{"id":28603,"date":"2021-10-15T13:22:02","date_gmt":"2021-10-15T11:22:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/?post_type=publikacija&p=28603"},"modified":"2023-04-04T15:45:51","modified_gmt":"2023-04-04T13:45:51","slug":"fighting-organized-crime-in-a-captured-state-is-serbia-s-war-on-mafia-genuine","status":"publish","type":"publikacija","link":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/publication\/fighting-organized-crime-in-a-captured-state-is-serbia-s-war-on-mafia-genuine\/","title":{"rendered":"Fighting Organized Crime in a Captured State: Is Serbia\u2019s \u201cWar on Mafia\u201d Genuine?"},"content":{"rendered":"

The young party rode on the promise of fighting corruption and organized crime, thus gaining unprecedented popular support, but its bombastic measures came short of actual results. Instead, the party has strengthened the grip of state capture. The term \u2018state capture\u2019 refers to a deliberately and gradually developed system of deep and widespread corruption in which institutions are abused, by legal and illegal means, to extract public funds for private gain, to the detriment of citizens\u2019 rights and freedoms and public interest, while the fa\u00e7ade of democratic processes is formally retained.[i]<\/a><\/p>\n

The concept has been\u00a0endorsed<\/a>\u00a0by the European Commission in 2018, referring to the troubles of the Western Balkans region in the European integration process. It is applied in different parts of the world and has evolved in theory and practice since\u00a0its inception<\/a>\u00a0by the World Bank back in 2000. Rather than being captured by businesses to influence public policies and regulations,\u00a0it is the political elite that instrumentalizes institutions<\/strong>\u00a0to extract public funds through companies close to it and to remain in power, which is a prerequisite for the process to continue unsanctioned.<\/p>\n

State capture in Serbia has been thoroughly documented by civil society in various areas \u2013 the\u00a0security sector<\/a>, the\u00a0judiciary<\/a>,\u00a0tailor-made legislation<\/a>,\u00a0public enterprises, and urban planning<\/a>, among others.<\/p>\n

Why should a captured state fight organized crime?<\/h2>\n

Both organized crime groups and the fight against them play an important role in state capture. The first link is intuitive.\u00a0Organized crime provides money and people when institutional means can\u2019t be used<\/strong>. For example, to protect officials from nosey journalists (presidential inauguration 2017<\/a>) and to silence critics of political leaders during\u00a0football matches<\/a>\u00a0(2021). Along with these cases, which were reveiled by investigative journalists,\u00a0several other instances can be mentioned, however, without prove<\/strong>. Masked men demolished over (election) night a bohemian quarter in the heart of the capital where luxury apartments were to be built (Savamala 2016<\/a>) and stirred\u00a0violence<\/a>\u00a0during peaceful anti-government protests (2020), while unidentified groups of men in black were spotted on\u00a0election sites<\/a>\u00a0during the last general and local elections (2020).<\/p>\n

On the other hand, the way the fight against organized crime contributes to state capture is counterintuitive, yet important. It is one of the key\u00a0narratives<\/a>\u00a0used to explain the\u00a0centralization of political power and boost the party leader\u2019s popularity<\/strong>. It is a powerful narrative that mobilizes public attention and shapes the views of the public. Serbian President Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107 has declared a \u2019war on mafia\u2019 on several occasions over the past years, most recently when the new government was formed in autumn 2020.<\/p>\n

Although this \u2019war\u2019 ought to be waged by competent institutions, in the dominant narrative the President is the \u2019supreme commander\u2019 praised for every alleged success. He is the\u00a0personalization of the fight against organized crime<\/strong>, he is the one who urges institutions to do their job, who invites suspects to undergo polygraph testing, who condemns or absolves criminals in the media. All of these actions are highly publicised, even though they would be unacceptable in a democratic state with the separation of power and independent judiciary.<\/p>\n

The February 2021\u00a0arrest<\/a>\u00a0of Veljko Belivuk and his group \u2019Principi\u2019 \u00a0\u2014 and the following proceedings \u2014 have turned into a media show with brutal footings being broadcasted during live presidential press conferences. Among other things, the show is\u00a0used to shock and engage the audience\u00a0<\/strong>and overshadow a series of incidents and corruption scandals involving public officials.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the narrative of fighting organized crime (and counterterrorism) is often instrumentalized to justify the introduction of\u00a0mass, smart surveillance<\/a>\u00a0measures. In the Serbian capital a\u00a0thousand cameras<\/a>, many of which have face recognition features, have been bought from China and secretively installed since 2019 to fight organized (and other) crime, as well as to sanction traffic offences. Experts, however, insist there is no\u00a0evidence<\/a>\u00a0that this highly intrusive measure decreases the rate of violent and more serious crime offences. On the other hand, in a captured state that has no tolerance for criticism, the\u00a0abuse of data is likely and human rights activists fear the consequences for privacy<\/strong>, data protection, and freedom of speech and assembly. Instead of reducing crime, mass surveillance could help to capture society as well.<\/p>\n

No tangible results beyond progress reports and media spectacles<\/h3>\n

According to the recently published\u00a0Global Organised Crime Index<\/a>, Serbia has\u00a0the second highest organized crime rate in Europe<\/strong>. A captured state has no interest in fighting organized crime beyond progress reports and media spectacles, unless certain criminal groups represent a competition. Investigative journalists have found a\u00a0pattern<\/a>\u00a0in the Serbian authorities\u2019 actions, suggesting\u00a0they took sides in the war between two dominant mafia clans<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Beyond these selective actions, the fight against organized crime in Serbia is rather a mimicry, like many other reforms undertaken to show\u00a0progress and willingness to join the EU<\/strong>. Along with the fight against corruption, independence of the judiciary and media freedoms, this area remains a slippery slope in the European Commission\u2019s\u00a0reports<\/a>\u00a0on Serbia.<\/p>\n

In a captured state fa\u00e7ade institutions only mimic democratic processes and principles, while political power to bring about real change remains elsewhere and unwilling to implement substantial reforms.\u00a0Shadow reports<\/a>\u00a0by expert civil society organisations repeatedly conclude that reform activities remain\u00a0a form without substance<\/strong>\u00a0and sometimes even that EU-demanded reforms are abused to\u00a0introduce<\/a>\u00a0controversial legal provisions that would, in the given context, tighten the grip of state capture.<\/p>\n

Police actions against organized criminal groups often have bombastic names and make all the news as a great success. However, making an arrest is only the beginning of the process, which often ends without convictions because prosecutors are not involved in a timely fashion. In the EU\u2019s terminology, the track record is missing. Institutions ignore important revelations made by investigative journalists, who often find\u00a0links between alleged criminals and public officials<\/strong>. In the abovementioned Belivuk case, the official investigation omitted the time period crucial to trace down the clan\u2019s ties to state structures.<\/p>\n

Twenty one years after October 5th<\/sup>, the symbolism of that date is almost forgotten, and its legacy is distorted. In a captured state,\u00a0bizarre and shocking phenomena become everyday reality<\/strong>. The President has publicly defended the release from custody of the indicted owner of the largest marijuana plantation in Serbia, who enjoyed support of state security services. The head of the Parliamentary committee for the judiciary \u2013 who acts as attorney, journalist, and member of judicial and prosecutorial councils at the same time \u2013 broadcasted an interview with said drug lord immediately after his release. On the streets of Belgrade, a convicted war criminal launches a petition to free from prison the man who assassinated Prime Minister Djindjic back in 2003, to mention just a few episodes that occurred during the writing of this commentary.<\/p>\n

[i]<\/a>\u00a0Petrovi\u0107, P. Peji\u0107 Niki\u0107, J.\u00a0Security Sector Capture in Serbia \u2013 an Early Study,\u00a0<\/em>Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Belgrade, June 2020, https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/publication\/security-sector-capture-in-serbia-an-early-study\/, pp. 12-14.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The fall of Slobodan Milosevic on October 5th\u00a02000 was supposed to be watershed moment in Serbia\u2019s democratic transition. Reforms were implemented slowly and not without resistance. Over the last decade, however, the new regime led by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has done\u00a0its best to discontinue and reverse institution-building efforts of its democratic predecessors. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":23104,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8606,8609],"tags":[11004,11003,7833,11002],"vrsta":[9441],"pdfpub":[],"coauthors":[10942],"class_list":["post-28603","publikacija","type-publikacija","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-challenges-risks-and-threats","category-organised-crime","tag-democratic-transition","tag-october-5th","tag-reforms","tag-slobodan-milosevic","vrsta-analysis"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publikacija\/28603","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publikacija"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/publikacija"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=28603"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publikacija\/28603\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":31827,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publikacija\/28603\/revisions\/31827"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/23104"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=28603"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=28603"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=28603"},{"taxonomy":"vrsta","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/vrsta?post=28603"},{"taxonomy":"pdfpub","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pdfpub?post=28603"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=28603"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}