs contribute to the improvement of the knowledge and expertise of representatives of security-sector institutions, that is, to building skills and the commitment of these institutions to provide security for their citizens effectively and efficiently.

## 3. CSOs as a voice of wider social interests, especially vulnerable and minority groups

Finally, CSOs also serve as **a channel for steering wider societal interests** into state policies. CSOs often perform the role of a "mediator" between a social group or groups whose interests and security needs they advocate, e.g. national minorities, disabled persons, women and children, LGBT persons (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals), etc., and the security sector. They do this by publicly advocating the development of policies and institutional mechanisms that would be able to respond adequately to threats to the security of these groups.

Issues such as human rights, both of ordinary citizens and of armed forces personnel, often arrive on the decision-makers' agenda by and through the advocacy efforts of CSOs. They serve as a voice for vulnerable and minority groups whose integration is a key prerequisite

### **Is civil society a potential spoiler to the authority of the state to provide security?**

"The civil society actors, particularly in fragile and post-conflict scenarios, are often de facto providers of security and can garner more legitimacy among local communities than the central state. In more stable situations, civil society can play a vital role as a counterweight or critic of state institutions. In the transition to stability, informal actors may be formalised and provide the basis for nascent state services or institutions."<sup>4</sup>



### Levels of participation of CSOs in decision-making processes

In order to analyse the level of CSO participation in security policy, we propose to use the scale of CSO participation in the decision-making process presented in the "Code of Good Practice for Civil Participation in the Decision-Making Process".<sup>5</sup>

The code cites four levels of participation:

1. **information** (a one-way process in which public institutions provide information about their work to CSOs and citizens);
2. **consultation** (a process in which public institutions seek the opinion of CSOs on certain issues, usually during the development of policies or policy documents);
3. **dialogue** (regular exchange of information during public discussions and special meetings of CSOs and public institutions with the aim of developing certain policies and reaching consensus), and
4. **partnership** (the highest form of CSO participation where they participate in all phases of the decision-making process - from setting priorities and draft development, to decision- and policy-making and implementation).

for the state's strength, political stability, and national security. CSOs play an important role in raising awareness (among decision-makers, representatives of security-sector institutions, and the wider public) about particular security-related problems that face society as a whole and/or some local communities (e.g. domestic violence, human trafficking, drug-addiction, juvenile delinquency).

In sum, CSOs are an important link in the policy chain. Their role is to participate in the formulation, oversight, and evaluation of security policies in a democratic system. Without a strong civil society capable of independent research, education and advocacy, SSR cannot be a successful process.

## THE CONTEXT ANALYSIS AS A BASIS FOR EXCHANGE



It is important to examine the challenges and opportunities faced respectively by Serbian and Egyptian CSOs in regards to security sector reform, and to identify key similarities and differences. An assessment of Egyptian CSOs in regards to security sector reform (SSR) was carried out by Refa'a Al Tahtawy Forum for democracy in the MENA region affiliated to One World Foundation (OWF), in co-operation with the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP).

The assessment is based on interviews with 10 Egyptian CSOs,<sup>6</sup> conducted in the period from 14-26 March 2012. The organisations were selected according to their previous experience with security issues whether from a legal, gender or human rights perspective.

An analysis of existing legislation and public opinion polls was conducted as a part of the accompanying desk research, and the findings were checked with 16 civil society activists and analysts working on SSR and SSR-related areas that took part in the Ismailia training.

The context analysis is followed by an examination of the interviewed CSOs' expectations about desired outcomes, priorities of SSR in Egypt, obstacles to the process of policy change, and mitigation strategies.

A brief comparison of civil society in the two countries - and their position within society - is then followed by key findings about the needs of the interviewed Egyptian CSOs - where assistance and co-operation might enable them to become more credible actors in SSR.

Comparison of SSR contexts		
	EGYPT	SERBIA
		
<b>Population</b>	81.7 m	7.3 m (July 2011 est.) note: does not include the population of Kosovo
<b>Area:</b>	1 million sq. km	77,474 sq. km land (without Kosovo)
<b>GNI per capita</b>	US \$2,440 (World Bank, 2010)	US \$5,630 (World Bank, 2010)
<b>Size of armed forces</b>	468,500	37,000
<b>Military expenditure</b>	US\$ 3.9 bn	€ 675 million <sup>7</sup>
<b>As percentage of GDP</b>	2.1	2.08
<b>Conscription</b>	Yes	Abolished in 2011. As from that year, over 90 per cent of the armed forces comprises professional soldiers and volunteers
<b>Beginning of protests</b>	25 January 2011	24 September 2000
<b>Toppling of leader</b>	13 February 2012 (Hosni Mubarak)	5 October 2000 (Slobodan Milošević)
<b>Estimated death toll</b>	850	2

Both countries have undergone the experience of authoritarian rule in which the security institutions have served and protected the regime and not the people. The main difference has been that Serbian security forces were not only repressive at home, but also a key player in the wars over the Yugoslav succession, targeting especially members of other ethnic groups. This is why a post-conflict legacy is also important for understanding the context of SSR in Serbia.<sup>8</sup>

The reform of security institutions and prosecution of those responsible for massive human rights abuses in the country was perceived as one of the top priorities by both Egyptians and Serbians who took part in the overthrow of the respective regimes. In particular, police and domestic intelligence services were distrusted and perceived as responsible due to their unprofessionalism or lack of interest in the suppression of crime, as well as a repressive attitude towards the public and a record of human rights violations.

In contrast to the police and intelligence, the armed forces of both countries enjoyed, and continue to enjoy, one of the highest approval rates among the wider public beyond the circle of political opposition and civil society groups.<sup>9</sup>

While the explanation for this fact is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be highlighted that the countries differ with regards to the level of power enjoyed by the military. While in Serbia informal power was located within the intelligence services, in Egypt much of the informal political and economic power has been in the hands of the military. Moreover, the Serbian armed forces had undergone the experience of fighting wars in the nineties, a factor that shaped the post-revolutionary agenda for defence reforms.

One feature typical of post-conflict situations is a demand for the prosecution of some senior officers for war crimes. Despite internal political turmoil created by external pressures for the extradition of war-crime suspects, the regional environment was more conducive to defence



reform in Serbia than in the case of Egypt. In the immediate aftermath of the transition in Serbia, it was clear that armed inter-state conflict would not be repeated soon, due to the overlay of the NATO and European Union (EU) military presence in the region. In Egypt, however, unresolved conflicts and the partisan involvement of the international community do not promise a stabilisation of the region in the near future.

Another key difference in the respective authoritarian legacies rests on the fact that the repression used against the majority population was more selective in Serbia than in Egypt. While Serbian security forces used violence against mass student and opposition protests, and against ethnic minorities, the opposition youth movement Otpor and top leaders of the opposition, it rarely ended up with a fatal outcome.<sup>10</sup> The exit from authoritarian rule was also more violent in Egypt, ending with the death of around 850 people, out of whom 685 young people were indiscriminately targeted with shots to the head and chest.

The relatively bloodless transition of power that resulted from the storming of the Yugoslav Federal Parliament on 5 October 2000 occurred not only because of people power on the streets of Belgrade but also because of the pacts made between some of the opposition leaders and a few key people in Milošević's security apparatus. The latter promised not to violently suppress the demonstrations in exchange for immunity.

This helps to explain why Serbian police did not fail to maintain law and order during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the protests against Milošević in the capital of Belgrade,<sup>11</sup> in contrast to Egyptian police who withdrew from the streets creating a traffic, public order and security vacuum filled in by informal neighbourhood committees. Public outrage with the past oppressive practices of the Ministry of Interior, a key policing institution, and revolutionary fervour, led to the burning down of around 28 police stations and the disintegration

of the Ministry, leaving the military, private security groups, and self-organising citizens to restore public order in Egypt.

In conclusion, the key challenges of security sector reform in both countries concern placing state security institutions under civilian and democratic control and setting up accountability mechanisms for crimes committed both during the time of the repressive regime and in the current period. Police reform was the first choice of public opinion for overhaul in the immediate aftermath of the revolutions, as it was perceived to be the most important for the improvement of the quality of everyday life of citizens, and also more feasible than defence reform. At the same time, the key dilemma faced by the new political leadership in both countries was how to choose a reform path that would install accountability, but not endanger stability and the provision of everyday security.

The major differences are the more stable regional context and the prospect of membership of the EU for a middle-income country such as Serbia in contrast to the less economically developed Egypt located in the highly volatile regional context of the Middle East. This is also evident from the responses of interviewed Egyptian CSOs concerning the main external and internal threats to Egyptian security. Although this overview is not exhaustive, it should provide an outline, according to which it will be possible to judge opportunities for civil society engagement in SSR in Egypt.

### The main internal security challenge

*"The regime would not re-establish security - as a punishment for the revolution" – an interviewed Egyptian CSO leader*

Unsurprisingly, given the context and the timing of this study, all but one interviewees considered a lack of basic safety as a major internal security challenge. Egypt was in March 2012, a year

after the revolution - when this needs assessment was conducted - still facing serious challenges to maintain public safety and to protect citizens from increased levels of crime, mass violence and thuggery. Almost half of interviewees (4) cited the resulting lawlessness, opening of jails, and the appearance of significant numbers of gangs in possession of huge amounts of illegal weapons, as major security challenges. Armed robbery and abduction at gunpoint were listed as new types of crime that have increased the feeling of a general lack of safety.

This is also supported by the results of public opinion polls. In a poll published in April 2011, two-thirds of Egyptians pointed out that "law and order" was a top priority for Egypt's future. Moreover, a poll conducted in August 2011 revealed that three in four Egyptians were overwhelmed by continuous fear for their lives or their family's lives. In the same poll, the Egyptians indicated their fears for their lives were now higher than under Mubarak's regime. Furthermore, the public uprisings raised the level of concern among a great number of Egyptians who regarded the actions as evidence of the increase in crime levels.

Police hesitation in applying the law for fear of harassment of citizens was reflected in the view of the majority of the respondents that the police exercised a negative impact on the country.<sup>12</sup> These opinions are indicative of the people's preoccupation with the issue of internal security and the lack of confidence in police officers who worked under the former regime.

There has not been a consensus on the cause of this situation. Half of the CSO leaders interviewed for this assessment considered the root of the problem to be the desire of the Ministry of Interior's leadership to sustain the current disarray in order to discredit the revolution - showing that it hasn't brought prosperity, but insecurity. The leadership of the ministry is perceived as comprising loyalists to the previous regime, who are continuing the old practices of serving the interests of the rulers and not the citizens.

One interviewee provided a less political explanation, indicating that the internal management of the ministry, which reflects the class system, is a main cause of the ministry's dysfunctionality. He explained that the absence of decision-making autonomy for lower ranks and the lack of promotion opportunities, combined with an autocratic organisational culture that does not allow for criticism, led to the corruption of police officers and their ineptness to provide basic services.

While the last analysis is relevant for understanding the causes of weaknesses of policing in a longer-term perspective, it does not provide an explanation for a particular failure to react in particular situations.

### The main external security challenge

The majority of interviewees (8) agreed that the security of borders with neighbouring Libya and Israel-Palestine represented the major external security challenge for Egypt. The borders were perceived as porous for arms and drugs trafficking. Additionally, the proximity of conflict in both neighbouring countries carries a risk of spillover into Egypt.

The western border with Libya was perceived as especially vulnerable since tribes who may be involved in the Libyan conflict live on both sides of the border. Another risk identified in relation to the proximity of armed conflicts in the region was the potential breeding-ground for extremist groups.





Besides this geostrategic analysis, two of the interviewees identified the sources of insecurity primarily in the area of **foreign influence on Egyptian society and state**.

One interviewee saw dependence on western imports as a major security challenge, while the other saw "external influence on the cultural traditions and intelligentsia as a threat to the Egyptian society value system and hence a threat to stability". Although this perception was not dominant among the interviewed civil society leaders, the fear of negative Western influence on Egyptian politics is widely spread in the population and actively manipulated by censored media coverage.

Some of the CSO activists that took part in the Ismailia training also expressed concern at the West's contradictory policy of assistance – supporting security institutions of repressive regime as a part of the war on terror and fight against illegal migration, and supporting pro-democracy CSOs at the same time. This should be taken into account when planning assistance to Egyptian civil society.

#### Definition of SSR and expectations from reforms

In defining the concept of Security Sector Reform, respondents insisted that the word "reform" was less comprehensive than "reconstruction", and preferred to use the latter term. When asking the participants in the Ismailia training for an explanation of the demand for differentiation in discourse, they mentioned that the word "reform" reflected minor cosmetic changes that could enable continuity with the old regime, while "reconstruction" reflected a thorough change and removal of the people and practices of the old structures. Such linguistic markers of expectations are important to keep in mind when planning engagement in line with local understanding of priorities and preferable solutions.

*"The reform must include a gender component as well. Women need to be present at all levels of the sector, and the sector needs to protect women from gender-based violence."*

Regardless of terminology, all answers revolved around the sector's **transformation from an autocratic to democratic apparatus**. The interviewees identified different aspects of democratic governance as the priority. For some respondents, this primarily meant the establishment of democratic control over the sector, for others transformation from protector of the regime to citizens' protector, and for one the key feature of transformation should be heightened attention to human rights.

Two interviewees deemed that the security sector must uphold **the rule of law**, and ensure that all citizens' rights are respected in a non-discriminatory manner. Half of the interviewees cited the need for **demilitarisation** (removal of military ranks in the police and military's disengagement from politics), and establishment of civilian oversight.

It was expected that the transition from militarised to civilian-controlled security provision would require an improvement in police efficiency in service provision and better inter-agency co-ordination of different security agencies.

A prominent human rights advocate believed that - besides professionalisation - SSR should foster the ability of security agencies to function in a democratic order. This entails their co-operation with elected civilian authorities and civil society organisations in a multiparty system, on the one hand, and building their popular legitimacy on the other.

The issue of **transitional justice** figured in the definitions of four interviewees, who argued that accountability for past abuses, especially torture, before and in the aftermath of the

January 2011 revolution, is a prerequisite for security sector reconstruction. This would require both lustration of all cadres who have been implicated in torture, and a change of the value system and police practices that have been shaped by operation in the decades-long state of emergency.

Moreover, during the Ismailia training, Ahmed Kandil from Al Ahram Centre added two more expectations of SSR - which he subsequently published in a paper for the European Policy Centre:<sup>13</sup>

*“Security sector reform is also the shortest way to development and prosperity for the Egyptian people. If this reform is not taken seriously, we will not be able to develop our country. Foreign investments inflows, trade exchanges and tourism will not be likely to flourish in Egypt without stability and a solid security situation... Furthermore, without powerful security institutions in Egypt, our neighbours in Europe can face a variety of dangers ranging from “a significant rise of Islamic militants who will take a harder line towards the EU” to “Egypt becoming a symbol of change for others to follow in the Gulf oil-rich countries, and consequently affect negatively the energy supplies to the world.”*

In summary, the key expectations of the interviewed CSO leaders focus on: placing the security forces under civilian and democratic control; establishing the rule of law leading to non-discriminatory treatment of all citizens; demilitarisation and professionalisation of security provision; and a demand for transitional justice and accountability for abuses. This should result in improved security for all citizens, transitional justice for all those whose rights were severely abused, and economic and international prosperity for the country and its citizens.



### Dominant issues in understanding the meaning of reform

Civilian oversight, demilitarisation, efficiency, Inter-agency co-ordination	five interviewees
Accountability for past abuses	four interviewees
Indiscriminate rule of law	two interviewees
Willing acceptance of security agencies to function within the democratic order	one interviewee

### Biggest challenges facing security and justice institutions

The **politicisation** of institutions in Egypt was cited by seven interviewees as a key challenge for reform - namely, the lack of independence of institutions, the interference of political elites in their work, and the general deficit of democratic governance evident in the separation of different branches of power. The executive has interfered in the judicial branch of government through controlling the selection of the Supreme Judicial Council, which used to be in the President's hands, and in the selection of judges, the Ministry of Justice's prerogative.

Interviewees agreed on the need for purging the judiciary of old cadres and for the introduction of new constitutional safeguards that would delineate the roles of the executive and judicial branches of power, and guarantee **judicial independence**. Another reason for their belief that the judiciary faces the biggest challenge is the general lack of observance of the law and the non-implementation of court decisions.

In discussing **challenges facing parliament**, half of the respondents (5) mentioned the influence of religion over politics, referring to the predominantly Islamist make-up of the first

democratically elected parliament and the consequent under-representation of minorities and opposition viewpoints. For that matter, the influence of an Islamist current in the judiciary and the military was cited by two respondents as worrisome. As two respondents noted, the make-up of parliament is in part the result of a partial democracy characterised by a lack of political and organisational experience on the part of newly formed parties, the short time for campaigning and the general absence of established electoral practices - including cases of electoral bribery in rural areas.

Others expressed some optimism, indicating that it might be possible for the parliament to assume its legislative role and correct existing bad legislation and pass new laws. Two respondents attributed the inaction of the new parliament to a deficit of courage to act revolutionary. They considered that a traditional approach takes time to generate results, and therefore revolutionary measures were needed to address some burning issues.

There is a consensus that the **armed forces' dual role of protector of the state and of transition custodian has been a major challenge for subjugating them to civilian rule**. Their current position allowed them to influence the political process in a way that would ensure the maintenance of the power and privileges they have enjoyed to date. This, and any future attempt by the parliament to exercise oversight of the military's budget oversight, are seen as a point of friction between the military and newly elected elites, and a challenge for reform.

To conclude, it is evident that the interviewed CSOs did not place much optimism in formal oversight mechanisms, such as parliament and the judiciary, and believed that the power to decide on future reforms lies with political parties and the military. The key challenge for CSOs in the near future will be their choice of strategy to apply in regards to this challenge – whether to maintain a confrontational strategy of public protests as a main tool or to supplement it with “blaming and shaming” though watchdog

activities with regards to the imperfect existing oversight mechanisms (all strategies tried out before the change of regime), or to supplement it with targeted partnerships for advocacy for setting up a new institutional and legislative basis for civilian control and rule of law.

While protest-voice strategy, watchdog and advocacy strategy can complement each other, it is difficult to balance them in such a way as on the one hand to keep the integrity of the CSO's values and at the same time to build up credibility and necessary alliances with at least some pro-reform officials.

### Expectations from reform

When talking about their expectations, most interviewees thought of broader reforms of which the security sector is only one part. There is a sense that reform is a long-term process, and that SSR is not possible without changes of state policies that would be followed by social and economic reforms and change in other institutions and legislation.

From the responses received, it was apparent that civil society representatives perceive **police reconstruction or a comprehensive change of the police apparatus as a key security sector reform**. None of the CSO representatives interviewed mentioned the role of the military in Egyptian politics and the need for “civilian control” over them as a priority.

The most striking finding was the agreement of all respondents on prioritisation, above all else, of reform of the police. First, the **separation of security and politics**, through clearly delineating the relationship between security institutions and political actors in the new constitution, is considered one of the top priorities and one of the most difficult tasks to achieve. This reform should further be translated into a redefinition of the national security concept and a change of philosophy among both the leadership and lower ranks in the Ministry of Interior.

Second, **decriminalisation** is desired and seen possible only if there is a full overhaul of the top echelons of the Ministry of Interior, which is considered to comprise loyalists to the previous regime. One interviewee also mentioned a need for lustration or the opening up of secret police files, and holding to account all those who committed human rights abuses. Another solution to this problem cited was reorganisation and restructuring to mix the people from heavily criminalised and corrupt departments of the ministry into new ones and change competencies that in the past allowed them to use too much discretion.

Few interviewees prioritised the establishment of external and internal accountability mechanisms for policing. While co-operation with the parliament will certainly face many challenges, respondents assessed that the establishment of functioning internal control mechanisms in the police would be tougher to implement. One interviewee also highlighted as a solution the improvement of economic conditions for police officers as a way to tackle corruption and associated abuses. The need in the future for the police **to be capable of applying the principle of equality before the law**, meaning investigation and prosecution of the highest state officials when they abuse power or commit a crime, was also recognised as a priority.

Another task deemed long term and expected to face many hurdles was **demilitarisation**, or annulling military ranks and military organisation of the work of the police. The **change of police culture** is expected to be achieved through training in democratic policing, and exposure to other policing tools that would enable them to resolve crime without resorting to violence.

Some respondents also recognised that effective law enforcement is impossible without an effective judiciary and an improvement in the rate of implementation of court decisions. This would help build the police's credibility and legitimacy. Last but not least, a few interviewees prioritised more gender-sensitive security sector reform that would address violence

against women and improve the prospects for women's participation in security provision and governance.

## Gender and SSR

"Women, like the rest of the population, are affected by the severity of the male-dominated security apparatus, therefore they should have an interest in security sector reform."

"The media portrays a woman in the security forces as a strong person who doesn't have a heart."

The lack of representation of women in the security sector mirrors their status in other sectors of Egyptian society. Interviewees unanimously agreed that women need to be represented in the security sector because they can contribute to its effectiveness, and especially as they are perceived as less prone to violence than men and they can therefore better deal with certain issues, thus improving the overall image of security agencies.

As a major obstacle to this change, a few respondents mentioned the institutionalised discrimination of women in the police and the fact that public campaigns that portray them negatively help sustain their low numbers in the security sector. For instance, since 1984 - when women were admitted to the Police Academy for the first time - the training for female recruits has been limited to six months compared with men's four-year studies. Moreover, unlike men who can enter the Police Academy with only a high-school diploma, women are required to hold a university degree. The classes are separate for the two sexes and the curricula differ. Women, for example, are trained in how to use light weapons only.

In terms of their career development, the promotion of women in the Ministry of Interior is heavily dependent on their superiors and their



personal connections. Additionally, the media portrays women in the police as heartless, on the grounds that the psychological and physical strength required for the job does not conform to the common and traditional perception of women as the “weaker sex”. The media has induced the perception that women are not fit for this type of job - which, according to one respondent, influenced the decision of the Chairman of the Police Academy to reduce the number of women cadets, after the release of a movie that featured women officers as incompetent.

Interviewees suggested a range of possible measures to streamline gender issues in the police:

- Create a level playing field for admission to police educational institutions;
- Address the culture of violence against women through police education. One possibility is to incorporate into curricula international conventions related to the protection of women, and women and the security sector; another is to introduce specialised training for dealing with cases of domestic and gender-based violence;
- Establish an office in police stations to receive women’s complaints and enable women plaintiffs to give testimony in the presence of a female officer and female psychologist;
- Pinpoint tasks that do not require physical strength and can be managed by women;
- Establish a “Women’s Police Academy”, where female officers could be trained in subjects like history, antiques, tourism and languages, and be subsequently engaged in ports, airports, antiquities-related policing tasks, and police education.

Even though the last two suggestions operate on the assumption that female officers are not equal to male officers in physical strength, and

hence not suitable for all jobs across the board in the police, they may provide entry-points for greater involvement of women in the security sector.

### What is possible and required for reform?

Interviewees differed in their assessment of the **necessary preconditions** for security sector reconstruction. Some described the most conducive environment as one in which the military was confined to the barracks and basic democratic institutions were in place. Others thought that the sooner reform begins the better. As the **easiest to reform**, interviewees identified the organisational units of the Ministry of Interior that haven’t played a role in propping up the regime – e.g. customs, passport, pilgrimage departments within the police and tourist police.

The civil society representatives interviewed also believed that it was important to come up with quick-impact activities that would improve confidence between citizens and the police, so that citizens would believe that reforms are possible and come to accept and recognise police services. Respondents identified as initiatives that could help improve the police’s image - and be easily introduced - the transfer of those who have a history of abuse to other administrations, and the opening of police stations to visitors, meetings with school children, and similar community policing initiatives. Similarly, while recognising that the internal culture or mentality of officers would be difficult to change, respondents believed that to an extent police misconduct could be mitigated through installing surveillance cameras to record officers’ interaction with citizens.

### Similarities and challenges between Egyptian and Serbian civil society

While civil society played a key role in mobilising the public, especially young people, towards the overthrow of autocratic regimes in both countries, this has not translated into civil

society's **legitimacy with the wider population immediately after the change of regime.** A major obstacle to this was the long-lasting propaganda by regime-controlled media that labelled CSOs as traitors against the national interests and implementers of a Western agenda.

While this claim took hold against the majority of CSOs in Serbia due to their origin in the anti-Milošević movement after the fall of communism, Egyptian civil society includes a different element that enjoys greater popularity with ordinary citizens. Both the research carried out by OWF, and the consultations organised within various conferences,<sup>14</sup> highlights that informal religious-based groups in Egyptian civil society enjoy a popular legitimacy. Religious charities are most trusted by ordinary citizens due to the fact that they deal directly with needy groups and perform the role of informal security providers.

In contrast, the argument used against CSOs working in Egypt on democratisation and human rights issues was that they were supported by foreign funding. Similarly, some anti-regime groups that played a pivotal role in mobilising the population against Mubarak were trained through the assistance of the US State Department. This is an important difference compared with Serbia: foreign support to CSOs was not actively used against civil society by the post-Milošević government; in fact, civil society has been at least declaratively recognised as a partner in the transformation of society, which is no longer portrayed as "an enemy of the state".

In Egypt, however, the active repression of freedom of association and speech is ongoing. The most prominent case was taken by military at the end of 2011 and in the beginning of 2012 when they searched and prosecuted a number of US CSOs with staff working in Egypt, and a few Egyptian CSOs working on democratisation issues.<sup>15</sup>

While both countries had **inadequate legislation regulating the work of CSOs**, in

Serbia it was not used after Milošević's fall to limit the activities of CSOs.<sup>16</sup> In Egypt, there are still serious impediments to freedom of association in the form of the necessary consent to establish and register CSOs.<sup>17</sup> This usually takes many months, especially for those who work in the field of human rights or development. Moreover, the Law on Associations issued in 2002 gives the Social Solidarity Ministry the right to intervene in all the affairs of CSOs, including blocking their work if their activity "threatens national unity" or "violates order or morality" (Article 11).

Such imprecise language was used to deny registration to human rights organisations or to interfere with their internal functioning by barring certain individuals from the organisations' boards or the launching of ad hoc requests by the authorities to check an organisation's funding and expenditure. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior during the Mubarak regime regularly rejected organisations or delayed authorisation without providing an explanation despite the fact that they had no legal authorisation to do so. This forced many CSOs to operate without registration or to register as civil corporations or law firms, which are not subject to the same restrictions.

In both Egypt and Serbia, CSOs face challenges to their sustainability – not least due to the limited domestic funding opportunities. OWF's desk research indicated different models of funding among charities and human rights and development CSOs - the former relying more on citizens' donations and the contributions of their members, while the latter depend on donor funding for projects and on the work of volunteers. The pressure against pro-democracy secular CSOs applied after the revolution has included the establishment of a committee by the Ministry of Justice that will look into the sources of funding of Egyptian CSOs with an intention to identify Western-supported CSOs.

Despite these challenges, at the time of the fall of the authoritarian regimes, in both Serbia and Egypt a well-established capacity for setting



up organisations was in existence, particularly in urban centres among the educated class. **A demand for SSR is rooted in both civil societies**, and the number of initiatives both prior to, and immediately after, the overthrow of the authoritarian regimes outnumbered those in other countries in their respective regions.<sup>18</sup>

Independent research into security policies outside the state security system was under-developed in both the Middle Eastern and Western Balkans regions. It is a legacy of the authoritarian regimes during which policy research was mainly nurtured within research institutes and academic departments affiliated with military and intelligence services or relevant ministries, and later within their respective GONGOs (government-created or affiliated NGOs). All education on security related topics was conducted within a closed state system, and independent advocacy and research on security issues were discouraged.

This is one of the reasons why new political elites, civil society, and the media alike lacked expertise in security issues. The initial research was activist-driven and, while it assisted the process of democratisation, it did not provide developed policy alternatives for the aftermath of democratisation and a post-conflict environment. A more detailed overview of existing initiatives, capacity gaps and necessary form of assistance are set out in the following assessment.

## THE ASSESSMENT OF EGYPTIAN CSOs' NEEDS REGARDING SSR

### What functions should CSOs perform in relation to SSR?

The possible strategies to be used varied significantly based on the identity of organisation and previous experience with the security sector. The following proposals include a wide

spectrum of non-confrontational partnership-based strategies:

- building alliances and common vision among civil society groups;
- getting political parties' buy-in;
- applying political pressure through parliament, public or courts;
- initiating direct dialogue with security-sector representatives or creating opportunities, like roundtables, to open discussion with them, and get them on board for reform;
- influencing legislation that delineates the authority of state security actors and defines the systems and standards to which they are accountable;
- organising awareness campaigns;
- requiring the security forces to orient more towards civilian protection and service;
- performing a watchdog role by calling attention to abuses and/or corruption within security bodies, and informing the public on the actions, responsibilities and/or transgressions of state security actors;
- providing input into vetting and recruiting measures for the armed services and police;
- providing local protection and defending public order.

### Is co-operation with security institutions possible?

Some, while recognising that the CSO sector needs to engage with the authorities in order to succeed in advocacy initiatives, believe that co-operation with the security sector is dependent exclusively on the security agencies' own willingness to listen to CSOs. Others thought that the **key for successful co-operation with**

the security sector was the credibility of the CSO and that mutual respect was required as the basis for dialogue. Only one respondent thought interaction with the security sector was impossible because they are corrupt and criminals. Addressing the **relationship between civil society and the security sector**, several respondents highlighted the presence of current or former members of the Ministry of Interior as a contributing factor to the success of existing initiatives. As examples of organisations that have “respectful relations with security institutions”, OWF researchers highlighted the United Group for Legal Profession, and the Arab Center for the Independence of Judiciary and Legal Profession who have organised a number of trainings for judges. In general, CSOs do not have good relations with the police – with the exception of the Police and People Association, and the Arab Defense Association.

### Existing experience with SSR within Egyptian civil society


Judging from past and existing initiatives, there is awareness among civil society groups in Egypt of importance of SSR for the country’s transition. Namely, security agencies are identified as one of the remnants of the previous regime that needs to be checked. Additionally, respondents saw a role for civil society in driving reform. To that end, several workshops, trainings and seminars have been organised, among others

by the Arab Defense Association and One World Foundation, with the aim to create civilian expertise in SSR.

**Noteworthy proposals for police reform coming from civil society**, according to the respondents, have included initiatives that have taken a comprehensive approach, such as “The initiative of police for Egyptian people”<sup>19</sup> affiliated to the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Hesham Mubarak Center for Law, and New Republic’s police reform initiative.<sup>20</sup>

Others have focused on specific problems, such as the proposal for confidence-building measures by Ibn Khaldun’s Center, El Nadim’s draft of a new criminal code, the police coalition’s advocacy for improvement of officers’ rights, and the United Group (lawyers association)<sup>21</sup> amendments to police law.<sup>22</sup>

The Clindegel report<sup>23</sup> cites the White Knights, a football fan club with experience of dealing with riot police, human rights lawyers, neighbourhood security committees, a group within the police such as the “Honourable Police Officers”, and a “Department of Human Rights” within police stations, which has reportedly been implemented as a way to prevent torture in police custody. Civil rights activists and human rights lawyers have given seminars at police academies on human rights and their significance. However, during the Ismailia training we heard from activists with





this experience that the training has limited effect and that it is not sufficient to render the necessary changes.

Regarding existing expertise, Egyptian CSOs are experienced in documenting human rights abuses and providing legal assistance to victims. They have the capacity to draft and propose laws and good communications skills to reach out to the public. However, as set out in the needs assessment below, the CSOs lack technical expertise regarding police reform, impeding their greater involvement in discussions of specific reforms. CSOs often lack experience in collaborating or co-ordinating among themselves to pursue shared objectives. Yet shared vision and alliance-building among civil society groups are key factors for successful advocacy initiatives, especially in still closed and repressive systems, such as the one in Egypt even after the revolution.

### Needs for capacity building

In order to be able to affect policy and security decision-makers, respondents identified the need to understand better the Egyptian official security set-up and its functioning, as well as to acquire more technical expertise on security and policing issues so as to be able to competently discuss possible alternative reforms. This goes hand in hand with the advocacy skills to choose "the right approach" to acquiring information in a semi-permissive political environment and to adopt the most appropriate strategy to influence change.

Regarding **security sector knowledge**, they expressed interest in:

- receiving comprehensive SSR training that would include analysis of all elements of the sector, not only police;
- studying the successful experiences of other countries regarding SSR;

- indepth seminars on police reform that will address typical phases of police reforms and include tools for analysis and prioritisation of possible reforms;
- developing and improving service-provision capacity (handling of complaints and torture cases, and liaising with lawyers and police to follow up on those);
- strengthening, and raising public awareness of, the rights of citizens on how to deal with the police, e.g. whether the authorities have the right to check the identity of persons at any time;
- indepth seminars on gender and SSR;
- indepth seminars on transitional justice and lustration of police;
- Getting to know better the Egyptian security sector by mapping the constituent parties of the sector and diagnosing the status of the security institutions, including the army, intelligence and police, as well as detecting the mechanisms of internal control processes inside the security institutions.

Moreover, the civil society actors were interested in an exchange on **the right strategies to become a credible civilian oversight actor in SSR**. Some of the topics identified within this theme were:

- how to conduct research and develop advocacy strategies for a security think-tank;
- how to convert the research findings into action plans in order to instigate real reform in the security sector;
- best approaches for conducting dialogue with security-sector officials without losing integrity and independence;
- how to access accurate data about state security institutions, a key challenge as

civil society doesn't have the correct data, and official statistics are still susceptible to interpretation (e.g. the number of political detainees is estimated by civil society at 18,000 while the official data estimate is less than 500);

- lessons learned about campaigning, lobbying, advocating for SSR by CSOs.

**Generic civil society skills** that were most frequently mentioned in the interviews and during the training were: network- and alliance-building, and fundraising strategies. This indicates that CSOs are aware of the sectoral fragmentation and challenges to maintain their activities in a restricted funding environment.

### Relevance of external assistance

Egyptian CSOs are lucky to have strong donor interest currently, but the challenge is how to use external assistance in an environment with a deeply rooted domestic scepticism of foreign involvement, particularly that of western donors. All but one of the CSO leaders interviewed agreed that **external assistance was important on the condition that it is long-term and serious** (in contrast, one believed it to be more harmful than beneficial). Again all but one believed that other experiences, particularly that of **Eastern European countries, hold very relevant lessons for Egypt** (one interviewee, however, believed that Egypt needs to deal with the reform on its own terms and construct its own response to the challenges of democratisation).

Tunisia's successful transition figured as the closest potential model for Egypt. Nordic countries were considered worth looking at in terms of their approach to human rights.

The question as to **how outside assistance in the area of Security Sector Reform would play into local political dynamics** must be seen against the backdrop of billions of dollars in US government assistance provide annually to the Egyptian military, set alongside the military

authorities' crackdown on NGOs from the beginning of 2012. The response reflects these realities such that respondents think that foreign assistance will not be challenged if it were to boost the security sector.

However, as one interviewee said, if the funding supported police trade unions, it would cause public outcry – given the unpopularity of the police. Another said that NGOs are stigmatised as unpatriotic, and their receipt of foreign aid for SSR would feed into this perception and might subject them to further prosecution.

NGOs need legal protection from the authorities in the form of a law regulating the relationship with donors and NGOs' functioning. Nevertheless, a majority agreed that any positive change in the security sector that might come as a result of external assistance, including improved CSO capacity to tackle SSR topics more credibly, could mitigate the negatives associated with foreign assistance.

With regards to the **forms of assistance** that would be most useful, the interviewees mentioned these in order of importance:

1. Transfer of experiences and exposure to comparative models from abroad.
2. Studying the rules of procedure of interior ministries in other countries, especially in Europe.
3. Learning techniques for designing questionnaires and conducting interviews, along with methods of documenting and assessing the performance of the Interior Ministry.
4. Training of trainers for more experienced Egyptian CSO activists so that they can further implement basic training about SSR and the role of CSOs.
5. Fellowships and practical training abroad in think-tanks focusing on security sector reform



6. Knowledge transfer via web platforms and sharing lessons online with relevant CSOs from Europe.

## SERBIAN CASE STUDY

The following case study sets out how the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) has become a credible civilian actor in security sector reform in the Western Balkans. The author is fully aware that the lessons learned are not fully applicable to the Egyptian case due to differences in the political and security context, as well as the stage of democratisation of the two countries. It can, however, serve as food for thought for CSO leaders interested in designing their organisations' strategy for involvement in SSR. This section will try to identify management strategies and types of competence needed for a think-tank to be able to influence security politics. The key lessons learned by BCSP are presented through an analysis of the changes in environment and strategies used by this think-tank throughout its 15-year history.

Period	BCSP organisation transformation	Serbian defence transformation
1997-2000	Activist organisation	Military is a key part of Milošević's regime
2000-2006	Advocacy organisation	Military is losing political and military might, and the transformation begins
2006-2010	Think-tank/ training institution – "a wanna-be" academic institute	Defence reform is a public topic
2010 - now	Think-tank	"More business as usual" – public has lost interest in defence reform (they are active only when incidents occur and possible membership in NATO is discussed)

BCSP is the oldest civil society organisation in the Western Balkans specialising in research, advocacy and education on security issues. BCSP was established in 1997 as the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR). Recently, BCSP entered a new phase of its development acknowledged with the new name of the organisation introduced to better reflect its mission and the broad understanding of security applied in its work. It is currently the only organisation in Serbia focusing on the whole of the security sector, and tries to act as a knowledge broker in human, national, regional and international security policy arenas.

### **The First Phase (1997-2000): Peace and Democratisation Activists' Agenda**

The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) was established under the name Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) in 1997 with a mission to advocate democratisation of the security sector in Serbia. It was the first civil society organisation registered in the Western Balkans with an exclusive interest in security issues. The founders of the organisation were CSO activists, researchers, and former research staff employed in the Yugoslav Armed Forces' academic institutions. Their initial ambition was to put on the agenda the need for the introduction of democratic control over the state security forces and for questioning their accountability for the conflicts in former Yugoslavia.

At that time - under the Milošević regime during the second half of the 1990s - none of the major state security institutions (military, police, intelligence) were subject to democratic control and oversight, as even electoral democracy was not functioning. This was not only a huge problem for democracy in Serbia, but also constituted a major obstacle to stability in the Western Balkans region because of the Serbian security forces' involvement outside Serbia.

**Opening and maintaining spaces for debate:** Breaking the monopoly of the state on matters of security (civil-military relations in the beginning) lies at the centre of BCSP's efforts to place the military under democratic civil control. Hence its early efforts focused on opening spaces for debate and discussion outside the state, where civil society would be able to participate freely. CSOs were new actors in the governance of both national and regional security policies in the Balkans. There are several reasons for this situation.

First, there was the authoritarian legacy of communism - during which most research and education in security issues was carried out within research institutes and academic departments affiliated with military and intelligence services or relevant ministries. Independent advocacy and research on security issues were discouraged. As a result, most post-communist political elites, civil society, and media lacked expertise in security issues.

Secondly, the post-conflict legacy of the wars of the nineties - CSOs in most of the Western Balkan states opposed the wars in former Yugoslavia. The conflicts provided substantial material for oversight and research about security policies, but the climate of nationalism and illiberal democracies was not conducive for critical inquiries. Courageous journalists or peace activists were the initiators of the first research on the role of security forces during the wars in former Yugoslavia. This activist-driven research assisted the process of democratisation, but did not provide developed policy alternatives for the aftermath of democratisation and the post-conflict context.

The main legacy from this period was that security in most countries of the region was still perceived as an issue of 'high politics', a public policy domain of particular importance for the sovereignty of new states and the protection of their citizens' national identity.

## How did BCSP (at that time CCMR) make an impact?

The fact that the Centre was the first, and until 2000, the only CSO in former Yugoslavia that dealt with the issues of civilian control of the armed forces and civil-military relations made things both easier and more difficult. The difficult part was to choose the venues to communicate these ideas safely and to mobilise the constituency for them. The Centre opted for advocacy aimed at a new generation of opposition politicians and opposition-friendly media, and relied on other pro-democracy CSOs for support on organizational issues.<sup>24</sup>

During this period, the Centre contributed to the demystification of the security sector through briefings for journalists on security topics and public events during which the concept of democratic civilian control over the sector was presented to the wider public. The initial task was to demystify the topic of security, and educate interested civil society activists, journalists and politicians in basic concepts. Many of the communications channels chosen were informal: ad hoc events, op-eds in opposition media, and participation in activities organised by other CSOs. The credibility stemmed from both the courage to speak up about this topic first, and from the fact that some of CCMR's founders knew the security system from inside.

External evaluators that assessed BCSP's work in 2012 also quoted interlocutors' assessment that the academic rigour used in presenting the concepts and evidence had become a BCSP brand. The easy part was that once you got people interested in the topic, the demand for CCMR input followed.

### Lessons:

1. In a hostile, deeply divided society, try to come up with **carefully tailored messages** on why democratic control of the armed forces does not diminish the military's might, but increases its effectiveness and protection of the people. Borrow the authority from a



culturally appropriate source. In the case of Serbia, the academic credentials of the Centre's founders helped, as well as talking first to those who shared their vision of democracy.

2. **Build and maintain a broad network of partnerships and alliances** to boost your expertise, advocacy potential, and protection of your team in the event of unjustified pressure from the government. In BCSP's case, the first alliances were built within a broad opposition-civil society-media block, and it enabled the team to disseminate the message about the need for the military's accountability. It has also served for protection in the case of the government's unjustified repression (e.g. CSOs activated legal professionals to seek protection for one of BCSP's founders who was arrested and detained longer than a month during 1999 with no information about his wellbeing).

### **The Second Phase (2000-2006): Using opportunities during the turbulent transition**

Immediately after the democratic transition, the political elites comprising the former opposition to Milošević's regime opened a window for BCSP's engagement, as they were more receptive to non-military advice on modern security arrangements within a democracy – a type of society that Serbia was trying to become. This was not true for most of the security elite and mid-ranking officials who harboured deep mistrust of BCSP (at that time still known as the Centre for Civil-Military Relations).

The mistrust had a lot in common with other security professions all over the world: a) an overarching mistrust towards any military/police/intelligence outsiders, and b) scepticism as to how an external civilian analytical centre could analyse the security institutions better than its in-house research and strategic institutes.

### **BCSP (CCMR at that time) was a pioneer in many activities:**

It opened a public discussion about the security integration of Serbia (FRY) into the Euro-Atlantic community (2001); it was the first organisation that signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Defence in 2004, the first to enter military barracks in order to educate officers and NCOs on security sector reform (2004-2005), and the first to conduct specialised public opinion polls on security issues (from 2003-2005 and 2011) or empirical research on private-security sector in Serbia (2007). It was the first organisation to provide a structured internship programme for both civilian and military students in Serbia, as well as a Western Balkans Security Fellowship.

A specific factor for Serbia was the suspicion of foreign espionage masked under the work of civil society, due to the recent conflict with major international actors. Moreover, due to the BCSP founders' vocal criticism of the military's involvement in politics and the Yugoslav conflicts, some officers distrusted the capacity of BCSP to provide "objective and constructive knowledge without an activists' agenda".

While military officials were sceptical of the changes, there was a tendency among some high-ranking officials, and the majority of the mid-level military officers, to learn about different realities elsewhere in the world, and understand the implications of any incoming reform.

Hence a minority was genuinely interested in the reforms, while the rest engaged in order to improve their public image and demonstrate to the political elite that they were not opposing the upcoming reforms.

## Challenges and strategies immediately after overthrow of Milošević's regime

So, the first challenge faced by BCSP and many pro-democracy CSOs after the transition was to build credibility with security professionals and citizens due to the reputation of the whole of civil society during the Milošević era. Internally, **the key challenge was to shift identity from an opposition-driven activist organisation into an advocacy organisation** that could continue demanding the accountability of security institutions while not resorting to protest strategies unless necessary. This required building up significantly the Centre's knowledge of possible comparative solutions to democratisation challenges, as well as the provision of relevant content in a user-friendly way.

BCSP established strategic partnerships with respectable international organisations and institutes with whose expertise relevant comparative expertise was brought to Serbia. The chosen communications channels were conferences targeting top political and security leadership and in-the-field seminars for mid-ranking and junior military staff. This is where BCSP (or CCMR at that time) was ready to provide models and bring relevant experts from abroad to share experiences from other countries that faced similar challenges e.g. Central and Eastern European states, other Balkans states etc. In this way, the Centre helped construct the agenda for the first generation of security sector reform.

Besides educational activities and conferences, BCSP provided solutions to the first-generation issues by the creation of model laws that would introduce internationally recognised standards of democratic civilian control of armed forces.

Another useful tool for communicating the need for greater accountability of security institutions was specialised public opinion polls on defence and security issues. Between 2003-2005, seven rounds of polls on perceptions of defence reform and security policies in Serbia were launched. This was the first comprehensive and specialised public research on defence issues, and the questionnaire has since then been incorporated into polls periodically commissioned by the Ministry of Defence.<sup>26</sup>

Political elites, security professionals and media alike were all highly interested in the results of these surveys, and the continuity in monitoring changes in public opinion in turbulent times of transition enabled BCSP to highlight the sensitive issues of reform and possible ways forward.

Moreover, in order to be ready to provide recommendations for emerging solutions, BCSP expanded its activities to encompass a wider and more holistic understanding of security. This happened in two ways: firstly, the organisation increased its attention to non-military dimensions of security policy, including police, intelligence services, private security companies, etc. In terms of issues, CCMR embraced the new concept of "security sector reform", which covered not only democratisation, but a full

According to Timothy Edmunds,<sup>25</sup> **first-generation reforms** include putting in place constitutional norms, and basic laws and structures necessary for getting the security sector under the control of democratically elected civilian authorities. The focus of reform in the first generation is the establishment of formal structures of civilian control as well as a clearer division of competencies among different actors within the security sector. This sets the foundation for democratic control. In addition, the demilitarisation and depoliticisation of security-sector governance should also take place during the first generation. These steps seek to remove the potential danger of state or non-state actors using force to jeopardise the democratic functioning of a political community. However, this is just one of the first steps in the democratisation process.



range of issues arising from the transformation of society and of its security sector, including effectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy, transparency, accountability, modernisation, and interoperability of the different security institutions.

**Opportunity and challenge - A common origin linking politicians and civil society:** Many CSOs, think-tanks, and politicians emerged from the social movements that led the political and economic changes of the nineties in the case of Serbia. As a consequence, researchers, activists, politicians, and policymakers belong to the same community, and many know each other quite well. This can offer great opportunities for collaboration, but may also be the source of tensions and mistrust as some individuals have inevitably 'changed sides' along the way. Another challenge that this common origin generates is that many former civil society activists (or researchers) who are now in government, or in positions of power, feel that the 'opposition' maintained by CSOs is unfair.

In the case of Serbia, this meant that the connections nurtured during the years of opposition to Milošević were useful to open the window for engagement with security institutions, but did not maintain open once criticism from civil society emerged. This has resulted in a situation where CSOs, including BCSP, are no longer perceived as "an enemy of the state", but accepted "as a necessary nuisance". Do not expect yesterday's partners from the opposition parties to stick to their promises once in government. They will seek technical assistance, but probably won't make accountability their number-one priority unless the demand for greater accountability is sustained by CSOs and the public.

**Challenge: how to grow out of an opposition identity and change the modus operandi:** CSOs from both Serbia and Egypt that identified their initial *raison d'être* as freeing their respective societies from authoritarian rule faced post-revolution challenges in seeking new

missions in the process of democratisation and new ways of doing things beyond a strategy of confrontation, e.g. throwing protests against government decisions.

In Serbia, this opposition was ingrained in many organisations' DNA and it was difficult to shake off, particularly as the new political environment after Milošević gave civil society a much greater role in public policy. While preserving watchdog activities is important, Egyptian CSOs should consider building their capacity so as to be able to provide alternative solutions to transition questions. As the first steps, it is worth investing in **building up the organisation's capacity and working on improvement of the legal and institutional environment for security governance within the democratic process.** By prioritising legislative changes and new institutional models, it is easier to help establish new governmental and civilian oversight mechanisms and open space for civil society activities in the future.

**Learn to give a chance to the employees of state security institutions.** Although Egyptian civil society activists might have personal experience of being prosecuted, molested, etc., it is important to establish a dialogue. While a dialogue should not avoid open criticism of wrongdoing, the tone of debate should be set up so that both chances feel free to express their views, and to learn from each other about expectations and possible obstacles to change.

In BCSP's experience, giving a chance to security professionals to see the reform agenda as their own helped build alliances for change. While seeking alliances among security professionals, it is necessary to develop your own vetting mechanisms to avoid use of your organisation to boost the biography of those with a proven track record of human rights abuses. **Do not run away from politics through official institutional channels due to lack of access or fear of losing integrity.** By constantly testing official channels, you will maintain the legitimacy of your activities as state-building and not destructive.

## How training could be used to change the values of security professionals<sup>27</sup>

At the seminars with security professionals, participants were initially reluctant to speak as they were afraid of being reported upon by their peers. Another inhibition stemmed from being perceived as being critical in front of a higher-ranking officer. Therefore, BCSP's facilitators guided senior officers to open up and speak up, or confront other government institutions (e.g. independent oversight bodies) as a way of gaining their trust and that of others.

It is also important to demonstrate valuable knowledge and 'show your good intentions for your country'. Also, in a learning environment, there is no emphasis on making decisions – choosing one policy alternative at the expense of another. These are all considered (by the learners) as secondary interests throughout the training, and so the pressure is quite low. Adding good educational design to this, BCSP were able to establish an open learning environment.

With the target group being 'softened' by the learning environment, the training design should seamlessly interweave the educational components with the data/analysis to be presented within the training sessions. To be clear, the training event is not used as a cover for a policy analysis presentation. That would be a manipulation. Instead, it is a skilful usage of 'fresh' analysis as part of the learning process and consciously designing space for positive externalities to emerge. This is easier said than done – designing interactive sessions is hard in its own right. Adding the think-tank's analysis as part of the background documentation, case studies, role-plays and simulation exercise, and being able to separate it from daily reality (simulation to be very much pertaining to the reality, but not exactly analysing it outright), is an art in itself.

BCSP has also put an emphasis on non-formal and interactive learning methods – an approach that does not come naturally to think tanks

given that most are more prone to academic-style teaching. In other words, you can 'sell' a message to a relevant stakeholder during a one-on-one meeting, but you are unlikely to influence the values and organisational culture without broader interaction. The freedom to debate and disagree provides an important opportunity to change people's mindsets. BCSP has designed and carried out many training activities with these mid- and long-term policy goals in mind: changing the system as well as the way people discuss security and military issues.

### Challenge: Asymmetry in relations is unavoidable, but it can be managed.

Inevitably, the security sector is a sector led (and largely controlled) by the state and the security forces in particular (the military and the police). Ever since its beginnings, BCSP has challenged this situation and made great strides in opening up the space in which civil society can play a role. Arguably, according to several interviewees as part of an external evaluation of BCSP's work, the role that civilians play within the state (e.g. in the Ministry of Defence) can be partly attributed to BCSP. The security sector is also one in which secrecy has a stronger appeal among policymakers, and so it is one in which opened spaces need to be fiercely guarded to avoid them slipping back under the control or influence of the state.

The reforms initiated in the security sector, and integration into international security organisations, increased the demand for qualified involvement of civil society organisations in national security policies. While this demand was limited, and needed to be nurtured through educational activities, the key advice is to learn to justify why civilian input is necessary in the process. **Tip: Make sure that your first threshold message is that while the state remains a dominant actor in provision and management of security issues, civilians have an important role to play!**





This is why BCSP learned **to explain the vision of security it has promoted**. The human security dimension implies a much wider referent object of security (security for whom?). Instead of the state as dominant referent object, we see an individual and the individual's human rights as a central value to be protected. This also implies security not as a sole prerequisite of the state's security apparatus (police, military and intelligence) but of a wider list of societal stakeholders such as the justice system, private security organisations, and civil society (media, think tanks, university, CSOs etc.). The goal of security policy should be then a pursuit of freedom from military, political, economic, societal and environmental threats.

In order to be ready to provide recommendations for emerging solutions, BCSP expanded its activities to encompass a wider and more holistic understanding of security. This happened in two ways: firstly, the organisation increased its attention towards non-military dimensions of the security sector. BCSP embraced the new concept of 'security sector reform' which covered not only democratisation, but a full range of issues arising from the transformation of society and of its security sector, including effectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy, transparency, accountability, modernisation, and interoperability of the different security institutions.

A concern for human security and issues revolves around the security-development nexus and includes a great variety of issues such as corruption, prevention of crime and violence, environmental security, youth security, conflict prevention and resolution, peace and reconciliation, and human rights more generally.

### **The Third Phase (2006-2009): Research Incubator**

The third phase of development of the organisation overlaps with the completion in Serbia of the first generation of reforms in

the security sector and a more complex and competitive political environment. The key strategies used by BCSP's leadership in this time were to invest in building in numbers and quality the level of civilian expertise in security issues, as well as launching comprehensive research frameworks that enabled BCSP to monitor the progress of reforms in a coherent way – a so-called Index of SSR.

**Educating the elites:** From its very beginnings, the centre was set up to develop a new generation of civilian security experts as a way of countering the dominance of military experts in Serbia. As a consequence, many of its activities have been geared towards this. For example, in this period, BCSP established co-operation with the Faculty of Political Science to offer a joint specialisation programme aimed at educating a new generation of security professionals. This programme gathered mid- and junior-level professionals from different state security institutions, parliament, and CSOs - which also facilitated networking and exchange within government institutions and with civil society.

A major breakthrough happened in 2006 when under CCMR's auspices a specialised research unit - the Belgrade School of Security Studies (BSSS) - was established. The first goal behind the establishment of BSSS was to train on the job a younger generation of civilian experts who will practise new thinking in security. For this purpose, ten young social sciences graduates were provided with mentoring and on-the-job training. In a relatively short time, the centre was able to develop a strong cadre of young, but experienced researchers who benefited from the credibility that the centre and its founders already enjoyed.

As a consequence, they have been able to build their own reputations in a policy community characterised by hierarchy and unfriendliness to 'outsiders'. This raised the staff numbers in BCSP, as well as its non-partisan research capacity capable of contributing to the national security policy-making process with evidence-

based proposals and scrutiny of official policies. At the same time, an internship programme for young graduates was launched, offering them an opportunity to learn not only about security policies, but also the basics of think-tanking.

While not all of these initiatives may be implementable in different contexts, it is worthwhile considering **how to use educational activities to create demand and educate current and future members of the security policy community in key security sector reform concepts.** In this way, BCSP opted for long-term indirect influence through the development of new groups of security sector experts who may go on to work for other centres, the state, international organisations, and other sectors.

To any given think-tank, the trainees become an ever increasing network of contacts: entry-points to various public and private institutions, avenues to increase their publicity, potential partners and allies, future consumers of the analysis offered by think-tanks, and a budding constituency as a whole. BCSP has turned these contacts into a powerful tool for communications. The centre's mailing list has increased due to these training activities, leading BCSP to expand its distribution channels.

**Identify problems to be solved:** One of the centre's key strengths is the identification of issues that demand attention and must be addressed. All of the stakeholders interviewed agreed that one of BCSP's main contributions to Serbia was the introduction of new concepts such as 'democratic civilian military control', 'security sector reform', 'gender in the security sector', etc. The introduction of these ideas responded to the identification of a problem, weakness, or deficit in Serbian policy and practice that had hitherto not been considered. Provide and promote new policy ideas: In response to these new problems, BCSP has been successful in promoting new policy ideas: in other words, the centre has answered problems with solutions.

### **Flagship INITIATIVE:**

*Development of innovative research and advocacy tool: Index of SSR*

One of the areas where BCSP had contributed to security studies in Serbia and security-related research is the methodology of SSR presented as the Index of SSR. The Index of SSR, the first such tool developed by a recipient country of international aid, after being originally constructed and tested by BCSP was in 2009-2011 exported to other think-tanks in the Western Balkans region who then applied it to their respective countries.

The aim of this initiative was to develop a rigorous, systematic methodology for mapping and monitoring the security sector from the perspective of civil society organisations (CSOs). The Index of SSR introduces a measurement framework on the quality of democratic governance of the security sector in democratising countries. It was developed by a CSO, for use by other CSOs, with the aim of strengthening nationally driven assessments and local ownership of security sector reform.

In the pilot phase of this project (2006-2009), a unique methodology for the monitoring and evaluation of security sector reform – Index of SSR - was developed and piloted on the case of Serbia. Special instruments for the numeric presentation of progress in security sector reform were developed from the perspective of a civil society organisation in a country where reform was taking place.<sup>28</sup> The results of the first monitoring phase of SSR processes in Serbia were presented in the *Yearbook of SSR in Serbia 2008*.<sup>29</sup>

It contains analyses of publicly available data on the progress of security sector reform, or more specifically democratic governance, efficiency and effectiveness of military, the police, intelligence services, institutions with policing competencies (customs administration, tax police and the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering), prisons, private security companies, as well as state and independent



bodies in charge of monitoring and control of the aforementioned ones (National Assembly, judiciary, CSOs). The added value of this work lies in the fact that it is the first such reference on the whole of the security sector, and that it can be used in future as a baseline for measuring the progress of SSR in Serbia.

In the second cycle of project, the methodology is enhanced in two tracks: first, **the development of new research procedures** that should improve the validity of results; and second, empirical fine-tuning of the Index through its application in Serbia and **comparative research in the Western Balkans**.

The main novelty was the organisation of focus groups with government and media to test the methodology and research findings. For that purpose, BCSP organised training about the whole-of-government approach to SSR, which was used for consultations with government representatives about the relevance and applicability of Index of SSR. Using the inputs given by experts from the institutions that are the subject of our inquiry (state security institutions), BCSP gained better insight into issues usually out of the reach of CSO representatives (e.g. internal division of roles, secondary legislation). The institutions' experts had in return benefited from a rare opportunity to take part in whole-of-government exercise and to learn about current academic and policy debates about SSR world-wide.

The second track of advancement of methodology is the **further testing of the Index in empirical research of SSR in Serbia and in the Western Balkans**.<sup>30</sup> The Index of SSR has been further shared and tested by six partner think-tanks with whom BCSP implements a region-wide study on the progress of SSR in the Western Balkans countries. For that purpose, BCSP delivered training sessions during which the Index of SSR and the results of the country studies are being reviewed. Testing a uniform methodology in different contexts should improve its focus and highlight comparable indicators. The results of this research serve as a foundation

for BCSP's advocacy for democratisation and for more effective management of security governance in Serbia.

### **The Fourth Phase (2010 - ongoing): Consolidating into Regional Centre of Excellence**

The Centre entered the fourth phase of its development with a new name which better reflects the mission and scope of its work and the broad understanding of security it applies in its work. In the previous five years, BCSP underwent a rapid transformation from a CSO into a think-tank specialised in security issues. Since 2008, the organisation managed to move beyond national borders and contribute to regional knowledge-production and civil society participation in security policies. Owing to the partnerships the Centre established, the regional consortium of think-tanks working in the area of security studies emerged as the first network of its kind in the region.

Twelve years since the fall of Milošević's authoritarian regime, Serbia is still an unconsolidated democracy and a deeply divided society. This status has multiple consequences for the freedom and security of Serbia's citizens.

First, both the governing and opposition political elites tend to claim that the relevant reforms for establishment of accountability in the security sector have taken place, and that the national security sector now faces only the challenges of modernisation. In their understanding, modernisation is primarily related to re-organisation and development of capacities for integration in international security organisations. Knowing that Serbia has half-completed the first generation of security sector reforms and that 'democracy is still not accepted as the only game in town', BCSP is still highlighting major deficiencies in the accountability of security governance in Serbia.

In this context, two strategies were particularly useful in BCSP's advocacy: first, **using the freedom of information act to acquire empirical evidence, showing deficiencies in accountability, as well as partnering up with independent state authorities**, such as Ombudsperson and Commissioner for Access to Information, in exercising demands for greater control and oversight over security institutions.

For example, in July 2009 BCSP, together with the Ombudsperson's Office, organised a roundtable on the draft law on Military Security (MSA) and Military Intelligence Agency (MIA) to highlight the most controversial issues in the proposed legislation, namely the right of MIA to use special investigative measures for data gathering on the territory of Serbia, or the rights of these agencies to use these measures without prior judicial approval.

As a result of public attention gathered by this event and subsequent media coverage, the major proposals on a clearer division of competencies between military intelligence and military counter-intelligence services were incorporated into the draft law presented to parliament in autumn 2009. During the same summer, BCSP partnered with other CSOs and independent oversight institutions so to stop the draft law on Data Secrecy, which would have seriously limited the oversight competencies of the Commissioner for Free Access to Information and Personal Data Protection, Ombudsperson, and the newly established Anti-corruption Agency.

The successful campaign resulted in provisions that enabled the independent oversight bodies to access all level of secret data and thus control on behalf of citizens the functioning of security institutions.

A final piece of advice is: **integrity requires vision**. If you want to be able to set your own agenda, you need to come up with proposals and use opportunities for learning. Therefore, we advise you to learn to say "no" to donor assistance that might damage your

organisational integrity and autonomy, or to initiatives that do not fit within your mission. Apply and ask for assistance that can help your organisation explore new venues, build capacity, or get access to new networking opportunities. This might require educating donors on context, needs and priorities.

#### Tips for external assistance providers:

1. Take time to **get to know the context** and do not take as given that the lessons learned in one context could be applicable in the other. It is important to invest in finding out how people in a given context define security, threats and access to security. It is of utmost importance to recognise the major divisions in society, as well as how both formal and informal security providers derive their legitimacy. In conclusion, SSR assistance should be more about finding a politically sensitive approach than providing technical assistance.
2. It takes time to develop capacity and expertise, so **be ready to commit for a long-time in CSO and academic capacity building** (at least five years). As CSOs and academia could be the basis for the next generation of actors in the state sector, it is worthwhile considering creating or supporting both formal and informal educational programmes that can nurture a new generation of security policy community figures to play a stronger role in security oversight and demand accountability.
3. **Open the door for CSO activities by making state actors more "people-centred", responsive and reliable**, e.g. by requesting the introduction of freedom of access to information and supporting the development of community policing and other partnership-based security practices.



1 The needs assessment and training on SSR and the potential role of CSOs took place in Egypt: the needs assessment in the period February-April 2012, the training from 11-15 May 2012. The study visit for OWF representative to Serbia took place in June 2012.

2 Hänggi, Heiner 2004: Conceptualizing Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction, in: Bryden, Alan/Hänggi, Heiner 2004: *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Berlin, p. 4

3 Caparini, M. & Fluri, P., 2006, 'Civil Society Actors in Defence and Security Affairs', in *Civil Society and the Security Sector: Concepts and Practices in New Democracies*, eds. Caparini, M., Fluri, P. & Molnar, F., DCAF, Geneva, Ch.1.

4 Observatoire de l' Afrique (2011), *The civilian influence of transitional security sector reform in North Africa*, expert meeting report, the Hague, 11 November 2011. Available at: <http://www.obsafrique.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Observatoire-Meeting-Reportfinal2.pdf>

5 The Code was adopted in 2009 by the Conference of NGOs (International Non-Governmental Organisations) of the Council of Europe. The Code is available at: [http://www.coe.int/t/ngo/Source/Code\\_English\\_final.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/ngo/Source/Code_English_final.pdf)

6 The interviewees came from the following organisations: Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies, the Human Development Association, Al Gomhoria al Gadida group (The New Republic), The New Women Foundation, Hisham Mubarak Law Center, the Arab Penal Reform Organization, Arab Defense Association, the National Association for Human Rights, Unit of Security & Strategic Studies - al Ahram Center, and El Nadim Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence.

7 18.05.2011. 16.22 Minister of Defense holds a press conference [http://www.mod.gov.rs/novi\\_eng.php?action=fullnews&id=2738#](http://www.mod.gov.rs/novi_eng.php?action=fullnews&id=2738#)

8 For a detailed overview of SSR context in Serbia, see: Popović, Dj. et al. (2011), *The Context of Security Sector Reform in Serbia 1989-2008* (Belgrade: BCSP then known as CCMR).

9 The honeymoon with the military ended in Egypt when the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) was criticised for using repression at mass protests and for its declaration of constitutional amendments in June 2012 institutionalising its political role after the transition (the newly elected President Mohamed Morsi announced on 12 August 2012 that these amendments will be annulled).

10 For an analytical overview of police reform in Serbia, see: Stojanović, Sonja and Downes, Mark, "Negotiating the Transition between Rhetoric and Reform: Policing the Transition in Serbia", in Hinton, M.C. and Newburn, T. (eds.), (2009) *Policing Developing Democracies*,

Routledge (Taylor and Francis), pp. 73-98.

11 While there has not been major insecurity in the capital, new interim government needed to acquire the loyalty of the security forces in order to calm the simultaneous mutinies that broke out in prisons across the country and the insurgency of ethnic Albanian militants in the three municipalities in the south of Serbia which commenced in November 2000.

12 Exum, Andrew & Stuster, Dana, N. D., *Reforming Police* [online], Available at: <<http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/02/16/policing-reform-and-reforming-police/9p6h>>

13 "Security sector reform in Egypt and the European Union's role: an Egyptian view" by Ahmed Kandil, in *The Arab Spring one year later: voices from North Africa, Middle East and Europe*, edited by Josef Janning and Andrea Frontini, Issue Paper No.69, European Policy Centre, July 2012. See: [http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub\\_2825\\_the\\_arab\\_spring\\_one\\_year\\_later.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_2825_the_arab_spring_one_year_later.pdf)

14 CCDP (2012) The Amman Issue Brief: 'Arab Civil Societies After the Uprisings: Challenges during Political Transitions' available at: [http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/6305/Amman%20Issue%20Brief1\\_%2023082012.pdf](http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/6305/Amman%20Issue%20Brief1_%2023082012.pdf) and Observatoire de l' Afrique (2011), *The civilian influence of transitional security sector reform in North Africa*, expert meeting report, the Hague, 11 November 2011. Available at: <http://www.obsafrique.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Observatoire-Meeting-Reportfinal2.pdf>

15 <http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Egypt-NGO-Backgrounder.pdf>

16 The new legislation on CSOs in line with good international standards has been finally adopted in 2009. In Egypt, the proposal of new even more restrictive legislation has been proposed during the military led campaign against human rights NGOs. For the text of law see: <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Egypt/MOSS2012-En.pdf>

17 Kheir, Ahmed, 2006, *The Egyptian civil society and information*, [online] Available at: <[http://www.id3m.com/D3M/AllAboutNews/Documents/NGO\\_Info.pdf](http://www.id3m.com/D3M/AllAboutNews/Documents/NGO_Info.pdf)> [Accessed 1 April 2012]

18 The white knights, a football fan club experience of dealing with riot police, human rights lawyers, neighbourhood security committees a group within the police, the "Honourable Police Officers", a "Department of Human Rights" within police stations has reportedly been implemented as a way to prevent torture in police custody. Civil rights activists and human rights lawyers give seminars at police academies on human rights and their significance. However, it must be recognised that training is neither the ultimate goal nor sufficient to render desired changes.

19 [http://eipr.org/sites/default/files/pressreleases/pdf/summary\\_national\\_initiative\\_for\\_police\\_reform\\_en.pdf](http://eipr.org/sites/default/files/pressreleases/pdf/summary_national_initiative_for_police_reform_en.pdf)

20 [www.eg-eg.org](http://www.eg-eg.org)

21 [www.ug-law.com](http://www.ug-law.com)

22 Police coalitions is a name for informal self organized interest groups within the Ministry of Interior, a post-revolution phenomenon, who use social networks and web to issue their demands regarding the position of police officers or their views on Ministry's operation. "Bearded officers" is one such coalition. They demanded to be allowed to grow beards, a symbol of their Muslim religious identity, a practice not permitted in Mubarak's regime.

23 Observatoire de l' Afrique (2011), *The civilian influence of transitional security sector reform in North Africa*, expert meeting report, the Hague, 11 November 2011. Available at: <http://www.obsafrique.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Observatoire-Meeting-Report-final2.pdf>

24 Although CCMR was a registered CSO, it was functioning without an office, projects and regular funding, as most activities were organised voluntarily or with ad hoc financial support channelled through other bigger organisations.

25 Edmunds, Timothy, "Security sector: Concept and implementation", in Wilhelm N. Germann and Timothy Edmunds (eds.) (2003) *Towards security sector reform in Post Cold War Europe: A framework for assessment* (DCAF / BICC), pp. 11-25.

26 Visit: <http://www.ccmr-bg.org/Knjige/2762/Javnost+i+Vojska.shtml>, in Serbian.

27 This is taken from a blog, "A peculiar use of training activities as vehicles for policy research uptake in Serbia" as part of an ongoing study on communicating complex ideas. The post was written by Goran Buldioski, Director of the Open Society Foundations Think Tank Fund, and Sonja Stojanović, Director of the Belgrade Centre for Security Studies, and is available on: <http://onthinktanks.org/2012/08/17/the-peculiar-use-of-training-activities-as-vehicles-for-policy-research-uptake-in-serbia>.

28 Stojanović, Sonja "An approach to mapping and monitoring security sector reform" in Hadžić et al. (2009) *Yearbook of Security Sector Reform in Serbia* (Belgrade: CCMR & Dangra), pp. 67-100.

29 Hadžić et al. (2009), *Yearbook of Security Sector Reform in Serbia* (Belgrade: CCMR & Dangra).

30 Klopfer, Franciska [et. al], 2012. *Almanac on Security Oversight in the Western Balkans* (Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy; Geneva: DCAF). Available at: <http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/almanac.pdf>







**Belgrade Centre for  
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Policy Association for an Open Society

**Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)** is an independent think-tank which is publicly advocating human, national, regional and international security based on democracy and respect for human rights.

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#### **One World Foundation for Development & Civil Society Care**

One World Foundation for Development and Civil Society Care was established in 2005 as an Egyptian non-governmental, non-sectarian and not-for profit organisation. The initiative was launched by some young Egyptians with a good background in developmental issues, particularly advocacy issues, human rights, public participation and democracy in Egypt.

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