

Róbert Ondrejcsák, Filip Ejodus (Eds.)

Slovakia and Serbia

Experiences from Transatlantic Integration
and Security Sector Reform

Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs, Bratislava, Slovakia
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Preface

This book is a result of a fruitful cooperation between two think tanks, the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) from Belgrade and the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) from Bratislava. It's main task is to present the evolution of Serbian and Slovak foreign, security and defence policies for the purpose of comparative analysis. The main underlying assumption of this project is that the two countries share a significant number of similarities which make such a comparison possible. On the funny side, one cannot fail to notice that both countries' names start with the letter S; the Danube River flows through both capitals which start with the letter B and finally, both countries' unpopular rulers' names start with the letter M. On the more political side, Slovakia is one of the few European countries left which still support Serbian position regarding the Kosovo status. However, since this book pretends to an academic stature, one should emphasize the reasons which make this two countries not only looking 'at' each other but also looking 'like' each other, beyond the above mentioned funny coincidences and current political alignment. Both countries are small, land locked post communist European countries that relatively recently regained their independence following a century of experience in a multiethnic federation. Also, in contrast to other post-communist states, they both suffered a period of isolation in the 1990s caused by illiberal governments of Milošević and Mečiar. Finally, soon after they left the authoritarian regimes of the 1990s behind, both countries attempted to accelerate European integration and quickly catch up with others. Slovakia made it. Serbia didn't make it, yet. That's why Slovakia's lessons learned may be extremely useful for Serbia to catch up as well. For that purpose authors in this book covered wide range of topics from development of security policies in Slovakia (Vladimír Tarasovič and Róbert Ondrejcsák) and Serbia (Filip Ejodus and Marko Savković), overview of Slovak strategic documents (Elemír Nečej and Róbert Ondrejcsák) and the Council of National Security in Serbia (Đorđe Popović) through defence reforms, civil military relations and formation of security community in Slovakia (Vladimír Tarasovič) and the relationship between democratization and defence reforms (Đorđe Popović) all the way to civil society and public opinion attitudes about foreign, security and defense issues in Slovakia (Ol'ga Gyarfášová) and Serbia (Zorana Atanasović).

This book, which was made possible by the generous financial support of the Fund for Open Society in Belgrade, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovakia and the International Visegrad Fund, may be the first one which puts Serbian and Slovak security transitions into comparative perspective but will definitely not be the last one. Hopefully, the dialogue between security communities of the two countries will continue in the future and result in an even better common understanding of the changing Europe we all try to live in.

Filip Ejodus – Robert Ondrejcsák
November 2008

Development of the Security and Defence Policy of the Slovak Republic

Vladimír Tarasovič – Róbert Ondrejcsák

Situation in Central Europe after the End of the Cold War

The first half of the nineties brought many significant changes. Not only the communist regime in the Central and East European countries collapsed but by the unification of Germany and the decline of multi-national federal states and the distribution of political forces fully changed. The period of the Cold War ended and the threat of global confrontation, escalated by the arms race between two nuclear superpowers – USA and Soviet Union – disappeared. In the former communist states, the free elections took place and the process of political and economic transformation started. The Europe was experiencing the euphoria from the victory of the democratic ideals, the rule of law and the free market. The seamy side of the said years was the war in the former Yugoslavia and conflicts in the post-Soviet territory. The Czechoslovakia was the only multi-national state that succeeded to divide in a civilised and peaceful way in that period.¹ After the decline of the bipolar world the Central European countries had theoretically several options how to solve their foreign policy and security situation. Slovakia, with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, created the so-called Visegrad Group that had four basic security options:

I. The North Atlantic option. Most of the political elite in four above-mentioned countries considered this option, not seeing any other realistic alternative. The reason was, among others, that NATO was the most successful alliance in the history and the only security organisation that provided – thanks to the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty – solid security guarantees in case of invasion. The provision of security guarantees that moved these countries from the existing so-called grey zone was very important for them. From Slovakia's point of view, the integration into NATO was related to two assumptions, namely that the process of the SR Army modernisation would accelerate considerably and that an involvement in the weapon and acquisition cooperation system within NATO would also create conditions for effective development and utilisation of own industrial defence basis.

II. The West-European option. An advantage of this option (integration into the EU and WEU) resides in its better acceptance in the public opinion. Another advantage was a wider and more conceptual range of security solutions for the region, since it added the stabilising economic integration to the political military instruments. A weak point of this option was that WEU did not avail itself of own military capacity allowing to provide security guarantees. Moreover, a more complicated system of membership categories did not provide these countries with what they needed in that period – security guarantees during the transition period.

¹ Duleba, A., Lukáč, P., Wlachovský, M.: The Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic. Issues, Situation and Perspectives, Research Centre of the Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 1998, p. 16.

III. The neutrality option was popular in Czechoslovakia and Hungary before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, with the termination of traditional antagonism of two superpowers, the concept of neutrality became meaningless for the Central European countries.²

IV. The Central European option implied a lot of theoretical and practical problems. The reason of the impracticability of this option was, besides the abilities of the political elite to even consider this option, an insufficient defence and security potential (also in case of close cooperation among these countries) to defend the region. This cooperation was most functional during the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the region. The accession of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to NATO in 1999 put an end to even theoretical considerations of this option.³

Slovak Security Policy in Period Following the Velvet Revolution till the Separation in 1993

To talk about a specific Slovak security policy in the period following the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia till the separation of Slovakia would be very difficult. In this period the Slovak party found itself in a deadlock, since it could deal with Slovakia's security only semi-legally and officially operated only within the common state.⁴

Therefore it is logical that the Slovak political elite searched for a possibility how to solve this deficit at least partially, and found it in a foreign policy area. Already at the end of 1989, when the first stage of the Czechoslovak foreign policy started, there was an effort to solve – in all Czechoslovak foreign-policy projects – the conflict residing in the fact that Slovakia, as a federal republic existing since 1968, had constitutionally guaranteed certain level of sovereignty, but it was unable to exercise this sovereignty within the communist power centralism. Finally, even Czechoslovakia as a whole was not able to exercise this sovereignty.⁵

In 1989, the Velvet Revolution offered to many Slovaks not only the possibility of a better and more dignified live in a democratic environment and functioning market economy, but also a hope of creation of an equal common state including the Czech and Slovak nations.⁶

Therefore, it is quite comprehensible that one of the first steps of the Slovak political elite was to establish the Ministry of International Relations in the first post-

² The theory of neutrality emerged in Slovakia just after the declaration of the international sovereignty in summer 1992, and with higher intensity again during the year 1995, in relation to the pessimistic reactions of many Western politicians to Slovakia's integration to NATO in the first round. The Slovak political elites started to discuss this possibility in years 1996 – 1998, and used a certain form of pressure on the Western countries because of their unwillingness to integrate the Slovak Republic into their structures. See Samson, I.: The Integration of Slovakia in the Security System of the West (Security Specifics and Specific Risks of Uncertainties), Research Centre of the Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, No 3/1997, Bratislava, 1997, p. 55-58

³ Duleba, A., Lukáč, P., Wlachovský, M.: The Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic. Issues, Situation and Perspectives, Research Centre of the Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 1998, pp. 28-30.

⁴ Samson, I.: The Integration of Slovakia into the Security System of the West (Security Specifics and Specific Risks of Uncertainties), Research Centre of the Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, No 3/1997, Bratislava, 1997, p. 8.

⁵ Alner, J.: A Brief Evaluation of the Slovak Foreign Policy, in Euroreport č. 48, Bratislava, 2002, pp. 46 to 47.

⁶ Bugajski, J., Duleba, A. : Bezpečnostná a zahraničnopolitická stratégia Slovenska, Biela kniha, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, May 2001, Bratislava, p. 10.

November government in Slovakia, that had particularly an ambition to “visualise Slovakia“, but the SR Government quickly transferred some of its business (e.g. the solution of the dispute regarding the Gabčíkovo Waterwork) to it.

The fact that in autumn 1989 the Czechoslovak People’s Army did not decide for the armed intervention in favour of the communists and its officers finally preserved the fundamental loyalty to the non-communist Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which had existed several months,⁷

and caused that after its necessary depolitisation and desideologisation, the forced pragmatic changes started to be executed. As it concerns Slovakia, particularly after its separation, no substantial personnel changes took place and armed forces in their basis preserved the conventional political military thinking.⁸

The deployment of the Czechoslovak army until the year 1989 in the territory of Czechoslovakia, resulting from the functions executed by the army on the basis of the Warsaw Pact, did not meet the “defence needs of the Slovak part of the Federation“, because while in the Czech territory combat formations were concentrated, in the Slovak territory training units and military schools were mostly deployed. In the new conditions, such a deployment lost its original meaning, which was the reason why at the first stage of the post-revolution changes a strong pressure was exerted – not only on the reduction in force and the shortening of the length of the compulsory military service, but also on the part of Slovakia there was a pressure to deploy a sufficient number of military units and military personnel in its territory. The then federal army command realised this fact and until autumn 1992 the army establishment decreased by 30,000 persons. After a mass redeployment of military units in the territory of Slovakia, 40% of total number was located there, compared to 17% from the period preceding November 1989. Further development of the military policy depended on political development in the country after the elections in 1992. Their results, after which Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar headed the Czech and the Slovak Republic, respectively, could not result in anything else than a “peaceful division“ of Czechoslovakia.

Slovak Security Policy from 1993 to 1997

On one hand, the peaceful division of Czechoslovakia was accepted with a relief that local wars accompanying a decline of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had not spread abroad to Central Europe, but on the other hand, almost unknown Slovakia which was understood rather as an “east territory of the Republic that had separated“, moreover with Mečiar’s government, raised doubts abroad. Nevertheless, already on January 1, 1993, Slovakia became a member of CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), was diplomatically recognised by 62 states, and later *de facto* by all the other countries. Already in January 1993, Slovakia became a member of the World Bank, UNO, and on June 30 it was incorporated in the Council of Europe. Moreover, on October 4, 1993 the association agreement with the European Union was signed in Bratislava.

An application for the succession after the Czechoslovak Federation, and not for

⁷ Samson, I.: The Integration of Slovakia into the Security System of the West (Security specifics and Specific Risks of Uncertainties), Research Centre of the Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, No 3/1997, Bratislava, 1997, p. 72.

⁸ Ibid., p. 74² Th

the succession after the Slovak Republic from the years 1939 to 1945, had a significant importance for a fairly fast process of international diplomatic recognition of a new state.⁹ The achievement of independence and statehood accentuated own political and national identity of Slovakia. The process of the accession to international organisations also meant a possibility that Slovakia might resign a part of this new achieved sovereignty in the future. It was upon the political elite of the country to decide whether it would interpret and present this process to the public in a way leading either to integration or isolation.¹⁰

The non-profiled political scene, limited experiences of new state administration, as well as under-institutionalisation of the new state's policy caused that Slovakia had not avoided several mistakes, although it achieved fairly quickly a wide international recognition, similar to that of its more experienced partners from the Visegrad Group. While in the mentioned countries the basic objective of the political elite was the fastest integration with the developed West, the Slovak elite concentrated on building of own political and economic power, frequently in contradiction with principles of the West integration processes. The integration into European and Trans-Atlantic political, economic and security structures was declared as a priority of the government, but the practical policy did not meet this declaration. On the contrary, this was frequently in direct contradiction with it.¹¹

One of the reasons why Slovakia started then, at the beginning of the year 1993, to lose an easily won positive score was the fact that the ruling political elite did not realise basic thesis that applies to foreign policy and in general: the integration of Slovakia is not a primary responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or diplomacy. It is a responsibility of internal politics. However skilful is the diplomacy, it is unable to disguise deficits of the democracy, social problems, non-compliance between legislation and its enforcement, and many other aspects that push the state either "to Europe", or in the opposite direction.¹²

Moreover, at that time, Slovakia had not built the institutional basis of the foreign-policy service, did not avail of a sufficient number of experienced diplomats, and had not formulated any foreign-policy and security program.¹³

Furthermore, the Slovak Republic only concentrated to the fulfilment of formal requirements related to the efforts at the integration into the EU and NATO. On October 27, 1993, the European Parliament in Strasbourg ratified the European Agreement on the Association between the European Communities and the Slovak Republic. On February 9, 1994, in the NATO headquarter in Brussels, the former Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar signed the framework political document on the accession of Slovakia to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) project, and on June 27, 1995 in the EU Summit in Cannes, he handed over the SR official application

⁹ Duleba, A., Lukáč, P., Wlachovský, M. : Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic. Issues, Situation and Perspectives, Research Centre of the Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 1998, p. 11.

¹⁰ Bugajski, J., Duleba, A.: Security and Foreign-Policy Strategy of Slovakia, White Paper, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, May 2001, Bratislava, p. 11.

¹¹ Duleba, A., Lukáč, P., Wlachovský, M. : Foreign policy of the Slovak Republic. Issues, Situation and Perspectives, Research Centre of the Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 1998, p. 12.

¹² Alner, J.: A Brief Evaluation of the Slovak Foreign Policy, in Euroreport No. 48, Bratislava, 2002 pp. 46 to 47.

¹³ Bugajski, J., Duleba, A.: Security and Foreign-Policy Strategy of Slovakia, White Paper, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, May 2001, Bratislava, p. 11.

for the accession to the EU. This procedure made the impression that Slovakia regarded the integration process as a sport discipline – to be among the first who would formally apply for the participation in the integration projects, but without greater effort at fulfilment of resulting commitments. The result of this approach was that at the end of 1995 Slovakia had to repeatedly face the criticism for the procedure in the internal politics that was expressed in the demarches of the EU and USA, and due to the non-fulfilment of political criteria for the membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures (Slovakia) found itself outside of the mainstream of the European integration processes. During the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 Slovakia – unlike Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic – was not invited to the initial interviews on the membership. Slovakia sustained a similar humiliating defeat in December 1997 in the EU summit in Luxembourg, when it was classified to the second category of applicants for the membership. Thereby still in the years 1993 to 1994 Slovakia was classified in one group with the other V4 countries.¹⁴

The surprisingly fast separation of CSFR had, of course, a serious impact on the defence policy of Slovakia. In a very short period the Slovak Republic had not only to build the structures of Ministry of Defence, but also execute the reform of the SR Army, created on the basis of training units and military education schools of the federal army and units dislocated to Slovakia in the year 1992. The operation of the Slovak Army developed with the basic principles of security policy from the Constitution of the SR and from the Defence Doctrine that was in force from 30 June 1992. This first political-military document expressed basic conditions, objectives and principles of activity of the state in the field of its defence. It was the first official document in which the Slovak Republic defined its security political orientation to the Trans-Atlantic and West European political, economic and security structures. Slovakia clearly declared in this document that it did not regard any state as its enemy or felt menaced by anybody.¹⁵

In spite of the “double-track” management of the Ministry of Defence – the Minister of Defence was Ján Sitek, representative of the Slovak National Party that was against the accession to NATO and in its election programme had embodied the neutrality of Slovakia, and the programme declaration of the government in which the government laid down as one of its priorities the accession to NATO – at the time when Slovakia had problems in the West with the enforcement of democracy, the SR Army was a stable and quite apolitical institution on the background of the partiality and manifestations of the emotional chaos that were typical for the internal political development of the country.¹⁶

The Slovak soldiers were involved in activities of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), but also in peace-making operations under the aegis of UNO in the Balkans. From 1 July 1993 the engineer troops operated within UNPROFOR in the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and from March 1996 in the mission of UNTAES in Eastern Slovenia. The preference given to the mission of UNTAES over the mission of IFOR under the aegis of NATO showed the true face of our integration pol-

¹⁴ Marušiak, J., Duleba, A., Bates-Melišová, Z. : Slovakia 2002, A Summary Report on the State of Society, Chapter Foreign Policy of the SR: Major Trends, ..., IVO, Bratislava 2002, p. 347.

¹⁵ in: Annual Bulletin of the Ministry of Defense of SR 2002, p. 11.

¹⁶ See Samson, I.: Chapter Defense, in Kollar, M., Mesežnikov, G.: Slovakia 2000, A Summary Report on the State of Society, Bratislava 2000, pp. 421 to 436.

icy and by all accounts was one of the notorious last straw that caused the non-invitiation of Slovakia to NATO in the year 1997 in Madrid.¹⁷

The internal politics of the government of Vladimír Mečiar during 1994 – 1998 caused that Slovakia failed not only in its integration policy toward NATO and the EU but also found itself in the international isolation. The coalition government started to persuade the citizens that Slovakia “did not need the integration”, and that the “Western model” of the transformation did not reflect the needs of the Slovak nation. In the end of the year 1995 the myth about “Slovak way of transformation” emerged that apologised the failure of the foreign policy and of integration ambitions of the Mečiar’s government. The leaders of the coalition parties (Movement for Democratic Slovakia, Slovak National Party, Association of Workers of Slovakia) called for the neutrality of Slovakia and the controversies with the West logically approached the Slovak representatives to Russia from that showed to them its full support and understanding.¹⁸

The Army of the SR that constantly enjoyed the highest confidence of the population and that in the previous years was the flagship of the integration started to lose its wind. The reform that was permanently attempted by each new management of the Ministry of Defence did not progress and the Slovak Republic appeared to be a “problem child” in the Central European region.“.¹⁹

Slovak Security Policy after 1998

The parliamentary elections in 1998 and the new government headed by Mikuláš Dzurinda meant the turn in the foreign and security policy of Slovakia. The primary objective of the foreign policy of the new Slovak government was to win back the confidence of the EU and NATO countries and subsequently catch up with other Visegrad countries in the process of the integration into the most important European and Trans-Atlantic groupings as soon as possible. The primary task of the Dzurinda’s government was to promptly correct the negative image of Slovakia abroad and put an end to the international isolation to which Slovakia was pushed in the years 1994 to 1998 by the then coalition government headed by the prime minister and the president of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia Vladimír Mečiar.²⁰

The first official travel of the new prime minister of the Slovak Republic led to Brussels, the headquarters of the European Union and NATO, which should have signalled the new orientation of the Slovak foreign policy. In spite of the positive impression from the arguments presented by the Slovak Republic (public support

¹⁷ Slovakia has given preference to the UNTAES mission under the lead of UNO in the Eastern Slovenia over the IFOR mission under command of NATO. It was a very bad signal for NATO because Slovakia that had been in this territory from the year 1993 and perfectly knew the ground left the NATO units in an unknown environment. The Major-General Ľudovít Gál, general director of the Section of Integration and Foreign Relations of MD SR, also expressed himself in these terms during the International Conference „Slovakia Belongs to NATO“ on 26 October 2000 in Bratislava (in Holotňák, M., Olexa, M.: Proceedings of the International Conference „Slovakia Belongs to NATO“, Bratislava, 2001, p. 61).

¹⁸ Bugajski, J., Duleba, A. : Security and Foreign-Policy Strategy of Slovakia, White Paper, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, May 2001, Bratislava, p. 22.

¹⁹ Lukáč, P., Samson, I., Duleba, A.: Chapter Visegrad Cooperation, Regional Initiatives and Relations of the SR with Neighbouring States, in Kollar, M., Mesežnikov, G.: Slovakia 2000, A Summary Report on the State of Society, Bratislava 2000, p. 368.

²⁰ Bruncko, M., Lukáč, P.: Chapter Major Trends in the Foreign Policy of the SR, in Kollar, M., Mesežnikov, G.: Slovensko 2000, A Summary Report on the State of Society, IVO, Bratislava 2001, p. 326.

of the accession of the SR to NATO and the compatibility of the Army of the Slovak Republic with the Alliance forces) the very short period that elapsed from the changes in the country could not convince the Alliance to rank Slovakia among the new NATO member countries already in the Washington summit. It was important that after the Washington summit the way to the accession to NATO remained open and Slovakia was allowed to start the difficult fight for the restoration of its starting position from the year 1993.

In June 1999 the Slovak government reacted to NATO MAP (*Membership Action Plan*) by the adoption of the Programme of the preparation of the Slovak Republic for the accession to NATO (PRENAME). The effective coordination of this Programme was supported by the resolution of the Slovak Government in the year 1999. In this way the tools for the implementation of MAP in conditions of Slovakia were created and conditions for the monitoring of the preparatory process on the part of NATO fulfilled.²¹

In relation to its integration ambitions the Slovak Republic was put before the task to systematically master two mutually complementary processes – to start the transformation of the armed forces and ensure the overall preparation of Slovakia to the membership in NATO. The new political situation after the elections in 1998 allowed to take fundamental measures aimed to the reverse the negative development in the sector of defence, resulting from its long-term undercapitalisation and from transformation failures, and hence to avoid its potential collapse. However the result was the adoption of the *Conception of the reform of the Ministry of Defence until the year 2002 (with outlook until 2010)* in October 1999, a document that contained several tens of tasks but without specification of deadlines, personal responsibility for the fulfilment, and financial calculations. It dealt with a “vision“ of reform rather than with the reform itself. Moreover, in that period the Slovak Republic still had not elaborated basic strategic documents clearly defining its vital interests, security threats and corresponding security and defence policy of the state for the achievement of strategic objectives. In the end of the year 2000 and at the beginning of the year 2001 the Slovak Republic was criticised by the Alliance for the situation in armed forces, their slow and lengthy reform, low-motivated management of the Ministry, the absence of defence planning, unrealistic plans that it presented and their conflict with declared priorities of the state.

The first success of the new government on this field was the approbation of three strategic documents (*the SR Security Strategy, the SR Defence Strategy, and the SR Military Strategy*) on the basis of a wide consensus that allowed it to pursue the legislative and conceptual changes. In compliance with the military strategy, the document *The Slovak Republic Armed forces – Model 2010* and the following *Long-term Plan of the SR Armed Forces Structure and Development* were drawn up. The Long-Term Plan became a historical landmark of the radical change in the reform of armed forces because it was the first reform document that also dealt with costs incurring by the reform and modernisation, including the change to smaller professional armed forces able of deployment, with the replacement of the obsolete military equipment and with the enhancement of

²¹ Bugajski, J., Duleba, A.: Security and Foreign-Policy Strategy of Slovakia, White Paper, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., Slovak Society for Foreign Policy, May 2001, Bratislava, p. 25.

the operational readiness aimed to the achievement of the NATO standards. All attempts at the reform of armed forces in Slovakia failed just because the reform conceptions were not connected with a qualified quantification of required costs.

In the area of foreign policy, just after the Washington summit, the Slovak Government confirmed in the practice its resolution to behave as a NATO member although it still was not the case when it opened the Slovak territory and the air space for the logistic support of the NATO operation during the crisis of Kosovo. Not less important task of both governments after the year 1998 was the fulfilment of all criteria required for the accession to the European Union in 2004, it means together with the other three countries of the Visegrad Group. Slovak succeeded to achieve this objective as well and in the Copenhagen summit it completed the access negotiations with the EU. From the security view, in its programme declaration in November 2002, the government supported a wider involvement of Slovakia in the erection of the European security pillar - the European policy of security and defence of the EU. However it understands the European policy of security and defence as the increase of the responsibility of the EU Member States in the security issues in the framework of the strategic alliance with USA and Canada within the North Atlantic Alliance.

The accession of the Slovak Republic to the North Atlantic Alliance on 29 March 2004 and to the European Union on 1 May 2004 meant for the SR a fundamental change of its foreign-policy and security position. The full-value membership in NATO gives to Slovakia "hard security guarantees" and the membership in the EU in turn is regarded as the provision of "soft security guarantees". The integration into the Euro-Atlantic security and European political structures creates favourable conditions for the successful solution of security problems of the SR. It also defines for the SR new security tasks that however have no more a purely national character, but affect the other Member States.²²

But in this context, the question arises what approach Slovakia would apply to solve these tasks. There will be probably the question to what extent it succeeds to solve in the long-term horizon the dilemma between the active and the passive approach of the solution of security crises and the dilemma between so-called "Euro-Atlantic" and so-called "Euro-autonomist" strategic orientation of Slovakia.²³

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²² Korba, M., Šťastný, M.: External Security and Defense, in: Kollár, M., Mesežnikov, G. (eds.): Slovakia 2004, A Summary Report on the State of Society, IVO, Bratislava 2004, p. 462.

²³ For more see Korba, M., Šťastný, M.: External Security and Defense, in: Kollár, M., Mesežnikov, G. (eds.): Slovakia 2004, A Summary Report on the State of Society, IVO, Bratislava 2004, pp. 462 to 463.

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Strategic Documents of the Slovak Republic

Elemír Nečej – Róbert Ondrejcsák

Overview of Slovakia's Strategic Documents 1993 - 2005

During the analysed period, the Slovak Republic has adopted following open (publicly available) security documents of a strategic security character

- SR Defence Doctrine (adopted in year 1994, ceased to be valid in year 2001)
- Basic Principles and Aims of National Security of the SR (adopted in year 1996, ceased to be valid in year 2001)
- SR Security Strategy 2001 (adopted by Parliament on 27.3.2001- it has replaced the Basic Principles and Aims of National Security)
- SR Defence Strategy 2001 (adopted by Parliament on 25.5.2001- it has replaced the SR Defence Doctrine)
- SR Military Strategy 2001 (adopted by Parliament on 25.10.2001)
- SR Security Strategy 2005 (approved by Government on July 13th 2005, submitted to the Parliament).²⁴

It will replace the Security Strategy 2001.

- SR Defence Strategy 2005 (approved by Government on July 13th 2005, submitted to the Parliament).²⁵

It will replace the Defence Strategy 2001 and the Military Strategy 2001

Situation in the Slovak Republic till the year 1998

The Slovak Republic, as the successor state following the division of the CSFR, was determined by the processes, which had to be performed following the division of common armed forces within the framework of set limits. As a "new state", it had to ensure its acceptance not only within the framework of Slovak political spectrum, but also as the subject of international relations (Constitution of the Slovak Republic). It had to respond to the challenges, which have resulted from the realisation of neighbourhood relations (dispute on completion of Water Works Gabčíkovo and the lawsuit in Haag, modernization of Nuclear Power Plant Jaslovské Bohunice, completion of Nuclear Power Plant Mochovce etc.).

Year 1993 was the year of creation of the SR Army, and for understandable reasons, main endeavour was aimed to the creation of new structures, delimitation of living force and material from the previous army of Federal Republic. It was necessary to form the headquarters of the SR Army and the Ministry of Defence. Theoretical works have started on the strategic documents, which were officially approved in years 1994 to 1996. Two of them were approved already also by the Slovak Republic National Council (SR NC).

On June 30, 1994, the SR NC has approved the *Slovak Republic Defence Doctrine* and in year 1996 it has taken note of the *Basic Aims and Principles of National Security of the Slovak Republic*. Both documents have meant a progress in the fact that they have become security-political documents of strategic importance, and first time since the origin of the Slovak Republic they have tried

²⁴ <http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/25EE0E111893509BC1257034003C3161?OpenDocument>

²⁵ <http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/07934884E18441EBC12570380033E95F?OpenDocument>

for a complex view to the problems of security and defence. However, they were prepared by a narrow group of people from the Ministry of Defence, and they were not consulted with academic workplaces, independent experts and non-governmental organisations. For this reason, as well as from the view of existing political development, they did not exceed certain narrow context of understanding of problems of the security and defence resulting from the shortness of time period since the origin of the Slovak Republic and from the structure of political scene of that period.

The Slovak Republic Defence Doctrine 1994

The Slovak Republic Defence Doctrine 1994 was, in accordance with present theory, rather a document, which was approaching the western understanding of the defence strategy. The relation to the integration processes to the EU and the NATO was characterized in it rather generally. From the view of approach to NATO, in its introduction it is quoted that it is the security-political document expressing the conditions, aims and principles of military-security policy of Slovakia for the period of its participation at the program of Partnership for Peace. NATO is considered in the document as the decisive and the most effectively operating security structure, and the gaining of full membership in NATO is considered as the basic orientation of security policy. In the relation to EU, it is concisely stated that the endeavour for integration, expressed by the signing of the European Agreement on Accession, is acquiring also the security dimension.²⁶

From the view of use of the army, it is aimed only to the defence of independence, sovereignty, and non-violability of Slovak borders. From the view of the integration process and tasks of the Partnership for Peace, a standpoint was missing there to the participation at peace missions, and at various another forms of cooperation of the armies. This task is mentioned partially only in Chapter IV as the activity within the framework of missions of international peace forces (not NATO).

Basic Principles and Aims of the SR National Security 1996

Basic principles and aims of the SR National Security 1996 were prepared in the period, when the democratic deficits of SR were deepened and the foreign-policy orientation of Slovakia has become hard to understand. The most space in the document is devoted to the definition of national interest²⁷ and the factors, which influence its realisation.

In comparison with the Defence Doctrine, it was less concrete at the expression of relation of Slovakia with the NATO and the European Union. Concrete measures towards the accession process both to the NATO as well as to the European Union have disappeared. Only in the aims of national security, third task in the order was characterised as the "creation of conditions of gradual integration of the Slovak Republic into the transatlantic and European collective political, security, economic structures and institutions", at which none of the institutions was mentioned by its

²⁶ Defence doctrine of SR, Chapter II. There is expressed the support for strengthening of European security and defence identity, however, this was the concept used within the framework of NATO

²⁷ The national interest - in comparison with later documents - was relatively narrowly characterised as the safeguarding of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-violability of borders, security, economic prosperity and international recognition of the Slovak Republic. (Basic principles and aims of national security of the SR, Chapter I)

name. In addition to that, creation of these conditions was questionable, as it is known that for our own faults we were not invited in year 1997 to the Alliance together with the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary.

Interesting is also the fact that the *Defence Doctrine* was prepared and approved in year 1994, but the *Basic Aims and Principles of National Security* as late as in 1996, but the logic speaks rather on the opposite. Thus the strategy of defence has “overtaken” the analysis of national security and determination of its aims. Basic aims and principles of national security of the SR were prepared under the management of the Ministry of Defence SR, and it can be concluded from this fact that in that period the problems of security was connected with a narrower understanding of security as the ensuring of defence. Next followed documents were approved exclusively by the “Defence State Council”. Such a document was “Strategic Concept of Defence” (which was a basis for the Concept of Army building till 2000) replaced by the “National Defence Strategy” (restricted document as a basis for “Long Term Plan of Slovak Army Development”).²⁸

Development after year 1998

In the period 1998-2001, on the base of Program Declaration of SR Government from year 1998, there was commenced the creation of strategic documents – the SR Security Strategy, the SR Defence Strategy, and the SR Military Strategy. A need to prepare these documents was underlined by the fact that the priorities defined in hitherto documents were not realised, as well as that in spite of their certain strategic aiming, it was necessary to characterise more unequivocally and in concrete terms the security environment, the analysis of security challenges, risks and threats, and the interests of the Slovak Republic resulting from it. Preparation of these documents was also a reaction to the non-inclusion of the Slovak Republic among newly accepted members of NATO. The fact that there were not elaborated documents of strategic importance, approved by the NR SR as a consensual material necessary for further development, has influenced negatively also the endeavour of the MoD SR to prepare the Integrated program for development of army till year 2010 with view to year 2015, which was not approved.

Non-compatibility of previous documents with new challenges and threats has expressed distinctly after the Washington summit of NATO in 1999. The Strategic conception of North Atlantic Alliance has brought a new view to the developing security environment, security challenges and risks and thereby also to the approach towards security in 21st century. The SR government has approved – immediately after the Washington summit – the program of preparation for membership in NATO, PRENAME, and the National Action Plan of Membership. The entire Action Plan of Membership in NATO, adopted in the Washington summit, has expected in the field of defence military questions that the aspiring countries shall identify themselves with the strategy of Alliance in the way as it is expressed in the Strategic conception, and at the accession to NATO they shall accept the approach to security described in the Strategic conception, they shall be able to provide forces and means for collective defence and the other tasks of Alliance and an adequate participation in its structures.

²⁸ Elemír Nečej: Bezpečnostná stratégia SR 2001 in Ondrejcsak, R. Odporúčania pre aktualizáciu Bezpečnostnej stratégie SR. (January 2004, IBOŠ MO SR) http://www.mosr.sk/ibos/docs/zb_bs.pdf . In Slovak only

In that period it started to be clear that the Slovak Republic is exposed to the same threats as the other countries of the Euro-Atlantic space, and the need of gaining the security guarantees through the membership in NATO ceased to be only a rhetorical question. However, the changes of security environment have influenced also the need of reconstruction of entire security system, and this need has expressed noticeably in the field of reconstruction of the armed forces. The endeavour till that time for a reconstruction of armed forces have failed, and in year 2000 and at beginning of year 2001 the Slovak Republic was criticised from the side Alliance about the state in the armed forces, for their slow and lengthy reform, as well as for the absence of security planning and disputes of plans with the proclaimed priorities of state ²⁹

In the beginning of deliberations on strategic documents of the SR, in the forefront there was the question, who should approve them – the SR National Council, or the SR government. We were warned during international seminars also to a possible lengthiness and complications in the case of submission of these documents to the parliament. (Majority of countries had these documents approved only on the level of government). From the view of need to express the political consensus, there was accepted the conclusion that the way through the parliament is unavoidable, as it guarantees a higher transparency and at the same time the continuity of security policy also following a change of government in the consequence of possible changes after the elections.³⁰

The SR Security Strategy 2001

The SR Security Strategy 2001 has originated as the first complete “umbrella” document, which was followed by the defence strategy and the military strategy. Its approach to the assessment of security environment, security risks, threats and challenges was based on the approach of the Strategic Concept of the NATO. In comparison with previous documents, the strategy has recorded a shift in the definition of SR interests, which were divided into the vital and important ones. The membership in the NATO and the EU was placed as the part of one of the vital interests.³¹ This strategy defines first time the security policy of the Slovak Republic and the requirements for its security system. It expresses an active approach to the shaping of the security environment and to the building of capability to respond to the risks and threats. From the view of integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures, the accession to the NATO prevails in the strategy over the accession to the EU. This fact has undoubtedly influenced the situation in the accession process to the NATO, when the integration of the SR to the NATO started to be hampered (if not endangered) by the stagnant reform of the SR army.³²

²⁹ Army of the SR 2001, MoD SR Bratislava 2001 „Department of defence in 2001“

³⁰ Present constitutional Act of Security and the Act on Defence of the SR already determine specifically that the NR SR approves the strategic documents and the developmental programs in the field of security and defence. (note of the author)

³¹ The last paragraph of Article 7 of the Security Strategy of SR states as one of vital interests: „ The maintaining of peace and stability in the Central Europe, connected with the expansion of the zone of democracy, security and prosperity, including the full membership of the SR in the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union“

³² On the base of approval of the national program PRENAME, the cycle of preparations has started in October 1999 for the admission to the NATO. The meeting of NAC NATO has approved the introductory phase in April 2000. In accordance with the conclusions of the NAC meeting in the form 19+SR in April 2001, the disproportions were criticised among the aims of MAP and the results of transformation in the field of defence. (note of the author)

As the decisive factor for the formation of European security environment is considered the transfer of stability through the enlargement of the NATO and its PfP and EAPC. The forming of security and defence policy of the EU is considered as a complementary process to the system of collective defence of the NATO.³³

Therefore also in the action part of the document, a bigger accent is put to the reform of the defence system and the armed forces, so that they would be interoperable with the armed forces of NATO.³⁴ The European Union is rather given to the relation with stability, performance and security of the economy. In the relation to the common European security and defence policy of the EU, it is quoted that Slovakia, as an associated country, shall look for the possibilities of its share on it (especially at the solution of emergency situations, with the accent to operations of humanitarian character). In the internal security, the strategy is aimed to the harmonisation of aliens' policy and asylum policy with the policy of EU and the realisation of requirements of Schengen agreement (in connection with uncontrollable migration).³⁵

Defence Strategy and Military Strategy 2001

The defence and military strategies, based on the security strategy, have elaborated its conclusions with the accent to the forming of aims of the defence policy and the definition of strategic aiming of the armed forces. The basic thing was to ensure an effective defence of the SR by own forces till the time of invitation to the NATO, and at the same time to ensure the fulfilment of military-political criteria for the entry to NATO. For the armed forces it meant to create preconditions for future activity both within the framework of the NATO and within the framework of the forming European security and defence policy.³⁶ For the reasons discussed above, it was determined that as the priority programs there were considered the programs directly connected with the compatibility and interoperability with the NATO, including the earmarking of financial means.³⁷ Equally it was assumed in the missions of the armed forces to maintain forces of high preparedness minimum on the level of battalion for the needs of defence of state, the prevention of conflicts and for contribution to entire spectrum of NATO operations (including the contribution to the collective defence). The forces of a lower preparedness minimum on the level of brigade were to be able, in addition to the operations for defence of state, to contribute to the operations within the framework of article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Equally, the attention was paid to the host support.³⁸ No concrete contribution to EBOP was stated in these documents.

A more concrete formulation of the relation to the EU was included to the amendment of Constitution of the SR in year 2001, where it was completed: *"The SR may, through an international agreement, which shall have been ratified and promulgated in the way stipulated by law, or on the base of this agreement, to*

³³ Security Strategy of the SR 2001, article 4

³⁴ Security strategy of the SR 2001, article 58. Identically, in articles 59-61, which are devoted to the integration to Euro-Atlantic political and security structures, the membership in NATO is characterised as an optimum variant for the achievement of effective security guarantees. The accent is put to the realisation of NP

³⁵ Ibid, articles 53 and 62

³⁶ Defence strategy of the SR 2001, art. 19 „ Basic aims of defence policy“

³⁷ Military strategy of the SR 2001, part III - Strategy art. 1.3- 1.6

³⁸ Military strategy SR 2001, chapter IV, part 2 „Mission and tasks of the armed forces“

*transfer the performance of a part of its rights to the European Communities and the European Union. Legal binding acts of the EC and the EU shall have precedence over the acts of the SR.*³⁹

Preparation of Strategic Documents after Joining NATO and EU

On the base of admission to the NATO and the EU, it was assumed that new documents shall be prepared and approved by the parliament in the course of year 2004. In view of the delay in the preparation of the “umbrella“ document – the security strategy, entire work was shifted to year 2005.

Directive for Defence Policy 2004

The Ministry of Defence was during entire time under the biggest pressure of requirements from the NATO, especially through the fact that it was given new tasks - Force Goals 2004. The need has arisen to review the Long-Term Plan of the SR Armed Forces Structure and Development 2010, and the SR Ministry of Defence commenced the preparation of long-term plan of development of the MoD with outlook to 2015. It was substantiated by the changed requirements of the NATO, especially in connection with the Force Goals. A certain starting point there was the preparation of the “Directive for Defence Policy“, approved by the government in June 2004. The Directive was “to bridge” the deficit that there were not elaborated and approved new strategic documents for the field of security and defence of the Slovak Republic, first of all the Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic and the Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic, which would respond to the changed security environment and new tasks, which result for the Slovak Republic from the membership in the NATO and the EU.⁴⁰

This document assumes a reevaluation of strategic documents for the field of security and defence of state in such a way that they shall respond to changes of the security environment, and in accordance with the strategic security documents of the NATO and the EU they shall enable the fulfilment of commitments, which for the SR result from the membership in them. At the updating of aims of the defence policy, it was proposed in the document to ensure the building and development of armed forces of the Slovak Republic preferably capable of fulfilling the tasks of defence of the state and to participate at the operations of NATO, and to ensure an active and effective participation of the Slovak Republic and its armed forces at the creation and realisation of the European security and defence policy, while maintaining the complementarity with NATO.⁴¹ In comparison with previous strategic documents, more concrete attitudes can be markedly seen here towards the NATO and the EU, while maintaining the long-term orientation known under the slogan “NATO first“. At the chance of character of the defence, it is reflected in the changeover from the model of the defence of territory to the defence of interests, where at the defence of territory it is considered to utilise the

³⁹ Complete wording of the Constitution of the SR – article 7 paragraph 2

⁴⁰ The purpose of Directive is „*In connection with changes of security environment and qualitatively new tasks, which result for the Slovak Republic from the membership in the NATO and the EU, to specify the political-defence framework for a strategic reevaluation of the defence of state, including the definition of key fields and requirements of defence policy to the creation of new strategic, conceptual and planning documents in the field of defence of state*“.

⁴¹ Ibid , article 3.1 “Updating of aims of the defence policy.“

advantages of the common defence according to article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and it is assumed also that the SR shall have a share on the operation outside the Euro-Atlantic space and apart from the article 5. The document expects a strengthening of cooperation in the field of security and defence policy of the EU, with certain specification.⁴² From the view of an impact to the reform of armed forces, the document consider as necessary to take into account an effective utilisation of common defence within the framework of NATO, to develop and structure the armed forces in favour of the NATO structures. On the base of the said, also financial priorities are assumed, and the assumption exists that also the creation of military capacities of the EU shall be taken into account.⁴³

The SR Security Strategy 2005 and the SR Defence Strategy 2005

Both documents were worked out in the same period and they were jointly submitted for the assessment by the SR Security Council, to the negotiation of SR government, as well as for the approval by the SR National Council. Both of documents were approved by Government on July 13th 2005 and submitted to the Parliament.

In view of that, these documents are sufficiently interconnected and they solve true basic problems in the field of security and defence of the SR. Their certain delay can be arguable. They are being approved one year prior the termination of mandate of present governmental coalition and therefore their realisation shall be in a considerable degree the task of subsequent government. However, this their vulnerability is decreased by the fact that they are being approved by the parliament, and in the case of a wide consensus, their realisation can be problem-free in spite of the fact that their binding character is not till now sufficiently defined.

The SR Security Strategy 2005 takes into account the essential changes of security environment and new commitments of the Slovak Republic after the accession to the NATO and the EU. In comparison with the SR Security Strategy 2001, this shift is visible in the defined interests of the SR. The support of the transatlantic alliance and the support for extension of the NATO and the EU remains the basic matter.⁴⁴

The position in the security environment is understood in connection with the Euro-Atlantic space, where as the part of the collective system of the NATO, the safety and stability of the SR is guaranteed by the allied commitments. With its entry to the EU, the SR is acquiring the guarantees of political and economic sta-

⁴² Ibid, article 3.4.1 point c) *“European Union, which shall strengthen the cooperation in the field of security and defence policy and the solidarity; in internal and penal matters, it shall widen the possibilities, which can be used by the Slovak Republic for the defence and protection of its interests, first of all in situations and regions, where the NATO shall not be engaged.”*

⁴³ Ibid, article 3.4.3 – changes in the process of reform of the armed forces of SR, point c). *“in context with that, the fulfilment of commitments of the Slovak Republic against the NATO (Forces Goals 2004, PCC) is to be considered as the key priorities within the framework of financial coverage of further process of reform of the armed forces of the Slovak Republic; however, it is necessary to take into account at this also the conclusions resulting for the armed forces of the Slovak Republic from the process of creation of the military capacities of EU on the base of the initiative of Headline Goal 2010.*

⁴⁴ Security strategy of the SR 2005, chapter 1, point 5 states among the interests: „to strengthen the transatlantic strategic partnership, to be a joint guarantor of security of the allies; to improve the efficiency of international organisations, member of which is the SR, and to support the extension of NATO and EU.“ <http://www.mod.gov.sk/data/files/833.pdf>

bilization and the possibility of a share on the European security and defence policy.⁴⁵ In comparison with the SR Security Strategy 2001, active attitudes of security policy against the NATO and the EU are formulated in a more concrete terms. The NATO remains for the SR the main platform for development of cooperation in the EA space, and the Strategy underlines the need to preserve its internal unity, and the need of transformation and adaptation to new security threats. The Strategy expresses at the same time an active approach to further development in the NATO.⁴⁶

In the relation to the EU, there is expressed an active attitude to joint creation and implementation of **Common Foreign and Security Policy** and the building of capacities of the European Security and Defence Policy, while maintaining the complementarity with the NATO.⁴⁷

In comparison with previous strategic documents, two elements become evident in the strategic orientation, which were not mentioned before. It concerns a special position of relations of the SR with the USA, where the USA are characterised as the strategic ally⁴⁸, and the formulation of attitude to “ad hoc coalition”⁴⁹. It is fact that although the SR Security Strategy 2001 “did not consider ad hoc coalitions”, Slovakia has sent an engineer unit of armed forces of the Slovak Republic to the operation **Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan**. The unit fulfils tasks under the coalition command since September 8, 2002. Another operation is the **operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq**. On May 12, 2003, the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic received the invitation of Poland for the activity in a multinational division within the framework of stabilisation forces in the Iraqi Republic. On the base of resolution of the SR National Council No. 332 of 19 June

⁴⁵ Ibid articles 10 and 11.

⁴⁶ Ibid article 68 in second part states: „SR shall support transformation and adaptation of the NATO to new kinds of threats and challenges. It shall reform and build its security system in such a way, which enable the SR to contribute to the development of required capabilities of the NATO, including the participation in the missions and operations of the Alliance outside the territory of its member countries. The SR shall consider also in the future the extension of NATO as the way of strengthening of the zone of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic space. The SR shall develop the cooperation with countries involved in the Euro-Atlantic partner structures and the countries of the Mediterranean-Sea Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The SR shall support common meetings of the NATO and the EU at high level, as well as day-to-day working meetings as the expression of their key strategic partnership. It shall support the development of an effective dialogue and cooperation of the NATO with further international institutions, first of all with the UN and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

⁴⁷ Ibid, article 69: “SR shall actively jointly form and implement the common foreign and security policy of the EU. The SR shall contribute to the realisation of aims of European integration and the creation of civilisation, civil, legal, internal-security and economic space, which shall be capable of own dynamic permanently sustainable development. The SR shall enforce the fulfilment of aims stipulated in the European security strategy and it shall strengthen the capacities of crisis management with the aim to contribute to the operations and missions led by the EU. It shall support the building of operating capacities of European security and defence policy, so that they were complementary to the capacities of the NATO. In accordance with the clause of solidarity of the EU, the SR shall help the countries attacked or threatened by terrorist attacks and hit by natural disasters. The SR shall support the development of activities of the European Defence Agency, with an accent to full engagement of the Slovak industrial and technological base to the building of European defence market. The SR shall support further enlargement of the EU, which is one of the most effective ways how to overcome the instability and achieve the prosperity of unified Europe. The SR shall contribute to the creation and realisation of common internal-security policy, the asylum, migration and visa policies.”

⁴⁸ Ibid, article 73

⁴⁹ Ibid, article 63: The response of the SR to new security threats and the unpredictability of security environment shall be also the support for a purposeful formation of political or military partnerships and coalitions with the aim to discourage these possible threats or to defend against them effectively.

2003, the engineer unit was sent to this operation with unlimited mandate concerning the length of activity of the unit in operations.

The SR Defence Strategy 2005 will replace the Defence and Military Strategy of the period of the transition from individual to collective defence and concentrates the attention of the Slovak Republic as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union to the fulfilment of the commitments and to the effective utilisation of possibilities provided to it by the membership in these organisations. From the view of the access to NATO and the EU it elaborates the conclusions of SS SR to issues of the defence. According to Article 12 “it will implement the basic objective of the defence policy of the SR from the position of the Euro-Atlantic orientation. The membership in NATO and the EU regards as decisive the guarantee of its security and striking power. It agrees with primary objectives and functions that result from the NATO Strategic Conception and from the European Security Strategy. This orientation gives rise to two out of four primary objectives of the defence policy⁵⁰

- To fulfil all commitments of the NATO member,
- To fulfil commitments of the EU member in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy.

The building of capabilities respects the order of priority of the commitments to NATO⁵¹ and the increase of the level of applicability and operational readiness of the armed forces will be achieved through the Defence Planning harmonised with the NATO Defence Planning. These priorities are also respected in the plan of the utilisation of the armed forces. According to the Defence Strategy these should be used⁵²

- within full scope in high-intensity operations for the defence of the Slovak Republic;
- within very large scope by the provision of forces up to the size of a brigade team in high-intensity allied operations for the collective defence in NATO,
- within a large scope by the provision of forces in the size of a battalion team in common operations conducted without geographical limitation under command of NATO,
- within a medium scope in the size of a motorised battalion in operations for the support of peace under command of NATO or the EU,
- within a small scope in operations for the support of peace and humanitarian operations under command of UNO, EU or an international coalition in the form of a long-term contribution in the size of a platoon.

In comparison with the SR Defence Strategy 2001 and the SR Military Strategy 2001 the tasks resulting from the membership in NATO and the EU are concretised and better react to the European Security Strategy and the European Security and Defence Policy. Already in the period of the preparation of the Defence

⁵⁰ The Defence Strategy 2005, Article 18., <http://www.mod.gov.sk/data/files/832.pdf>

⁵¹ Before the end of the year 2010 to **adequately** contribute to the defence capabilities of the collective defence of NATO and to military capabilities of the EU, by the year 2015 to increase the ability to make **full-value** contributions within NATO and the EU to the prevention of conflicts and the solution of global crises, after the year 2015 to achieve the level of applicability 1 to the wide range of operations of NATO and other international organisations (The SR Defence Strategy 2005, Art. 21).

⁵² The SR Defence Strategy 2005, Article 25.

Strategy 2005 the Slovak Republic took into account the fact that in December 2003 the EU Security Strategy was adopted and that on the basis of the new ambition defined therein the Headline Goal 2010 (HG 2010) was drawn up. During the year 2004 the SR started to analyse the reassessment of its existing contribution for purposes of the EU military crisis management. The basis was provided by two basic reasons. First, that the SR declared at the political level that it would reserve for the purposes of the EU equal forces and resources as it reserved for NATO. At the same time, on 23 June 2004, in the Resolution of the SR Government No. 608/2004 the "Force Goals 2004" and the subsequent change of the timetable of the implementation of the reforms, approved by the Resolution of the SR Government No. 133 of 25 February 2003, were approved. The result of this reassessment is that a motorised battalion team, the RCHBO battalion, the movement control team (all from the year 2008) and 4 helicopters Mi-17 from the year 2007 were proposed for the EU military crisis management for the purpose of the performance of tasks within the European Security and Defence Policy.

In 2004 the SR started to pay more attention to the issues of the EU civil crisis management and the potential involvement of the SR in this area. The situation in this area is more difficult than in case of military crisis management which is also documented by the deliberations of the SR Government on this issue of 10 November 2004. The quotation: *"While in the framework of the EU military crisis management the objectives and priorities are fairly clearly defined the area of the civil crisis management remained underdeveloped and the capacity rather non-transparent for a long period"*. In the framework of the preparation to the EU Conference on the capacity of civil crisis management that was held on 22 November 2004 the Slovak Republic analysed the potential participation in operations of the civil crisis management. During the process of preparation of the contribution of the SR several problems were identified that presently do not allow to the SR to declare with responsibility such contribution that would adequately correspond to its actual possibilities and position within the EU. Although the SR has been involving in the EU civil crisis management since the year 1993 in the form of the participation in the Monitoring Mission (ECMM) and in 2000 (and repeatedly in May 2001) officially declared its commitment to reserve for the EU the capacity of 50 policemen not later than by the end of the year 2003 it did not fulfil this commitment by the end of the year 2004.⁵³ On the basis of the analysis of the situation the SR Government by its Resolution 1070 of 10 November 2004 approved the contribution of the SR to the capacity of the EU civil crisis management. The involvement of the SR in the individual priority areas of the building of the CCM will be as follows:⁵⁴

Police: 33 policemen able of deployment in 90 days for the period of 6 to 12 months;

Civil defence: Team with mobile laboratory for the detection and identification of chemical and radioactive substances (6 persons); Team for search and rescue works (24 persons); Stand-by capacity for long-term accommodation of 400 per-

⁵³ Report on the involvement of the Slovak Republic in the building of the capacity of the EU civil crisis management
[http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/CC2CB2DFF3F9C336C1256F46004B276B/\\$FILE/Zdroj.html](http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/CC2CB2DFF3F9C336C1256F46004B276B/$FILE/Zdroj.html)

⁵⁴ Resolution of the Government of the SR 1070/2004
[http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4B5D72692363E1DAC1256F4A0034F42F/\\$FILE/Zdroj.html](http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4B5D72692363E1DAC1256F4A0034F42F/$FILE/Zdroj.html)

sons under tents in cases of humanitarian catastrophes (including necessary service personnel of 35 persons); Team of divers for search, rescue and pyrotechnical underwater works (11 persons);

Observer missions: 1 observer for the area of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; 4 observers for border regions; 4 observers for political security issues able of deployment in 90 days for the period of 6 to 12 months; the possibility of sending more experts depending on the specific requirement for the particular mission;

In this context it is necessary to remind that also in the preparation of the SR Security Strategy 2005, in spite of the improvement of the approach of the multi-dimensional security and the interconnection of its elements, the authors did not succeed to classify these elements adequately to their weight from the view of the potential development of the security environment. Like in the year 2001, in relation to the security strategy, only the defence and military strategy was prepared; at present period it is the defence strategy. There is the question to what extent other strategic documents will be prepared and how their interconnection will be ensured from the view of the growing complexity of the solution of security problems of the future.

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Emergent Concept of National Security Policy in Republic of Serbia

Filip Ejodus – Marko Savkovic

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to analyze the current concept of national security in the Republic of Serbia. This will be done by analyzing strategic discourses and practices between 2000 and 2008 through David Baldwin's conceptual framework.⁵⁵ The period between 2000 and 2008 is chosen because it is a period of democratic transition and arguably a period in which the new concept of security has been slowly emerging. The main method used is discourse analysis. The sources that will be used are the major official documents defining explicitly or implicitly the concept of national security in Serbia such as the White Paper on Defence (2005)⁵⁶, Constitution of Serbia (2006)⁵⁷, Strategic Defence Review (2006)⁵⁸, President's Draft of the National Security Strategy (2006)⁵⁹, and the Partnership for Peace Presentation document (2007). The analysis will also draw on parliamentary and other public discussions of the concept of security especially in section four where Serbian political and strategic culture is discussed.

Trying to figure out the concept of security in Serbia is not an easy task. It is so for several reasons. Firstly, Serbia is a politically deeply divided country. The division cuts the political space into two blocs ("democratic" and "patriotic") with fundamentally diverging visions of national interests, identity and strategic orientation of the country. While the "democratic bloc" argues for the European and Euro-Atlantic integration, the "patriotic bloc" is "sovereignist", Euro-sceptic, at times pro-Russian. But this division is not only political, it is also cultural.⁶⁰ This cultural division, which follows the mentioned political division, creates diverging inter-

• *Authors' note: many thanks to Sonja Stojanovic for thoughtful comments on the earlier drafts of the paper.*

⁵⁵ David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies*, 23 (1997), 5-26

⁵⁶ Adopted for the State Union Serbia and Montenegro.

⁵⁷ Drafted and supported by all parties except Liberal Democratic Party and League of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina.

⁵⁸ Strategic Defence Review (SDR) is presented as a "framework" for medium and long term defence planning, based on the review of challenges and threats to Serbia's security, and proposed missions and tasks for its armed forces in the near future. It is a "starting point for drafting all relevant documents", which seeks to envisage efficient defence resource management, transparency of defence related activities, establishment of pre-conditions for a democratic civilian control, and the professionalisation of the SAF in carrying out its missions and tasks

⁵⁹ The draft is available in Bojan B. Dimitrijević, „Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti (model)“, *Vojno Delo*, 2, 2008. In 2006, both President (Tadic) and Prime Minister (Kostunica) drafted their own strategies. While Tadic's strategy was written by his advisors (most prominently National Security Advisor Bojan Dimitrijevic) through non-formal consultations, Kostunica's draft was made by Ministries in formal consultations. So far none of them has been officially approved. For comparative analysis of the two drafts see: Stojanović, Sonja „View from Serbia: Study on the Assessment of Regional Security Threats and Challenges in the Western Balkans“, p. 121 in Istvan Gyarmati and Darko Stancic, Ed. *Study on the Assessment of Regional Security Threats and Challenges in the Western Balkans*, (DCAF: Brussels, 2007) p. 115-131.

⁶⁰ One could argue that the strict division between blocs has somewhat weakened with the forming of the new government between Socialist Party of Serbia (former Milosevic's party) and Democratic Party (party of the President Tadic). However, it is could also be interpreted as socialist "transfer" from one bloc to another. Kostunica's DSS shifted to the "patriotic bloc" on the other side.

pretations of history, national and political identity of Serbia. On the one side is a *civic-democratic* discourse which is emphasizing historical narratives of internal emancipation and projects post-modern identity of Serbia as opposed to Serbia from the 1990s.⁶¹ On the other side is *national-liberational* discourse which is built around Serbia's external emancipation and projects Serbia's national identity in ethnical terms as opposed to geographically and culturally distinct "Others". Secondly, the concept of security is still in the making. Arguably, the traumatic period of disintegration of Yugoslavia, which began with secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and ended with separation of Montenegro in 2006 and declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008, has been the latest formative period for the constitution of Serbian strategic culture and its concept of security. It may seem too early to tell the long term impact of these events on the strategic thinking in Serbia. For all the above mentioned reasons it has been difficult to achieve national consensus on the key national security issues in the early phase of the democratization process as it was the case in other post communist countries in the early 1990s.⁶²

This resulted in a big delay regarding the adoption of key strategic documents.⁶³

However, in spite of the challenges, it is still possible to think about the emergent concept of security in Serbia and discern its rough contours *in statu nascendi*.

What is a concept of security?

Security, in the largest sense, can be defined as a pursuit of freedom from threat. The concept of security can be defined as an abstract idea about the norms and values underlining legitimacy and efficiency of policies and actors involved in the collective pursuit of freedom from threat. It is a unit of knowledge from which one derives answers to questions like these: Who pursues security? From what threats? To what referent objects? By what means? In this text we are going to analyze the pursuit of freedom from threat at the national security policy level in the Republic of Serbia. However, just because we analyze the national security policy level doesn't mean that the primary referent object of the policy is necessarily a nation or state. One polity can have an individual, world order or something else as a referent object of its concept of security.⁶⁴

Analyzing the concept of security is important, as Baldwin puts it, for three main reasons: „it facilitates asking the most basic question of social science [...] it promotes rational policy analysis by facilitating comparison of one type of security policy with another, *and* [...] it facilitates scholarly communication by establishing common ground between those with disparate views.“⁶⁵

⁶¹ For a more detailed discussion on the division see section four of this paper or Filip Ejdus, "Security, Culture and Identity in Serbia", *Western Balkans Security Observer*, 7-8, 2008, p 38-64

⁶² Slovakia presents an exception to this rule, being a country where the concept of national security started consolidating following the end of Vladimir Meciar regime in 1998.

⁶³ The Strategy of Defence was adopted in 2004; White Book on Defence in 2005, Strategic Defence Review in 2006, the long expected first post-Milosevic constitution was adopted in December 2006 while the major legislation on security and defence was adopted in 2007. Serbia still lacks National Security Strategy (NSS) and Foreign Policy Strategy. For all the above mentioned reasons, one should firstly ask if Serbia has a concept of security at all.

⁶⁴ For example, countries which are members of Human Security Network (e.g. Norway, Canada, Japan etc) endorsed individual human rights as referent objects of their security policies.

⁶⁵ Baldwin, 5-6

In order to specify a security concept, Baldwin proposes asking 7 questions. 1) *Security for whom?* This question regards referent object of security that are seen as threatened. Although theoretically it could be just about anything, notions such as individual, society, state and international systems usually take up the place. 2) *Security for which values?* Values can also vary, but the most usual ones in security discourse are physical survival, political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, democratic order, free market etc. 3) *How much security?* Given that absolute security is no less than utopia, a concept of security can only tend towards certain level of security. 4) *From what threats?* Threats can be caused by human or natural factors, directly or indirectly caused, military or non-military, can be regarded as old or new, symmetric or asymmetric, short/mid/long term and their carriers can be actors or processes and can come from different levels such as individual, societal, unit, global etc. 5) *By what means?* Security can be achieved through various means such as military, diplomatic, economic, intelligence; police etc. Relying on different means will produce different results. Fighting terrorism with military means is different from doing it through law enforcement or economic development. No actor can rely on all available means equally, since each one of them has a different logic, cost and benefit. Thus, the phrase commonly used “by all means necessary” usually means “including the use of force”. 6) *At what costs?* Just like in economy, there is no such thing as free lunch in security. To put it differently, every security policy has its economic and social price. The approach to costs depends on whether we consider security as having a *prime value* (the most important value), *core value* (one of most important values) or *marginal value* (the diminishing marginal utility of security depends on how much do you have it just like it does with other goods and services). 7) *In what time period?* Short term gains can have negative long term impact and *vice versa*. Also, some means may be quite effective on the short run, such as military force, but can turn out to be quite costly and inefficient in the long run.⁶⁶ Now that we laid out the dimensions of concept of security we turn to the Serbian case.

Does Serbia have a concept of national security?

Asking if Serbia has a concept of national security policy is not like asking if Serbia has a concept of let's say economy. Although different governments may differ in nuances regarding their conduct of economic policies, there is a general minimal consensus among decision makers and citizens that Serbia abandoned planned economy and collective property in favour of free market and capitalist economy. Their economic policies may differ in style and quantity but not in essence and quality. However, this could not be easily said for security policies. Questions we have laid out in the previous section have been, until recently, differently answered by different actors and documents in Serbia.

The analysis of strategic and security discourses conducted for the purpose of this paper reveals that the deep rift from the 1990s bordering the atmosphere of civil war and principal divergences from the early phases of transition (2000-2006) have given way to a recent convergence in the domain of security (2006-2008).

⁶⁶ “You can do everything with bayonets except to sit on them” was a Tallierand's warning to Napoleon regarding the possibility of indefinite use of military power.

Secession of Montenegro, the subsequent independence of Serbia (2006), adoption of the new Constitution (2006) and set of laws and resolutions (2007) provided some answers on many pre-modern political questions - who we are and where we are? - that puzzled Serbia since the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Although the national security system is at least formally institutionalized, it nonetheless still doesn't function in a holistic and well coordinated fashion. Finally, an emerging national consensus about the basic security and defence orientation started appearing following the recognition of Kosovo by most NATO member states in 2008. The new foreign, security and defence consensus can be shortly formulated as: *yes to membership in the EU; yes to active status PfP; no to NATO; never to recognize Kosovo as an independent state. All political parties except one rallied practically around one single policy regarding Kosovo.*⁶⁷ For the above mentioned reasons we argue that the concept of security has started to emerge between 2006 and 2008 from newly adopted official documents, as well as from the increasing convergence of official and opposition security discourses. However, if Serbia does have a concept of security, it is definitely not a very well pre-conceived and explicitly articulated one but rather a concept around which consensus is emerging in a gradual and incremental way. In the lines that follow, we will outline this emergent concept of national security in the Republic of Serbia.

Political Culture in Serbia

It is difficult to discuss and analyze any concept of security out of its social and cultural context. For that purpose, we will in this chapter analyze the main strands of political and strategic culture in Serbia. While political culture can be defined as assumptions about the political world, strategic culture is assumptions about usefulness and appropriateness of use of force in international relations.⁶⁸

Arguably, Serbian political and strategic culture is composed of two discursive streams: *national-liberational* and *civic-democratic*.⁶⁹

The *national-liberational* stream is built around narratives on external emancipation and internal integration. Its main elements are medieval myths about the Golden Age and Serbian unity, defiance against foreign conquerors and interpretation of Serbian identity through concepts of victimhood and martyrdom. This discourse is susceptible to neurotic behaviours which Sabrina P. Ramet described as 'denial syndrome' (denying one's own responsibility in war crimes), 'sinister attribution error' (everybody is plotting against us) and 'dysphoric rumination' (tendency to reinterpret past events in a negative light).⁷⁰

⁶⁷ The dissenting party is the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). All other have implicitly or explicitly agreed that the declaration of independence of Kosovo is illegitimate and illegal act which Serbia will never recognize. Also, most of them agree (apart from SRS) that it should be resolved with recourse to non military acts. The main difference between the former Kostunica's and current Cvetkovic's government is that former politicized the issue by connecting it to other political questions like the Serbia's EU accession while the later opted for 'depolitization' of the issue and moving it completely into the realm of the international law.

⁶⁸ For discussion about political culture in foreign policy analysis see: Valerie Hudson, *Culture and Foreign Policy*, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1997). For the concept of strategic culture see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about strategic culture" *International Security*, 19:4, 1995


⁶⁹ See: Filip Ejdus, 2008, p 38-64

⁷⁰ Sabrina P. Ramet, "Denial syndrome and its consequences: Serbian political culture since 2000", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 40, 2007, 41-58. See also: Sabrina P. Ramet, "Under the holy Lime Tree: The Inculcation of Neurotic and Psychotic Syndromes as a Serbian Wartime Strategy, 1986-1995" in Sabrina Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković eds., *Serbia since 1989: Politics and Society under Milosevic and After*, (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2005) p.125-142

The *national-liberational* concept of Serbian nation is ethnic and cultural.⁷¹

Accordingly, the concept of national identity, deriving from such a view, is ethnic and spatial: the Self is community of birth and native culture while the “Other” is spatially located outside of the Self.⁷² It is usually neighbouring ethnic groups such as Albanians, Croats, Bosnian Muslims and recently liminal Montenegrins. Finally, in Serbian politics, the legitimacy, appeal and resonance of the *national-liberational* discourse is directly proportional to the strength of external pressures and reversely proportional to the magnitude of internal pressures (graph 1). External pressures relate to demands coming from the international domain that put honour, sovereignty or independence to the test. Internal pressures relate to pressures that the Serbian Government exert on its society, civil liberties and democratic processes.

In other words, the stronger are the pressures and demands coming from the external fore, the bigger will be public resonance of *national-liberational* arguments (if made). Also, the greater the governmental strain is on the Serbian society, the smaller are chances that *national-liberational* arguments will seize the day.



Graph 1: Resonance of *national-liberational* discourse and external/internal pressures

On the other side stands the *civic-democratic* stream developed around narratives of internal emancipation and international integration. Its major themes are democratization, individualism, human rights and civilian liberties, modernization and international integration. The concept of nation in this tradition is civic rather than ethnic and cultural. Its components are, in Anthony Smith's words, historic territory, political community, equality of members and common civic culture and ideology.⁷³

Given that the Serbian society has a very limited democratic historic experience and that it still doesn't have a clear idea of the “historic territory” it is entitled to, this conception of civic nation in Serbia has remained underdeveloped. There have been attempts to construct Serbian civic identity though temporal *Otherring*, with the aggressive ethno-nationalist Self from the 1990s constructed as it's most radical *Other* but without any significant success. When this failed, the pro-democratic elites engaged in the reconciliation with Serbia from the 1990s.⁷⁴ Lastly, it

⁷¹ For the difference between *ethnic* and *civic* concept of nation see Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, (London: Penguin Books, 1991)


⁷² For the difference between spatial, temporal and ethical identity see Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (New York: Routledge, 2006)

⁷³ Smith, p.11

⁷⁴ See for instance the declaration of reconciliation between Socialist Party of Serbia and Democratic Party signed in October 2008.

is noteworthy stressing that the public appeal of the *civic-democratic* discourse in Serbian contemporary politics is directly proportional to the magnitude of internal pressures and indirectly proportional to the severity of demands coming from the outside (Graph 2).⁷⁵

To put it differently, to the extent the individual or society is under pressure from domestic government the *civic-democratic* discourse appeal to Serbian audience but loses its potency with the increase of foreign pressures.



Graph 2: Resonance of *civic-democratic* discourse and internal/external pressures

In conclusion, we have so far argued that Serbian political culture is composed of two divergent discourses with different conceptions of nation and national identity and foreign, defence and security policies. Now we turn to the elements of the concept of national security evolving out of the cultural, political and historical contexts during the last few years.

Seven Elements of the concept of Serbian national security

The first and the foremost important question defining one concept of security is ***security for whom?*** It is the question of referent object of security policy, of the object that is to be protected. Theoretically just about anything could be constructed as a referent object. In practice, however, not everything *can* be protected. Therefore, states make priorities. In case of Serbia, there is no coherent set of priorities what the priority referent objects of security should be. For instance, the Constitution of Serbia mentions that “Serbia is a state of Serbs and all citizens that live in it”.⁷⁶

This first sentence of the Constitution has several possible implications. Firstly, it implies that not all citizens in Serbia are part of the Serbian nation. This clearly shows that the Constitution opted for the ethnic basic conception of Serbian nation rather than a civic one. Secondly, it could imply that ethnic Serbs, even those who are not citizens of Serbia (e.g. citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro or any other country) may be privileged over non Serbian holders of passport of the Republic of Serbia. However, the foundation for this implicit discrimination is to a certain extent mitigated by explicitly stating that “everyone has a right to personal freedom and security” (article 27) and that “the state guarantees special protection to national minorities” so that they can preserve their iden-

⁷⁵ It should be noted that theoretical propositions graphically represented on the graphs 1 and 2 are only that: theoretical propositions. They are explained in more detail in Ejodus 2008. However, although empirical evidence seems to abound in the history of Serbian contemporary politics, the theoretical hypothesis has not been so far put under a thorough empirical falsification. This research could be done in the future.

⁷⁶ National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2006, The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, article 1

tity” (article 14). In the context of possible renewal of hostilities, authors of the White Paper on the Defence and Strategic Defence Review pointed out that Serbs and other non-Albanian population living in Kosovo is especially important referent object.⁷⁷ Strategic Defence Review further broadens the referent object by stating how “stability and a sense of security are essential prerequisites for a successful progress of the overall *society*”.⁷⁸

In sum, we can conclude that the main referent objects are Serbian nation, minorities, and society as a whole. It is very unusual that referent objects which dominate spoken security discourse, such as sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are not being elicited in any of the existing documents. The draft of the NSS prepared by the team of the incumbent President Boris Tadić brought out these referent objects along with many others like democratic institutions, human rights, freedom and security of citizens, peace and stability in SEE, protection of economic infrastructure, protection of environment and natural resources, economic, technological and cultural development of society. However, although the most articulated document in terms of referent objects, the draft of the NSS has so far not been adopted.

The second dimension of security is of **values and interests** which are the referent object of concept of national security policy. Serbian strategic discourses emphasises three major values driving national security policy. These are the protection of democracy, human rights, rule of law and economic infrastructure. According to the Constitution, core values of the Republic are the rule of law and social justice, civic democracy, human and minority rights and a sense of belonging to European principles and values.⁷⁹

According to the draft of the NSS, main values to be protected are economic infrastructure, environment and natural resources, economic, technological and cultural development of society. The central security interests refer to maintaining sovereignty and independence, territorial, cultural and historical integrity, democratic institutions, human rights, freedom and security of citizens but also peace and stability in South East Europe.

In the White Paper on Defence it is stated how in a changing security environment cooperation has become a prerequisite for strengthening peace, stability and democratic development. In such surroundings, “democratic system of government, respect of human rights and freedoms, acceptance of the market economy and the observance of internationally agreed obligations and standards” are the “generally accepted civilisational values”.⁸⁰

Apart from security, SDR introduces the value of *human safety*, which is a composition of the “respect of human rights, rights of minorities, ethnic and religious communities, political stability and democratic progress, as well as environmental protection”.⁸¹

⁷⁷ State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Ministry of Defence, 2005, “White Paper on Defence” (The Security Environment), p. 12. White Paper on Defence (WP) “contains basic information about (Serbia and Montenegro) security environment, security challenges, risks and threats, the defence policy, the defence potential, the organisation, management, funding, control and development of the defence system of Serbia and Montenegro”: Prvoslav Davinic, 2005, “White Paper on Defence – Why?”.

⁷⁸ Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Defence, 2006, Strategic Defence Review (Security Environment), p. 9

⁷⁹ The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Principles of the Constitution), article 1

⁸⁰ “White Paper on Defence” (The Security Environment), p. 9

⁸¹ Ibid.

Human safety resembles the concept of human security. However, the authors of the document decided to leave out the important economic dimension.⁸²

Still, it was implicitly recognized in a later passage, where “unfavourable economic and social situation” is also conceptualized as a threat to security.⁸³ Interests that are to be protected by regional interaction include a “lasting political and security normalisation”, “full predictability at the military level” and finally “guaranteeing territorial integrity of every country in the Western Balkans”.⁸⁴

Since this document was prepared in the midst of Kosovo status negotiations, official state policy is reiterated, with the preferred outcome being Kosovo formally remaining a political entity within Serbia.⁸⁵

SDR defined the unresolved question of status as a source of threat, or “instability”, for Serbia and the region alike.⁸⁶

The question “**how much security**” is not touched upon explicitly in any of the existing documents. The Constitution however stipulates that personal liberty and security can be suspended and restricted in the interest of national and public security.⁸⁷

At no place any similar restriction is put onto national security such as economic development, democracy etc. Nonetheless, this should not lead us to conclusion that the concept of security in Serbia is absolutist. For instance the NSS draft stresses that human and national security has to reinforce each other. Also, some implicit confinements of pursuit of freedom from threats are however elaborated and will be discussed under the 6th dimension further in the text.

Definition of threats is a constitutive element of any concept of security. Therefore, explaining and understanding any concept of security is impossible without taking threat perception into consideration. The official strategic discourse in Serbia seems to define threats at the national and regional level quite realistically through casting problems arising from democratic transition as the biggest security challenges. These are organized crime, corruption, weakening of state etc. At the global level, there seems to be less articulate vision. Thus, global threats are either copy-pasted from other nation’s strategies or its national concerns that are being projected as global threats. There is very little awareness of climate change and pandemics while international terrorism tops the list of global threats.

The draft of the NSS, written by Boris Tadic’s advisors in 2006, is a slight exception to this. At the global level it perceives threats such as international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, organized crime, uncontrolled migration, failed states, health threats (epidemic disease), environmental change and industrial disasters. The same document rules out aggression in the region, as practically impossible in the near future. However, since Serbia is at the centre of the Western Balkans which is in turn at the crossroads of civilizations, the authors of the document argue that Serbia is thus directly connected to global threats. On the regional level as the most prominent threats are listed armed conflicts, terrorism, ethnic and re-

⁸² The concept of human security has two elements: physical security (freedom from fear) and in a wider definition economic/social security (freedom from want).

⁸³ Ibid, p. 11

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 10

⁸⁷ The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Human and Minority Rights and Freedoms), article 27

ligious extremism, Secessionist, autonomist and independentist tendencies. Concerning internal security threats as the most dangerous is perceived the unresolved status of Kosovo together with potential spill over to South Serbia.⁸⁸

Although the draft NSS doesn't see Serbia as a direct terrorist target, it is argued that Serbian territory serves as a transit route for terrorists. Moreover, terrorists are connected to organized crime mostly active in drugs, vehicle and human trafficking, money laundering and corruption. Finally, the documents securitizes a long list of economic issues stemming mainly from economic transition including poor maintenance of ammunition and armaments depots and social problems in the Serbian Armed Forces.

According to the White Paper, global challenges and risks are consequences of the "increasing differences in the economic development of certain nations and peoples".⁸⁹

In the White Paper on Defence, internal threats were summoned under the category of "social and political problems and difficulties, which, under certain circumstances, can cause increased tensions".⁹⁰

In the SDR, security challenges and threats stem from a changing environment, characterized by "overall insecurity". Threats are asymmetrical; actors who drive them are using the context of "increased global interrelation". White Paper also warns of the threat of an "armed rebellion [...] motivated by unconstitutional or violent attempt of changing state borders".⁹¹

This is translated into "local crisis" in the SDR. Terrorism, organised crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic and religious terrorism and illegal migration are next in the list.⁹²

Regional challenges are similarly laid out in both the White Paper and the SDR. State institutions across the region are equally denominated as insufficiently democratic and competent. Tense relations between Western Balkan countries are explained by the "lack of trust, slow resolution of the refugee return issue and compensation for their property, as well as slow confirmation of responsibility for war crimes and unresolved territorial disputes."⁹³

Internal threats to the security in Serbia seem to originate from the process of transition, the "unfavourable economic and social situation" primarily.⁹⁴

Finally, in the PfP presentation document, terrorism, organised crime, ethnic and religious extremism, illegal migration, illegal trade, the spreading of weapons of mass destruction and natural or man-made disasters are all listed as perceived challenges and threats to security.⁹⁵ There is however no clear explanation whether these challenges and threats are perceived as endangering security of the region, or Serbia.

⁸⁸ The name "South Serbia" refers to three municipalities, Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja that lie adjacent to North-eastern parts of Kosovo and are populated mainly with Albanian population.

⁸⁹ "White Paper on Defence" (The Security Environment), p. 9

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13-14

⁹² Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Defence, 2006, Strategic Defence Review (Security Environment): p. 8.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 9

⁹⁴ Strategic Defence Review (Foreign Policy and its Influence on Domestic Policy), p. 10

⁹⁵ Serbia's Partnership for Peace Programme Presentation Document (The Political Framework: Foundations of a Partnership), p. 4

Origin of threat	Specific source of threat
Internal	Armed rebellion (White Paper, p. 13) or "local crisis" (SDR, p. 8)
	"Ethnic and religious extremism"; "illegal migration" (PfP Presentation document, p. 4)
	Unresolved status of Kosovo (NSS draft p,73)
	The process of transition resulting in "unfavourable economic and social situation" (SDR, p. 10) or "social and political problems and difficulties, which, under certain circumstances, can cause increased tensions" (White Paper, p. 10)
	Natural and industrial disasters and outbreaks (SDR, p. 13); "natural disasters, industrial and other accidents, and epidemics" (White Paper, p. 14)
	Corruption (White Paper, p. 14); illegal trade (PfP Presentation Document, p. 4)
	Organized crime its relationship with authorities. Forms of organized crimes enlisted are all kinds of illicit trafficking (humans, drugs, vehicles, and counterfeit goods), money laundering and corruption. (NSS draft pp.73-74)
	"It can be claimed with certainty that Serbia is not a direct target of terrorist activities"(NSS draft, p.73)
Regional	Military intervention less likely; military challenges, risks and threats have been reduced but are not completely excluded. (White Paper, p. 13)
	The region is a transit route for terrorists and criminals (NSS draft, p.71)
	Failure of European and international integration can revive armed conflicts, terrorism, ethnic and religious extremism, (NSS draft, p. 72)
	State institutions insufficiently democratic and competent; "lack of trust, slow resolution of the refugee return issue and compensation for their property, as well as slow confirmation of responsibility for war crimes and unresolved territorial disputes" (SDR, p. 9)
	"Insufficiently developed state institutions"; "national and religious extremism" (White Paper, p. 11)
	"Secessionist, autonomist and independentist tendencies of certain ethnic groups are still the fundamental security risk in the region"(NSS draft, p72)
	"Economic-social problems" (White Paper, p. 11)
Global	International terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, organized crime, uncontrolled migration, failed states, health threats (epidemic disease), economic gap between rich and poor, environmental change and industrial disasters (NSS draft, p.68, p.71)
	"Ethnic and religious extremism, illegal migrations and others" (SDR, p. 8)
	"Increasing differences in the economic development of certain nations and peoples" (White Paper, p. 9)

Table 1: Origin, type and specific source of threat according to the strategic documents of the Republic of Serbia

Once we have defined values, interests, referent objects and threats it is crucial to define **means** by which the protection is pursued. In that respect, the draft of the NSS points out that Serbia should become "exporter of security from an importer of security". This is supposed to be achieved through democratization and economic development. In terms of policy, the NSS, written in 2006, as foreign policy objectives prescribes integration into the EU and NATO as well as the achievement of European standards. It also stresses the importance of cooperative security, regarding defence policies. Finally, in internal security policy, the document emphasises police coordination and integration (e.g. Europol, Integrated Border Management), stresses how important is the role of Gendarmerie and of police in protection of civilians and defence. The NSS draft also lists a long inventory of economic and social policies relevant for national security, such as

health and social security for all citizens, equality, strong middle class, demography, but also emphasizes environmental polices, democratization and respect for human rights. As principles of security policy the draft evokes legality, indivisibility, cooperation and coordination, peace and partnership, transparency and openness to change.

The White Paper listed UN, OSCE, EU and NATO as the “key elements” of the European security architecture, on whose ability to adapt to new security challenges and threats depends the whole contemporary international community.⁹⁶

Their influence on the strengthening of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic was described as positive for the consolidation of the situation in countries of South-Eastern Europe.⁹⁷

In SDR, accelerated integration into Euro-Atlantic structures is understood as a stabilisation instrument.⁹⁸

Short-term priorities are defined as the accession to the PfP Programme and signing the SAA. Integration is sought because NATO stands for “the most efficient instrument for confronting contemporary challenges”. EU and OSCE have in this regard an important role in prevention, crisis management and post-conflict and democratic consolidation of unstable states and regions.⁹⁹

Plus, EU integration into a “political, economic and security environment of the states sharing similar values” is a fundamental defence interest of Serbia.¹⁰⁰ For accomplishing the task of partnership with NATO, according to the Presentation document, Serbia is prepared to use “economic, financial, human, material and other resources”.¹⁰¹

“Other resources” possibly stand for “military power”, which is presented in the White Paper as “no longer the only mean of achieving international security but one of the instruments for doing so”.¹⁰² Similarly as the White Paper, the SDR document states that security can be achieved only through cooperation, first and foremost with other countries from the region. It is interesting that in this document strong emphasis is being put on the role of civil society, probably perceived as a catalyst of new and contemporary values that are to be the basis of this co-operative approach.¹⁰³

The uniting factor for all of the actors mentioned is their common orientation towards the Euro-Atlantic community.¹⁰⁴ Cooperation is more specifically dubbed as pro-European, where defence policy is supposed to create safe preconditions for progress.¹⁰⁵ In the SDR, however, SAF is presented as a foreign policy potential of the Republic.

The PfP presentation document also point out that national security can be pro-

⁹⁶ “White Paper on Defence” (The Security Environment), p. 10

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11

⁹⁸ Strategic Defence Review (Changes in the Republic of Serbia), p. 9

⁹⁹ Strategic Defence Review (Security Environment), p. 9

¹⁰⁰ Strategic Defence Review (Foreign Policy and its Influence on Domestic Policy), p. 11

¹⁰¹ Serbia’s Partnership for Peace Programme Presentation Document (The Political Framework: Foundations of a Partnership), p. 5

¹⁰² “White Paper on Defence” (The Security Environment), p. 10

¹⁰³ Strategic Defence Review (Security Environment), p. 8

¹⁰⁴ However, following the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in February 2008, Serbia abandoned the “Atlantic” part of the equation: *Ibid.*, p. 9

¹⁰⁵ Strategic Defence Review (Foreign Policy and its Influence on Domestic Policy), p. 10

tected only through partnership with NATO.¹⁰⁶ This is legitimised by the claim how “there is a deep belief in the Republic [...] that national as well as regional security is strengthened” if Serbia is to contribute to the goals shared by the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme participant countries.¹⁰⁷

Regional cooperation therefore remains essential for peace, security and prosperity of the Western Balkans.¹⁰⁸ Analysis of divergent strategic discourses uncovers two types of armed forces preferred in *civic-democratic* and *national-liberational* cultures. Although the preferences of agents can change over time, as well as adherence to civic or nationalist discourse, we can construct ideal-type armed forces deriving from the concept of nation, national identity and general worldviews pinpointed by the two discourses (Table 1). According to analysis of the two discourses we can conclude that *civic-democratic* ideal type is a relatively small in size, highly mobile, democratically controlled professional and internationally integrated armed forces, loyal to civic community, focused at accomplishing non-traditional military tasks such as international peacekeeping missions and support to civil authorities. On the other side is the *national-liberational* ideal type of large in size and heavily equipped, military neutral armed forces composed of conscripts and loyal to ethnic Serbian community.

	<i>Civic-democratic</i> ideal types of armed forces	<i>National-liberational</i> ideal type of armed forces
Size and equipment:	Small and light	Large and heavily equipped
Functions:	International military missions, support to civil authorities	National defence
Mode of recruitment:	Professional; voluntary	Conscription based; compulsory
Loyalty:	Civic community; cosmopolitan	Ethnic community; parochial
Strategic orientation:	Defence integration	Defence neutrality
Democratic control:	Strengthens defence	Weakens defence
Conscientious objection:	Positive	Negative

Table 2: Civic-democratic and national-liberational ideal types of Serbian armed forces

In sum, concerning the means, it seems that there is consensus that security should be achieved primarily through security cooperation and non-military means. Regarding security cooperation, until February 2008, there was disagreement over that whether Serbia should also pursue NATO membership. However, since then, the emergent consensus goes no to NATO, yes to EU and PfP (for the time being). Therefore, it can be expected that Serbia will soon become much more active member of the PfP program and very interested in the CFSP and ESDP di-

¹⁰⁶ Serbia's Partnership for Peace Programme Presentation Document (The Political Framework: Foundations of a Partnership), p. 3

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 4

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

mension of European integration in order to make up for giving up NATO. Regarding the military instrument, there is still no consensus on the size and form of the armed forces. It will however follow from still unclear strategic orientation of the Republic – military neutrality as declared by the National Assembly on December 26 2007 or NATO membership as foreseen in the draft of the NSS, White Paper and SDR.

When trying to answer the question *at what cost* one should look whether security is described as a prime value, core value or marginal value. Although the documents do not provide explicit answers to this question, answers can however be inferred implicitly. In the Constitution, security is one of the core values, alongside “rule of law and social justice, civic democracy, human and minority rights and a sense of belonging to European principles and values”.¹⁰⁹

Likewise, the White Paper treats security as one of the core values, in addition to “democratic system of government, respect of human rights and freedoms, acceptance of the market economy and the observance of internationally agreed obligations and standards”, as well as Euro-Atlantic integration, of which depends the security of the “world as a whole”.¹¹⁰ Moreover, in the SDR, security is seen as one of the core values, alongside “human safety” and Euro-Atlantic integration. Finally, in the PfP presentation document the “core value” approach is also adopted. Its goal is to protect Serbia’s national security, through building the partnership with NATO.¹¹¹

According to PfP Presentation document, Serbia will mobilize its resources within the limits of its national possibilities, “to provide the necessary funds to engage its forces and share the cost of military exercises where it participates, as well as to meet the needs of other agreed PfP activities. Any increase in the allocated resources will be in line with the further dynamics of defence reform in the Republic of Serbia.”¹¹²

Thus, in conclusion, there is a divergence in all documents that security is a core value, or one of most important values of the Republic.

Final element of definition of national security concept is the question “*for what time period (is security provided)*”. Unfortunately, most of the documents do not contain any provisions about the time period in which the concept of national security is conceived. However, there are two exceptions to that. In the White Paper, the complete overhaul of the defence system is supposed to be completed by 2010.¹¹³ The Strategic Defence Review contains the long term “Vision of the SAF in 2015” which is “a collection of attitudes on functions, organisation and the necessary resources” as well as medium term (according to the required capabilities of defence system by 2010 and development priorities).¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Principles of the Constitution), article 1

¹¹⁰ “White Paper on Defence” (The Security Environment), p. 10

¹¹¹ Serbia’s Partnership for Peace Programme Presentation Document (The Political Framework: Foundations of a Partnership), p. 3

¹¹² Ibid, p. 12

¹¹³ “White Paper on Defence” (Reform of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro), p. 88

¹¹⁴ Strategic Defence Review (Vision of the Armed Forces in 2015), p. 18

	<i>Security for whom?</i>	<i>Security for which values?</i>	<i>How Much security?</i>	<i>By what means?</i>	<i>At what cost?</i>	<i>In what time period?</i>
Constitution	Serbian nation and all citizens of Serbia (article 1)	Rule of law and social justice, civic democracy, human and minority rights and a sense of belonging to European principles and values (article 1)	“Personal liberty and security can be suspended and restricted in the interest of national and public security” (article 27)		One of the core values, alongside “rule of law and social justice, civic democracy, human and minority rights and a sense of belonging to European principles and values” (article 1)	
White Paper	Serbs and other non-Albanians living in Kosovo (p. 12)	“Democratic system of government, respect of human rights and freedoms, acceptance of the market economy and the observance of internationally agreed obligations and standards” (p. 9)		“Opting for a pragmatic and rational foreign policy orientation and membership in international security structures, first of all the “Partnership for Peace” programme and NATO, significantly contributes to the security of our country” (p. 12)	One of the core values, in addition to “democratic system of government, respect of human rights and freedoms, acceptance of the market economy and the observance of internationally agreed obligations and standards”, as well as Euro-Atlantic integration, of which depends the security of the “world as a whole” (p. 9)	Medium term (2010)
SDR	Overall society (p. 9)	“Human safety”, a composition of the “respect of human rights, rights of minorities, ethnic and religious communities, political stability and democratic progress, as well as environmental protection” (p. 10) “Lasting political and security normalisation” (p. 11) “Full predictability at the military level” (p.11) “Guarantying territorial integrity of every country in the Western Balkans” (p. 11)		By “accelerated integration into the Euro Atlantic structures” (p. 9)	One of the core values, alongside “human safety” and Euro-Atlantic integration (p. 10)	Long term (2015)
PfP presentation document		“Serbia’s national security” (p. 3)			Unclear: mobilisation of resources in line with the proposed pace of the defence reform (p. 12)	
NSS draft	“Democratic institutions, human rights, freedom and security of citizens, peace and stability in SEE, protection of economic infrastructure, protection of environment and natural resources, economic, technological and cultural development of society”	“Economic infrastructure, environment and natural resources, economic, technological and cultural development of society”	“Human and national security has to reinforce each other”	“Democratization and economic development” “Cooperative security” “Police coordination and integration (e.g. Europol, Integrated Border Management)”		

Table 3: Summary of key elements in Serbian strategic documents

Conclusion

This paper analysed the concept of national security in the Republic of Serbia by drawing on the concept of political and strategic culture and by using David Baldwin’s conceptual framework composed of seven dimensions of security. It was argued that

the security discourse on security is split into two major streams of political culture, *civic-democratic* and *national-liberalist*. While the former draws on discourses of internal societal emancipation, the latter draws its legitimacy from narratives about external, national liberation. Consequently, while the former discourse is congruent with military integration, force projection and professional light forces the latter prefers military neutrality and recruit forces heavily armed for national defence. Regarding the official documents adopted in the period 2004-2007, the analysis revealed that there is a certain level of convergence allowing for an underdeveloped emergent concept of national security. This convergence relates to several issues. Firstly, the referent object of security is mostly defined in national and ethnic terms. Secondly, the documents point out democratic order and to a lesser degree economic well being of Serbia as central security values to be protected. Thirdly, documents contain very little awareness of social and other costs of security. Fourthly, most documents implicitly considered security as one of the core values together with democracy, human rights and Euro Atlantic integration. Fifthly, regarding threat perception, the documents in a realistic and balanced way enlist the key threats to national security of Serbia including organized crime, ethnic tensions, corruption and unresolved Status of Kosovo. However, on the global level, the documents stress too much on the international terrorism and miss to mention the key non-military threats such as climate change. Sixthly, since 2007, there has been an emergent consensus regarding foreign policy orientation which could be defined as *yes to the EU and Pfp, but no to NATO and never to independent Kosovo*.¹¹⁵

What will happen if these goals clash in the future remains to be seen. Nonetheless, Serbian leaders not only in former Kostunica's but also in current Prime Minister Cvetkovic's government stressed out more than once that should Serbia have to decide between Kosovo and the EU, it will opt for the former.

Taking into consideration everything said, it would be useful now to turn to practical steps that could be taken to ameliorate the current situation and add more coherence into the emergent concept of national security in Serbia. Firstly, National Security Strategy should be adopted by the Serbian Parliament as soon as possible. This document should clearly and unambiguously define security interests and values of the Republic of Serbia, foreign, security and defence orientation as well as formulate threat perceptions and devise security means. Especially needed is a more precise definition of the level of origin and specific source of threat (e.g. whether one threat is internal, regional or global by its spread and level of origin). The threat perception should be more inclusive of global non-military threats other than terrorism. Secondly, the Parliament or the Government should adopt a Strategy for Security Sector Reform. This document could create a holistic approach to scope, dynamics and intensity of reforms in the Army, Police, Intelligence services, Private Security Sector, Justice System and all other actors who belong to security sector holistically defined.¹¹⁶ Thirdly, an economic cost benefit analysis of NATO integration vs. military neutrality should be made so that both political and defence elites but also citizens know the price of their decisions.

¹¹⁵ It can be noted that before 2007, only two documents officially proclaimed NATO membership as Serbian foreign policy goal – White Paper on Defence and Strategic Defence Review.

¹¹⁶ For a holistic definition of security sector see Hänggi, Heiner, "Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction" in Bryan Alan and Hanggi Heiner ed. *Reform and reconstruction of the Security Sector*, (DCAF: Geneva, 2004)

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Defence Planning and Resource Management: Importance of Strategic Documents for Defence Planning

Elemír Nečej

Introduction

Central and Eastern European (CEE) military forces have undergone dramatic changes in the post-communist era. All of them have conducted significant down-sizing, reoriented their national security strategies and military doctrines to adapt to the post-Cold War strategic environment, and achieved essential elements of subordination to democratic political control. Three CEE states – Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland – were granted NATO membership during the first stage of the NATO's post-Cold War enlargement in 1997. Seven other states received invitations at the Prague Summit in November 2002 – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. However, all of them were victims of their Warsaw Pact legacies which have had a long-term impact on their societies, politics, as well as national security cultures. The adaptation of the national security apparatuses, inherited from the communist era, posed the greatest challenge.¹¹⁷

While speaking about Slovakia's approach to the NATO and the EU development and defence reform, we should look back at the Slovak Security Policy development and its influence on security and defence planning. The MoD and the Armed Forces were and continually are:

- mostly under the influence of NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy development;
- institutions which are deeply interested in security documents preparation (they were and are a way out for the defence reforms).

The first effort to reform the Army failed due to bad or no security vision and the lack of comprehensive programme for the defence system that is essential for such a vision. It means to have a comprehensive and transparent Defence Planning and Resource Management System. The Security/Defence Strategy without resources (funding) is just a pure theory on the paper. On the other hand, Defence Plan and Budget without strategy are just wasting money (state budget). This begs the question what kind of civilian control should be in defence spending area – as a part of a comprehensive democratic control of the defence activities. The defence planning, budgeting, financial management, procurement of the weapons and equipment administered a big part of the state budget. The defence department guides a powerful, expensive and autonomous organisation, and therefore the democratic control of the MoD and the AF expenses is an important issue. Among important levers of democratic control, the Defence Planning and Resource Management System represents a critical issue. It requires the management, check, and control not only at the MoD level (taking into consideration that the MoD as such is a part of the democratic control), but at the governmental and parliamentary level as well.

¹¹⁷ Transformation at Last? Achieving Radical Military Reform in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College, 2005.

At the MoD level, the particular attention must be given to the establishment of “internal” structures in the Defence Planning and Resource Management Area – separation of planners from budget people; institution of independent “controlling” structure. At the governmental level (despite the power and position of the Minister of Defence), some kind of supervision structure would be quite a good idea. In Slovakia, it might be the Security Council and its part – the Defence Planning Committee. According to the Slovak laws, Security Council is a governmental institution. The next question is what role the General Staff should play in this area. The relationship with the Parliament represents the highest level of planning and control structure. The parliamentary control depends on the Constitution and laws, and beside the power of the Parliament to pass the proposal of the budget, there are several other possibilities of parliamentary responsibility in the defence planning area. The Defence Committee, approval of the *Defence Planning Law*, the *Long-Term Plan of the AF Development*, etc. Parliament must understand the AF needs. It means to comprehend what resources are required, how they are utilised, or what requirements NATO and the EU have as for defence capabilities.

Defence funding is a problematic issue. We know that a NATO demand, which represents allocation of 2% of GDP to the defence area, poses problem not only in transition countries (including Slovakia). The second problem is that the national budget follows up the 4-year mandate of the Government, while the NATO planning cycle is based on the 6-year rotating system. So the planning, programming, and budgeting system in the AF is not compatible with the system of national budget preparation. The civilian democratic control of this area is problematic, too. Moreover, it seems that this does not fall into to the realm of the highest interest of taxpayers, democratic controlling institutions, or even the NGOs.

The First Attempt on the Defence Reform till 1998: Lessons Learned – Importance of NATO Accession Process. Importance of Strategic Documents for Defence Planning Programming and Budgeting

Let us follow a connection between the strategic documents and defence planning, or more particular influence of strategic documents on the defence planning.

The first years after the establishment of the Slovak Republic and its Armed Forces (1993) were focused on creation of the MoD, General Staff, new forces, or new command and control system. In 1994, the MoD worked out “*The Concept of SR Army Building till 2000*” which presented a programme of relatively small, though well trained, and equipped army comparable with forces of the Western nations. The concept had been divided into 2 phases, from which only the first one was realised (in 1994 – 1995). Within this phase, a common system of command and organisational structure was established, and coincidence with *Vienna Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe* was provided. The second phase failed. In a simplified way, we might observe that most of the politicians were not qualified enough in the Security and Defence Area (they were not able to agree on relevant defence doctrine/strategy) and a majority of military was burdened by “traditional” thinking of “territorial defence” against an attack coming from neighbouring border. The missing co-ordination between “military parameters” of the

Armed Forces transformation and “political parameters” was a cause of problems. This period was characterised by permanent changes in organisational structures. The formal aspects of the Armed Forces reform were overestimated, while the need for overall change of the Armed Forces character was underrated. The qualitative parameters of the AF transformation were rather neglected, at the expense of accelerating a reorganisation and re-dislocation of the military units.

The fulfilment of the second phase of the AF reform began at the turn of 1995/1996. Information about the second phase was vague and the MoD working groups started with preparation of new reform called “*The Integrated Programme of Army Development till 2010 with Outlook till 2015.*” The main aim was to concretize the *Long-Term Plan till 2010* with preservation of the *Defence Doctrine 1994* and the *National Defence Strategy 1996* principles. During the second phase, the AF reform braked. The process of the Armed Forces transformation and the process of Slovakia’s integration to NATO were not harmonized. Moreover, there were some difficulties with AF modernization and rearmament,¹¹⁸

with increasing of military potential and professional readiness. In 1998, after constitution of new government and new garniture at the MoD (see the previous chapters), this document was put ad - acta.

The first attempt of the Defence and AF reform failed mostly because it had been covered with old documents from 1994 and 1996. These documents corresponded neither with development of security environment, nor with new governmental statement of 1998. The preparation of the Defence and AF reform had been prepared without having new conceptual security documents, because those were not prepared in that time. This was a key factor limiting the success of the previous reform efforts. The Slovak Ministry of Defence published *The Defence Doctrine* (1994), followed by the *National Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (1996), and the *Concept of Reform till 2003*. However, each of these policy and doctrinal statements was short on overarching national security strategy. Therefore, they lacked both a logical hierarchy and the consensus that is founded in mature national security systems. The U.S. Department of Defense external evaluators criticized these efforts and evaluated them as not adequately addressing the defence requirements and concepts of their time. The “*Defence Assessment of the Slovak Republic*” from 1999 stipulated that key elements which were essential to provide the conceptual basis for the future military reform, such as the broad National Security Strategy and a subsequent National Military Strategy, were missing¹¹⁹

NATO’s Influence on the Planning Process till 1998

Despite the difficulties connected with the AF transformation, some reform processes influenced by mechanisms of cooperation with NATO began. One of them was the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme which was focused on cooperation in the political and military field, helped with transparency of the De-

¹¹⁸ Rearmament and modernization of the army has remained a problem even after the accession to NATO. It seems that their financial demands are not sufficiently evaluated, neither after an introduction of comprehensive process of defence planning. On the other hand, early start-up of rearmament process in the given period would mean resources wasting. As it will be demonstrated later, NATO also changed an approach to building of the capabilities after the Washington Summit in 1999, Prague Summit (Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)).

¹¹⁹ Mm Peterson Ulrich, p. 200.

fence Planning and Budgets, and strengthened civilian democratic control of the AF. In January 1994, the SR Government signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document which provided the basis for the Individual Partnership Plan (IPP), adopted by NATO in November 1994. The latter was updated annually. The first activities based on the IPP were aimed to strengthen mutual confidence through exchange of information concerning defence planning transparency and the democratic control of the AF. However, just a minimum part of the MoD budget was allocated for these activities. In 1994, this sum represented 10 million SKK (0.1 % of defence budget), and in 1995 it was 129 million SKK (1% of defence budget). In 1995, the Slovak Republic joined two-year NATO planning, known as PARP¹²⁰. This required an increase in financial means from 129 million to 262.3 million SKK. The declared forces of the SR started to be prepared for peace and humanitarian operations. Since 1995, the number of activities within the PARP framework has increased. Moreover, it is not only Ministry of Defence, but also civilian ones which have taken part in these activities. At the end of 1996, Slovakia decided to launch the second phase of the PARP (summer 1997 – 1999), in which Interoperability Objectives were broadened on more units of the SR Armed Forces. In 1997, 641 million SKK (4.1 % of defence budget) were allocated for the PfP and PARP activities. In 1998, the first officers were sent to the NATO staff structures, which were established for partnership countries, and staffs in the SFOR operation. Thirty Partnership Objectives were to ensure achievement of a minimum level of interoperability of the forces, that the Slovak Republic had set aside. Despite financial difficulties, the whole PARP process influenced the AF transformation and launched the defence planning process. At the same time, it influenced a progressive formation of mechanism of more comprehensive preparation for the NATO membership. That was, however, carried out only later. The PARP mechanism enabled a transition towards an establishment of defence planning, which has been created step by step since 1995 as an integral part of the state control. However, it was much later when it managed to reach the nationwide comprehensive level. The experience gained thanks to participation in the international planning (PfP, IPP, PARP) was later used in preparation of the defence planning at national level. Before the planning at national level, the defence planning at the defence department level had started. The use of NATO knowledge initiated the first attempts to introduce Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). In 1997, the State Defence Council¹²¹ approved “*The Report on State of the PPBS Introduction at the Defence Department*”, including proposal of continuation in 1998 – 2012. As it has been already mentioned, the resolutions in the defence planning area were not implemented. An effort to harmonize strategic planning, resource planning, acquisitions, and operational planning, failed. The whole process lacked the sufficient institutionalization of the planning structures at the defence department (not speaking of governmental structures). All of these requirements started to be implemented in more consistent manner only after 1999. As regards civil democratic control of resources for the AF and the use

¹²⁰ The Partnership Planning and Review Process (PARP) began in 1995 and were deliberately modelled on NATO force planning. It had been one of the key elements in PfP and absorbed about 40% of the efforts of national and NATO defence planning staff. The PfP nations in the PARP only declared forces that might be made available on a voluntary basis for non-Article 5 operations.

¹²¹ Later, it was transformed into the State Security Council – author’s comment.

of defence budget, this period was not characterized by creation of conditions for such a control. There was the lack of unequivocal determination of the position that parliament and its committees had at their disposal in approving defence planning documents; there was no adequate planning structures at the MoD; and the legislative covering of the above-mentioned area was deficient, too. In 1997 a document *White Paper on Defence* was prepared. However, it was not published due to some political skirmishes and changes in the MoD top-management. Moreover, a high secret level of all documents coming from the department did not enable a sufficient access to information. Likewise the above-mentioned defence documents from 1994 and 1996 (*Defence Doctrine* and *Basic Objectives and Principles of National*) which were prepared only by a narrow circle of people from the MoD, the documents concerning development and formation of the Armed Forces were prepared in the same manner and high level of secret, too.

Defence Reform in 1998 – 2001: The Slovak Republic Preparation for NATO Membership

After the elections in 1998, a new government (more pro-Atlantic oriented than the preceding one) dealt with two simultaneous processes: launching a new phase of the AF reform and preparing the Slovak Republic for NATO membership. From the Armed Forces perspective, it was necessary to ensure compatibility between the Armed Forces and NATO standards.

On October 13, 1999, the Slovak Government approved "*The Concept of Defence Department Reform till 2002*" (with outlook to 2010). The goals it wanted to achieve were the AF transformation and balance between the AF requirements and the State resources. The document "*The Concept of the Ministry of Defence Reform till 2002 with Outlook to 2010*" launched a real change in the Slovak AF. It was focused on these aims: to decrease the number of personnel, to establish land forces and air forces HQ, and particularly to relocate the General Staff from Trenčín to Bratislava (120 km distance), with intention to integrate it into the Ministry of Defence. However, it was only a short-time oriented document inducing further problems. It aimed to balance the army needs with economic potential of the country and, at the same time, to initiate a process of creating the compatibility between the armed forces and the NATO standards. That was no easy matter, since preparation and application of the army reform were not based on conceptual security documents. The Current Conception (design) by 2002 had quite a general character, despite certain positive influence. It did not deal with a reform as such, but with certain "vision" of the reform. Therefore, in March 2001, a special commission dealing with armed forces reform was created. Consequently, several conceptual documents, including "***The Slovak Republic Armed Forces – Model 2010***", were elaborated.

An intention was to provide the AF with ability to perform the tasks independently – following the principle of individual security – and at the same time to increase their ability to participate in NATO missions (operations away from Article 5). In that way, they ought to have prepared themselves for action within the NATO collective security principle (Article 5), in case of admission to the Alliance. After the first attempt on the reform was evaluated, it was clear that changes in the whole national security system were necessary and that the admission process was not

an exclusive matter of the MoD and the AF. However, that called for acceptance of conceptual strategic documents that would create a new legislative framework. Despite this piece of knowledge, there was a paradoxical situation. Support of new strategic security documents within the AF reform was still lacking. That could base only on the above-mentioned documents from 1994 and 1996 that were not in accordance with new policy statement of the SR Government established after 1998 elections. Moreover, they did not correspond to contemporary situation connected with Slovakia's unequivocal orientation to NATO in the realm of foreign-policy. It is necessary to add that after the Washington Summit in April 1999, new NATO strategic concept "shuffle the cards", too.

Within the preparation and execution of the reform, certain "institutional limits" at the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff played a negative role. There was a snag, since the competencies within the MoD and between the MoD and the General Staff were not transparently defined. There were also some political reasons inside the department. A part of the top-management did not see any interconnection between the process of Slovakia's admission to NATO and the Armed Forces transformation process. For example, the analysis of the western consulting groups reproached the Minister of Defence, Pavol Kanis (1998 – 2000), for incapability or unwillingness to make more radical changes. He also came under the strong criticism because he entrusted the implementation of the AF reform to people who had neither sufficient professional qualification, nor political capability. The extent of their political will has been in question, too.

As regards practical measures within defence planning and the AF reform area, continuing Membership Action Plan (MAP) implementation played an important role. In June 1999, the SR Government passed the PRENAME (Preparation for NATO Membership) plan that was specified in annual plans. Its contribution resides in involvement of other departments into the process of Slovakia's preparation for NATO membership. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became a "guarantor" of the first chapter (political and economic issues) and the fifth chapter (legal issues) preparation. The Ministry of Defence was charged with the second chapter (defence and military issues). Other issues were entrusted to the newly-created PRENAME governmental committee. Following the approved PRENAME plan, Slovakia pledged to develop proposals of conceptual security documents, to implement perennial planning process and its successive harmonization with NATO planning processes, to keep up the AF reform, and to meet interoperability objectives as well as partnership objectives. The above-mentioned difficulties, however, caused that Slovakia's integration to NATO became endangered by the AF reform difficulties, which became apparent in the second half of 2000. According to NATO assessment, adaptation of national security and defence system and laws to the NATO standards was not sufficient. The same applied to the Army transformation which did not comply with NATO criteria. Let us make closer analysis of the mentioned period.

The "Open Door" policy of the new government (established after the 1998 elections) brought a lot of teams from different countries, whose aim was to help the Slovak military, conduct an independent defence assessment and defence review, identify main problem areas, and recommend priorities for transforming the armed forces as well as the whole defence system.

The most important were the following ones:

- The Army of the Slovak Republic Combat Capabilities Evaluation – 1999;
- “C4 Study” completed by the US Air Force in July 2000;
- The Slovak Republic Defense Reform Study – June 2000 by Major General Garrett of the U.S. Department of Defense (Garrett Study);
- Defence Review of the Slovak Republic – January 2001 by Cubic Applications, Inc. (Cubic’s Defense Review);
- Review of the Management Structure and Administration of the MoD and GS – 2000 conducted by the United Kingdom (Clarke Study);
- Assessment of the Partnership for Peace Program – January 2001 conducted by NATO.

All those studies confirmed a seriousness of problems that the SR Army faced with. Three of them had a direct impact on intensifying the reform effort. The most significant was the Garrett study. It was the first comprehensive study conducted by the U.S. government. The findings and recommendations represented the official opinion of the U.S. government. The Garrett Study primarily focused on “*The Concept of the Ministry of Defence Reform till 2002*” (with outlook to 2010) and compared it with a real state of the forces. The main Garrett’s statement about “hollow forces” became a tool used by opposition parties against the government and by some coalition partners against the Minister of Defence. They said that it was the result of a new government, and particularly of a new Minister of Defence. The Garrett Study’s assessment and its recommendations opened up discussion in the broad security and defence society and created the environment necessary for a real reform of the security and defence system. In March 2000, following the Garrett Study, the Slovak Republic Minister of Defence requested assistance from the U.S. DoD to provide services which were necessary to plan and support Slovak defence modernization efforts. The U.S. Department of Defense selected Cubic Applications, Inc. (CAI) to provide this support. This assistance was planned in three phases. The first phase, initiated in September 2000, consisted of a “top-to-bottom” assessment of the current defence posture within the Slovak Republic. Its principal focus was to address the current state, practices, legislation, regulations and policies, and to provide prioritized recommendations. As requested by the Minister of Defence, this Defence Review was “build” on:

- Garrett Study;
- Clarke Study; and
- C4 Study.

The second phase focused on helping Slovak military experts to create a “Long Term Plan” for implementation of approved recommendations of Cubic’s “*Defence Review*”. The third phase resided in helping with implementation of the “Long Term Plan”. The agreement was signed by the General Director of Defence Policy and Defense Planning for a five-year period. Result of the first phase was Cubic’s *Defence Review* that confirmed most of the findings mentioned in Garrett Study, and agreed with the majority of its recommendations – the same applies to the Clarke and C4 Studies. The Cubic’s Defense Review was delivered in January 2001 and the NATO Assessment was delivered in February 2001. Both documents highlighted many areas where reform had to be intensified, as well as those areas where current defence plans were too ambitious. Moreover, these

assessments came to the common conclusion: the SR Army failed to move more quickly to the forces based upon the western doctrine and more realistic threat conditions. They were especially critical of inadequate resource levels given the planned size of the force and the large amount of equipment that needed to be modernized. They expressed the need to finalize an overall military strategy¹²².

The combination of this negative report and personal involvement in economic scandal caused that the Minister of Defence (Mr. Kanis) lost support of his own political partners. The new Minister of Defence, Mr. Stank, came with a clear objective to lead the Slovak military towards the NATO membership, which became more real at the Prague Summit where Slovakia was invited to join NATO.

As for Defence department and the AF, representatives of the MoD admitted that realisation of the 1999 – 2000 reform was backed neither by new security documents nor with development of appropriate sources (funds). The lack of strategic documents induced that defence planners were not backed by appropriate legislative documents – laws, notices, etc., which would unambiguously establish responsibilities and relations among the Parliament, Government, MoD, General Staff and rules for civilian and democratic control of the defence area.

Defence planning as a system posed another problem. The process started with some kind of institutionalisation. At the MoD level, the Defence Planning and Resource Management branch was created, under the Defence Policy Division. Later in 2005, it started to work as an independent division, though an attempt to introduce the defence planning started earlier, in 1995, at the MoD level.

In 1997, implementation of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), as a part of it the Defence Resources Management Model (DRMM) for 1998 – 2002, was approved. However, a complete implementation of defence planning required revision of several military doctrines and norms, as well as harmonisation with the NATO defence planning system. Despite some progress, the level of defence planning during the 1999 – 2001 period did not reach expected level. The intensification of planning process started during 2001 – 2002, after approval of three main strategies: security, defence and military one.

Period 2001 – 2005: Launch of the Long-Term Planning Process after the Preparation of Basic Strategic Documents

After NATO experts' recommendations, particularly after the preparation of so called *Garrett Study* in 2000, a preparation of new strategic documents started. The *Garrett Study* concluded that the SR policy and strategy-related documents provided ample details determining what had to be accomplished, but very little guidance on how to achieve those goals. This was a major obstacle to the national defence reform. It emphasized that documents established by the SR had to correct it and recommended the highest priority on their completion, publication, and periodic review.

As regards the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces, the MoD representatives admitted that implementation of the 1999 – 2000 reform was backed neither by new security documents nor by development of appropriate resources. Due to the lack of strategic documents, defence planners were not backed by appropriate legislative documents – especially laws, notices, etc. – that would unam-


¹²² The Long Term Planning Process – A Unique Approach for the Development of Future Force Structure. LTC Josef Pokorny. The Slovak Republic Armed Forces. U.S. Army War College, 2003.

biguously determine responsibilities and relations among the Parliament, the Government, the MoD, and the General Staff, as well as rules for civilian and democratic defence area control.

The defence planning as a system posed another problem. The process started with some kind of institutionalisation. At the MoD level, under the Defence Policy Division, the Defence Planning and Resource Management branch was created. Later, in 2005, it started to work as an independent division. However, an attempt to introduce the defence planning started even earlier, in 1995, at the MoD level. In 1997, implementation of Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and its part – the Defence Resources Management Model (DRMM) for 1998 – 2002, was approved. Complete implementation of defence planning, however, required revision of several military doctrines and norms, as well as harmony with NATO defence planning system. Despite some progress, the level of defence planning during the period 1999 – 2001 did not reach an expected level. The intensification of planning process started during 2001 – 2002, after approval of 3 main strategies – security, defence and the military one.

The *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* served as a model for the elaboration of other major security and defence documents, especially **The Slovak Republic Defence Strategy** (2001), **The Slovak Republic Military Strategy** (2001) and so called *Armed Forces Model 2010*. The preparation of important laws followed. *The Constitutional Law on National Security in Times of War, States of War, Endangerment, and Emergency* represented the way out for the next laws preparation. Among laws which secure the defence and which created conditions for our entry into NATO, there were *Constitutional Law on Security, Law on the Defence, Armed Forces Law, and Law on Conscription*. They are still valid (of course after several amendments). The complexity of these documents is shown in the Table 1. Blue coloured fields represent cancelled documents.

Changes of S and D documents 2001



The Defence Strategy was understood as a transition document. It replaced the *Defence Doctrine of the Slovak Republic* (from 1994) and the *National Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (restricted from 1996). Its main objective was to create a systemic and material basis to secure the defence of the Slovak Republic, while creating conditions of transition, in order to secure the national defence within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through taking into account the security environment and the defence resources of the State. One of the main goals was to create new conceptual documents and legal standards in the area of the National Defence, and thus initiate the State defence system reform and the defence planning process at the national level. According to the DS, in order to achieve compatibility with command and control systems of the NATO member states' armed forces, it was necessary to reassess AF management and command, and subsequently to ensure management of all components of the AF by the Slovak Republic Ministry of Defence.¹²³

At the same time, it was important to prepare a transition period necessary for transformation of the troops of the SR Ministry of Interior and the railway troops of the SR Ministry of Transport, Postal Services and Telecommunications to non-military components that would not be a part of the AF, but would fulfil the tasks within their respective departments.

The Slovak Republic Defence Planning According to the Defence Strategy 2001¹²⁴

Defence Strategy quoted:

Defence planning must be a part of the State management and an integral part of the state planning process. It will represent a complex process carried out by the Government and the state administration bodies for ensuring the defence of the State. The Slovak Republic Defence Planning will be aimed at:

- *defining the long-term plans and medium-term programmes for the defence of the State, which will ensure effective utilization of the defence resources of the State according to specified priorities;*
- *ensuring stability of defence expenditures;*
- *co-ordination and improving the effectiveness of the work of state administration competent bodies;*
- *improving the effectiveness of mutual co-operation of the Slovak Republic with the NATO bodies and creating the conditions for smooth interconnecting of the defence planning within the NATO defence planning;*
- *creating the material conditions for more effective participation of the AF in the planning and implementation of international political-military co-operation, including the participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations;*
- *improving the transparency of expenditures used for the defence.*

¹²³ Another step was a preparation of a transition period needed for transformation of the Armed Troops of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic and the Railway Troops (armed) of the Ministry of Transport, Postal Services and Telecommunications of the Slovak Republic to non-military elements which will not be part of the Armed Forces, but will fulfill the tasks within their respective departments.


¹²⁴ The Slovak Republic Defence Strategy 2001. Articles 67 – 70. se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=7&fileid=077AAD34-B43E-6551-C03D-619F8996AF63&lng=en.

To support the defence planning, the SR will introduce a system of defence planning, programming and budgeting which will ensure the defence of the State. Budgetary resources for defence in particular years based on long-term and medium-term priorities and tasks defined in the following documents: the Long-term Plan of the Armed Forces Development and the Plan of Development of the Defence System of the State within the Framework of Possibilities of the State Budget.

The Slovak Republic Military Strategy became the principal source of defence reform guidance. As required by the Defence Planning System, the *Military Strategy* was developed to provide the strategic guidance for the armed forces. It served as a conceptual guidance to the working groups that fleshed out their specific proposals and completed the complementary documents, *The Organizational Structure of the Slovak Republic Ministry of Defence*, the *Programme Force Model 2010* document, and *The Long Term Plan of Structure and Development of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces*. Ultimately, all of these inputs served as the basis and rationale for the overall plan to reform the Slovak Republic Army (SRA) within the *Slovak Republic (SR) Force 2010*. *The Military Strategy* became the most critical document from a force development perspective. It directed a three-tiered force design: High Readiness Force, Forces at Lower Readiness and Long Term Build-Up Forces. Model Force 2010 preparation is shown in the Table 2.

Reform Planning for 2001

SR Force 2010 : Process and Products



The Long Term Planning Process represented for the first time that rigorous cost analysis was incorporated into defence planning. The applied cost analysis model was based on the *Defence Resource Management Model* methodology. The basic steps were: to predict the annual funding level for 2002 – 2010 period, to determine a ratio of operation to modernization costs for every year of the reform,

and to develop cost analysis methodology. Previous reform efforts were severely under-funded and conducted without inputs of a strategic planning process that would effectively and realistically determined the objectives, while taking into consideration economic resources.

This led to inappropriate, incomplete, or stalled implementation. *The SR Force 2010* was developed with a reasonable annual funding level in mind. The Governments promised the defence planners that in 2005 they can expect military spending at the level of 1.89 % of GDP. From 2006 onward, there was an expectation that defence spending would increase minimally to 2 % of GDP (*The SR Force 2010* document, 2002, p.19).

The threat analysis conducted within the military strategy called for the development of a force structure that would transform the SRA into a smaller, but high quality force, capable to contribute to a wide range of collective security operations across the entire spectrum of war. A major goal of the *SR Force 2010* is to reduce the overall manpower levels from the current level of 40,000 (including civilian employees) to approximately 24,000, with a possibility of further reductions, as the final force structure evolves¹²⁵

(*The SR Force 2010* document, 2002: p. 48). The *Force 2010* called for radical change that would reduce a number of senior grade officers and increase the number of junior officers and NCOs. The SRA had simultaneously met the additional challenge – to eliminate conscription and move to all-professional force by 2006.

In 2001 the first steps of building the defence planning system started, along with the *Long Term Plan* development. In this experimental year, so called “zero year” started for cycle 2002 – 2007, in accordance with NATO 5+1 year cycle. The first year of the defence planning for 2002 – 2008 was a way out for the 2003 national budget preparation. It was launched on the basis of the MoD Defence Planning Guidance and selected ministries prepared the annual budget. The main problem was that this “first year” of defence planning cycle had not been backed by *The Long Term Plan*. Thus the first cycle which was based on the *Long Term Plan* was a planning cycle launched in accordance with the Defence Planning Guidance for years 2003 – 2009. In this way, it has created conditions also for programmes and budget planning for years.

It is interesting that the first DP Guidance was restricted, in contrast to the situation in NATO countries. Foreign experts recommended to remove excessive secreting of information within the defence resources area. In June 2002 the government approved an open document *The Defence Planning Methodology*.

The first phase of the reform (in 2006 horizon) should have put the accent on communication ability, armament modernization, as well as strategic transport provision and sustainability of the High Readiness Force. Material facilities and equipment of other units (so called Forces at Lower Readiness) had a secondary priority, thus financial resources intended for their improvement ought to have been provided as late as the second phase. In 2004 Slovakia became a NATO member country.

¹²⁵ In 2003, it was 32,800 (13,700 professionals; 8,600 conscripts; 10,500 civilians), in 2004 it was 25,400 (21,000 professionals and 4,400 civilians, till March 2005 it was 84 % professionalisation, till the end of 2005 100% were planned).

The membership in the NATO collective defence and security system provided Slovakia with contractual security guarantees which enabled effective defence with maximum use of collective defence advantages. Through the NATO membership, Slovakia fully entered collective force planning. At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, a package of the Force Goals 2004 was officially adopted. It has formed a basis for a new structure of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces, too. In December 2004, the governmental committee for the NATO membership preparation (PRENAME) terminated its activity. This mechanism, based on the Alliance internal functioning, defined a new, comprehensive and interdepartmental approach to defence planning. So the year 2004 became the last one of fulfilling the *National Programme of the SR Preparation for NATO Membership* (NP PRENAME). However, at the same time, new programmes began. Those related to full involvement of the Slovak Republic in the Alliance defence planning and package of capabilities, known under the title *NATO Force Goals 2004*.

Through the *Force Goals 2004* adoption, the NATO planners tried to achieve approximately the same level of capabilities as in particular NATO member states. Through adoption of these goals, we were invited to re-evaluate existing strategic plans and documents, since the spectrum of our armed forces action in the Alliance configuration was extending. The Slovak Republic committed itself to prepare mechanized battalion with appropriate combat support and combat service support elements; then radiological, chemical and biological defence battalion; as well as two other smaller units; and all this within 3 years. Till 2010, we undertook to prepare the main contribution in form of mechanized brigade with complete combat support and combat service support elements, as well as other smaller units at the company level. The Force Goals represented qualitatively new requirements for forces detachment and their military capabilities. Through their extent, they markedly exceeded the then commitments, including those that were defined in then existing *Long-Term Plan of Armed Forces Development – Model 2010*.

Financial demands of the *Force Goals* required considerable reduction in armed forces target numbers, which led to other significant interferences into the forces structure. In the course of 2004, admission to the NATO defence planning and Force Goals 2004 adoption required updating of the Model 2010 that used to be a corner stone of the defence planning. Long-term planning cycle 2004 had to take into consideration the contributions into the defence dimension of the European Union that we joined in the same year, 2004. Other points that had to be taken into consideration were requirements following from new threats, there were also some imperfections of the Model 2010 and several failures during its implementation caused – inter alia – by actual inaccessibility of financial resources it was based on. The Long-Term Plan till 2010 was based on allocation of 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) for the armed forces reform needs, within the Ministry of Defence budget chapter. We never managed to reach this level (which stays unrealistic even after 2008). In this way, none of the governments met its obligation that was confirmed in the NATO Headquarters several times, which then (but also now) brought about troubles within performing national missions by the SR armed forces. Even then, it was clear that defence spending – confronted with other social transformation priorities – reached the ceiling, at least in a short-term

and medium-term horizon. To reach 2% of GDP for defence remained just a kind of ambition. That is why it was necessary to put greater emphasis on resources spending effectiveness, which in the MoD conditions meant to continue in improving defence planning system.¹²⁶ It was assumed that broader modernization projects would be carried out after the professionalization finished.¹²⁷

Nevertheless, it is possible to assess this delay as something positive, since Slovakia did not buy expensive weapon systems that – in regard to interoperability with NATO – did not have to represent priorities and could reduce financial resources allocated for the reform. On the other hand, there used to be delays in provision of crucial means, particularly in area of information and communication systems. The resources budgeted for the development were “cannibalized” by expenses on maintenance, personnel and unplanned operations abroad. Militarization process, notably its acquisition phase, was becoming a kind of chronic problem causing late introducing of weapon systems and too high prices of commercially available equipment.

Following a need to intensify the armed forces reform, a fully reviewed conceptual document *The Armed Forces Reform – MODEL 2010* entitled *The Long-Term Plan of the Ministry of Defence Development with Outlook to 2015*, that started to be implemented successively, was presented to the government. A summary analysis of the main assessing documents from the beginning of 2004 discovered, inter alia, that national defence planning still was not fully harmonized with allied defence planning procedures. It also proved that politico-strategic and military-operational plans did not have an expected impact on defence system and armed forces development. Within the MoD expenses assessment, a too wide and no-address scale was used. Defence planning did not dispose of effective feedback. Moreover, acquired knowledge and information were predominantly assessed at administrative level and did not reflect in long-term objectives, programme intentions, or economic analyses evaluation.

Partial Conclusion

In 2004, following the changes in the Slovak Republic’s security position and environment – related to the SR accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union – as well as new development of the security situation in the world, a process of the SR defence reassessment began. The preparation of new *Slovak Republic Security Strategy* and the *Slovak Republic Defence Strategy* (passed in 2005) launched. At the same time, updating *Long-Term Plan of the SR AF Structure Development – Model 2010* initiated, too¹²⁸.

Reason for reviewing/updating the SR security documents, in particular Security Strategy:

- Changes in the security environment (both global and regional). New threat assessment (The U.S. Security Strategy 2002, NATO Summit in Prague and Istanbul, the EU Security Strategy 2003).
- Principal change of the SR position after the accession to NATO and the EU.

¹²⁶ Mário Nicolini: Slovenská republika rok po vstupe do NATO, Euroatlantic Centre 10.5. 2005. (Mário Nicolini: The Slovak Republic one Year after its Accession to NATO, Euroatlantic Centre, May 10, 2005.)

¹²⁷ Modernization remains one of the topical problems even after 2008; author’s note.

¹²⁸ From the foreword of the Model 2015, the SR MoD document.

Reason for reviewing/updating the SR Military Strategy and Defence Planning Process 2010:

- Failure to implement some aspects of the reform and difficulty with receiving expected resources.
- New NATO approach to the Force Goals:

- F 2010 (oriented to provide combat forces – battalion and brigade task force) primarily for A-5 collective defence operations;

- NATO review of the Force Proposals has requested corps level Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support Units (CSS) declared to be deployable outside the NATO region (in 2001 we did not anticipate such changes).

Situation after Accession to NATO and the EU – Influence of New Strategic Documents Approved in 2005

Political and Security Situation after Slovak Republic's Accession to NATO

After the Slovak Republic joined NATO and the EU in the spring of 2004, a process of security environment assessment was executed. This process became a platform for elaboration of the Slovak Republic's Defence Policy Directives, following a NATO document Threat Assessment (MC 161/02). The directives were approved by a resolution of the Slovak Republic Government (in 2004) and their conclusions provided basis for political-military and strategic reassessment of the security environment defence aspects.¹²⁹

The problem was (likewise in 2000 – 2001), that the defence reassessment became without elaboration of new strategic documents. Those were not approved until 2005. Some analysts presume that the department of defence influenced those strategic documents through changes in planning, and not vice versa. Initiative was, once again, rather on the part of the defence department. That was understandable, when taking into consideration that after accession to NATO and EU, both institutions defined requirements for contribution to capabilities more openly. The difficulties were caused by slow reaction of the decision sphere (away from the MoD), but particularly of the parliamentary one. It is possible to say that a preparation of these documents could start immediately after the 2002 elections, considering Slovakia was invited to join NATO and EU. The government's statement of policy from 2002 emphasized that *“current strategic conceptual documents and legal regulations, as well as character and training of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces, have to meet collective defence requirements, even in the new security conditions of the present day and the nearest future.”* A preparation of the *Defence Policy Guidance* (2004) represented an attempt to overcome this vacuum existing in the security documents.

The *Defence Policy Guidance* (2004) assumed a revision of Defence Strategy and Military Strategy, with aim to prepare a new Defence Strategy in connection with a new Security Strategy. The guidance called for defining the SR political-military ambitions, in order to express our tasks in NATO and the EU, and tasks of

¹²⁹ Defence Planning Directives for period 2006 – 2011, part b1.2.

the Armed Forces. Reading this document, one must allow an idea that DPG surpasses a preparation of new Security Strategy as a consequence of Armed Forces needs (after joining NATO and changes in NATO requirements). The better way would be to prepare the Security Strategy firstly as a kind of an umbrella document. In this document, there are issues and areas that should be solved in the Security Strategy.

In the course of the defence reassessment analysis, it was observed that the Slovak republic's membership in NATO and the EU had changed internal security environment and represented articulated security guarantees, ensured by NATO. The Slovak Republic accepted commitments resulting from its NATO and EU membership, and thus joined the collective defence system. Conclusions from defence reassessment initiated update of the *Slovak Republic Security Strategy* and the *Slovak Republic Defence Strategy*, including the *Long-Term Plan of Armed Forces Structure and Development – the Slovak Republic Armed Forces – Model 2010*. An actual influence upon the defence reassessment was proved by so-called *NATO Force Goals 2004*, passed by a resolution of the Slovak Republic Government. The Ministry of Defence thus launched a process aimed to update the *Slovak Republic Defence Strategy* and the *Long-Term Plan of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces Structure and Development – Model 2010* and to broaden its planning outlook to 2015. These documents comprised collective defence intentions, objectives and tasks that resulted from NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitments (2002), Force Goals 2004, and Istanbul Summit conclusions.

To sketch in the situation, the above-mentioned document stated that a next process of the armed forces reform should accept these facts:¹³⁰

- a) NATO collective defence is considered to be a crucial method of the SR defence;
- b) SR Armed Forces are developed as a part of the NATO Armed Forces structure, with a key mission for Article 5. At the same time, they should be able to contribute into the NATO operations away from Article 5;
- c) Meeting commitments of the Slovak Republic towards NATO (Force Goals 2004, PCC) represents a **key priority** within financial provision; at the same time, conclusions resulting from a process of EU military capacities creation are also taken into consideration;
- d) Building and sending of combat units as well as building and detachment of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units have to be provided simultaneously;
- e) The forces have to be built-up with accent on rules of engagement, deployability, sustainability, and interoperability with the NATO members' armed forces.

The NATO and EU membership influenced also a preparation of strategic documents in 2005. The Slovak Republic agreed with primary objectives and functions resulting from the Alliance Strategic Concept and the European Security Strategy. This orientation gives rise to two out of four primary objectives of the defence policy:¹³¹

¹³⁰ Ibid, part 2.1.3.

¹³¹ The Defence Strategy 2005, Article 18.

- to fulfil all commitments of a NATO member;
- to fulfil commitments of an EU member within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy.

In comparison with the *SR Defence Strategy 2001* and the *SR Military Strategy 2001*, the tasks resulting from NATO and EU membership were concretised and better responded to the European Security Strategy and the European Security and Defence Policy. Even in time of the *Defence Strategy 2005* preparation, the Slovak Republic took into account that in December 2003 the EU Security Strategy was adopted and, on the basis of the new ambition defined therein, the Headline Goal 2010 (HG 2010) was drawn up. During 2004, the SR started to analyse the reassessment of its existing contribution for purpose of the EU military crisis management.

New Situation Required the Model 2010 Amendment

Due to the changes of the Slovak Republic's security position, a process of strategic reassessment of the Slovak Republic defence and top-strategic documents afforded conditions for modification of the long-term defence planning cycle. Regarding new conditions and new NATO Force Goals 2004, it was necessary to amend the *Long-Term Plan of Armed Forces Development – Model 2010*. **In December 2005, the government approved the *Long-Term Plan of Ministry of Defence Development with Outlook to 2015*.**

Starting points for the Model 2015 preparation were the following ones:

a) New Strategic Documents

- the SR Security Strategy;
- the SR Defence Strategy;
- the Long-Term Plan of SR MoD Development with Outlook to 2015.



b) NATO Force Goals

c) New Estimate of Resource Assumption for the SR MoD Budget:

- in period 2006 – 2010 it represents 1.85 % of GDP
- in period 2010 – 2015 it represents 1.86 % of GDP

On October 13, 2004, the Slovak Republic Government approved the **Draft Budget of the Public Administration for years 2005 – 2007**, where a share of defence spending represented **1.9% of GDP – 1.86% of GDP** for the MoD department and **0.04% of GDP** for other ministries and central organs of the public administration. Pursuant to an expenses plan, a presumed limit for the MoD department (from 2008 to 2011) represented 1.86% of GDP. Later development showed that even this percentage is hardly realizable. Nevertheless, it is necessary to add that an absolute budget for the defence department represented in Slovak crowns (SKK) was raising up.

A progression of this planning process preparation is demonstrated in the following tables:



Model 2010 review had 2 aspects:

EXTERNAL ASPECTS

NATO TRANSFORMATION

- changes in political-military strategy;
- requirements on force structure and capabilities;
- emphasis on deployable units;
- expeditionary force;

EU MILITARY POLICY

- NATO-EU relation;
- EU security/military policy;
- EU vs. NATO requirements;

INTERNAL ASPECTS

- Results and experience from the current Long-Term Plan implementation;
- Defence Planning System;
- Resources Availability;
- NATO/EU Accession;
- Implementation of Force Goals 2004.

The *Model 2015* is not a new conception, but only an amendment of the *Model 2010*. The *Model 2010* was based on individual defence and at the same time it provided ground for the integration to NATO. At the present day, a membership in joint defence and security system grants us a promissory security guarantee based on a joint principle. These reasons have influenced a progress in the armed forces requirements. There is a shift from the forces for individual defence towards the forces for common defence, from orientation on Article 5 operations towards of wider engagement and better interoperability. Addition of CS/CSS units requirements have represented a significant change. In other words, the philosophy of approach has changed. Comparison of these models is demonstrated in the following table:

Model 2010

Strategic Goal: to defend national strategic interests independently; to ensure the preparedness for accession to NATO, and to modernize in a long-term framework.

Balanced Force for Self-Defence

Less Deployable: Focused on Article 5

Lower Capability/Interoperability

Predominantly Combat Forces

No Corps-Level CSS Contributions to NATO

MODEL 2015

Strategic Goal: to restructure the armed forces for a full spectrum of Alliance operations (with preservation of ability to defend national strategic interests) in accordance with the NATO and EU requirements and commitments to other international organizations or coalitions.

Contributor to Collective Defence

More Deployable: No Restrictions

Higher Capability/Interoperability

Combat Forces with Fully Deployable Supporting CS/CSS

Corps-Level CSS Contributions to NATO

The changes defined in the new long-term plan should guarantee that the armed forces will dispose of ability specified in the *Force Goals 2004* in a medium-term outlook to 2010. The next step comprises implementation of the *Force Goals 2006*, so that the Slovak Republic could adequately carry out obligations arising from the North Atlantic Treaty by 2015.

The starting points for the Model 2015 preparation were the following ones:

a) New Strategic Documents:

- the SR Security Strategy
- the SR Defence Strategy
- the Long-Term Plan of the SR MoD Development with Outlook to 2015

b) NATO Forces Goals

c) New Estimate of Resources Assumption for the SR MoD Budget:

- for period 2006 – 2010 it represents 1.85 % of GDP
- for period 2010 – 2015 it represents 1.86 % of GDP

From the aspect of planning, the year 2005 thus represented a partial success. In *Comprehensive Assessment of the SR Defence in 2005*, there has been the following statement: The SR Defence Strategy requirements were incorporated into the *Long-Term Plan of the Ministry of Defence Development with Outlook to 2015*. It managed to partially reduce the tension between political-strategic and force-development (defence) planning. Effectiveness of defence planning was unfavourably influenced by inconsistent respect for given priorities of the Ministry of Defence development, complexity of programme structure, large number of subjects entering the programme budgeting processes, excessive number of obligatory indicators, need to ensure budgetary provision of the tasks, that were not passed in budgetary breakdown.¹³²

The *Long-Term Plan of SR Ministry of Defence with Outlook to 2015*, which is incorporated also in Model 2015, responded to the fact that after the SR admission to NATO and the EU, a great shift has occurred in its security system and the armed forces. That is why it amends a previous medium-term model (2010) and defines particularly the MoD priorities, requirements and tasks of the armed forces in a more realistic spirit, follows a planning limit 1.9 % of GDP for the department. It contains a crucial change, which is a formation of expeditionary forces, a use of collective defence instead of individual one, and including of preventive security activities in accordance with international coalitional treaties.

Problems that Remain Despite Increase in Defence Planning Quality: Military-Political Ambitions vs. Reality

According to the Defence Strategy 2005, the political-military ambition of the Slovak Republic is to prepare its Armed Forces for participation in at least two simultaneous operations. The priority shall be to attain readiness, firstly for NATO-

¹³² Komplexné hodnotenie obrany SR za rok 2005. Časť 2/6. (the Comprehensive Assessment of the SR Defence in 2005. Section 2/6 , transl.)

led operations, and secondly for peace support operations led by international organizations¹³³.

Military-political ambitions mentioned in the defence strategy were particularised in the *Model 2015*, e.g. ability to keep 8 % of army (ground force) in operations (40 % of force has to meet the requirement of deployment availability¹³⁴). The rotation of units in operations at level of battalion and battalion group or element of expense equality to the battalion is expected. The plan does not expect the ability for rotation of brigade group provided by itself.

In course of 2005 – 2008, a contradiction between the military-political ambitions and reality emerged. There was also a shift of terms connected with promised readiness of a bigger type of land combat unit for the NRF and a chemical unit; e.g. a term for readiness of a mechanized brigade group shifted by 7 years, which the NATO negotiating team accepted, but after initial surprise and disenchantment.

One of the problems connected with the defence reforms provision and improvement of capabilities was and still is a non-fulfilment of governmental promise of the defence spending in an amount of 2 % of GDP. Recent three years, since 2005, have shown that even an estimate of 1.86 % of GDP was not realistic. In fact, another decrease in percentage has come about, although expenses have not been rising in reality.

- in 2005 it was	1.77% of GDP, which actually represented	25.341 milliard SKK
- in 2006	1.65% of GDP	26.987 milliard SKK
- in 2007	1.51% of GDP	27.987 milliard SKK
- in 2008 ¹³⁵	1.682% of GDP	
- in 2009	1.687 % of GDP	
- in 2010	1.685% of GDP	

In course of 2006, military planners had to cut almost 1 milliard SKK and in course of 2007 almost 0.5 milliard SKK in comparison with data from the approved national budgets. In the Comprehensive Defence Assessment for 2006, it was stated that neither a purchase of new land technique, nor a modernization of out-dated technique were realized.

A critical attitude was adopted in the Comprehensive Defence Assessment for 2007. Let us quote:

“Contrary to the past, a fundamental change which happened within a defence department planning area is that only those things are planned for which real financial resources are guaranteed.

*Planning according to the available economic framework has demonstrated within content, resource, and time interconnection between a process of acceptance of the Force Goals 2004 proposals and a **process of the Long-Term Plan 2015 reassessment.***

- Analysis of the Long-Term Plan has demonstrated that a possibility to achieve originally planned objectives and priorities in a required quality and within originally determined time horizons is unrealistic and unrealizable.

¹³³ The Slovak Republic Defence Strategy 2005, art. 27 <http://www.mosr.sk/data/files/794.pdf>.

¹³⁴ Practically, the 40 % of deployable forces represent approximately 4,000 troops ready for engagement, and 8 % of deployable and sustainable forces represent approximately 800 troops.

¹³⁵ Podľa návrhu, ktorú schválila vláda v roku 2006, s výhľadom do roku 2010. –pozn. autorov

- *The basic reasons of this situation were particularly the following ones: **internal deficits from the previous period, macro-economic planning starting points and reserves in the provision process without sufficient resources.** This results in a necessity to reassess it fundamentally **with a view to harmonize political-military ambition of the SR with real financial possibilities of the State.***

In 2007, the Long-Term Plan was reassessed, or better say updated, once again. The process started on the bases of the government's statement of policy from 2006, which observed: "... *the SR Government will intensify its efforts in promotion of comprehensiveness and efficiency of the defence and create preconditions for improvement of the defence control system, inter alia through an up-date of the Long-Term Plan of the SR MoD Development 2015.*" This was followed by the government's statement of policy from February 2007, which assigned the Ministry of Defence to reassess the SR AF Model 2015 and suggest a way of the Long-Term Plan adjustment.

Reasons for the Long-Term Plan 2015 Reassessment

- Imbalance between tasks and resources
- increase in tasks without additional financial backing
- more demanding Force Goals (2004, 2006, 2008);
- new missions throughout the year;
- unplanned assistance tasks for state administration authorities;
- constant budgetary provisions for various reasons, shift of financial resources from priority projects to "new" and substitutive ones;
- failure to comply promised budget for defence
- Experience gained in DP 2015 carrying out
- differences between DP and reality;
- command and control;
- increase in numbers of NATO and EU representations.

Therefore, defence planners for defence tasks performance modified an amount of assumed allocation of financial resources in the SR MoD budget category on defence tasks performance (it means on the behalf of Force Goals 2006, too):

- from 2 % to 1.85 % of GDP in 2006 – 2010

- in an amount of 1.86% of GDP from 2011.


As it has been already demonstrated, neither this reduction corresponds to reality. According to the available analyses, a deficit of available resources could reach 23.6 milliard SKK – what represents about 2.9 milliard SKK per year – in contrary to the resources intended in the *Model 2010*.

To better understand the complexity of this process, we will try to analyse the reasons, or better say "starting points" of this update:

1. MC 400 – Security Environment Assessment (NATO document)
2. The Slovak Republic Defence Strategy (2005);
3. Defence Policy Directive for 2008-2013 (developed on the basis of a NATO directive);
4. The Catalogue of the SR AF tasks resulting from laws, strategic documents and international commitments (developed at the SR MOD);

5. The Long-Term Plan of the SR AF Development and Structure – Model 2010;
6. The Long-Term Plan of the SR MOD Development – Model 2015;
7. The SR Force Goals 2004 (NATO requirements updated in 2-year cycles);
8. The SR Force Goals 2006¹³⁶ (NATO requirements updated in 2-year cycles);
9. The SR National Attitudes to Force Goals Proposals 2008 (a proposal was known in 2007; it is approved in 2008);
10. The SR Defence Assessment (elaborated in 2-year intervals; a proposal is for 4-year intervals);
11. Defence Requirement Review 2007 (NATO document);
12. Strategic Vision – Military Challenge (ACT, 2004), NATO document;
13. The EU Long-Term Vision (2006) – An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capability Needs;
14. European Headline Goal 2008, European Headline Goal 2010.

A simplified outline depicting the impact of NATO and the SR documents is demonstrated in the following scheme:



Another factor, with which military planners could not count, is an influence of the worldwide financial crisis. According to the budget approved by the SR government for 2009, the defence spending will reach only 1.4 % of GDP, which represents 32 milliards SKK – 1.06 milliards of euros (an increase by 0.7 % in comparison with year 2008). The defence department is thus forced to dismiss altogether 1,440 civilian employees, which represents 25 % of their overall number, till February 2009. Likewise, in time of writing this paper, dissolution of two commands subordinated to the command of training and support forces was planned. A supposed decrease in number of soldiers – professionals has not been known.

¹³⁶ Force Goals 2006, in comparison with 2004, require from the SR less land combat units and – on the contrary – more units of combat service support. The aim is to build, within the SR AF, deployable capabilities of more comprehensive character – author's comment.

Conclusion

Experience of defence planning development at departmental and national level have confirmed a need for permanent analysis of the security environment and preparation of political-strategic decisions as a starting point for defence planning preparation. On the other hand, this process requires a consistent feedback to make military-political ambitions not only a pure unrealistic idea, but to provide them with adequate capabilities of the armed forces and creation of sufficient resources for their formation.

Within a preparation of the whole defence planning system, a positive influence of a pre-accession process to NATO has proved. During this process, the defence department, as well as governmental structures, prepared for interconnection with the NATO planning system – the system of defence control and planning was harmonized with the NATO procedures. On the other hand, NATO requirements “forced” to improve the planning system. Despite this, other analyses identically warn that national defence planning is still not fully harmonized with procedures of the allied defence planning.¹³⁷

Accession to NATO and the EU pointed out a need of more consistent anticipation of development in the security realm, and the possibilities to change their requirements on member states – including the Slovak Republic. The planning documents were “under the pressure” of both institutions and prepared either without covering by umbrella strategic documents or at best simultaneously with them. This has negatively reflected in a need for “reassessment” of the long-term plans and subsequently in changes within programmes, programme structure, or in non-implementation of the programmes.

In terms of internal problems within defence planning, it is necessary to call attention to problems within cohesion of long-term plans with medium-term programme planning and budgeting. What is positive is a division of responsibility for long-term, medium-term, and short-term planning. On the other hand, a negative is represented by interventions exceeding the tasks determined in the long-term plans. This manifests either in integration of programmes, with which the long-term planning does not count, or in non-implementation of approved programmes. Interventions into annual budgets and low discipline in observance of budgets have a negative effect, too.

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¹³⁷ Comprehensive Defence Assessment 2005, 2007.

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Model 2010,

<http://www.mod.gov.sk/12/materialy-a-dokumenty.php?mnu=11&PHPSESSID=8633b0ff8b573ee7d237ad17d7aa5e2c>

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Reform of the Slovak Republic 's Armed Forces

Vladimír Tarasovič

“We trained hard, but any time our groups should have come over to practical activities, we had to reorganize. It was only in my more mature age I came to the piece of knowledge that we have the leaning to face each new situation by a reorganization – it is a unique method for producing an illusion of progress. In fact, however, it produces chaos, inefficiency and demoralization.”

Gaius Petronius (died in 66 BC)

In 1993, after the Slovak Republic was established, the SR Ministry of Defence and the SR Army were being created *de facto* root and branch. Thus the first year of the Armed Forces (AF) existence was devoted mainly to formation of a pre-arranged organisational structure and to development of their command and control system.¹³⁸

The SR Army was established on January 1, 1993, in compliance with the Law of the SR National Council No.3, passed on December 16, 1992, concerning the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and establishment of two independent states – the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic. Following the law, the SR Army was considered to be an attribute of the state power, pertaining to a new actor on the international scene, and its role was *“to defend freedom, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic and assist in removal of effects of natural disasters and catastrophes endangering human lives or properties to a large extent.”*¹³⁹

Before the SR Army formation (at the end of 1992), the teams consisting of federal army servicemen – who were in Slovakia or wanted to return to Slovakia at that time – had started to work on preparation of command and organizational structures, and on preparation and implementation of decisions concerning a division of equipment, ammunition and other estate that was at disposal of the federal army. By the end of 1992, the main combat units with armament and equipment as well as substantial part of material and supplies were transferred to Slovakia. At the same time, the measures focused on redeployment of Slovak soldiers from divisions and departments dislocated in the Czech Republic to Slovakia were launched.

After the common state division, the Slovak armed forces disposed of 53,000 soldiers; 995 tanks; 1,370 combat vehicles; 1,059 artillery systems; 146 combat aircrafts; and 19 armed helicopters. This army composition, arrangements of its components in the territory, as well as overall conditions in a defence area, corresponded to a then assessment of possible development in Europe and position

¹³⁸ Kmec, Vladimír, Korba, Matúš, Ondrejcsák, Róbert: Transformácia NATO a bezpečnostná a obranná politika SR, Centrum bezpečnostných štúdií, Bratislava, 2004, s.113. (Kmec, Vladimír, Korba, Matúš, Ondrejcsák, Róbert: NATO Transformation and the SR Security and Defence Policy, Centre for Security Studies, Bratislava, 2004, p.113)

¹³⁹ The Order of the SR Army Commander No. 1 from January 1, 1993.

of a new state without appropriate security guarantees. At the same time, they were strongly influenced by strategic-operational concepts which still regarded an offensive operation as the main way of a national defence. The situation in Slovakia did not markedly differ from the situation in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of 1990s. Even in the course of 1993, the Slovak Republic had to reduce the number of soldiers and main types of conventional weapons, in compliance with commitments resulting from the *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces* – in order to reach the stipulated limits: 46,667 soldiers; 478 tanks; 683 combat vehicles; 383 artillery systems; 115 combat aircrafts; and 25 attack helicopters – till the end of 1995.¹⁴⁰

This period was very complicated. A high dynamics, with which the independent state had been established, meant that national authorities (with a new Ministry of Defence among others) entered the first days of the independent Slovak Republic existence with provisional ideas of their work in the modified conditions. Inherited military structures, based on units which had been serving for the CSLA¹⁴¹

training purposes and military education (7 out of 11 secondary schools were situated in Slovakia, as well as 5 out of 7 universities), and military departments redeployed to Slovakia in the course of 1992, were not able to ensure full performance of the SR Army main task, which was “*to ensure defence of the republic by means of own forces and under own national command*”, without adequate reforms in the whole defence system.

The SR Army transformation, which the MoD originally planned for six years, finally changed into a long-term process, since in the first decade the reforms were executed, more or less, by means of an “attempt – mistake” method. It often reminded the already mentioned quote of Gaius Petronius.

From a time perspective, the process of reforms can be divided into three phases:

- 1993 – 1995 – period of self-searching;
- 1996 – 1998 – transformation or reform – efforts to make changes continue;
- 1999 – present day – from proclamation to a real reform (?).

Years 1993 – 1995: Period of Search for Own Security Policy and Resulting SR Army Model

At the same time, the then MoD and army management realized that a relatively successful fulfilment of tasks after the establishment of a new state was just the first step in the reform process. Limited financial resources (in 1993 the budget defence allocation represented 8.5 milliards SKK) and complicated building of military structures resulted in conclusions that it was necessary to draft a political platform for the SR Army transformation and the Slovak Republic defence implementation. This platform ought to have taken into consideration power-political transformations in Europe and the rest of the world, as well as expectations connected with development in the international security realm and its institutional framework in a long-term perspective. This resulted in *The SR Defence Doctrine*, approved in the SR National Council, on June 30, 1994.

¹⁴⁰ Armáda 93, Ministerstvo obrany SR, 1993. (Army 93, The SR Ministry of Defence, 1993.)

¹⁴¹ CSLA – Czechoslovak People's Army; author's note.

The SR Defence Doctrine was the first political document which – following the SR Constitution – set the defence policy goals and principles of the state's engagement in the defence area. At the same time, the doctrine set a goal to ensure a transition from the individual defence to the collective one, by means of participation in the Partnership for Peace programme and use of opportunities provided by NATO and WEU decisions on preparedness of both communities to begin a dialogue about enlargement and admission of new members coming from transforming countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. The doctrine defined that a major task of the SR Army was to prepare itself to parry dangers to the national sovereignty at the own territory and, in case of attack, to parry air or land attack of an aggressor. Regarding the limited resources and limited defence potential of the Slovak Republic, it was obvious that only an integration to an effective community of states with a collective defence, such as NATO, could provide Slovakia partly with effective defence against probable threats, and partly with long-term guarantees comparable with countries of Western Europe.

The Ministry of Defence had prepared a document *The Strategic Concept of the SR Defence* which was intended to be a military-professional elaboration of *The SR Defence Doctrine* adopted in June 1994. It comprised *The Concept of the SR Army Construction by 2000* which included prevailing opinions on army transformation, as well as goals and tasks on which a process of further changes and army development was supposed to focus. The concept had set the SR Army transformation goal “*to construct, by the year 2000, relatively small, adequately equipped and trained army that – after the mobilization and operational development – will be able to defend sovereignty and integrity of the Slovak Republic.*”¹⁴²

Achievement of this goal ought to have supported an approaching to the forces of the NATO and EU developed states and have developed interoperability with their armed forces. The tasks were divided into three fundamental areas:

- establishment of new organizational structures;
- gradual rearmament and overall army modernization;
- increase in professionalisation level;

In 2000, a resulting army model was supposed to ensure – inter alia – a reduction of peace troops (35,000 soldiers), a rise of professionalisation level, an equipment enhancement, and formation of the response forces which would be capable to engage wherever in the national territory or participate in operations under the command of the United Nations and other international organizations.

The transformational goal ought to have been achieved within three phases. By the end of 1995 (the first phase), fundamental strategic-operational principles should have been elaborated, the structures should have been optimized through transition to brigade and corps army structure, the military education should have been reformed, and requirements resulting from the *Treaty on CAF* should have been met. The second phase (1996 – 1997) intended to finish organizational changes, stabilize structures, successively increase combat potential, intensify training, implement armament programmes, and increase professionalisation level. The third phase (1998 – 2000) ought to have rounded off the whole process by means of equipment modernization.¹⁴³

¹⁴² Armáda 93, Ministerstvo obrany SR, 1993. (Army 93, The SR Ministry of Defence, 1993)

¹⁴³ Armáda 93, Ministerstvo obrany SR, 1993. (Army 93, The SR Ministry of Defence, 1993)

Years 1996 – 1998: Efforts for Transformation Continue

Political leaders of the MoD, which had entered into the office after early elections in 1994, continued in the predetermined transformation only pro forma. Executed organizational changes in the army (e.g. formation of militia, which was politically motivated and included into the transformation concept additionally), as well as capacity and structure of combat support and combat service support at all levels of the land forces, signaled a long-term orientation towards defence of national territory, without taking into consideration the consequences of a membership in NATO or participation in peace support operations led by the United Nations. This solution was connected with opinions according to which the Slovak Republic would have to orientate itself preferentially to individual model of defence, and was strengthened after unsuccessful negotiations about Slovakia's membership in NATO in 1997.

The results of the 1st phase of transformation were assessed in a predominantly positive way, due to international response to timely fulfilment of commitments adopted to implementation of Treaty on CAF, participation of the Slovak Republic in the Partnership for Peace programme, and active participation in solution of crisis situation in the Balkans, where the engineer battalion of the SR Army had been engaged since May 1993, within multinational forces UNPROFOR. Under the influence of these positives, the servicemen of the SR Army entered the 2nd phase of transformation with expectations that in course of this phase the Slovak Republic, alongside its neighbours, would manage to make an important step towards NATO.

The aim of the second transformation phase was to stabilize the situation after the executed organizational changes and shift an attention to training, combat preparation, and gradual implementation of rearmament programmes and the army modernization. To support this and the third phase, the *Long-Term Plan of the SR Army Development till 2000* was elaborated and passed by the Council of the SR National Defence, on June 26, 1996. An actual development was, however, more complicated and contradictory, particularly due to some changes within internal political development. Already in 1996, the difficulties in communication with NATO and EU member states started to emerge. The Slovak Republic was the only country that at the beginning of 1996 had not dispatch its unit to the IFOR operation under the command of NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Subsequently, the Slovak Republic started to drop out of a group of hot candidates for NATO membership and slow down the dynamics of approaching to NATO, particularly at the political level. These changes caused decrease of defence expenses, which in 1995 represented 2.5 % of GDP, in 1996 it was 2.33 % of GDP, in 1997 it represented 2.1 % of GDP, and in 1999 this index reached a minimum level 1.6 % of GDP.

At the end of 1997 there was a prevailing opinion that the 2nd phase goals had not been fulfilled and an overall picture of the army and its preparedness were illustrated by a repeated proposal of the Chief of the General Staff to assess the SR Army as unable to fight and unprepared to perform appointed missions and main tasks. The political leaders of the defence department agreed with general conviction that all of this was caused by the lack of financial resources. After the second phase had failed, an implementation of the third phase goals and tasks was

not performed. Despite the situation was becoming more and more complicated, the MoD leaders and the army command continually repeated arguments about the lack of financial resources allocated for the defence. These statements were based on the fact that the defence budgets in an amount of 12.9 milliards SKK in 1995 up to 14.1 milliards SKK (which represented 1.93 % of GDP) enabled to cover neither operational costs of the defence department, which represented 16 – 17.5 milliards SKK. Moreover, till the end of 1996 the army depleted a great amount of material stocks it had gained after the division of the federal army. A rate of investments to purchase of new equipment and technique, or to its modernization, ranged in particular years from 2 % to 8 % of the defence budget and significantly fell behind investments of the developed countries (which invested to their armed forces modernization approximately 20 – 45 %).

At the end of its term, in 1998, the Ministry of Defence made one more attempt on the armed forces reform. It elaborated *The Integrated Programme of the SR Army Development by 2010, with 2015 Perspective*, which was supposed to create conditions for systemic organization of the SR defence department, determine optimum composition of command and control components, propose further development of the armed forces and their modernization, as well as strengthen integration preconditions of the SR. This programme, however, was launched too late to be implemented.¹⁴⁴

In terms of future development, this attempt was important, because in contrast to the transformation concept prepared by the military experts, this integrated programme represented the first initiative of political circles, which signaled decline of their confidence in ability of the army command to adequately cope with demanding requirements for a long-term development of the army. Despite the words about formation of relative small, well-equipped and trained army, and a need to approach to the developed countries, an adjective “relative” was of a paramount importance. So a war-deployable army, to which the peace structures adapted, was supposed to be a main safeguard for complex situations and defence. The situation in the armed forces of the neighbour countries represented an important criterion for assessment of a real state in our national defence, and thus a dynamics of the proceeding changes ought to have adapted to it.

This period was marked by a considerable integration failure which subsequently affected the armed forces reforms. The lack of political willingness and digression from originally declared goals meant also a stagnation of the armed forces transformation.¹⁴⁵

Even the goals of the 2nd phase of the SR Army transformation, planned for years 1996 – 1997, failed. In this phase, the emphasis should have been put on increase in force readiness, modernisation and rearmament, as well as fulfilment of the adopted partnership goals. On the one hand, a declaration of interest in accession to NATO continued, but on the other hand a top secret document *National Defence Strategy* was written in spirit of the Cold War with almost precisely defined enemy. Gradually, the next documents were elaborated which replaced the old ones. However, they did not solve a heart of the matter – practicability of

¹⁴⁴ See: Armáda Slovenskej republiky 1998, Ministerstvo obrany SR, 1999. (The Slovak Republic Army 1998, The SR Ministry of Defence, 1999.)

¹⁴⁵ Armáda Slovenskej republiky 1998, Ministerstvo obrany SR, 1999, s. 6. (The Slovak Republic Army 1998, the SR Ministry of Defence, 1999, p. 6.)

transformational steps resulting from the lack of financial resources. If in 1995 a share of defence expenses had represented 2.5 % of GDP, in 1998 it represented only 1.95 % of GDP.

Year 1999 – Present Day: From Proclamation to Real Reform

A new political situation after the 1998 elections enabled to take fundamental measures with aim to stop a negative development in the defence department. These measures had resulted from permanently insufficient financing (that continued also in 1999 by decrease to 1.65 % of GDP¹⁴⁶

) and transformational failures. The object was to avert its possible collapse. However, after one year of the new government ruling, the only result was the *Concept of the Ministry of Defence Reform by 2002 (with 2010 Perspective)*.

The basic intention of this concept, adopted by the government in 1999, was to restart inevitable changes in the defence and army field in such a way that their results would support a process of preparation for the NATO membership.¹⁴⁷

The main goals followed a renewal of balance between army needs and available resources, and increase of efficiency of the defence system to a level comparable with developed countries. A part of these goals was to build the armed forces which would be able – either independently or together with NATO forces – to response to challenges and threats in the security area at the beginning of the 21st century. The fulfilment of the goals should have been supported by the armed forces reform, which should have prepared for integration to NATO in horizon of 2004 – 2005. The armed forces with lower number of staff (30,000 soldiers) should have namely developed interoperability with NATO, increased a professionalisation rate (to 60-70 % by 2007), updated equipment and machines, and used modern methods of human resources management. An exceptional emphasis was put on increase in quality of the defence department control and the armed forces command, which should have been supported by integration of the SR MoD and the General Staff, reorganization of the corps commands into the force commands, and their internal division along a NATO model. It is true that the document contained tens of tasks, but without particular deadlines for their performance, personal responsibility for their fulfilment, and financial calculations. It did not determine successive steps of the reform, just a kind of “vision” which, however, provided neither a clear image of the armed forces in the future, nor need for the NATO membership.

However, instead of an expected renewal of activity focused on meeting the reform goals, the top authorities of the MoD and the General Staff were exhausted by preparation and effectuation of two reorganisations and a replacement of the

¹⁴⁶ The defence department has received insufficient financial support and it is not just a case of the present day (year 2000 – author's note), but since 1995. If in that year, expenses of defence represented 2.5 % of GDP, in 1999 it was only 1.95 %, for year 1999 it represented 1.65%, and in 2000 only 1.62 % of GDP. Manga, Slavomír: *Reforma rezortu obrany – hľadanie optimálneho variantu pre Slovensko*, in: Nečej, Elemír, Tarasovič, Vladimír (eds.) *Reforma rezortu ministerstva obrany a jej sociálno-ekonomické súvislosti*, Zväz vojakov Armády SR, MO SR, 2000, s. 25. (Defence Department Reform – Searching for Optimum Variant for Slovakia, in: Nečej, Elemír, Tarasovič, Vladimír (eds.) *Reform of the Ministry of Defence Departments and its Social-Economic Context*, p. 25).

¹⁴⁷ Kmec, Vladimír, Korba, Matúš, Ondrejcsák, Róbert: *Transformácia NATO a bezpečnosť a obranná politika SR*, Centrum bezpečnostných štúdií, Bratislava, 2004, s.120. (NATO Transformation and the SR Security and Defence Policy, Centre for Security Studies, Bratislava, 2004, p.120.)

General Staff to Bratislava. Moreover, the first year of the reform was affected by further decrease of allocated financial resources at the sum which was deeply under the level of operating costs. The defence department was in debt to material and common services suppliers. In 1999, only 13.5 milliards SKK were allocated for the defence, and a share in the GDP decreased to a record low level of 1.65 %. In the same year, only 56 million SKK were allocated for the interoperability goals, thus a fulfilment of this important commitment to NATO was postponed to the next year. It was clear that the defence department as well as the armed forces were not able to break out from the crisis in which they had fallen in course of transformation.

The difficulties caused by limited financial resources continued even in 2000. It was evident that a force command model and the armed forces composition – which were brought into their existence in that phase of the reform – still did not ensure a required balance with available resources, despite proclamations and promises to increase financial resources for the defence and decrease a capacity of war-deployed forces in a significant way. In spite of positive international response and clear support of the NATO action within Kosovo crisis solution on the part of the Slovak Republic as well as dispatch of the SR AF units to AFOR and KFOR, the partners in NATO started to worry whether the Slovak Republic would be able to manage all the important tasks connected with preparation for accession to NATO within such a short time, regarding a tempo of the planned changes in the defence and armed forces realm. These worries emerged during the NATO negotiations in the spring of 2000, when the Slovak Republic could not confirm a fulfilment of the interoperability goals from 1997, and was not able to guarantee that in years 2001-2006 it would meet criteria stated in the proposed 64 partnership goals.

At the end of 2000, the Alliance criticised the Slovak Republic for the state of the armed forces, their slow and drawn-out reform, insufficiently motivated management of the ministry, absence of defence planning, unreal character of the presented plans and their contrariety to the proclaimed priorities of the state. In that period, the Slovak Republic still lacked basic strategic documents that would clearly define Slovak national interests, security threats, as well as adequate security and defence policy of the state. In that situation, the U.S. government helped the Slovak Republic and sent some military experts to Slovakia, who were supposed to assess the state of the armed forces and subsequently elaborate a strategy of a further reform procedure in cooperation with our military experts.

The U.S. team, in its official report (so-called Garrett's Study), came to these main conclusions:

- the Slovak Republic has pursued changes in the defence system and the armed forces without such standard strategic documents as the Security Strategy or the Military Strategy;
- the Slovak Republic does not have a perennial defence planning system at its disposal;
- a size of defence capacities exceeds available resources and does not correspond to the real security situation;
- the peace forces are weakly staffed, which is insufficient for their engagement,

and the mobilized reserves have not undergone a training;

- a peace training is complicated, since the armed forces are incorporated in three ministries;¹⁴⁸
- personal management system represents a combination of new and obsolete procedures; it is not transparent in terms of professional growth, performance assessment, and planning of shift to the reserve;
- the training organized up to the company level is insufficient; it is a serious shortcoming that there is no common training organized with attendance of units from various types of forces;
- the armament plans are based on unrealistic expectations of resources;
- excessive command and control centralism; insufficient delegation of powers to operational and lower command levels has hampered their initiative and creation of the conditions which are suitable for independent combat action of these units;
- Response Forces should be mobile and flexibly deployed;
- it is necessary to restrict a number of narrowly specialized units which limit resources for more flexibly employable units;
- units staffed under the level of 70% are not employable and pointlessly bind resources for preparation of deployable units;
- the armed forces are at low level of operational readiness; equipment is outdated, without spare parts, and possibility to renovate life-cycle of the used armament and equipment;
- the reform procedure plans are neither harmonized nor supported with sufficient financial resources.

Following the conclusions of the Garrett's Study and in cooperation with American experts, the *SR Military Strategy* and the *Model 2010* concepts were elaborated in 2001. They were supposed to provide a basis for a required dynamics of the reform. The strategy has stated that an achievement of this goal requires armed forces modernization which should enable them to contribute to the all NATO missions. The programmes ought to have met a requirement of availability within national resources allocated for the armed forces. Among the goals, there were also development of compatibility and interoperability with NATO, professionalisation, intensive combat-oriented training, participation in the peace support operations, as well as modernization of C2 systems. The future armed forces were supposed to achieve capabilities such as destructiveness, flexibility, mobility, professional readiness, and sustainability.

Strategic goals of the armed forces – compared to the transformation goals – had not been changing significantly. Construction of relatively small, but high-grade, adequately equipped, and well-trained forces capable to integrate into the NATO collective defence mechanisms ought to have been managed by 2010. In searching for an optimum set of armed forces capabilities, the authorities used a method of planning based on different scenarios of military as well as non-military threats to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and other vivid interests of the Slovak Republic. Following these scenarios, a method based on shaping the required defence capacities and armed forces structure was used in the Slovak Army con-

¹⁴⁸The SR Armed Forces included: the SR Army subordinated to the MoD; the Forces of the Ministry of Home Affairs subordinated to the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Railway Forces subordinated to the Minister of Transport – author's note.

ditions – it was for the first time in such an extent. The course of the whole procedure confirmed a prevailing consensus of opinions on the defined parameters of military capabilities. A subject to discuss related rather to issues concerning the tempo of procedure within their formation.

The armed forces structure in the *Model 2010* target configuration comprised – besides the general staff with support organizational components – three commands: the land force command, the air force command, and the training and support force command. The training and support forces, which appeared in the armed forces structure for the first time, constituted units and bases providing a training of professional non-commissioned officers, command support, and logistic support for commanders at the strategic and operational level. A total number of staff in the armed forces should not have exceeded 24,500 persons.

Model 2015 – Mobile, Proactive, and Global Forces

A new strategic situation in the world and changes in Slovakia's security position after its admission to NATO and the EU required to overcome the armed forces orientation towards individual defence and to prepare them for performance of the missions outside the national territory, and thus a participation in the whole spectrum of operations. Besides the expeditionary capabilities, this fundamental change required to strengthen combat support and combat service support elements of own units, and to build the capabilities in support of allied forces at the corps or battlefield level.

The above-mentioned changes enforced a correction of the *Model 2010* which represented the first comprehensive reform of the armed forces. Several years of its implementation demonstrated its strong, but also weak points. And since this plan did not reflect reality in some areas, it was necessary to correct it. The main reasons for the *Model 2010* update were the following ones:

- increasing NATO demands on forces deployment, their combat support and combat service support, as well as on broadening of their engagement in the whole spectrum of operations within the Force Goals 2004;
- divergences in the process of the *Long-Term Plan of the Armed Forces Structure and Development* implementation, which resulted in demands on number of personnel and put a strain on financial resources that were originally allocated for the armed forces development and modernization;
- insufficient efficiency and performance of the MoD and the General Staff, accompanied with remaining duplications and internal fragmentation within a command and control sphere;
- the lack of available financial resources for the *Long-Term Plan of the SR Armed Forces Structure and Development* implementation.

The basic difference, however, is that the *Model 2010* was based on the territorial defence and the *Model 2015* on defence of interests, which means that formation of the expeditionary forces has been a priority. The SR MoD set up the main goal to reach such a level of capabilities which would be comparable with other NATO and EU member countries by 2015.

However, the greatest difference – compared to the *Model 2010* – is that expeditionary forces formation has become an absolute priority. The territorial forces of the 20th century are replaced with high mobile, proactive, and global forces

intended for a wide spectrum of operations. The Alliance has to be ready to take action against threats in the global extent. An international crisis management, as an integral part of the armed forces development, is a real novelty in our conditions. The army will be engaged in operations of different intensity: from the humanitarian aid up to the warfare.¹⁴⁹

The SR Armed Forces should be prepared to engage at least in two simultaneous operations of international crisis management – up to 8% of the land forces should be sustainable in operations of international crisis management, while 40% should meet a requirement of engagement capability in these operations.¹⁵⁰

Whether this ambitious goal will be achieved or not depends on limits of defence resources which the Slovak Republic Government will be able and willing to allocate.

Instead of Conclusion

During all the attempts on reforms, the department leaders were trying to define place, tasks, and capabilities of the armed forces in a new security environment, as well as to reduce financial costs related to preservation of the original forces (this was connected with armed forces reduction and inversion of a personnel pyramid upside down – which meant a decrease in number of high-ranking officers and increase in number of soldiers, “combatants”).

In the first period of transformation process (as well as in other periods devoted to the attempts on reforms) there were many daring resolutions, high aims, and good formulation of the documents. However, some important aspects lacked, which induced a failure of the first attempt on the AF reform. The main reasons were: insufficient or politicized analysis of the SR security environment, failure to determine transformation priorities, but particularly insufficient financial resources. Though, there were also other reasons:

- during the first three years of the SR existence, three various governmental groupings with different views on security and army model alternated in power;
- the prepared reform represented just a short-term programme that was insufficient for strategic decision-making, mainly in the armament and technical support realm;
- there was no perspective model which would respect possible development tendencies within a security area and reflect economic resources of the country at the same time;
- Slovakia lacked sufficient theoretical background that would examine and develop security and defence issues. Those who had participated in development of strategies remained under the sway of an old military saying that soldiers usually prepare to the previous war.

Besides the same causes that appeared in 1993 – 1995, there were other reasons which contributed to the failure of the next reform phase:

- Disputes among the then coalition partners in the defence department management – the Minister of Defence from the *Slovak National Party* on one hand, and the assistant secretary from the *Movement for the Democratic Slovakia* on the other one – stopped a follow-up of the SR armed forces transformation, which

¹⁴⁹ Fedor, Martin: Budujeme mobilné, proaktívne a globálne sily, in: Hospodárske noviny – hnonline.sk, 22.5.2006, , 23.10. 2008. (We build Mobile, pro-Active, and Global Forces).

¹⁵⁰ Model 2015, the Ministry of Defence, 2006.

led to regular cancellation of decisions when one or another was absent. This was possible thanks to the same competencies in time, when a competency pyramid did not have its peak;

- Permanent absence of the basic strategic documents in area of the SR security and defence;
- Schizophrenia concerning an attitude towards integration to NATO (e.g. a proclamation of accession to NATO on one hand, and building of a strict individual defence model based on National Defence Strategy on the other hand).

At the end of 1998, an overall situation in the defence department required adoption of fundamental and immediate measures to stop negative development in the defence department, which was pointed out in the Alliance's assessments, too. However, early attempts of the Ministry of Defence and the army command had failed. Only a methodical assistance of foreign experts (the U.S., the Great Britain, and Germany) helped to carry out radical changes within the armed forces.

Due to the new strategic situation in the world as well as changes in the security position of the Slovak Republic after its accession to NATO and the EU, it was necessary to overcome the armed forces orientation towards individual defence and start to prepare them for performance of missions outside the national territory and participation in the whole spectrum of operations. Besides the expeditionary capabilities, this fundamental change required to strengthen combat support and combat service support elements of own units, and to build the capabilities in support of allied forces at the corps or battlefield level.

An initial situation was complicated by a pointless postponement of performance of the *Partnership Goals 2000* criteria – although financial resources allocated for this purpose had been available since 2001. The more detailed analysis proved that some expectations connected with the *Model 2010* implementation are unrealistic. Other reasons for update may be the following ones:

- failure to carry out the plans;
- execution of a large number of unplanned organisational changes in the SR MoD, the GS, and the SR Armed Forces structure;
- preservation of some system-less components of the armed forces (regional military administrations, army sports clubs, the duplicate Guard of Honour of the Slovak Republic President, folkloric group, etc.). The plan did not count on a need to create the structures of the armed forces representation in the NATO and EU headquarters;
- unplanned demands on financial and human resources needed to ensure protection (guarding) of unnecessary movable or immovable assets, etc.

We can sum up the basic experience gained during the whole period of more or less successful reforms in the following, tried-and-true, folk saying: It is easier to build a new house than to reconstruct the old one.

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The National Security Council of the Republic of Serbia: Contributing to the Formation of an Integrated Security System or just Another Coordinating Body

Djordje Popović

In the absence of a National Security Strategy the document defining the country's security challenges, threats and dangers, as well as her strategic orientation, is the founding paper of the National Security Council.¹⁵¹

This is not the first time such a body has been set up in Serbia but it is the first time that its establishment and operation is properly regulated. The question this paper will attempt to deal with is whether this body contributes to the restructuring of the security sector in Serbia or whether it is simply a coordinating body without any real authority.

The National Security Council was formed partly in response to the need to bring together all of the main security sector decision-makers, to coordinate the various elements of the sector and, in so doing, to create an integrated security system in Serbia. However, the Council also has the role of improving democratic and civilian oversight of the sector and its main actors. Similar national security councils exist in other countries around the world and these are frequently powerful institutions, primarily due to the fact that they bring together the most significant security sector actors. The differences often lie only in the fact that in some countries this body is called a National Council for Security. This places the emphasis on the idea that the body is a national council and that its members are people in the most significant positions in a given country's security sector.

Alternative Experiences

The most well-known body of this kind is, of course, the National Security Council of the United States. This body, chaired by the president's national security advisor, has the task of aiding and advising the president on questions of national security and foreign policy. The council also serves as the main coordinating body between the president and the various security services. Therefore, the "goal of the Council is to provide the president (as the most powerful foreign and security policy actor in the US) with a forum which brings together, in one place, all of the main representatives of the administration so as to avoid any problems in coordinating the various government agencies."¹⁵²

The US National Security Council is a very powerful body; however, in spite of this fact (or perhaps because of it) the operation of the National Security Council is monitored by Congress, or more specifically, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.¹⁵³ Similar bodies are also in place in Israel, Russia and Turkey.

¹⁵¹This paper partially resulted from research Mapping and Monitoring of Security Sector Reform in Serbia carried out by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations in 2007/8.

¹⁵² Živojinović, Dragan, Savet za nacionalnu bezbednost: Naše potrebe i američka iskustva, Vreme no. 809, Belgrade, July 2006

¹⁵³ For more information see: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc>

Institutions much like the US National Security Council are to be found in the countries of the Western Balkans. Consequently, in Croatia there is the Council for National Security, the role of which is to scrutinise the work of the security services and to facilitate cooperation between the president, the government and these agencies. This council also dictates the strategic orientation of the security services and ensures their oversight by both the president and the government.¹⁵⁴

The Montenegrin National Security Strategy also provides for the existence of a National Security Council. The main function of this body is to examine strategic questions dealing with the operation and development of the national security and defence system.¹⁵⁵

Birth of the National Security Council

That the formation of a national security council in Serbia is not entirely unheard of is supported by the fact that there have been admittedly unsuccessful, attempts to establish such a body. The government headed by Zoran Djindjić created a body called the Council for State Security.¹⁵⁶

however, this council was short-lived and did not manage to adopt any strategic documents. In January 2006, the first Vojislav Koštunica government also set up a similar council with the aim of coordinating the intelligence services in arresting Ratko Mladić. Unfortunately, however, this council never held a single session.¹⁵⁷

Legal and Systematic Status

By forming a National Security Council the government is trying to overcome some shortcomings of the Constitution; the Serbian Constitution does not provide for the establishment of such a body and, therefore, does not provide for the formation of an integrated national security system. The powers that this body has, however, suggest that its operation must be regulated by the state's principal legislative act. Instead of a constitutional foundation, the Council was established on the basis of the Law on the Basic Regulation of the Security Services in the Republic of Serbia, which, amongst other things, regulates the powers, membership and operation of the Council. This law regulates the operation of the intelligence services and it is questionable whether it will be sufficient to regulate the National Security Council or whether a separate law will be necessary. The Council must approach the coordination of the security sector in a holistic manner. In other words, it must establish a unique and comprehensive coordination system. The absence of such a systematic approach could obstruct the successful operation of the Council.

Even before the Council's existence was properly regulated by legislation, the Government of Serbia decided that the President of the Republic should preside over the Council. However, the President and the government both perform executive functions. Moreover, the legitimacy of the office of President is stronger than that of the Government as the president is elected through a direct ballot.

¹⁵⁴ The Law on Security and Intelligence Structures of the Republic of Croatia, June 2006.

¹⁵⁵ The National Security Strategy of Montenegro, June 2006.

¹⁵⁶ For further information see: Vasić, Miloš, "Osnivanje Saveta za nacionalnu bezbednost – strana iskustva i domaća praksa", *Vreme*, no. 857, 7 June 2007.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

Therefore, it is not logical that the Government, an institution with the same legal clout as the President (and with somewhat lower democratic legitimacy) should decide whether the President will perform some function or other, including chairing the National Security Council. This illogical deed has, however, been smoothed over by the adoption of the Law on the Basic Regulation of the Security Services in the Republic of Serbia, which provides some legislative support for the decision of the Government.

Membership of the Council

The National Security Council is made up of the President of the Republic - who also chairs the Council - the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Director of the Security and Intelligence Agency, the head of the Military Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defence, and the Council Secretary - whose function is performed by the President's Chief of Staff. Inexplicably, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the President of the Supreme Court, the Public Prosecutor, the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Chair of the Parliamentary Committee have all been overlooked, even though they clearly ought to be represented in some capacity. Although it should be mentioned that some of these functionaries are members of the Intelligence Service Coordination Bureau. The Bureau is only the operational body of the Council and is not involved in its decision-making process. Also worth mentioning is the fact that the founding document of the Council, the Decision on the Founding of the National Security Council of the Republic of Serbia, does allow the Chair to call representatives of other government bodies should the need arise. Nonetheless, the need for the permanent presence of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor's office or representatives of the National Assembly is more than clear.

Financing the Council

The founding document determines that the Council should be funded from the State Budget. However, no information on funding for the Council can be found in either the 2007 State Budget or the Law on the Budget for 2008. Presumably the funding burden of the Council on the national budget should be relatively small; however, the question of how its continued operation is to be financed is not an insignificant one. If indeed the resources necessary for the operation of the Council are to be taken from the budget, the public must be able to access this information.

Responsibilities and Powers

The founding document defines the Council's responsibilities as maintaining national security by analysing security related issues and coordinating the operation of other bodies that form part of the security sector and by proposing various measures for the improvement of national security. The Council directs and coordinates the operation of the security services by processing intelligence reports, dictating priorities and measures to be taken for the enforcement of security. It is also responsible for the realisation of national interests that are attainable through the work of intelligence and security services and presents the Government with

assessments of the security services' budget proposals, yearly and half-yearly goals and proposed employment or discharge of the heads of said services. The Council also coordinates the application of standards and regulations for protection of personal data and other regulations that are in place to protect human rights from the exchange of information or other security service operations.¹⁵⁸

Interestingly, the emphasis is placed on coordination and directing the operation of the secret services. The powers of the Council relate mostly to the cooperation and coordination of the traditional elements of the security sector – i.e. the army, the police and the intelligence services.¹⁵⁹

Furthermore, the founding document provides for the establishment of a Communication Bureau that will coordinate the operation of the intelligence services and whose membership is made up of the heads of the security services and the Council Secretary. The Communication Bureau separately tracks assignments carried out for the purpose of coordinating the security services' operations, organises mixed operative teams for assignments and analyses the results of operational cooperation. It then reports the results to the Council should this be necessary.

One major shortcoming is the fact that, in the founding document, the role of creating the most significant strategic documents, not least of which is the National Security Strategy, is not explicitly stated to be a responsibility of the Council. This could be seen to be the Council's responsibility as part of its rather ill-defined task of proposing measures for the improvement of national security. Unfortunately, the adoption of a national security strategy is not even provided for in the Constitution itself. As a result, a number of proposals for such a strategy have been prepared by teams of experts grouped around either the President or the Prime Minister but it is still unclear which of these will be presented for adoption before the National Assembly. If the National Security Council, or rather a team of experts formed by this body, were tasked with the creation of a National Security Strategy such confusion could be avoided.

Democratic Oversight and Control

One of the potential dangers that can arise from the establishment of a National Security Council is the fact that this body can frequently elude any kind of democratic or civilian control. The founding document of the Council contains no measures that relate to checks and balances for this body. Neither does the proposed Law on the Basic Regulation of the Security Services of the Republic of Serbia contain any provisions that would regulate control over the Council. It is of the utmost importance that the obligations of the Council as a whole, and of each of its separate members, be properly regulated to facilitate control of this body, principally by the National Assembly.

In order to guarantee enforcement of the Council's decisions the law expresses the intention of its author that the Council should not merely be an advisory body; in other words, that its decisions should be binding. According to the founding document, all government bodies are obligated to cooperate with the Council and

¹⁵⁸ See: Odluka o osnivanju Saveta za nacionalnu bezbednost Republike Srbije from the 31st of May 2007, Službeni Glasnik RS no. 50/07

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

to act on its decisions. In the event that a relevant government body fails to cooperate with the Council or fails to act on its decisions, the Council Secretary must inform the Council, which can then call in the head of the offending service and take all legal measures to ensure further cooperation with the Council.¹⁶⁰

The National Security Council has been presented to the public as a body that will bring together representatives from all parts of the security sector and which will finally coordinate their operation and prevent the discord that so evidently exists. One of the fundamental goals of the Council will be to completion cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague. However, the Council will also have to deal with a number of other significant challenges. These challenges relate to the definition of current and future threats, challenges and dangers Serbian national security, and her goals and interest, are faced with.

Recommendations:

- Introduce a new statute into the Constitution that will provide for the existence of an integrated security system
- The National Security Council must adopt a holistic approach to the security sector, taking into account all of the actors therein, rather than focusing purely on the state security services
- Broaden the National Security Council's current membership to include the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the President of the Supreme Court, the Public Prosecutor and the Speaker of the National Assembly, or at least the Chair of the Defence and Security Committee
- Make the National Security Council responsible for the creation of a National Security Strategy
- Make the National Security Council accountable to the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia

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¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

Defence Reform and Democratisation

Djordje Popovic

Insufficiently reformed security sector can be the cause of the delayed consolidation of democracy in a post-authoritarian or a post-conflict society. Consolidation of democracy is by all means the ultimate goal of the democratisation process. This goal will not be achieved as long as democracy does not become “the only game in town”.¹⁶¹

Therefore, it is necessary to examine the relation between security sector reform and the consolidation of democracy. The question that imposes itself is – In what way the security sector reform influences the consolidation of democracy in a transforming society.

Democratisation as a process, at its starting level consists of abolishment or overcoming the previous authoritarian regime, establishment of a democratic system and its consolidation.¹⁶² However, experiences and theory findings warn us that one of the preconditions for establishment of a free and democratic society, especially after transition from nondemocratic system of power, is the security sector reform. Unfortunately, there is a lack of the relevant scientific considerations on the relation between security sector reform and consolidation of democracy. Only few authors tried to answer the question whether the consolidation of democracy in a society depends on the security sector reform and in what scale.

After recognition of importance of the security sector reform for the democratisation process, it is very important to establish what elements of the security sector are crucial for the consolidation of democracy. Although it is the holistic approach that is mostly used now days for determination of the elements of the security sector, in this paper the traditional determination of this sector will be used. This means that under the security sector actors as military, police, secret services and paramilitary forces are determined as main elements of the security sector.¹⁶³ The reason for using this approach is the fact that security sector reform concerns the actors that provide security for the state, in an efficient and effective manner under the democratic civilian control.¹⁶⁴

Defence system is the biggest and often the most important element of the security sector that influences the process of democratisation in a transforming society.

In establishing the role of the defence reform in the democratisation process it is of great importance to consider in what way the political elites which should be the driving force of this process acted while implementing the reforms. Often there is a case that the new decision-makers perceive elements of the security sector as their clients that should be used in political fight for obtaining or preserving

¹⁶¹ Linz, Huan and Stepan, Alfred. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*. (John Hopkin's University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996).

¹⁶² Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. (University of Oklahoma Press, March 1993.)

¹⁶³ Edmunds, Timothy. *Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation in: Flury, Phillip; Hadžić, Miroslav (ed.). Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform, (DCAF, CCVO, Belgrade, 2004.)*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

power. This can in many ways make the process of reform and process of democratisation more difficult. Although the order in which the reforms are being carried out in a transforming society often depends on international factors, this order is firstly dependent on the situation in the country, but also on the perception of the initiators of the democratisation process. Therefore it is very important to establish whether the political elites understand the importance of the security sector reform for the democratisation process, or they maybe have other priorities.

The initiators of the democratisation process are often people with completely different political heritage and aims.¹⁶⁵

They can be in favour of democracy because they believe that democracy itself is a goal, or because they could use democracy in reaching other goals. After taking the power they often fight about the nature of the new government.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, it is not a rare case that the most powerful group defines what the needed fundamental changes are.¹⁶⁷

The state apparatuses of force in a nondemocratic society are usually exempted from any kind of democratic civilian control. This position in the society they will often try to preserve after the democratic changes. Some of them will succeed by creating strong ties with new political elites. Having in mind these examples, it is important to determine whether the new decision-makers have already prepared security sector reform strategies which would enable any kind of biased reform.

Defence reform is a process that requires presence of strong leadership which can create wide consensus and marginalise disturbing factors, preventing them from taking dominant positions in public and political life.¹⁶⁸

We can therefore conclude that the success of the defence reform often depends on its initiators.

Military will usually keep reserve power also under a new regime. The officer core as a whole usually perceives itself as a permanent part of state apparatus, which has long-term interests and constant functions which overcome the interests of current governments. Military leadership, more than any other state structure, is capable of imposing reserved domains to the newly-elected government, and that by definition prevents consolidation of democracy. This is especially acute problem if the military as a part of the state apparatus took part in wide violations of human rights and if the absence of any kind of punishment is the condition of its loyalty to the new government.¹⁶⁹

Another important factor that influences the democratisation process is the nature of the previous nondemocratic regime. The characteristics of that regime have many implications on the ways of transition and tasks that different countries are facing when they start their fight for consolidation of democracy.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵ Vučetić, Srđan. From Southern to Southeastern Europe: Any Lessons for Democratization Theory? (Southeast European Politics, Vol. V, No. 2-3, December 2004.)

¹⁶⁶ Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (University of Oklahoma Press, March 1993.)

¹⁶⁷ Linz, Huan and Stepan, Alfred. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. (John Hopkin's University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996).

¹⁶⁸ Ehrhart, Hans-Georg; Schnabel, Albrecht; Blagescu, Monika. Towards More Effective Assistance in Security Sector Reform. (Policy Brief, Based on the IFSH/United Nations University Project "The Role of the Military in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding".)

¹⁶⁹ Linz, Huan and Stepan, Alfred. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*. (John Hopkin's University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996)

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

That is why the transfer of power between old and new regime is important for further democratisation process. Peaceful transfer of power makes the consolidation of democracy much easier. In order to make this transfer peaceful the initiators of the democratisation process often make pacts with members of the old regime, or even more often with members of the security forces. Unfortunately, making pacts is not the necessary condition of peaceful transfer of power. Pacts created that way can be democratic, but also nondemocratic in their aims and consequences. Furthermore, once created it does not mean that pacts will function in practise.¹⁷¹

Defence reform for its goal has removing the obstacles that defence system can create for consolidation of democracy. That is because the elements of this system, its actors more accurately, can have great influence on political situation in transforming societies. This is especially present in post-authoritarian societies where members of the system of defence can, out of their utilitarian reasons – protection of their partial interests and acquired power, openly or secretly interfere in the democratisation process. The possibility that new pro-democratic government tries to use the security sector, or its elements for their own purposes, should not be excluded either. Therefore it is very clear why Timothy Edmunds claims that security sector reform is a key component of any democratisation process.¹⁷²

At the end it must be observed that the list of difficulties and obstacles, as well as the achievements of this reform can be used as an important indicator of the direction and success of the democratisation process of a society.¹⁷³

Especially because of the fact that the security sector reform for one of its goals has creation of the legal framework for subordination of the security elements – state apparatuses of force, to the legitimate political power. Establishment of this legal framework, which guarantees civilian supremacy, can be seen as a starting point for a successful democratisation process in a transforming society. This framework is, among other, based on two main principles – accountability and transparency. Therefore the relations between the government and security elements should be based on these two principles too.

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¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Edmunds Timothy. Security Sector Reform in: Flury Phillip, Hadžić Miroslav (ed.). Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform. (DCAF, Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, Geneva/Belgrade, 2004.)

¹⁷³ Hadžić, Miroslav. The Concept of Security Sector Reform in: Flury Phillip, Hadžić Miroslav (ed.). Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform. (DCAF, Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, Geneva/Belgrade, 2004.)

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Slovakia's Experience with Building of Civil-Military Relations

Vladimír Tarasovič

A study of a democratic public (civil) control of armed forces¹⁷⁴ has a long tradition. Since 1950s, several theorists engaged in civil-military relations have pursued this field. It is Samuel Huntington who is considered to be a founder of civil-military relations, thanks to his work *The Soldier and the State* published in 1957. This work introduced a basic theoretical framework for study of interaction between the armed forces and the society, and formulated elementary principles of civil-military relations.

The civil-military relations are shaped through a complex system of interconnections between the armed forces and the rest of the society. According to law, the armed forces – as a national institution – are used for defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state, as well as for defence of its social and political system. At the same time, they ensure defence or implementation of all strategic national interests, and that is why they have the means of military power at their disposal.¹⁷⁵

Historical experience demonstrated that a lack of sufficient control of the military power may lead to its abuse for particular interests of individuals or groups. That is why every democratic society has tried to establish a system of democratic and civil control of armed forces, wherein it has to create such conditions that guarantee effective and balanced integration of the armed forces into the society, and a true picture of their real possibilities, capacities, and capabilities. It is particularly important in countries passing through a significant socio-political change. In such a case, it is crucial to answer the following questions:

- How to ensure that the armed forces will not determine goals and directions of a national policy, but vice versa, they will perform their mission in accordance with the Constitution and law of a given state?
- How to ensure that the armed forces – in terms of structural and functional aspect – will form themselves as a particular “standard” known from democratic states?
- How to establish a harmony between the armed forces and the society?

Within this procedure, it is important to ensure that the armed forces will preserve their functional parameters and perform the tasks for which they were created, and at the same time to prevent them from possibility to endanger democratic principles of the society they should defend.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ In case of public control of the armed forces we use a traditional term “civil control”; author’s note.

¹⁷⁵ Korba, Matúš, Nečej, Elemír, Tarasovič, Vladimír: Slovenská bezpečnostná komunita a bezpečnostný sektor, Centrum bezpečnostných štúdií, Centrum pre európske a severoatlantické vzťahy, Redos Humenné, 2007, s.24. (Korba, Matúš, Nečej, Elemír, Tarasovič, Vladimír: Slovak Security Community and the Security Sector, Centre for Defence Studies, Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs, Redos Humenné, 2007, p.24.)

¹⁷⁶ Kmec, Vladimír: Parlamentné riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl Slovenskej republiky, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Demokratické riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl, Inštitút obrany a bezpečnosti MO SR, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, s. 61. (Kmec, Vladimír: Parliamentary Control of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Defence and Security Institute of the SR MoD, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, p. 61.)

Development of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent political changes, an interpretation of civil-military relations in the former Warsaw Pact countries changed, too. New countries realized that a democratic control of armed forces, in the first period after the political changes, provided a basis for improvement of political stability, democratization support, and extension of transparency and cooperation among all components of national security. That was the main reason why all transforming countries placed the greatest emphasis on a formal aspect of the armed forces control and thus a creation of democratic power structures and political supervision of a security sector. It is necessary to say, that in the past decade the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Slovakia, achieved great success in area of civil-military relations:

- constitutional reforms, which clearly determined position and functions of parliamentary and executive power, were implemented;
- new legislative conditions for the armed forces control were created – AF have been controlled partly by the Defence Secretary who is a civilian, not a soldier, and partly by the Ministry of Defence, not by the General Staff;
- new formal structures and procedures of a democratic control were stipulated, e.g.:
 - creation of parliamentary committees for supervision of defence policy making, planning, programming, and budgeting, or
 - introduction of routine legislative procedures for supervision of these areas.

Of course, this development has not been running in all countries in the same extent and with the same intensity, which applies for Slovakia, too. For example, as late as eight years after an establishment of independent state, the decisive security documents were passed – e.g. Security Strategy, Defence Strategy, Military Strategy, necessary legislation, etc. On the other hand, transitional countries had to create and implement democratic structures in the security area simultaneously with other fundamental reforms in political, economic, or social sphere.

Development of Civil-Military Relations in Slovakia: 1993 – 1998

Events connected with November 1989 implied a fundamental change in the security policy sphere. The whole society was faced with a new possibility to transform political system and restructure its institutions to the form generally approved in stabile democracies. These processes affected the armed forces, too.¹⁷⁷ A comprehensive process of the armed forces transformation and thus a process of transformation of civil-military relations in Slovakia were significantly determined by internal political factors. An establishment of a democratic regime required to embed such principles of civil-military relations that would correspond with a standard Western model playing a crucial role of civil and democratic control of the armed forces. In the Slovak conditions, it did not mean an absolute predominance

¹⁷⁷ According to the Law of the SR National Council, No. 3/1993 Coll. on the Slovak Republic Army Establishment, the SR Army has represented a crucial part of the SR Armed Forces. The Military Service Law defined a composition of the armed forces: the SR Army, Forces of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and Railway Forces. Law No. 321 Coll. on the Slovak Republic Armed Forces from May 23, 2002, amended the Law No. 3/1993 Coll. on the Slovak Republic Army Establishment, and changed a term “SR Army” into “SR Armed Forces”; author’s note.

of a civil sphere over a military one, but a comprehensive and interconnected process of setting goals for the armed forces and observation of their fulfilment – on the part of political institutions as well as the public; it has meant a process performed through formal and informal tools, in a bilateral way, and with mutual interconnection.¹⁷⁸

A formal level of the civil-military relations (the parliament, the president, the government, the MoD, courts, etc.) was legislatively settled as early as 1990 – 1992 within a common state. The Slovak Republic has continued with development of this level, even after the establishment of independent state with its own power institutions. An informal level, however, became much more complicated, since a civil society participating primarily in the civil control of the SR Army was not prepared for such a mission and had no experience in that realm. It took almost one decade to build the foundations of a security community (including civilian experts, non-governmental organizations, media, academic institutions, etc.) and provide civil society with sufficiency of information necessary for basic orientation in the security and defence policy of the country.

A relationship between the Slovak Republic Armed Forces¹⁷⁹ and the civil society has represented an integral part of a social development since the establishment of independent state in 1993. Its importance was really significant because it was being formed root and branch, which aroused a kind of tension in some cases.¹⁸⁰

(Kmec, Vladimír: Prliamentary Control of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Defence and Security Institute of the SR MoD, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, p. 62).

During the first years of the independent state and the SR Army existence, the cooperation was limited to cooperation between the defence department and civil associations or organizations of occupational character with relation to the defence issues.¹⁸¹

A point of this cooperation resided in development of bilateral communication, deepening of mutual familiarization, confidence, and support within formation and strengthening of the SR citizens' defence awareness, with aim to increase its defensiveness.¹⁸²

This trend of “imbalanced” civil-military relations, which were oriented towards a flow of information from the armed forces to the society and exclusive cooperation with selected social organisations, was characteristic almost for the whole 1990s. On one hand, it was affected by the then internal political situation, but it was also a result of the previous personal management at the defence department and a deficit of new knowledge from the security policy realm.

¹⁷⁸ Korba, Matúš, Kmec, Vladimír: Civilno-vojenské vzťahy a scenáre ich vývoja v SR; SFPA, FES, s. 41.

(Korba, Matúš, Kmec, Vladimír: Civil-Military relations and Scenarios of their Development in the SR; SFPA, FES, p. 41)

¹⁷⁹ The Law No. 321 Coll. on the Slovak Republic Armed Forces from May 23, 2002, clause 2, article 1; the Law No. 321 Coll. amended the Law No. 3/1993 Coll. on the Slovak Republic Army Establishment (which was created in January 1, 1993) – author's note.

¹⁸⁰ For more information see: Kmec, Vladimír: Parlamentné riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl Slovenskej republiky, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Demokratické riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl, Inštitút obrany a bezpečnosti MO SR, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, s. 62.

¹⁸¹ Organizations created as a result of the former Union for Cooperation with Army break-up – author's note.

¹⁸² Armáda 93, Ministerstvo obrany SR, Bratislava, 1994, s. 98.

(Army 93, the SR Ministry of Defence, Bratislava, 1994, p. 98.)

In contrast to the relatively well-established formal level of civil-military relations, the informal level – in the Slovak Republic conditions – was evolving much longer. Therein, the cooperation with foreign partners was effective, particularly with the Centre for European Security Studies in Groningen which organized a series of educational activities at the MoD and Military Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš in 1995. New knowledge has induced a partial change of opinion on civil-military relations on the part of military public; however, there was much more positive impact on academic community and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which subsequently started to pay much greater attention to the realm of security and defence policy. Participation of representatives from other departments, academic community, and NGOs in educational activities of the defence department may be labelled as the first informal “infiltration” of the civil society to the military ground.

The internal political changes in 1998 were largely incited by the civil society which actively engaged in fight for return of democracy to the country – for the first time after the revolutionary changes of 1989. A basic impulse was that Slovakia had been neither invited to join NATO at Madrid Summit in 1997, nor included among “promising” EU members. In both cases, it was a matter of failure to meet political criteria, thus subjective criteria connected with a form of the then coalition’s control.¹⁸³

Development of Civil-Military Relations in Slovakia: 1999 – the Present Day

In this period, the international security situation reflected also in shaping of civil-military relations and public attitudes towards an accession and a subsequent membership of the Slovak Republic in NATO. Elaboration of the *Strategy for Communication with Citizens*, as a reaction to the first crisis of public support for the SR accession to NATO during the military operation in Kosovo in 1999, helped to overcome the second crisis of public support, held in 2003, during the Iraq crisis, too.¹⁸⁴

Following the discussions about questions raised by Matus Korba and Vladimír Kmec in the book *Civilno-vojenské vzťahy a scenáre ich vývoja v SR (Civil-Military Relations and Scenarios of Their Development in the SR, Engl. transl.)*, but also considering certain feeling of “depletion of thoughts” which occurred among people who engaged in these issues in Bratislava, there appeared an idea to transfer the discussion to regions. The aim was to gain new knowledge and enrich discussion with new aspects, but also to enlarge an emerging security community from centre to regions.¹⁸⁵

The new emerging Slovak security community, that gained its first practical experience thanks to the cooperation with the defence and foreign affairs departments during the elaboration of new strategic security documents (the SR Security Strategy, the SR Defence Strategy) in 2000 – 2001, realized that regions had suffered a great deficit in information concerning security policy, which applied to

¹⁸³ The government coalition included the Movement for the Democratic Slovakia (MDS) with Vladimír Mečiar at its head, and two small parties – the Slovak National Party (SNP) and the Union of Slovakia’s Workers (USW) – author’s note.

¹⁸⁴ An adult public support of accession to NATO decreased from 57% in March 2002 to 46% in January 2003. See: Ročenka MO SR 2003, Bratislava, 2004, p. 65.

¹⁸⁵ Petráš, Michael: Výsledky regionálnych seminárov a ďalšia práca v oblasti reformy bezpečnostného sektoru z pohľadu pracovníka Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Demokratické riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl, Inštitút obrany a bezpečnosti MO SR, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, p. 123

the whole cross-section of the civil society. Together with the defence department (the Defence and Security Institute), they elaborated a 2-year project focused on growth of regional knowledge of the security policy issues. They concentrated on three key issues: civil-military relations; democratic control of the armed forces; and the security sector reform. Among the target groups, there were self-administrations, regional media, non-governmental organisations, and academic community. An inseparable part of the project was to inform about a progress of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces reform. The reform was connected not only with a launch of changes relating to the new abilities of the armed forces, but also changes of dislocation of military components in particular regions, which often had almost fatal impact on some towns and micro-regions, whence the soldiers departed.¹⁸⁶

A course of the project confirmed an interest in security issues in a broader sense (multidimensionality), particularly from a perspective of the new strategic documents of the Slovak Republic. However, an emphasis was put on a transition from the strategic documents to the laws and particular expression of responsibility, powers, and competencies in the security realm – in term of impact on the regions.

Besides, a need for theoretical elaboration of the security policy proved true – particularly with reference to a correct interpretation and harmonization of terms concerning its exposition, but also in area of civil-military relations. The terms like *control*, *civilian*, or *democratic* came to the fore. Moreover, there were proposals to substitute a term *civilian* for another one (e.g. *civil*), to provide a term *relations* with larger sociological dimension, or to define dimensions of terms *defence* and *military one* (within discussion about security, defence, and military strategies of the Slovak Republic).¹⁸⁷

Terminology remains a problem even now, and it is evident that sometimes it is not possible or appropriate to try to search a Slovak equivalent of an English term. With regard to civil-military relations, they were perceived rather as “antagonistic” for a long time. Furthermore, many experts, particularly foreign ones, were persuaded that problems of civil-military relations in Slovakia were solved only vertically and a horizontal cooperation was lacking.

The cooperation between the defence department and the civil society graduated in 2003 – 2004, by means of so called “progressive communication.” Its object was to provide the largest possible public with information about NATO and formation of the professional armed forces in Slovakia. A campaign was successful, since the public support for accession to NATO reached again 50 %, after it had decreased in 2003 (due to the Iraq crisis). Likewise, a recruitment to the gradually professionalized armed forces covered their needs. A negative point of the whole process, connected with civil-military relations, was its “campaign character” which did not guarantee a progress in a future perspective. After the accession to NATO, several projects involved in this realm terminated. The same applies for many regional non-governmental organisations engaged in those projects.

¹⁸⁶ Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): *Demokratické riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl*, Inštitút obrany a bezpečnosti MO SR, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, p. 6

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

The SR Government, established after the 2008 elections, has pledged in its statement of policy that it will pay particular attention to the civil-military relations. However, these relations are interpreted only in the narrow sense of the word – as relations between the SR Ministry of Defence and the SR General Staff.¹⁸⁸

Non-Governmental Organizations – a Cornerstone of the Security Community in Slovakia

Alongside media, academic community, and public administration, the non-governmental organizations in the developed democracies represent the most important actor engaged directly in civil control of the armed forces and indirectly in their democratic control. The major research organisations (think tanks) are becoming a real actor of the armed forces civil control, mainly with respect to the extent of qualified expertise which is necessary for comprehension of security and military issues. The think tank experts form an important part of the security community. The Slovak conditions, which were in the examined period characterized by the lack of experts on security and military policy, did not allow to constitute the security community as a network of institutions, but only of individuals.¹⁸⁹

The preparation of the strategic documents in 1999 – 2001 may be regarded as the first practical engagement of the security community in promotion of opinions on security and defence issues in Slovakia. In that time, several international and national colloquia were organized with aim to create a platform for exchange of views of the “community” interested in the security policy issues. At the same time, the conditions for increase in transparency were creating. This positive trend, however, did not proceed in the defence policy. The civilian experts were provided only with a minimum scope for discussion about military strategy, and almost no scope within elaboration of a vision concerning the armed forces construction, particularly with respect to professionalization and defence expenses.¹⁹⁰

The formation of the security community was really important, since all the polls signaled that “an ability level of the Slovak public in the security and defence area” was not sufficient to expertly assess the security issues. It was confirmed by a public indifference to participate in discussion within the strategic documents elaboration. In the foreground of the public opinion, there were always issues and threats of internal character. On the other hand, external challenges, perils, and dangers were of low importance to the public opinion. Perhaps that is why an opinion on accession to NATO had been rather tepid, and only later an increase in preferences was noticed.

In the 1990s, the process of the security community formation within non-governmental organizations was influenced by a long-term absence of institution which would comprehensively engage in purely security issues. It was rather a matter of individuals who engaged in the security alongside a wider specialization

¹⁸⁸ To vyplynulo zo seminára Civilné riadenie Ozbrojených síl SR (29. 5. 2007), ktorý zorganizovalo MO SR – pozn. autora.

¹⁸⁹ Nicolini, Mário: Miesto a úloha mimovládnych organizácií pri demokratickej kontrole ozbrojených síl, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Demokratické riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl, Inštitút obrany a bezpečnosti MO SR, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, s. 94

¹⁹⁰ Nečeň, Elemír: Transparentnosť bezpečnostnej a obrannej politiky štátu ako východisko pre demokratické riadenie a kontrolu ozbrojených síl, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Demokratické riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl, Inštitút obrany a bezpečnosti MO SR, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, p. 78.

of their institution. Moreover, financial resources coming from abroad were gradually reduced and search for internal resources for this area was quite problematic. Furthermore, the formation of the community has been still hindered by a very small social order for theoretical elaboration of the security issues, or for comprehensive or partial analyses. Nowadays, only the MoFA and the MoD have their own grant system for elaboration of analyses. Financial covering, however, does not allow more than a mere survival of the NGOs engaged in the security and defence studies.

Within the civil-military relations and particularly in area of the public control of the armed forces, the Slovak Republic is just in a process of social transformation. In a pre-accession period, before integration to NATO and the European Union, the Slovak non-governmental organizations had occupied themselves particularly with public relations and their effort to influence a political development had been directed rather at the society than towards governmental departments. Although the Slovak security community provides some critical reflexion of the government's steps within the European and Atlantic integration, it is not systematic.

Place and Role of Regional Public Administration and Local Government within Civil-Military Relations

Unresolved legislative questions concerning security and crisis management had a considerable impact on regions, too. On the one hand, the laws had assigned some responsibilities to a local government, but on the other hand the local government had few competencies and particularly the lack of finance. One of the regional leaders commented on that situation with these words: "Municipalities will either light or buy the masks." This was one of the reasons why the regional leaders' view on existence of the military garrisons in their region had diametrically changed. While in the 1990s, the local leaders had tried to get rid of them, at the beginning of the new millennium the more positive view on their existence started to appear in their statements. They realized that in case of new crisis situations of non-military character (flooding, snow calamities, industrial breakdown, etc.) it was better to have the military forces as close as possible. Moreover, a presence of the military garrisons had also signified an economic contribution for the region, in form of new jobs, purchase of services, as well as many other indirect causalities. In terms of negatives, we can mention: noisiness at the garrison airports connected with unsolved recompense designated for the people (to the similar extent as in the surrounding of nuclear power stations), a long-term unsolved problem concerning removal of the effects (environment devastation) after the former Soviet garrisons, and solution of the military forests and assets delimitation on the municipalities.

Place and Role of Media in Civil-Military Relations

In Slovakia, a relation "armed forces – media" had evolved continually since the establishment of the independent state. However, regarding the lack of qualified journalists pursuing the security and defence area, it was a matter of rather one-way information flow running from the defence department towards the public. Nevertheless, this development was not always fully continuous and did not have only a rising tendency. However, there has always been an effort to attain profes-

sionality. Relations with media, from the defence department point of view, are based mainly on mutual communication. On one hand, it is communication through journalists, and on the other hand it is a direct communication with public administration, local governments, organizations cooperating with the armed forces and particular citizens. Quite important part of the communication system is also a communication inwards the armed forces, particularly after the professionalization of the armed forces.¹⁹¹

The communication with the public and media must be based on openness and truthfulness. After the decades, when the only published information were related to a successful building of the People Army and even more successful trainings with partners of the Warsaw Pact, the “information doors” has suddenly opened to the military quarters, too. The areas that used to represent taboo, have all of sudden become accessible. It was a great turning point. However, it is necessary to add that it was particularly the General Staff¹⁹²

command which has strived for this kind of approach during the first years. Subsequently, the Ministry of Defence followed it. The commanders of garrisons and particular divisions did not “show their hand” so quickly¹⁹³

and it became a commonplace only after the law on free access to information was adopted in 2000.

The weak points in terms of communication between the defence department and media have resided in absence of special courses and medial training for responsible commanders, which represents a part of career education in the armies of the developed countries. Following the experience from NATO countries, but also thanks to information about activity of the European Military Press Association or pieces of knowledge gained from the preparation systems of the officers in developed countries, it is clear that the public relations – particularly at lower levels – have not been provided with a sufficient attention for a long time. The situation improved only after a systemic preparation of spokesmen at all levels of command was introduced, and after the principles of communication technique were incorporated into curricula at the Military Academy of the Armed Forces in Liptovský Mikuláš.¹⁹⁴

On the other hand, it is possible to observe that the defence department still does not have medial partners able of constructive thinking and contextual awareness, who would – although critically, but purposefully – engage in the defence

¹⁹¹ Vitko, Pavol: Úloha médií v civilno-vojenských vzťahoch, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Demokratické riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl, Inštitút obrany a bezpečnosti MO SR, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, s. 104.

(Vitko, Pavol: The Role of Media in Civil-Military Relations, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Defence and Security Institute of the SR MoD, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, p. 104.)

¹⁹² In the first half of 1990s, the Council of Chief of GS for public relations was founded. Particularly in that time, that free community of representatives of the most powerful media and journalist organizations, heads of the most important Churches, or cultural humanitarian and peace organizations, helped with “opening of information gates” of the then Slovak Republic Army towards media and the public – author’s note.

¹⁹³ Vitko, Pavol: Úloha médií v civilno-vojenských vzťahoch, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Demokratické riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl, Inštitút obrany a bezpečnosti MO SR, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, s. 105.

(Vitko, Pavol: The Role of Media in Civil-Military Relations, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Defence and Security Institute of the SR MoD, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, p. 105)

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, s. 106

policy. There is an essential deficit of commentators and wider analytical journalism in the daily press, but also in electronic media. In this realm, the media fall behind their possibilities.

Democratic Control of Armed Forces

The democratic control of armed forces is also a part of civil-military relations. This term was often extended by adjective “civilian”, which characterized a change in position of armed forces in the society. A generally used term *democratic control of armed forces* signifies structured and complex process of control and setting up of goals, which performed at both formal and informal levels. It is a bilateral process passing either from political and civilian authorities towards the armed forces, or from military expertises towards a political sphere. While analysing a semantic content of the term *civilian democratic control of armed forces* it is possible to state that in the *formal* aspect it is a matter of civil and democratic control, while in the *informal* aspect it is a matter of purely civil control of the armed forces. The civil democratic control of armed forces could be characterized – within the security policy – as predominant position civil political representatives over professional soldiers in the decision-making sphere. The civil control could be interpreted as a predominance or surveillance of the public sphere over the armed forces.¹⁹⁵

The issue of civil democratic control of armed forces is still topical in the world, although opinions on its importance can differ, of course. In the conditions of the Slovak Republic, a positive development has been noticed – both in theoretical as well as practical filed. Since this establishment, Slovakia has had to cope with several particularities which have been connected not only with a change of political system, but also with a formation of an independent state, or building of the armed forces on the democratic principles. Moreover, a speed of changes in a short time sequence has not provided a sufficient scope for theoretical discussions about the term itself and searching for its content/meaning.

The lack of theoretical knowledge and practical experience often led to extreme opinions on the democratic control of armed forces, which usually resulted in incorrect interpretation of term *civil*. And thus one group came to the conclusion that it did not concern the armed forces members, since it was a matter of *civil control* – what means that civilians should have controlled, but only those areas which are in their authorization. The second group, on the other hand, affirmed that civil control meant that the civilians would control everything within the armed forces. This perception of the whole issue reflected the development of the society, level of democracy, and processes running within the armed forces – particularly successive “civilization” and professionalization of the armed forces. Within the context of the already-mentioned changes in area of civil democratic control, a need of control and civil interference into the armed forces development still seems to be topical and still gains new forms.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵ Kmec, Vladimír: Parlamentné riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl Slovenskej republiky, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Demokratické riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl, Inštitút obrany a bezpečnosti MO SR, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, s. 63.

(Kmec, Vladimír: Parliamentary Control of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Defence and Security Institute of the SR MoD, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, ¹⁹⁶ibid, p. 61.Bratislava, 2004, p. 63.)

For example, after the recent parliamentary elections in 2006, an effort to stir up a discussion about political neutrality of the professional soldiers emerged, in other words there was an idea to allow them to engage politically. The reason of these ideas was a use of a provision of law concerning interdiction of engagement in political parties for a departure from the armed forces.¹⁹⁷

Parliamentary Control of the SR Armed Forces

The parliamentary control of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces has a dominant position within the civil democratic control. It has been executed by authorities elected in the Slovak Republic National Council and implemented in four main areas:

- *Legislation*. The Slovak Republic National Council passes the laws of the security and defence policy;
- *Budget*. The budget is one of the main levers for control of the military power by civil authorities. An amount of budget and its particular programmes are determined by elected representatives of the citizens, which ensures its transparency;
- *Control through Executive Power Representative* – the Minister of Defence. The Minister of Defence is subordinated to the parliamentary control; in compliance with the Constitution, art. 116, a member of government is subordinated to the Slovak Republic National Council;
- *Control through Own Elected Authorities* – SR NC committees. Within the armed forces realm, it is provided mainly by the SR NC committees: Budget, Finance and Currency Committee, Defence and Security Committee, Special Control Committee for the Military Intelligence Control, Special Control Committee for the Slovak Intelligence Service Control.¹⁹⁸

Since 1993, the situation within the governmental control of the armed forces has considerably improved in Slovakia. A turning point came in years 2000 – 2002, when the parliament participated in preparation and approval of the strategic security documents. Today, the parliament knows how to handle theoretical strategic documents and has a possibility to assess and thus control mid-term documents of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces development. In this context, the parliament members execute their rights in area of the civil democratic control of armed forces according to their ability, capability, and interests.

Despite these positives, it is necessary to take a realistic view on fact that the area of the parliamentary control of armed forces has not managed to improve itself because the parliament does not include a sufficient number of deputies who specialize in security and defence field, which results from the fact that the political parties themselves have insufficient number of experts at this field.

¹⁹⁷ These ideas were presented in the opening speech of the former Minister of Defence, Frantisek Kasicky, on the colloquium "Civil Control of the SR Armed Forces", May 29, 2007; author's note.

¹⁹⁸ Kmec, Vladimír: *Parlamentné riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl Slovenskej republiky*, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): *Demokratické riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl, Inštitút obrany a bezpečnosti MO SR*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, s. 67.

(Kmec, Vladimír: *Parliamentary Control of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces*, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): *Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Defence and Security Institute of the SR MoD*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, p. 67).

Instead of Conclusion

Cooperation between the non-governmental organizations and governmental sphere within the “security sector” has been limited by isolation of the “national security” issue and spirit of “secretiveness” for a long time. Although the system changes were made very quickly and after 1993 the “security sector”, or let us say its institutions, advocated cooperation with civil society, a change in thinking of governmental authorities needed much more time. An important role within the development of civil-military relations was played by non-governmental or academic organisations and foundations, e.g. the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Institute for Public Affairs, Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs, Center for Security Studies, Euro-Atlantic Centre, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation, and the Department of Political Sciences at Komenský University or the Department of International Affairs at Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica. At the same time, however, it is necessary to say that an independent security community in Slovakia still does not represent an equal partner of national institutions, mainly due to a small number of its members. Although after 2000, other NGOs started to engage within the sphere of security issues, they were oriented rather at areas of education and providing information about NATO and ESDP, and after Slovakia’s accession to Euro-Atlantic structures, they restrained or completely revoked their activities.

Moreover, the non-governmental organizations engaged in the security realm have almost failed to entrench at regional level. The result is that regional “security community” is staffed with the state administration employees who are responsible for a wide spectrum of security issues, the civil defence, and so on. There are higher representatives of the Slovak Republic Armed Forces and Police Corps at regional level and local government representatives, whose work competencies include the security agenda as well. These actors have not established any mutual informal contacts, and furthermore, their interconnection with the civilian society and regional non-governmental organizations is marginal.

In terms of NGOs activation within the security and defence policy, the role of foreign partners was unambiguously the most important one. The non-governmental organizations and independent research centres from the Western Europe as well as the U.S. not only supported an interest of the civilian society in the security and defence issues, but also initiated and systematically financed engagement of domestic non-governmental organizations in cooperation with national institutions of the “security sector.”

The successfulness of the way the Slovak society and its armed forces have passed since 1989 proved true. The issue of democratic control of armed forces is entrenched in the Slovak Republic constitutional system in a way which corresponds with principles of parliamentary democracy and is accepted also within the armed forces. In the area of formal control, there are still problems within fine-tuning of system of cooperation among particular actors, mainly in terms of enhancing participation of “civilians” (especially politicians) in elaboration of basic documents concerning defence and security. In terms of control efficiency, it seems that the most important necessity is to maximally pursue activities of the fi-

nancial tools, particularly their transparency.¹⁹⁹ The control of the armed forces activities through budgetary rules and departmental expenses represents the most effective tool, which the public – thanks to the parliament, but also media – can apply. In the area of informal control, there are some problems that are partly caused by shortcomings in the formal control area. For example, media which play an important role within a control process in democratic countries and are crucial for quality of a public discussion consider a question of setting the criteria for the security situation assessment and work of the armed forces to be very important. These criteria must represent a political assignment, thus a part of the formal control. On the other hand, only clear assignments may provide a basis for successful work of the armed forces with the public opinion, for transparency of information purveyed to the public, and thus for a well-functioning feedback within the communication.²⁰⁰

It turned out that it is necessary to keep on building a theoretical base and improving educational system. Without a new field of study focused on security studies, which would prepare experts also for the defence department, there will be a predominance of people with military education. This could lead to specific problems within relations between civil and military personnel at the department, but also in a broader community of experts on security and defence issues.²⁰¹

In the regions, a troubleshooting field of *civil-military relations* concentrates on interaction between civil and military actors in the region. A dominant position pertains to the relation between a local government and military garrisons, or between mayors and commanders. An example of communicating the armed forces reform has demonstrated that a failure of communication flows (with only minor exceptions) between the defence department and the local governments or the public in regions is partially caused by the lack of well-elaborated communication strategy on the part of the Slovak Republic Ministry of Defence. Moreover, the local governments criticized an absence of analysis which would target economic, ecological, and social influence of the armed forces in regions. They perceived the armed forces mainly in terms of handling the emergency situations. On one hand, it was proved that local governments would play more important role within informal control of the armed forces, but also that the centre would have to pay much more attention to harmonization of state and regional interests in the security realm.²⁰² Experience gained within the civil society development in Slovakia has proved that to reform civil-military relations and bring the armed forces under the public control is not enough; it is necessary to enlarge the democratic control to an area of the whole *security sector*. This relatively new kind of approach towards interpretation of security issues requires a change in a security awareness of the public, a need to define and legislatively adjust the whole security sector. It is a matter of enlarging a band of national security creators and keepers away

¹⁹⁹ Petráš, Michael: Výsledky regionálnych seminárov a ďalšia práca v oblasti reformy bezpečnostného sektoru z pohľadu pracovníka Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, in: Tarasovič, Vladimír (ed.): Demokratické riadenie a kontrola ozbrojených síl, Inštitút obrany a bezpečnosti MO SR, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, s. 123.

(Petráš, Michael: Results of Regional Seminars and Further Work in the Area of the Security Sector Reform from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung employee's view, In: Tarasovič, Vladimír ed.: Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, the SR MoD Defence and Security Institute, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, 2004, p. 123.)

²⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 123-124.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 124.

²⁰² Ibid, p. 124.

from the Slovak Republic defence department, covering the whole security sector with effective control, and providing transparency of all processes associated with its functioning. At the same time, it will require to solve a whole range of partial problems, e.g. place and role of private security services within the national security system, or problems connected with regressive integration of members serving in special military and police units or military professionals into the society after a termination of their professional service.

Finally, we propose conclusions resulting from the brainstorming which took place on October 10, 2003, at the end of the “*Democratic Control of Armed Forces*” project. The brainstorming aim was to define priorities that should be pursued while building civil-military relations in Slovakia. Although this event took place five years ago, its conclusions are applicable even nowadays, and can help countries currently passing through this process.

Following knowledge gained during the regional seminars, the organisers defined three basic areas that were discussed – **civil control of armed forces**; **civil-military relations in regions**; and **the security sector reform**. Within particular areas, the participating experts agreed on the following priorities:

I Civil Control of Armed Forces

- legislation issues (formal level of control)
 - parliament, government, SR Security Council, SR Ministry of Defence
 - competencies and responsibilities
- theoretical base building
 - armed forces mission
 - development or direction
 - objectives and methods
- education system
 - guidance of knowledge concerning democratic control process
 - experts training (e.g. for political parties)
- democratizing society
 - needs and interests
- informal control
 - public discussion about strategic documents
 - critical media
 - assessment criteria
 - role of the local government
 - task of non-governmental organizations
 - national service as control factor
- public relations of armed forces, handling of public opinion
 - public access to information
 - correctness of information-passing
 - feedback
- international experience
- financial tools of control
- relations between civilians and soldiers at the department

II Civil-Military Relations in Regions

- actors interaction
 - relation between local government and garrisons/commanders
 - citizen in uniform
 - civilian personnel
 - common interests (culture, sport, etc.)
 - feedback
 - informal control
- communication functioning
 - creation of communication flows
 - regional media
 - communication strategies and public awareness
- harmonization of defence security interests, or the regions and the State
 - armed forces professionalization issue
- contingency
 - crisis management
- analyzing economic, ecologic and social impacts of garrisons on region

III Security Sector Reform

- citizens' security awareness
 - transformation of culture concerning security conception
 - understanding relation "State – Citizen"
- system reform and its establishment
 - to define who belongs to system
 - reform in term of new security environment
 - cooperation among departments
 - relation between armed forces and police force
- security theory development
 - defining security interests
- education
 - improving the quality of security community
 - educational system reform
- communication
 - networking
 - international relations
- control issues
 - covering of the whole security sector
 - transparency of processes
 - systematization
- effectiveness

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Formation of Security Community in Slovakia – Achievements and Failures

Vladimír Tarasovič

In the age of global threats, security community has become an important pillar of national security in every country. It represents a vital binder between a state and a citizen, between a capital city and regions. However within the Slovak conditions, a formation of the security community – which is based on mutual confidence and rotation of people among governmental, private, and non-governmental sector – perhaps needs one further generation. Its importance has increased due to the integration, since ambitions and commitments of a NATO member as well as tasks connected with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can be completely implemented only by means of interconnection among departmental experts and parliamentary ground, party central offices, academic community, journalists, analysts, businessmen, and public opinion makers.²⁰³

An absence of the security community which would provide a scope for open expression of opinion – designated for politicians, experts, journalists, and all the people who are interested in such a kind of discussion – appeared for the first time soon after the independent state was established. A need for expert and independent discussion about Slovakia's direction and position in international relations became an impetus to establish the “think-tank” institutions in Slovakia. The first scientific-research institution of that type was the *Slovak Institute of International Studies* (SIIS), established by Svätozár Bombik at the beginning of 1993. Unfortunately, his aim to create the think-tank in the manner of British Chatham House or American Council of Foreign Relations did not come true – partly due to indifference of a then governmental garniture to functioning of such an institution, and partly because of the founder's tragic death.²⁰⁴

Paradoxically, the only institution that existed from the early establishment of the Slovak Republic – and the only one that engaged exclusively in the security and defence issues – was the *Strategic Studies Centre* (SSC)²⁰⁵

of the SR MoD. The SIIS as well as SSC were not standard NGOs, since their founders were state authorities (the SR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the SR Ministry of Defence). This fact had a great (predominantly negative) impact on both institutions, because their founders – due to insensitive and non-systemic reorganizations of their structures and personal changes in different periods – set back their development and thus a development of the security community in Slovakia.²⁰⁶

²⁰³ For more information see Nicolini, Mário: Aké komunikačné stratégie pre bezpečnosť a Ozbrojené sily?, EAC, 4.10.2005, <http://www.eac.sk/page.php?doc=207>.

²⁰⁴ Korba, Matúš, Nečej, Elemír, Tarasovič, Vladimír: Slovenská bezpečnostná komunita a bezpečnostný sektor, CSS, CENAA, REDOS Humenné, 2007, p. 34 – 35.

²⁰⁵ In the following period, even this institution underwent several changes. In 1999, it was renamed Defence Studies Centre, in 2000 Defence and Security Institute, and since April 2004 till its end it existed under the name Institute for Security and Defence Studies – author's note.

²⁰⁶ Tarasovič, Vladimír, Nečej, E., Korba, M.: Slovak Civil Society in Defence and Security Affairs, in: Caparini, Marina, Fluri, Philipp, Molnar Ferenc: Civil Society and the Security Sector, DCAF, Lit Verlag Berlin 2006, p. 158.

So the nascent security community had to face a challenge to define the Slovak security community and start with its building step by step. Its first task was to match a notion *security community* to its contents – thus to its basic formative elements. The founders of the Slovak security community based their approach on a concept of civil society, which was generally accepted in the developed democracies. According to this concept, the civil society refers to voluntary associational groupings in a society, and the public expression of the interests, priorities, grievances, and values around which those associations are based.²⁰⁷

Who Forms the Security Community in Slovakia?

The process of our security community formation demonstrated a need to include not only non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in security issues, but also deputies, academic community, journalists and media, civilian as well as military experts, representatives of public administration, but also every citizen who was interested in the security and defence issues. Each of them has its unique place in this mosaic. Also in Slovakia, the *non-governmental organizations* play the most important role. They involve the widest range of qualified experts and are able to elaborate and publish independent analyses, organize expert *think-tanks* and thus contribute, in a sense, to increase in public know edge in area of security and defence policy. During an initial period, when the civil-military relations in Slovakia were formed, NGOs replaced even the academic community (which was passing through the transformation in terms of personnel and contents) in the educational area of a security perception.

The independent group involved *military experts* or experts coming from military environment. Those represented the greatest expert group among all the mentioned elements of the security sector for a long time. It is very hard to assess whether it is a plus or a minus. According to Chris Donnelly, a former Special Advisor to the Secretary General for Central and Eastern Europe, the greatest shortcoming of the Central and East European countries was a fact that all the most important security documents had been elaborated by soldiers who just put them to the approval. He was persuaded that if the deputies themselves were not engaged in the preparation of these documents, we could not talk about democratic control of the armed forces.

Another component of the security community is formed by the *parliamentary deputies* who – as democratically elected representatives of the citizens – should occupy the top of the hierarchy within this community, since they can directly influence legislation or important decisions, both through parliamentary committees and public hearings. This represents a kind of “double track” between the society and the government. On one hand, the deputies represent public interests, and on the other hand they give sense to the governmental decisions towards voters. However, the number of deputies who clearly understand a new security concept is still low.

Independent journalists and media will always play an irreplaceable role in a democratic society, since they have provided the public with basic information concerning this field. However, it is necessary to point out that there, in Slovakia,

²⁰⁷ Caparini, Marina, Fluri, Philipp, Molnar Ferenc: *Civil Society and the Security Sector*, DCAF, Lit Verlag Berlin 2006, p. 10.

are almost no journalists who would pursue the security issues regularly and without sensation seeking.

A task of *academic community* resides in research sphere as well as in preparation of future experts in the security realm. After new faces joined it, it has gradually become one of the most dynamic parts of the security community. Nevertheless, Slovakia's integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures has demonstrated it will take some time to prepare a sufficient number of well-prepared experts for work in the whole spectrum of the Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Development of the Security Community in Slovakia

In terms of influence on political process and political decisions in the security and defence area, the security community has the greatest possibility of action within a theoretical field. In the matter of a practical influence, everything depends on approach of the governmental organizations (ministries) – to what extent they are able to use its theoretical potential. Thus the best way is when the security community sets the areas in which the state power would welcome assistance or consultancy, and then steers its efforts to these fields. A potential of the Slovak security community was marginalized for a long time (particularly in the 1990s). At first, a decisive sphere did not treat it as a partner. The reasons can be summarized in the following points:

- the lack of civilian experts with contemporary education willing to work in the security community;
- The surplus of “contemporary experts” with military-political education who often considered themselves to be elite of the decisive sphere.

A change occurred between 2001 – 2003, when the state administration started to realize qualitative changes in the security community in Slovakia on the one hand, and the lack of its own capacities in obtaining public's support of integration on the other hand. Moreover, the integration efforts were practically impossible without adequate civilian-military relations. Finally, accumulation of tasks in that period (meeting political criteria enabling NATO and EU accession, as well as particular reform processes) forced the state administration to establish closer cooperation with the security community. In a relatively short time, the community managed to create good, although limited, basis – particularly in the capital city. At the regional level, the process was much more time-consuming and a number of NGOs working at this level is still minimal.

While studying a development of the Slovak security community in the security and defence relations realm, we find out it has basically copied a development in the foreign policy realm. Formation of the security community and its engagement in security and defence issues have been evolving in connection with a growth of interest in foreign policy and in connection with gradual formation of a need to develop an alternative mid-term and long-term foreign policy concept exceeding 4-year horizon. Furthermore, the fact that the foreign and security policies have been formulated in the cabinet, and that the official governmental institutions arrogated to themselves an analytical activity as well as a concept creation, led to an attempt to create an independent expert group that would regularly monitor development in Slovakia, elaborate alternative analyses, and propose concepts.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ Korba, Matúš, Nečej, Elemír, Tarasovič, Vladimír: Slovenská bezpečnostná komunita a bezpečnostný sektor, CSS, CENAA, REDOS Humenné, 2007, p. 36.

It was in a period of formulation of the basic strategic documents, when the Slovak security community gained its first experience in the sphere which was until then dominated purely by “civil officers and soldiers.” For example, *The Slovak Republic Security Strategy* – as the first document of so great importance – was published even during its preparation. It was released on Internet with a possibility to comment on it. Moreover, it was sent to the corporate organisations, non-governmental organizations, or academic community; the discussions and colloquia were organized, even at international level. On the one hand, experience gained thanks to a participation of the security community in security documents development proved to be right, but on the other hand it demonstrated that the Slovak security community was only in its infancy. Generally, only some individuals and a minimum of the addressed organizations or civil associations with relation to security or to the whole spectrum of a civil society participated in the project.

A process of fast changes, which had affected central Europe, did not enable to stabilize the Slovak security community in an adequate manner. The greatest problem the community has had to cope with is its insufficient financing. The state administration, which was the main user of the security community services, did not replace NP PRENAME²⁰⁹

(from which a pre-accession information campaign was financed) with any other universal grant system that would enable to support security community and assign some projects to it, even after an accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures. Furthermore, a state administration’s willingness to use an expert potential of the security community is also gradually decelerating. It is to the detriment of the cause, since an expert opinion exchange and stimulation of dialogue between the national institutions and the engaged representatives of public society is a worldwide phenomenon which helps to deepen cooperation between the governmental sphere and the public society representatives within a security policy cultivation and public control of the “security sector”.

Slovak Experience of the Security Community Formation and its Possible Use in Other Countries

Slovak experience of the security community formation can be summarized into the following points:

- A cornerstone of the security community was laid by enthusiastic individuals who established reputable NGOs;
- The NGOs in the security and defence area have developed particularly from the organizations engaged in the foreign policy issues;
- It would be very difficult to establish the security community without assistance of foreign donors and cooperation with the NGOs from developed democratic countries; Even the best projects cannot be carried out without an adequate financial support;
- There must be an interest in a particular cooperation, which comes from the state sphere.

²⁰⁹ NP PRENAME – National Programme of the SR Preparation for NATO Membership – author’s note.

Achievements and Failures of the Security Community in Slovakia

Achievements:

- Gradual increase in influence upon democracy development within a governance system;
- Greater interest of the NGOs and expert circles in the foreign-policy issues, which influences also a connection to the security and defence issues;
- Rise in public interest – and particularly interest of students – in the security and defence issues;
- Partial increase in transparency within a strategic documents preparation;
- Interest in use of the Slovak experience in other countries of Eastern and Southern Europe;
- Establishment of a new security community able to perform several key activities:
 - Panorama – a unique publication providing views of predominantly Slovak civilian and military experts on development of a global security environment; published annually by the Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA)²¹⁰;
 - Report on Slovakia – a unique publication devoted to the Slovak society development; published annually by the Institute for Public Affairs (IPA);
 - National Convent – a SFPA project reputable also abroad;
 - Journals – *Zahraničná politika*; *International Affairs* (SFPA); *Euro Atlantic Quarterly* (Slovak Atlantic Commission); *Strategické analýzy* (Centre for Security Studies, CSS);
 - Summer School for Young Professionals – organized by CENAA in cooperation with Academy of SR Armed Forces from Liptovský Mikuláš and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Liptovský Mikuláš and Uzhhorod (Ukraine) for Slovak and foreign students of political sciences and international affairs;
 - Slovak Strategic Forum on the ESDP – organized by CENAA;
 - Slovak Security Forum – organized by the Euro Atlantic Centre;
 - Conference on Global Security – GLOBSEC – organized by SAC.

Failures:

- Vague or frequently modified legislation on the NGOs functioning and funding. Insufficient number of national grants led to the great dependence on foreign donors who shifted their assistance to other regions after the SR joined NATO and the EU;
- Insufficient degree of coordination, experience, and information exchange among the NGOs in the security and defence area;
- Dissolution of the Institute for Security and Defence Studies which used to be a coordinator of cooperation between the defence department and the third sector within the security community;
- Failure to provide the public with sufficient explanations concerning influence of new global challenges and threats on the SR security.

²¹⁰In 2003 – 2007 it was a common project of the SR MoD and the security community, financed from the defence department resources. After the project founders left the defence department, CENAA took over the project and the publication has been financed from private resources – author's note.

Ongoing Problems that Require Our Attention

First of all, it is necessary to solve support and development of the security community. A form of support remains uncertain:

- State Support (e. g. grants) – there is no assumption it will increase in a considerable way. The state administration still regards itself as sufficiently competent to solve all the problems on its own. Moreover, during the previous period, it had to allocate a great part of budget on particular reforms;
- Foreign Support – the tendency of its shift to the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe and Asia will continue. The security community will have to focus on NATO resources or EU funds, or on common projects with the NGOs from the already mentioned regions;
- National non-state resources will be probably oriented rather to area of macro and micro-economy;
- A greater chance of development is on the part of university scientific and research workplaces pursuing the security and defence area, at national as well as international level;
- The NGOs cooperation at national and international level. This still begs the question whether it is necessary to establish a kind of umbrella organization:
 - NGO in the security and defence area at the national level (panel);
 - At international level, it will be probably the most progressive to consider the possibilities of “closer – regional” cooperation, e. g. a central-European one, by means of establishing the “virtual regional research institutions.”

Conclusion

The main task of the security community is to balance relations between political and military leaders in process of security and defence policy formation. The Slovak experience has proved that building the security community represents a long-term process which does not finish after the integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures. The reverse is the case! Even during a pre-accession process, the country has to take a long view – the view behind the horizon of an accession to NATO or integration to the EU, and find a place and tasks of the security community in new conditions. The Slovak experience, as well as experience of other central-European countries, has proved that after the integration, a majority of governmental garnitures have limited their cooperation with the third sector, since the third sector becomes rather a mirror of their actions than a kind of helpmate. In many cases, however, this view is very short-sighted and rather to the detriment of a democratic development in the country.

The cooperation between the security community and governmental sphere within a security sector used to be limited for a long time by isolation of “national security” issues and a spirit of “secretiveness”. Although formal changes came about very quickly, and after 1993 the “national security system” or its institutions claimed a cooperation with civil society, a change in thinking of governmental representatives lasted much longer. This change was supported by active work of NGOs and academic community or foundations (e.g. Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung or Department of Political Sciences at Komenský University) engaged in security and defence issues since 1995.

In Slovakia, the security community became an equal partner of national institutions only after 2003. At that period, it gradually started to admit other NGOs which, however, need some time to gain necessary experience and relevant contacts. Thus a limited number still remains the weakest point of the security community. Moreover, there is a lack of NGOs that would engage not only in analytic work, but also in national security sector control, and represent a strong partner in this governmental sphere. This represents the most limiting factor within deepening of transparency in the security sector. Furthermore, a majority of security community elements operate in the capital city and just a limited number works at a regional level.

For a long time there was no system which would prepare experts for security issues; mutual professional contacts between a governmental and non-governmental sector were limited. The positive examples of mutual cooperation include:

- the National Security Course at the Armed Forces Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš, which engages the security community experts in the educational process; and
- an organization of international Summer School for students of political sciences and international affairs, organized by CENAA and already mentioned Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš and Uzhhorod.

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Public Attitudes towards Integration, International Institutions and Global Threats

Oľga Gyarfášová

Introduction: Initial Conditions for Formation of Attitudes towards the Foreign Policy Orientation of a New State

The Slovak citizens were influenced by several factors during the formation of their foreign-policy attitudes. First of all, Slovakia – in time of the communist regime fall, but also three years later when an independent republic was established – suffered a historical shortage in all spheres of foreign policy, concerning personalities, elites, concepts, and institutions (for more information, see Lukáč 2000, p. 6). Citizens as well as political elites²¹¹

lacked historical experience of life in an independent state that would perform its own foreign policy, define and defend its own foreign-policy objectives and national interests. Only after 1993, the state institutions, own diplomacy, analytical centres, journals or forums – a background on which a social discussion about foreign policy issues is held and cultivated – were established. The lack of knowledge, a poor reflection of Slovakia's geopolitical position, a weak orientation in international political context, and overall relatively insufficient awareness²¹² were just a logical implication of that situation.

1. The social costs of economic transformation (objective deterioration of standard of living and sensitive subjective perception of social difficulties), but also other problems resulting from society's transition, have "pushed back" the foreign-policy topics to the bottom of the social issues scale, where social problems (unemployment, standard of living, state of health service etc.) dominate.

2. Researches demonstrate that foreign-policy openness is closely connected with interest in foreign policy and contact with a western culture. In this respect, however, the Slovak society has opened up very slowly. According to the polls that took place from 1992 to March 2000, a number of those who did not speak any western foreign language fell from 76% to 67%, likewise a number of those who had never visited any developed western country for a longer period than a week declined from 77% to 68% (compare Bútorová 1998, p. 175). Reclusiveness and indifference towards foreign policy events are strengthened mainly by indefinite and vague attitudes towards Slovakia's integration to the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Neither media, that devoted to foreign policy just marginally, nor politicians and social elites, who held "poor" discussion about foreign policy and expressed their opinion of foreign policy topics rather rarely than regularly, contributed to faster overcoming of initial conditions.

²¹¹ Within this context, we can talk about an "un-commonplace heritage" of domestic political elites. These elites, not speaking of so-called "common people", traditionally did not feel fully responsible for the situation in the country. (Bútorová – Bútorová 1994, p. 60).

²¹² We can mention, for example, the Slovak-Czech comparative survey from December 1994. Only 34 % of adult population in Slovakia knew about the results of the Austrian referendum on accession to NATO, while in the Czech Republic, this number represented 66 % (Aktuálne..., December 1994, pp. 27-29).

This situation is characteristic also for other post-communist countries that – besides political and economic changes – have built a new statehood and thus faced up a phenomenon, which was named a German political scientist, Klaus Offe, called “triple transition” at the beginning of 1990s.

Development of Public Opinion on Slovakia’s Foreign Policy Direction

The strategic goal of Slovakia’s foreign-policy orientation was to join the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The public attitudes towards the integration goals have considerably differed from the early beginning of 1990s. Whereas in relation to the EU, a long-term confidence has predominated over scepticism and a percentage of partisans has permanently exceeded percentage of opponents, an attitude to the Alliance has undergone more dramatic development. The beginning of 1990s was characterized by indefinite public opinions; a great part of population was not able to take any stand on Slovakia’s foreign-policy direction. In April 1992, 45% of population took indefinite stand on NATO, and in March 1993 this percentage reached 34%. (*Aktuálne ...*, March 1993)

Shortly after the establishment of independent Slovakia, there was a widespread conviction that **Slovakia had to “paddle its own canoe”, rely upon itself, and should not enter any pacts or alliances.** In March 1993, one third of Slovak population held the view that Slovakia could not trust anybody and had to rely mainly upon itself (*Aktuálne ...*, March 1993, p. 71). An option of independent way was preferred only by one third of citizens, whereas a direction to the West and accession to the European Community and NATO was supported only by one fourth of the adult population.

The first year of the state independence was characterized by intensive crystallization of Slovakia’s foreign-policy orientation. Alongside a proclaimed interest in continuation of the Slovak foreign policy within intentions of the CSFR policy, reflections about neutrality and possibility “to turn to the East in case we would fail in the West” occasionally appeared. Step by step, all the parliamentary parties as well as majority of non-parliamentary political parties agreed not only on necessity of Slovakia’s integration to the European Union and usefulness of the Visegrad cooperation, but also on support of Slovakia’s accession to NATO. This reflected in public opinion, too.

Whereas the first months of 1993 were characterized by the already mentioned indefinite attitudes and low confidence in international institutions – and in case of NATO by predominating mistrust – by the end of October 1993 a significant increase in confidence came up. In October 1993, 45% of respondents had a confidence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 55% trusted the European Community. Thus the year 1993 may be labelled as a period of accelerated process of the Slovak public’s self-education in the realm of foreign policy.

There are many factors that have influenced this phenomenon. First of all, the public realized that Slovakia itself was responsible for its foreign policy, there was nobody to blame. Faced to real foreign-policy responsibility, the public started to view the direction towards the West as an alternative which is more attractive than doubtful visions of “the third way” or even inclination to Russia.²¹³

²¹³ In survey from December 1995, the respondents ought to have answered a question: “What foreign-policy orientations do you consider to be the most appropriate for a successful development of our country?” Half of them stated that it was the integration to the EU and NATO; 27 % would prefer an own way (*Aktuálne...*, 1996).

On the other hand, despite increasing consent to pro-integration political line of foreign policy, a heritage of autarchy and isolationism remained in public consciousness, too. "This finding cannot surprise us: decades of political and economic isolation have been contributing to reproduction of mentality of a reclusive country and provincialism. If the Czechs used to be excessively interested in Europeanism, and if T. G. Masaryk was convinced that 'the Czech issue was the world issue,' than the Slovak leading personalities were usually placed in smaller space. Domestic horizons used to be limited to the closest neighbours: the Slovaks compared themselves with the Hungarians or the Czechs several times, often in a defensive way. (Bútorová – Bútor 1994, p. 60)

In the next period, a significant profiling – even polarization – of the foreign policy attitudes arose. The foreign policy orientation became an integral part of a value profile. Moreover, a line between pro-integration, transformationally open trend on one hand, and pro-integration, transformationally closed trend on the other hand, was identical with a line of a deep division, based on cultural values, between pro-democratically thinking people on one hand and people who inclined to the authoritarian attitudes on the other one.

In 1994 – 1998, the Slovak direction digressed from the Central European model of integration. In these years, very important decisions were adopted – three former members of the Warsaw Pact were invited to join NATO, and accession talks with the first group of candidates for the EU membership were launched. Slovakia had all the chances to "be in"; however, the politics of the Mečiar's government disqualified it from both processes. At the level of the public opinion, confidence in the EU and NATO as well as support for Slovakia's accession to these communities increased. This trend culminated in time of a defeated referendum on a direct presidential election and Slovakia's accession to NATO. According to the then surveys, if the referendum had taken place, its results concerning accession to the Alliance would have been univocally positive. In October 1997, 52 % of an adult population supported Slovakia's accession to NATO, 35 % were against.

After the government of Mikuláš Dzurinda came into office in autumn of 1998, Slovakia followed the way out of international isolation and, within the integration processes, started to catch up its Visegrad neighbours – Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Since autumn of 1998, a positive trend had started to appear – the confidence in the EU and NATO, as well as support for Slovakia's direction towards these groupings, had gradually increased. It was important mainly in relation to NATO, where the support reached around 50 %. Integration efforts were rounded off successfully – in 2000 Slovakia became a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and in 2004 it became a member of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Public and Integration to European Union and NATO

The European Union

The public support of integration to the EU and NATO was evolving in two different ways. An attitude towards integration to the EU was steadily positive. In the long term, an accession to the EU was supported by 70 % of population. Citizens' expectations have been significant and connected particularly with economic and social benefits. Great public support was conditioned by a high degree of con-

sensus among political parties and other opinion-making elites engaged within an issue of Slovakia's integration to the EU. In a pre-accession period, people expected that a membership would bring some advantages for the country as a whole and situated them to the more distant time horizons. According to the results of several surveys, the positive expectations of the public were based on three main "pillars". Two of them directly and explicitly concerned a social-economic sphere. First of all, citizens expected more job opportunities which would appear after the opening of a labour market. The second most often mentioned argument was a general and overall social-economic improvement which might have different background – more investments, European funds, or more generally – increase in standard of living, pensions, etc. The third group of expectations related to possibility of free travelling, Europe without borders, a definite overcoming of the "Iron Curtain" and division of Europe.

The citizens' worries concerned a decline in their standard of living, price increase, or deepening of social differences. Another one was immigration to Slovakia. This phenomenon has two basic aspects – a fear of the cheap labour force at our labour market, and criminality. However, there were also concerns about emigration of qualified and competent people from Slovakia, so-called brain drain. In the overall review, however, advantages and positive expectations prevailed.

After the accession, contentment and optimism connected with the membership in the EU has predominated. The contentment with the membership in the EU has much to do with several circumstances. First of all, negative scenarios, which had predicted a dramatic rise in prices of food and services, did not come true. In 2004, macro-economic indices even improved in comparison with a previous year. Slovakia reached the greatest growth of GDP out of all V4 countries, the wages slightly raised, inflation was low, some consumer prices (e.g. for food or clothes) even decreased in some way. Although this favourable macro-economic development was not a pure result of the membership in the EU, and came about in conditions of substantial regional and social disparities, it after all contributed, besides other advantages of non-economic character, to a positive assessment of the membership in the EU. This trend has remained also in the following years. The Eurobarometer surveys have shown that the Slovak public has been very satisfied with the membership in the European Union. Even within the Central European region and the V4 group, Slovakia ranks among the more Euro-optimist countries. This positive approach and attitude have been consistently demonstrated in various indicators – the membership is a good thing which brings advantages; confidence in the EU institutions and EU democracy; further enlargement; positive image of the EU; and so on.

EU Membership as a Vivid Reality

More structured view on development of advantages and disadvantages perception (and in retrospective also expectations before the accession) is provided in Table 1. While in the first year of the EU membership the citizens' persuasion concerning four out of five the most important advantages of the EU membership strengthened, in the next period there were no considerable changes in perception of the majority of advantages. The only exception is represented by "EU funds drawing" – in 2006, 33 % of citizens were aware of its expedience, in contrast to

24 % in 2005. Thus, this factor moved up to the fourth notch in perception of the most important advantages of the EU membership. The most often mentioned advantage is still matchless possibility to work abroad. Its asset is gradually growing with increasing number of open labour markets.²¹⁴ The Slovak citizens take advantage of this possibility, although a labour migration model is gradually changing.

Table 1.

“What advantages resulting from Slovakia’s membership in the EU do you expect?”

(April 2004; expressed in %)

“What advantages does Slovakia get from its EU membership?”

(May 2005, November 2006; expressed in %)

	April 2004	May 2005	November 2006
Possibility to work abroad	48	59	59
Possibility to travel without passport/visa	40	46	42
More opportunities for young people	44	40	41
Possibility of the EU fund drawing	20	24	33
Arrival of foreign investors, new job creation	28	34	30
Acceptance of Slovakia in Europe and in the world	12	14	13
Increase in standard of living	19	8	12
Home producers can export their products at the markets of the EU countries	13	8	11
Strengthening of democracy	7	7	9
Increase in competition	9	10	8
Increase in Slovakia’s security	8	8	8
Harmonization of the SR regulations with the EU ones	7	3	4

Note: Respondents were allowed to choose three in their view the most important advantages, and thus a sum of percentages in the table has exceeded 100 %.

Source: FOCUS, 2004, 2005; Institute for Public Affairs, November 2006.

The reverse side of the coin – perceived disadvantages – is represented mainly by use of a cheap labour force in Slovakia, departure of experts and young people from Slovakia, and concerns about decline in the standard of living. Within this area, a stabilisation, or even a slight diminution of concerns, has set in. Equally, worries about increase in bureaucracy and harmonisation of regulations have weakened. Thus a direct contact with the European institutions has not fulfilled original rate of concerns. Compared to 2005, a worry about emigration of young qualified people has slightly increased, which reflects a real work migration from Slovakia, so far non-compensated by more noticeable waves of returns.

²¹⁴ Now, the transition measures are valid only in Austria and Germany.

Table 2.

“What disadvantages resulting from Slovakia’s membership in the EU do you expect?” (April 2004; expressed in %)

“What disadvantages do result from Slovakia’s membership in the EU? (May 2005, November 2006; expressed in %)

	April 2004	May 2005	November 2006
Use of a cheap labour force in Slovakia	52	46	42
Emigration of experts and young people from Slovakia (brain drain)	43	37	42
Decline in population’s standard of living	39	33	31
Diminution of Slovakia’s security (increase in criminality, terrorism, ...)	21	23	26
Products from other EU countries will flood our market	27	29	24
Arrival of foreigners from other EU countries	24	17	20
Increase in bureaucracy	15	23	18
Takeover of the “western” way of life	13	16	18
Loss of some decision-making powers – loss of Slovakia’s independence	15	15	18
We will have to observe the EU laws, regulations, and directives	10	16	13
Increase in unemployment	9	12	13
Increase in competition	7	6	7

Note: Respondents were allowed to choose three, in their view the most important disadvantages, and thus a sum of percentages in the table has exceeded 100 %.

Source: FOCUS, 2004, 2005; Institute for Public Affairs (IPA), November 2006.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Pros and Cons

While the public motives for accession to the EU were mostly of a socio-economic character, the reasons for Slovakia’s accession to NATO were vague for many citizens. The most clearly perceived is a connection between the accession to NATO and the security of our country: in January 1999, 36 % of respondents supposed that after this step, Slovakia’s security would increase; one fifth thought this step could not affect it; and one third was not able to take a stand (IPA, January 1999). Positive impacts on economy and democracy were supposed only on the part of one fifth of respondents. Altogether, a considerable part of respondents was not able to give its opinion on consequences of Slovakia’s accession to NATO, or did not suppose any impacts of that act. At the end of 2000 this state remained the same. One third of population stated that the strongest argument for the SR accession to NATO was the security, however the second most commonly provided answer was “I don’t know” (17 %), the following answers were: “no argument”, “I am against the accession”. The arguments as “strengthening of the SR international position” (7 %) or “economic prosperity” (6 %) were represented just marginally. In other words, there were many ambiguities and interrogations in the public mind.

Weaker support for accession to NATO was connected not only with weakly perceived reasons for accession, but also with stronger fears of consequences that this step might bring. In spontaneous answers, the most often mentioned concerns are the concerns about drawing of Slovakia into war conflicts, increase in


army spending, as well as loss of the SR sovereignty. In 2000 – 2002, the Slovak government implemented a large information campaign focused on public awareness of the Alliance (Concept ..., 2000). The awareness increased, as well as support. In time of accession to NATO, the public support for this step had a majority character, but not a dominant one. More reserved public attitude towards the accession to NATO corresponds with a fact that it reflects risk factors as well as requirement of increased army spending. The accession to NATO merges in public mind not only with strengthening of security, but also with weakening, e.g. in form of increased probability that Slovakia might become a target of a terrorist attack. However, more and more people are persuaded that NATO will increase our security and that Slovakia needs collective military defence coming from part of other countries. At the same time, Slovakia should participate in common provision of military defence of other countries.

Opinions on Foreign Policy Themes after Accession to EU and NATO International Position of Slovakia

What do the citizens think about the role of Slovakia? According to the survey Transatlantic Trends 2005²¹⁵ (TT05), almost two thirds (64%) of the SR citizens think it will be better for the future of their country to actively participate in course of events in the world. One fourth prefers an alternative to keep aloof from international events. If we compare Slovakia with an average of nine EU countries which were involved in the survey (EU 9 = Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain and Slovakia), a proportion of pro-actively thinking people in our country is lower. For example, a pro-active approach of their country is supported by 89 % of French, 84 % of Portuguese, and 83 % of Spaniard. It is understandable, since a proportion of pro-actively thinking citizens is affected by a whole range of factors, e.g. size of country, its foreign-policy “weight” in the past, and resulting ambitions at the international scene.

Graph 1

“Do you think it would be better for the future of Slovakia to actively participate in course of world events, or rather to keep itself aloof from international events?” (% supporting an active participation)



Note: EU 9 = a weighted average of 9 EU member states that were included into the TT research (Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain and Slovakia). **Source:** Transatlantic Trends 2004, 2005.

²¹⁵ The survey of the German Marshall Fund and its European partners took place in June 2005 in the U.S., in 9 EU countries (Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain and Slovakia), as well as in Turkey. Further information and results are available at: [and](#) .

However, it is important that a proportion of SR citizens who prefer an active attitude towards international events increased from 59% to 64% during the last year (Graph 9). This shift, with several other changes indicated by other surveys, implies that the Slovak public – which used to be until recently preoccupied primarily by its own problems – starts to open itself towards the world, accustoms itself with its membership in international organizations and realizes that Slovakia is a part of larger groupings.

In relation to the question of a world superpower, a certain “anti-superpower” reflex has appeared on the part of Slovak citizens. In 2005, within a question “Who should be the only superpower?”, 36 % of respondents designated the European Union, only a marginal part assigned this role to the United States (3 %), and a majority chose the third possibility – “none country should be a superpower”. In Slovakia, this answer has much greater representation than in other European countries. For an older generation, perhaps, it is an expression for the “Soviet resentment”, for many others just an insufficient “political socialization” of a member of the European Union. In deeper layers of identity, we could possibly find a lack of geo-politic realism, a romantic inclination to neutrality, and so on.

In questions concerning transatlantic relations, Slovakia has demonstrated more general European pattern – a majority of population thinks that the United States and the European Union have a sufficient number of common values to be able to cooperate in solving international matters. However, if they should decide “either – or” (“Who is more important in terms of vivid interests of Slovakia – the United States or the European Union?”), the preference is unequivocally on the part of Europe. Slovakia also thinks – alongside other European countries – that the European Union should apply more independent approach from the U.S in the realm of security and diplomatic issues.

Another question from a “package” concerning the future of transatlantic relations has pointed out vigilance/aloofness of the Europeans from a superpower leadership. In terms of question: “To which extent is it desirable so that the United States apply their position of a strong leading superpower within international matters?”, 68 % of the Slovaks have answered in a negative way, while 21 % have responded positively. Their attitudes do not differ from the French, Germans, or Spaniards; however, they are relatively distant from attitudes of citizens in Great Britain, Netherlands, or Poland.

Global Threats Perception

In current conditions of global security, kinds of threats have been fundamentally changing – we talk about so-called asymmetric threats, notably international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. At the same time, an increasing security threat is constituted by climate changes, pandemic spread, and so on. Awareness of these menaces varies in different countries. A country’s experience plays also an important role, though not the only one.

The Slovak citizens, likewise citizens of other countries, see international terrorism as the most serious of all the examined threats (see Table 3). The same applies for proliferation of nuclear weapons, depression, or large number of immigrants and refugees – the Slovak public’s sensitivity about these threats is comparable with the European average. On the other hand, the Slovaks are not

so sensitive about global spread of diseases, effects of global warming, or Islamic fundamentalism threat.

Table 3.

“I will read you a list of international threats that may endanger Europe in ten coming years. Tell me whether you consider each of these threats as *very serious*, *serious*, or *slight*.” (The numbers in the table represent percentage of answers: “It is a very serious threat.”)

	Slovakia	EU 9	U.S.
International Terrorism	62	60	71
Global Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	54	56	66
Global Spread of Diseases, e.g. AIDS	41	50	56
Great Depression	40	42	43
Global Warming Effects	37	53	41
Islamic Fundamentalism	35	44	42
Large Number of Immigrants and Refugees	25	27	33

Source: Transatlantic Trends 2005.

In 2005, the Transatlantic Research surveyed a subjective perception of threats – not only in relation to the whole Europe, but also at the personal layer. A questionnaire included a question: “To what extent is it probable that the following threats will touch you personally in ten coming years?” A pattern of concerns is more differentiated in this area. In general, the Americans are more sensitive about all the mentioned threats. The great depression and terrorism are considered as the most imminent ones. The Europeans, on the other hand, feel endangered mostly by global warming effects and economic crises. In Slovakia, terrorism is the most sensitive issue (Table 4).

Table 4.

“To what extent is it probable that the following threats will touch you personally in ten coming years? – It is *very probable*, *rather probable*, *not very probable*, or *very improbable*.” (The table shows % of answers *very/rather probable*.)

	Slovakia	EU 9	U.S.
International Terrorism	66	51	71
Great Depression	55	73	80
Global Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	53	53	67
Large Number of Immigrants and Refugees	43	52	61
Global Warming Effects	24	74	64
Islamic Fundamentalism	24	40	50
Global Spread of Diseases, e.g. AIDS	22	38	49

Source: Transatlantic Trends 2005.

These results imply certain change. Early surveys demonstrated that the Slovak public was mostly concerned about economic and social issues. In relation to the security, the accent was put on “internal” sources of danger. External dangers or perils that might come “from beyond the borders” were not perceived as so pressing – although, sensitivity about them has increased in recent years. The


perception of terrorism as the most significant security threat was supported by the IPA research in November 2004. So the accent on classical (traditional) threats, in form of conventional military attack of a country, shifts to so-called asymmetric and civilizing threats of a contemporary world. However, we can see that an extent of intensity and sensitivity about particular threats is in Slovakia much lower than in other (surveyed) European countries or the U.S. The most significant difference was revealed in relation to the global warming effects. This research does not permit to generalize the results as a phenomenon of “new democracies”, since in Poland almost 65% of respondents expressed concern about global warming effects. However, we cannot compare the results with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Generally, we can observe that a lower sensitivity about environmental issues on the part of the Slovak public reflects poor presence of “green” topics in public discussion as well as in agenda of political parties.

Attitudes towards Development Aid and Democracy Promotion Policy

After accession to the OECD in 2000 and to the EU in 2004, Slovakia joined the states providing other countries with development aid. The IPA research from June 2005²¹⁶ indicated the public’s support of this aid is great, stated by 83% of respondents. Similar findings emerged after the previous IPA research conducted in September 2004, in which 77% of adult population considered it right that Slovakia provided other countries with humanitarian and development aid. So it is emphasis on humanitarian aid that dominates in consciousness of the Slovak public.

At the same time, the *Transatlantic Trends 2005* research surveyed to what extent the Europeans and the Americans supported democracy promotion in the world. According to the findings (Graph 14), a majority of Slovak public supports this political goal, though it does not reach an average attained in nine surveyed EU countries: it was supported by 63% (compared to 74% in EU9). In Slovakia, undecided attitudes (12% compared to 4%) are more common, whereas a percentage of opponents is just slightly higher than in the EU9 (25% compared to 22%).

Graph 2
Democracy Promotion in the World as a Goal of EU Policy (expressed in %)



Source: Transatlantic Trends 2005.

²¹⁶ The Slovak public opinion survey concerning provision of humanitarian aid was performed by the Institute for Public Affairs (IPA) per order of the SR MFA in June 2005. The survey was co-financed by the Canadian governmental agency CIDA.


Democracy promotion in the world has the greatest support among voters of the *Slovak Democratic and Christian Union* (77%) party, and the lowest support among the partisans of the *Slovak Communist Party* (58%). Differences in age and education are not significant from a statistic point of view.

As regards particular tools of the democracy promotion policy, Slovak public prefers a “soft power” use: 56% approve of election monitoring as well as support of independent groups (e.g. trade union, human-rights, non-governmental organisations or religious groups, etc.); 38% prefer economic sanctions, and 36% tend towards political sanctions. The use of military power to bring down a totalitarian regime has been supported only by 19% of respondents. In Slovakia, the support of all the mentioned actions is below the EU9 average (Graph 3). This implies an interesting paradox: although almost two thirds of population associate with a generally formulated political goal of democracy promotion in un-free countries, an approval of particular forms of meeting this goal is much rarer. This stems from the fact that a public discussion about the particular forms of democracy promotion has not been sufficiently structured yet. At the same time, the general public has no clear conception of what the particular tools of democracy promotion actually are.

Graph 3

“Imagine that there is an authoritative regime and lack of political and religious freedom in some country. Should the EU use the following means to promote democracy?”

(The graph shows % of affirmative answers of respondents in the EU9 and Slovakia.)



Source: Transatlantic Trends 2005.


Lower support of particular actions within democracy promotion is connected with a fact that in Slovakia – the country which was several times in its history exposed to internal intervention – the “culture of non-intervention” or “non-interventionism” are considerably wide-spread. This is proved by a finding that in comparison with other European countries (particularly with Great Britain, Spain or Netherlands), as well as the U.S., the Slovak public inclines to the opinion that “an intervention to internal affairs of other countries is never justified” (64% of af-

firmative answers, Graph 4). It is probably an ambivalent experience that reflects in this phenomenon: on one hand there is a reclusiveness and “smallness complex” that may result in sense of helplessness towards the greater and the more powerful, but on the other hand, there is also rich historical experience – when the others, the stronger, used to intervene in events in Slovakia.

Graph 4

“Intervention in internal affairs of other countries is never justified.”

(The graph shows % of affirmative answers.)



Source: Transatlantic Trends 2005.

Conclusion

Slovakia is a small central European country that has passed through several regimes and state systems in its recent history. It is fixed in its historical memory that the others used to decide its fate. Also this historical heritage induces the lower interest in the course of world events and foreign policy, comprehension of which requires certain extent of awareness, experience, scope of knowledge, etc. The crucial creators of foreign policy are represented by elites and institutions; however, more and more important place belongs to civil society – the public in the broadest sense. This is another point where we have to eliminate the deficits relating experience, the lack of information and particularly contextual perception of foreign-policy connections, or broader public discussion about international issues. A position of a waiter for the membership and a period of “lost time” are gradually changing to the “identity of full membership” in the EU as well as NATO.

Thus it is very important to know how the public perceives several foreign-policy issues as well as a broader context. However, we have to realize that it is not possible to compare the Slovak public with those of countries representing crucial international actors, where the foreign-policy issues are more considerably present also in internal political discourses. The Slovak respondents answered several questions with words “I do not know” or “I have no opinion” more often

than respondents of other countries, which is a natural result of low awareness and lack of familiarity with the given topics – not only on the part of the public, but very often on the part of political elites, too.

The integration to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization posed a great challenge for modern Slovakia. We managed it. This step, however, does not mean “the end of history.” The very reverse is the case! A coming period is equally important, even more complicated in many aspects, and more demanding of extent and depth of internal sources of the foreign policy. The goals, questions, and challenges will increase, not vice versa. This situation results from at least two facts. Firstly, since the accession we have become a part of a greater whole, its actors, partners, as well as opponents. The second factor is represented by an overall, very dynamic international situation characterized by new challenges as well as dangers.

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Public opinion on defence and security issues: the role of public opinion in Serbia

Zorana Atanasović

Introduction

Global security environment has changed in the last several decades. The end of Cold War has initiated changes in understanding of the concept of security and mission of armed forces. Concept of security encompasses military aspect, but political, economic, social, societal and environmental dimensions as well. The study and analysis of security includes not only national level, but individual, regional, international and global as well.

One of the consequences of the changed security environment is that the armed forces face new security challenges which changed their mission. Security sector is today term that encompasses armed forces, non-statutory security forces, civil management, legislature, legal framework²¹⁷. Civil society bodies are the fifth dimension of security sector that includes: NGOs, (independent) media, think-thanks, research institutes, public opinion, and the electorate...²¹⁸

In this article we will focus on the role of public opinion on security issues because of the limited space. Research and analysis of domestic and foreign authors will be used in an attempt to answer the question what are the possible roles of public opinion in shaping and managing the security sector and to provide the sketch of public opinion on defence issues in Serbia.

Public opinion and defence policy

General definition of public opinion is "format of collective reasoning of political public about current social situations that develop into issues important for the life and practice of social community."²¹⁹

Public opinion defined in this way is the format of expression of social attitudes of the representatives of political public about given situation-problem, and this implies the function of public opinion in stimulating the actors of political practice to behave in certain way during the process of resolution of socially relevant problems.

The reasons for carrying out public opinion research are numerous. One of them is the complexity of the notion of attitude, which makes it possible to achieve a better insight into complexity of human behavior. Attitudes encompass all three aspects of psychological life – cognitive, affective and conative²²⁰. Research and analysis of attitudes enables overcoming of one-sidedness of sociological or psychological approach in explaining human behavior. Attitudes connect two important moments for social behavior: influence of social factors and attributes of personality.

²¹⁷ According to: Law, David, Security Sector Reform in the Euro-Atlantic region: Unfinished Business, in: Bryden Alan, Hanggi Heiner (Eds.) Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, DCAF, Geneva, 2004, pg. 27-28

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Đorić, dr. Toma, Političko javno mnenje, Radnički univerzitet «Radivoj Ćirpanov», Novi Sad, 1975, pg. 60

²²⁰ Rot, Nikola, Osnovi socijalne psihologije, Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, Beograd, 1994, pg. 294

Public opinion research started to expand during the first and the Second World War when the power of propaganda and media was observed and developed to real industry. Not only scientists and experts are interested in public opinion research, but industry, health system, public administration, politicians, as well, and the list of interested sides is constantly expanding²²¹. Public opinion depends on several factors²²²: a) on the strength of traditional norms in the society and the given culture; b) on the integrity of the normative system across various layers within the society; c) on the general perception of the main institutions within the society (esteem, trust, image); d) on the preceding societal or collective experience (e.g. totalitarian or democratic past); e) on the subjective evaluation of credibility of various sources of information (specific media, specific channels of interpersonal communication); f) on the personal or group capabilities of integrating contradictory pieces of information into the framework of previous knowledge and experience (ability to cope with cognitive dissonance).

Consensus on the national level on major security issues is precondition of successful security policy and resolving of security and defence issues. Attitudes of citizens are integral element of the defence policy and one step in the process: perception – policy conception – decision – implementation – professional evaluation – public opinion feedback²²³.

Specialized knowledge is precondition for understanding security issues and this fact puts additional pressure on the relation between public opinion and security policy. Average citizen can not estimate ex. Which sort of weapons is efficient for a certain security threat, what number of soldiers is required in national army or where to build barracks. Very often, the information important for security is classified. It is sometimes hard to draw the line between information of the public importance and classified information, or to define the period until which a certain information is classified. Furthermore, security issues are usually sensitive, especially when they refer to life or death issues. All mentioned attributes additionally broaden the gap between the request for democracy and the request for efficiency of security policy.²²⁴

Is public opinion competent to judge on security and defence issues?

“Almond-Lipman consensus” is a result of two decades of public opinion research after the Second World War. The main conclusions are that “public opinion is volatile and thus provides inadequate foundations for stable and effective foreign policies; lacks coherence and structure and it has little if any impacts on foreign policy²²⁵. This view is advocated by the Realist School of international relations which pointed out that problem of foreign policy (of which security is a part) are far from the knowledge and experience of average citizens. Hans Morgenthau, one

²²¹ More details: Hartl, Jan, The Importance of Public opinion in Security and Defence Policy Making, in: Marie Vlachova (ed.), The Public Image of Defence and the Military in Central and Eastern Europe, DCAF, CCVO, Beograd, 2003.

²²² Ibid, pg. 17

²²³ Ibid, pg. 16

²²⁴ More details: Almond, Gabriel A, Public Opinion and National Security Policy, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2, str. 371-378, 1956.

²²⁵ Holsti, Ole R., Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippman Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec. 1992), str. 439-466

of the leading realists considered that foreign policy can not rely on the support of public opinion whose preferences are rather emotional than rational²²⁶. According to this school of thought, public opinion does not influence creation and implementation of foreign and security policy and its role is passive, i.e. to provide support to policy decision makers.

Page and Shapiro wanted to answer the question if citizens' preferences influence foreign policy decisions by analyzing public opinion trends. They collected 3319 items about policy preferences of which 609 were repeated in identical form at least in two public opinion surveys in the period from 1935 to 1979. One of their findings was considerable congruence between changes in preferences and policies, especially for large and stable opinion changes on salient issues. Congruent changes in policy were more frequent than non congruent, and public opinion had the tendency to change before the policy change occurs more frequently than reverse process. Public opinion according to the results of this research changes before the change of policy, but authors have opened the possibility that congruence of public opinion and policy can be result of manipulation by political elite or interest groups.²²⁷

Another research conducted by the same authors included 6000 items of public opinion research from 1935 to 1982 confirmed stability of public opinion. Changes in preferences of foreign policy were rational response of public on national or international events that were objects of media reports or interpretations of policy creators or other elite. This research showed that objective events do not influence public opinion directly, but that citizens of USA form their attitudes relying on mass media, especially reports of experts and reporters. Public opinion reflects the quality of information and choices presented to public.²²⁸

The research related to the impact of public opinion on public policy, using the results of 30 studies, showed that public opinion affects public policy three-quarters of times the impact was gauged. The effects of public opinion were of substantial importance at least a third of the time. The salience of issues is important factor and decision makers were more responsive to public opinion on defence issues than other spheres of public policy²²⁹.

Political environment influences competency of citizens, according to results of the researchers at University of Illinois. Limits in citizens competency are, according to this experimental research, rather result of deficiencies in political environment than individual capabilities and dispositions²³⁰. Favourable political environment provides combination of general information with increased motivation to act responsibly and neutralizes individual differences in education and information on political issues²³¹.

²²⁶ibid, pg. 440

²²⁷ More on the results of this research: Benjamin I. Page; Robert Y. Shapiro. Effects of Public Opinion on Policy. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 77, No. 1. (Mar., 1983), pp. 175-190.

²²⁸ More on the results of this research: Benjamin I. Page; Robert Y. Shapiro. Foreign Policy and Rational Public. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 32, No. 2. (Jun., 1988), pp. 211-247.

²²⁹ Burstain, Paul, The Impact of public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda, *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 56. No.1 (Mar., 2003)pp. 29-40

²³⁰The main advantage of this research is that used experimental research design on respectable sample (1160 citizens of Illinois), but the main disadvantage is that it did not refer security issues.

²³¹ More on the results of this research: Kuklinski, James H. and Paul J. Quirk, Jenifer Jerit, Robert F. Rich, Political Environment and Citizen Competence, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 45, No. 2, (Apr. 2001.), str. 410-424.

Domestic structures are an intervening variable between public opinion and foreign policy. The degree to which political institutions are centralized and the degree to which state dominates policy network seem to be the determining factor²³². The illustration are two states on the opposite sides – USA where public opinion has the greatest and France where has the least importance.

Public opinion on defence and security issues in Serbia

Interested public is one of the basic components of democracy because it provides critical rethinking of policy and the government decisions. Free, developed and differentiated civil society is a base for competent public. Serbia is country in transition and is in process of building democratic institutions, public is one of those. Public and security come from opposite theoretical and practical traditions, based on the opposite values and that fact creates additional tension. Public is concept that refers to public good, something available to everyone. Security issues, on the other hand, deal with classified information and are protected from the influence of public. This tension was one of the criteria in Serbian society and security issues were out of the reach of researchers. As an example, in Serbia (FR Yugoslavia) there were no public opinion research with the focus on the Army or civil-military relations until 2001²³³.

Centre for Civil Military Relations, non-governmental organization from Belgrade, carried out seven surveys of public opinion research on the military reform of the then Serbia and Montenegro, from June 2003 till April 2005, with sets of items referring to how citizens are informed about defence, confidence in defence institutions, expectations from defence reform and attitudes towards security integrations.


Over a half respondents during seven polling periods were for the most part interested or completely interested in security issues. Having in mind that over a half of citizens in Serbia estimate that are fully or for the most part informed about security and defence there is a good base for constructive potential of Serbian public opinion in public debate on security issues²³⁴. On the top of the list of security threats that public opinion perceives are security threats within the country more frequently than threats coming from abroad. Potential conflicts in nationally mixed communities, organized crime and economic and social conflicts and tensions are perceived as the most important security threats. Professionalization and modernization of equipment are according to public opinion top priorities in the Army reform.

²³² Rise-Kappen, Thomas, Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies, *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (July 1991), pp. 479-512.

²³³ Centre for Civil-Military Relations included several questions on the Army and security integrations in the poll on state of human rights within the project Protection of Human Rights in Army and Police in FR Yugoslavia, more details: Milorad Timotic, Serbian Public Opinion on Human Rights in the Yugoslav Army, in: Hadzic, Miroslav (ed), Protection of Human Rights in Army and Police, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Beograd, 2006 pp.69-91

²³⁴ More details in: Glišić, Jasmina, Koliko javnost zna o Vojsci i odbrani i da li je to važno in: Hadžić, Miroslav, Timotić, Milorad (eds), *Javnost i Vojska*, Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, Beograd, 2006, pp. 55-82

Graph 1 Should our country join NATO?




Public opinion in Serbia holds a negative opinion towards joining NATO²³⁵. In all seven circles of research the same question was raised *Should our country become NATO member?* The support for the NATO joining is negligible, but we must not forget that the citizens of Serbia experienced traumatic experience during bombing 1999. A rise in support has a positive trend which is probably a result of the circumstances that political elite since 2000 mention Euroatlantic integrations as one of the most significant goals. The support for the NATO joining is the most relevant among the young and the educated respondents, which indicate that additional attention and information on the positive and negative aspects of the NATO joining should be focused on the elderly and uneducated citizens. The biggest percentage, about half of the respondents with slight variations was against NATO joining.

Although NATO membership is not welcomed by the majority of people of Serbia there is a positive attitude toward some forms of cooperation with it. The cooperation within the Partnership for Peace is according to the research till 2005 been supported by the huge majority, and the support had a growing trend, whereas the percentage of opponents did not exceed 15%.

In the public opinion research conducted by TNS Medium Gallup from Belgrade in February 2008 over a half of respondents (58,5%) supported Serbia's joining of Euro-Atlantic integration. However, there are differences in understanding the concept of Euro-Atlantic integration. More than one half of respondents includes European Union as Euro-Atlantic integration. One third considers NATO and PfP as Euro-Atlantic integration.

Graph 2 What we mean by euro-atlantic integration?



²³⁵ More details in: Timotić, Milorad: Očekivanja građana od reforme vojske, lbid, pp 105-133

The results of the research which was done by the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy²³⁶ go to say that on average half of those who want the EU integration do not want the NATO membership. But still the percentage of those who accept one or the other form of integration is sufficient enough to be a firm foundation for building a huger support for NATO.

The biggest percentage of people (almost two fifths) holds that the country security would benefit most of the Western orientation and EU membership. According to the results of the opinion poll organized by Serbian European Integration Office, Serbian joining EU on a prospective referendum would be supported by huge majority of people - 70%. Joining EU is a thing many people of Serbia long for, but most of them regard EU as merely an economic integration, although a significant part of the cooperation refers to the security (mainly in the field of legislation and home affairs and in the foreign, security and defence policies).

Probably the most significant circumstance which contributed to such results is that majority of European countries belong to Partnership for Peace and that among political elite there is an agreement that Serbia should be part of such a programme. At the end of the research 72,8 % of the respondents supported joining Partnership for Peace. It is true that 15% of the opponents of this cooperation within Partnership for Peace were against any form of cooperation with the institutions of "the West". Comparing the percentages of the advocates of NATO joining and the membership in Partnership for Peace, truth is a harsh reminder that there is enough space for additional rise in the support of NATO joining. If the people were familiar with the positive experience of the armed forces during cooperation within Partnership for Peace, it will probably serve as an additional stimulus for the rise in support of extensive cooperation within NATO. The fact that the armed forces will specialize in medicine and engineering which do not involve direct involvement in combat operations will most certainly have positive impact.

Serbia is different from other countries in Central and Eastern Europe in that it has a number of particular traits which shape its attitudes towards NATO. It seems the argument that bombing in 1999 had a goal of ending the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo was not plausible enough for the people of Serbia, and the grim impression was worsened by the fact that the operation was done without the approval of the UN Security Council. Besides, Serbia is a country which is still in transition period ensuing after the conflict and authoritarian order and its citizens are primarily interested in improving standard of living, and the security is regarded as yet another domain in need of reform.


One part of the general public still has an attitude of Serbia not having the tradition of joining military alliances, and non-aligned policy in the period after the Second World War goes to prove it. On the other hand, most of the neighbouring countries are NATO members, candidates to join NATO or they see the membership in prospect. This argument is used by the elite / for instance by the President of Serbia / as a reason why Serbia cannot remain neutral and why it is preferable to join NATO.

Up to now the stated results indicate that the citizens of Serbia do not see the connection between the economic and security integration. Security integration,

²³⁶ It refers to the research Perception of State and Party Divisions done in spring 2006, more details on

i.e. membership in NATO is not a formal precondition of economic integration, i.e. EU joining. The experience has shown up to now that post communist “new” EU members had joined EU before and the NATO membership for most of them added many bonus points for the accession to EU.

Graph 3 Confidence in institutions



Social and political environment influences attitudes of citizens. Good illustration is drastic decrease in the confidence in Army after death of the two conscripts in military barracks in 2005. Media reports analysis showed that response of the officials of the Army was informing the public about the event in a way that was not in a proper time frame, not coordinated and not corresponding to given situation. This manner of informing the public did not respond to the need of citizens to have clear information about the event and to resolve the issues that were uncertain and contested. This resulted in spread of the rumors and decrease in confidence in Army (Graph 3)²³⁷.

Media report on security and defence issues that was analyzed paralelly showed that these issues took significant portion of media report. However, media report had not provided pluralism in treatment of issues and factography dominated over analytical approach. Official interpretation dominated media reports, and the issues of public importance (such as financial aspects of military reform or war crimes on the territory of former SFRY) were marginalized and out of public discourse²³⁸.

Reaching the consensus on security issues in Serbia is additionally burdened by ideological division. We can differentiate group that is interested in security and defence issues, has strong confidence in Army and is strongly opposed to joining NATO and the group that is not so much interested in security and defence issues, is critical towards Army and shows more than average support to NATO integration²³⁹. These two groups can not be simply qualified as right wing and left wing oriented, but provisory can be qualified as pro-reform and anti-reform forces of society.

²³⁷ Đurašinović, Dragana, Case Topčider: Reporting on the death of two conscripts in barrack Topčider on 5 October 2004, presentation at workshop Strategy of Communication of MoD of SCG, in Kanjiža, 23- 25 April 2005.

²³⁸ More details: Matić, Jovanka, Mediji o Vojsci SCG u procesu reforme, in: Hadžić, Miroslav, Timotić, Milorad ur, Javnost i Vojska, Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, Beograd, 2006. pp. 155-176.

²³⁹ Atanasović, Zorana, Političke partije Srbije i stavovi o Vojsci SCG, in: Ibid. pp. 133-152

Conclusion

Widening of the concept of security to include along with military sector political, economic, social, societal and ecological security threats intensified the role of public opinion in security sector. Individual security is leading reason for states to pursuit for security and because of that security is public good and part of public discourse. Public opinion in Serbia is interested and according to selfestimation well informed on security issues. According to research, public opinion has potential for competent participation in security sector reform and wider in security policy.

There is a clearcut European orientation of Serbia but it is an open ended question whether Serbia can be independent from Euroatlantic dimension of integration. This question is not a subject of serious social debate in Serbia yet. It is rather uncertain whether Serbian people bear that in mind and hence there is a need to open a debate on whether it is possible to join EU, which is a wish of most people, and remain out of NATO. The experience of countries which became members of NATO in the two last enlargements prove that the membership in NATO occurred prior to EU membership and that full membership in NATO has made a positive shift in the negotiations with EU.

The support of the general public for the NATO joining will remain negligible as long as the general public does not see the benefits of Serbian joining NATO. The belief that Serbian accession to EU will bear propitious results in the economy growth and indirectly in the higher standard of living are the strongest stimuli of all. As one can see in the results shown, economic progress, i.e. the growth of investments after joining NATO was a good sign of the country's stability and thus investment safety for the foreign investors. To get familiar with the experience of economic development of „new NATO members“ would definitely lend itself to the growth of general public support.²⁴⁰

This is even more important when we have in mind that around four fifths of respondents mention TV and one third dailies as a main source of information on security and defence²⁴¹.

A public debate on NATO where the arguments pros and cons of the joining are examined, has started, but on and off organization of public debates will not bring about huge shifts in the attitudes of the general public. It is necessary to stop the ambiguous wording such as Euroatlantic integrations and begin an open national dialogue at the highest level on the benefits and challenges of joining NATO²⁴².

Presented trends are relatively stable and show the widest public is not emotive in reaction. Public opinion is very responsive to social environment especially media and interpretations of political leaders and elites. Political elite should have in mind when creating messages for the public that public opinion reacts to inadequate and improper treatment by decrease in legitimacy to government institutions.

²⁴⁰ More on the connection between the joining NATO and the investment increase can be found in the text by Marko Savkovic Does joining NATO contribute to the more stable business environment and economic development in Serbia, in: *Western Balkan Security Observer* No 5, April-June 2007, pp. 48-55

²⁴¹ Glišić, Jasmina, Koliko javnost zna o Vojsci i odbrani i da li je to važno, in: Hadžić, Miroslav, Timotić, Milorad (eds), *Javnost i Vojska*, op. cit, pg. 75

²⁴² More about debate on NATO in Petrović, Predrag: An attempted debate – mapping the debate about NATO in Serbia's civil society, in: *Western Balkan Security Observer* No 5, April-June 2007, pp. 31-41

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CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN AND NORTH ATLANTIC AFFAIRS (CENAA)

Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) is an independent NGO, which is focusing mainly on activities within the scope of foreign and security policy. All our activities are divided into six programs:

- Transatlantic relations and Europe
- Strategic regions
- Transition
- Security and Defense Policy
- Panorama of the Global Security Environment
- International summer school for young professionals – future leaders

Each program covers a wide variety of research projects, conferences, workshops and publication activities with local and international partners involved. Education and training of representatives from NATO and EU neighboring states as well as regions has become one of CENAA core activities in the recent years.

CENAA aim is to play an active role in the strategic discussion in Slovakia, to participate in the education process of future professionals of foreign and security policy and to contribute to stability and sustainable development in all regions and countries were CENAA experts present through the educational and training programs.

CENTRE FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (CCMR)

Centre for Civil-Military Relations (www.ccmr-bg.org) is a civil society organisation from Belgrade established in 1997. CCMR promotes the public and responsible participation of civil society in increasing the security of the citizens and state based on modern democracy principles, as well as security cooperation with neighbouring countries and Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

Belgrade School of Security Studies (www.bsos.ccmr-bg.org) is a special division of the CCMR set up to carry out systematic research and promote academic advancement of young researchers thus contributing to the development of security studies in Serbia.

Since its establishment, the CCMR developed significant experience in research, education and advocacy and had profiled itself as a leading independent knowledge-centre in this field in Serbia.

Zorana Atanasovic graduated psychology at Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade. She has worked as an associate of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations in Belgrade since 2004 where she participated in research and advocacy projects. Currently, she is preparing her M.Phil. Thesis entitled "Discourse Analysis on NATO in Serbia", to be presented at the Department of International Relations of Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. Zorana's primary research interest is the interrelation between public opinion and NATO.

Filip Ejodus is a Research Fellow at the Belgrade School of Security Studies and Executive Director of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations. He currently also works as an expert on youth security for the Ministry of Youth and Sports (Government of Serbia) on writing and implementing National Youth Strategy. Currently he is a PhD student at the University of Belgrade where he works as a teaching assistant. He holds double master degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Sciences-Po Paris and BA in international Relations from the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. His research interests are identity, security, European foreign policy and enlargement, Middle East, democratic oversight.

Ol'ga Gyárfášová completed study of sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy, at Comenius University in Bratislava. She defended a doctor's degree in comparative political sciences field. Since 1999 she has been working as an analyst and a programme director at the Institute for Public Affairs. In her work, she has focused on research of public opinion, political culture, value orientations, and electoral behaviour. Besides research work, she has lectured at the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences of Comenius University.

Elemír Nečej studied at the Faculty of National Economy at the University of Economics in Bratislava (1974), at the Military School of Pedagogy – in the field military psychology and pedagogy (1994), and completed specialized post-gradual study in the “European Integration and European Union” field at the Faculty of Management, at Comenius University in Bratislava (1999). From 1971 to 2001 he served as a professional soldier. In 1997 he started to work in the Centre for Strategic Studies and at the Defence Planning Section of the SR Ministry of Defence. From 2001 to 2008 he worked as a civilian expert at the Institute for Defence and Security Studies of the SR MoD and the Strategic Studies Institute at National Defence Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš alternatively. He has been engaged in area of security and defence policy with emphasis on the European Union. From a geographical point of view, he has pursued analyses of the Western Balkans and South Caucasus. Nowadays, he works as an external member of CENAA staff.

Róbert Ondrejcsák studied political sciences, history, and philosophy. Today, he works as an executive director of the Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA). In the past, he worked as a director of the Institute for Defence and Security Studies of the SR MoD, as a deputy chief of mission at the SR Embassy to Hungary, as a foreign and security policy adviser of the SR National Council Vice Chairman. Before, he had worked at the Department of Defence Policy and International Relations at the SR MoD as well as in the Slovak Centre for Strategic Studies. He is a co-founder of the Institute for Asian Studies, by CENAA, where he has engaged in East Asia area. He has pursued foreign and security policies of the U.S. and the European powers, as well as Central Europe. He is one of the *Panorama* founders and works as its editor now. He is an author or co-author of various publications within the foreign and security policy area and works as an editorial board member of several journals in the SR and abroad.

Djordje Popovic is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Civil – Military Relations and a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. He holds a B.A. degree in international law and a M. A. of Peace and Security Studies, which he obtained at the University of Hamburg. Djordje is momentarily working on his PhD thesis, submitted to the Belgrade Faculty of Political Science under the title “Security Sector Reform as a part of the process of democratization in Serbia”. In his research, he is primarily monitoring defence reform and related processes of democratization in Serbia.

Marko Savkovic has been working as a Research Fellow at the Belgrade School of Security Studies, a research unit within the Centre for Civil-Military Relations since January 2006. He holds a BA in International Relations obtained at Belgrade Faculty of Political Sciences in 2005, and is currently working on his M. Phil proposal, researching the Europeanization of Serbia’s security sector. Apart from his background in European studies, he is also interested in the process of reconciliation in former Yugoslavia, monitoring the reform of the security sector in Serbia and other Western Balkans countries, as well as international civil and military missions in general.

Vladimír Tarasovič studied at Military Air Force Academy in Košice (1978). In 1995 he completed study at the College of Strategic Studies and Defense Economics, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Germany), and in 1998 he finished a 1-year study within the 15th course of the General Staff (*Generalstabslehrgang*) at the National Defence Academy in Vienna (Austria). After the graduation, he worked at different posts: at Military Air Force Secondary School in Prešov, at the Air Force Headquarters of the Slovak Army in Trenčín (2 years), and in 1994 – 2005 he worked at the SR Ministry of Defence. In 1994 – 1999 he worked in the Centre for Security Studies (CSS), in 2000 at the Defence Policy and Defence Planning Department, in 2001 – 2004 at the Defence and Security Institute, and from April 1, 2004 till his departure from the armed forces he worked as a chief of the Security Studies Department and a deputy director of the Institute for Security and Defence Studies. Since November 2005 he has worked as a research fellow in CENAA (Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs). He is one of the *Panorama* editors as well as author of studies and articles focused on security issues, the Middle East, asymmetry in warfare, and security sector reform.

Contents

Preface	5
Development of the Security and Defence Policy of the Slovak Republic <i>Vladimír Tarasovič – Róbert Ondrejcsák</i>	7
Strategic Documents of the Slovak Republic <i>Elemír Nečej – Róbert Ondrejcsák</i>	17
Emergent Concept of National Security Policy in Republic of Serbia <i>Filip Ejodus – Marko Savkovic</i>	29
Defence Planning and Resource Management: Importance of Strategic Documents for Defence Planning <i>Elemír Nečej</i>	45
Reform of the Slovak Republic´s Armed Forces <i>Vladimír Tarasovič</i>	71
The National Security Council of the Republic of Serbia: Contributing to the Formation of an Integrated Security System or just Another Coordinating Body <i>Djordje Popović</i>	83
Defence Reform and Democratisation <i>Djordje Popovic</i>	89
Slovakia´s Experience with Building of Civil - Military Relations <i>Vladimír Tarasovič</i>	93
Formation of Security Community in Slovakia – Achievements and Failures <i>Vladimír Tarasovič</i>	109
Public Attitudes towards Integration, International Institutions and Global Threats <i>Oľga Gyarfášová</i>	117
Public opinion on defence and security issues: the role of public opinion in Serbia <i>Zorana Atanasovič</i>	131
<i>About Authors</i>	140

