{"id":33820,"date":"2023-12-15T18:21:57","date_gmt":"2023-12-15T17:21:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/?post_type=publikacija&p=33820"},"modified":"2023-12-29T19:09:30","modified_gmt":"2023-12-29T18:09:30","slug":"serbian-elections-political-survival-in-times-of-global-crises","status":"publish","type":"publikacija","link":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/publication\/serbian-elections-political-survival-in-times-of-global-crises\/","title":{"rendered":"Serbian Elections, Political Survival in Times of Global Crises"},"content":{"rendered":"

Kosovo, lithium, Trump, Middle East\u2026the English would say that I mixed apples with oranges, but there is a logic behind the seemingly unrelated issues. Serbia\u2019s foreign policy and geopolitics is\u00a0one of the topics of discussion in the Serbian elections scheduled for December 17th<\/strong>, but not the most important. However, many foreign media and experts wonder if these elections will bring a geopolitical shift. Moreover, many are concerned about possible foreign (read: Russian) interference in the election process.<\/p>\n

Before assessing the foreign influence(s), it is important to emphasize that the elections in Serbia will be held in a very dynamic (geo)political and security environment. First of all, the elections were announced a month after the\u00a0violent incident in the village of Banjska in northern Kosovo<\/strong>, which resulted in the killing of a Kosovo police officer and three members of paramilitary forces from Serbia. In a later address to the Serbian public, Vu\u010di\u0107 said that Banjska was a \u2018tactical mistake,\u2019 drawing\u00a0a parallel with the bombardment of the hospital<\/strong>\u00a0in Gaza and\u00a0noting<\/a>\u00a0that neither Hamas or Israel will ever admit that they bombed the hospital.<\/p>\n

Given the context, many pundits argue that early elections will not only help Vu\u010di\u0107 to divert public attention from the Banjska incident and the public outrage and massive protests triggered by the two deadly mass shootings occurred last May, but it will also provide the Serbian president with room for maneuver in foreign relations, i.e. to\u00a0once again postpone unpleasant issues, such as imposing sanctions against Russia and reaching a final compromise on Kosovo<\/strong>, until\u00a0next summer<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Overwhelmed by the news about Banjska, Serbian public was unaware that two days before the incident, Serbian president, during his visit to the UN General Assembly in New York,\u00a0had signed<\/a>\u00a0a letter of intent with the European Commission on a\u00a0strategic partnership in the areas of batteries and critical raw materials, including lithium<\/strong>.\u00a0The move undoubtedly secured political support from the European Union for the ruling party ahead of the elections, as access to the country\u2019s natural resources and critical raw materials is\u00a0essential for the EU\u2019s green transition<\/strong>,\u00a0decoupling<\/a>\u00a0from Russia and global competition with China. Therefore, it is not surprising that news of this strategic partnership has been suppressed in the Serbian mainstream media, since lithium mining is a highly\u00a0polarized topic<\/a>\u00a0in the country and has led to\u00a0massive demonstrations and a series of roadblocks<\/a>\u00a0in 2021.<\/p>\n

Following the outbreak of violent conflict in Israel and Palestine, the Serbian parliament adopted an\u00a0850-page bilateral trade agreement with China<\/strong>. The deal was barely mentioned by European media, due to the alarming media reports coming from the Middle East and other conflict zones. However, Serbian leaders hailed the deal in the mainstream media as a \u2018big step forward\u2019 in the economy and foreign affairs.\u00a0Politicians have failed to mention the defence aspects of the trade deal, as well hidden within the hundreds of pages are\u00a0provisions to<\/strong>\u00a0eliminate the custom tariffs on<\/strong>\u00a0Chinese\u00a0<\/strong>arms,<\/strong>\u00a0missiles, bombs, torpedoes, tanks, and other defence-related products<\/strong>, which can open the European market for sanctioned Chinese companies. The ruling party seems to think that Serbia\u2019s plan to buy more arms from China will not raise flags among Western countries, as they are currently too preoccupied with other global events.<\/p>\n

The Serbian leadership has been very cautious in its reactions to global events, especially the Hamas attack on Israeli citizens on October 7th<\/sup>, because\u00a0it relies<\/a>\u00a0on Israeli lobby groups in the US to open the White House door for Serbia, especially in the case of a future Republican administration. In one of the last interviews before the elections, Vu\u010di\u0107 conveyed\u00a0the message<\/a>\u00a0to domestic audience that Ukraine\u2019s setback, along with the return of Republicans in the White\u00a0House, will provide Serbia with a favourable geopolitical environment<\/strong>. So, the strategy of the current Serbian leadership is\u00a0to \u201csurvive politically\u201d\u00a0<\/strong>u<\/strong>ntil the next presidential elections in the US<\/strong>. Considering that, early elections are nothing more than a way of buying time, in the hope that global events will favour Vu\u010di\u0107\u2019s position.<\/p>\n

The year 2024 will not only be marked by the US presidential elections, but also by the\u00a0equally important elections for the European Parliament<\/strong>. Based on the results of Poland\u2019s parliamentary elections held in October, one might think that\u00a0there is a chance<\/a>\u00a0to defeat the populists and reverse democracy\u2019s decline in the European Union. However, the victory of Geert Wilders\u2019s far-right party in November\u2019s Dutch elections sent shockwaves through Europe, signaling that the far right is\u00a0becoming the political mainstream<\/a>.\u00a0The outcome of the Dutch elections could suggest that other European nationalist and far-right parties will also instrumentalize widespread frustration with migration to win power in next year\u2019s European Parliament elections.<\/p>\n

Another far-right leader at European Council meetings that could upend the upcoming debates on enlargement,\u00a0among other things<\/a>,\u00a0may spell bad news for pro-European forces in Serbia, but not necessarily for the current leadership<\/strong>. Since 2015, the Serbian government took a very cooperative stance on the \u201crefugee crisis\u201d, thereby securing the political support of key European leaders and the funds to maintain clientelistic networks. At the same time, Vu\u010di\u0107\u00a0worked to strengthen alliances<\/a>\u00a0with like-minded leaders and illiberal democracies in the EU and beyond. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia\u00a0Meloni\u2019s visit to Serbia<\/a>\u00a0showcases that it is useful for Italy to have like-minded friends in high places in Belgrade to address the migration issue.\u00a0In turn, Meloni\u2019s support for Serbia\u2019s membership in the EU can be also interpreted as political support for the ruling elite in the midst of the pre-election campaign.<\/p>\n

Foreign interference in Serbia\u2019s elections<\/h2>\n

There is a little evidence of any concrete, orchestrated clandestine involvement of Russian or any other foreign actors in the pre-election campaigns ahead of Serbia\u2019s elections. However,\u00a0American<\/a>,\u00a0EU<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Russian<\/a>\u00a0officials alike\u00a0do not seem to mind directly or indirectly supporting, if not openly promoting, Serbian President Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Even though several declaratively Russian or pro-Russian political parties will be participating in the upcoming elections at different administrative levels, this is not an indicator of any greater Russian presence in the Serbian political scene. In fact, most if not all these parties founded by ethnic Serbs- prove to be either\u00a0directly or indirectly linked to, and influenced by, the Serbian President and his ruling Serbian progressive party (SNS)<\/strong>, rather than by the Kremlin.<\/p>\n

For example, the list holder of the newly founded \u201cRussian Party \u2013 Serbs and Russians brothers forever\u201d is Ljubica Bertovi\u0107 from Subotica, a SNS activist\u00a0who works as an assistant<\/a>\u00a0to the director of \u2018Park Pali\u0107,\u2019 a company established by the Republic of Serbia, Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the city of Subotica.\u00a0Furthermore, although receiving the status of a minority party, the \u201cRussian Party \u2013 Slobodan Nikoli\u0107,\u201d\u00a0was not supported<\/a>\u00a0by a single signature of anyone with a Russian first and last name. Moreover, there is not a single person of Russian origin among the seventeen candidates for the Belgrade city council. Since 2020, the Russian Party has participated in the ruling coalition in the city of \u0160abac together with the SNS and the \u201cEuropean Green Party of Serbia\u201d. The Greens \u2013 which don\u2019t represent the branch of European Green Party and are not part of the environmental movement in Serbia \u2013 is led by a doctor of internal medicine employed at the health care centre in the city of \u0160abac.<\/p>\n

The number of declaratively Russian parties could have been even higher, if not for the decision of the Serbian state election commission (RIK) to reject the electoral list of the Russian minority alliance \u2013\u00a0Pavle Bihali<\/a>\u00a0Gavrin, which includes Serbian Russian Wolf Party and Serbian Greek Movement.<\/p>\n

Despite the fact that more than 200,000 Russians came to Serbia in the last two years, only\u00a0110 Russians\u00a0received Serbian citizenship in the period 2021-2023<\/a>.\u00a0It is not clear if and how those Russians who have received Serbian citizenship will vote in these elections, but\u00a0it is clear that they do not support the pro-Russian parties<\/strong>\u00a0that have sprung up like mushrooms in recent years. Based on countless local and foreign media reports, most Russians residing in Serbia have expressed\u00a0strong anti-war and anti-Putin attitudes\u00a0<\/strong>and are surprised and\u00a0confused by the state-sponsored pro-Russian propaganda in Serbia<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The participation in the elections of traditional far-right parties promoting Russia-friendly views is also\u00a0not an indicator of Russian interference<\/strong>. Vojislav \u0160e\u0161elj, Vu\u010di\u0107\u2019s political mentor and leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), announced that radicals will join forces the SNS at all levels, except for the parliamentary elections. This marriage of convenience would ensure more votes for progressives, as the pro-Russian and anti-Western radicals continue to enjoy support at the local level, especially in Vojvodina. In 2020, the ruling party lowered the threshold from 5% to 3% to facilitate the entry into parliament of pro-Russian right-wing parties, such as the Serbian Party Oathkeepers, the Serbian Movement Dveri and the NADA Coalition, most of which are seen as\u00a0an extended arm of the ruling party<\/strong>. Participation in the elections of extreme right parties is an ideal boogeyman for Vu\u010di\u0107, as it\u00a0allow<\/strong>s<\/strong>\u00a0him to position the SNS as a centre-right party<\/strong>, and to portray himself to the West as a\u00a0stabilising factor and as a barrier to nationalist excess<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Far-right parties can also agitate for what Vu\u010di\u0107 cannot say out loud, without the risk of jeopardizing his international reputation. Unlike\u00a0Vu\u010di\u0107\u2019s statement<\/a>\u00a0from January 2023 that \u201cfailure to accept the Franco-German proposal will stop investments and the path to the EU,\u201d the focus of the campaigns of pro-Russian right-wing parties is the rejection of the Franco-German plan for resolution of the Serbia-Kosovo relations (agreements accepted in Brussels and Ohrid). In addition, the \u2018Russian Party \u2013 Serbs and Russians brothers forever\u2019 is demanding Serbia\u2019s immediate entry into the BRICS, the intergovernmental organization comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.<\/p>\n

So, what are the Serbian elections about in the end?<\/h2>\n

In the last six months Vu\u010di\u0107\u00a0has been facing<\/a>\u00a0\u201cmounting pressure from the opposition after the two deadly mass shootings in the spring sparked public outrage and triggered massive protests\u201d. The president and government had no response to the violent incidents, other than calling early elections and\u00a0further polarizing the society<\/strong>. In addition to avoiding solving problems, consolidating power through early parliamentary elections is\u00a0the method Vu\u010di\u0107 has used<\/a>\u00a0in all the eleven years of his party\u2019s rule. Of the six parliamentary elections held in the last eleven years only the ones in 2012 and 2020 were regular. According to pundits, such a\u00a0de facto<\/em>\u00a0permanent election campaign\u00a0weakens political opponents<\/strong>, primarily from the democratic opposition, and allows Vu\u010di\u0107 to set the political pace of the country<\/a>. Moreover, permanent election campaign, in combination with the government control over most of the local media, ensures access to\u00a0state<\/strong>\u00a0funds which are\u00a0<\/strong>used to consolidated the electorate<\/strong>, allowing the SNS to remain in power unchallenged since 2012.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The elections in Serbia will be held in a very dynamic (geo)political and security environment.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":33821,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[7415],"tags":[11227],"vrsta":[9441],"pdfpub":[],"coauthors":[],"class_list":["post-33820","publikacija","type-publikacija","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-bscp","tag-serbian-elections","vrsta-analysis"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publikacija\/33820","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publikacija"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/publikacija"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=33820"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publikacija\/33820\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":33824,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/publikacija\/33820\/revisions\/33824"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/33821"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=33820"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=33820"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=33820"},{"taxonomy":"vrsta","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/vrsta?post=33820"},{"taxonomy":"pdfpub","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pdfpub?post=33820"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bezbednost.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=33820"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}