

Context Analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Serbia 1989 – 2009



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List of Abbreviations

| | |
|----------|---|
| BIA | Bezbednosno-informativna agencija (Security-Information Agency) |
| DOS | Demokratska opozicija Srbije (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) and |
| DS | Demokratska stranka (Democratic Party) |
| DSS | Demokratska Stranka Srbije (Democratic Party of Serbia) |
| EU | European Union |
| ICTY | International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia |
| Interpol | International Criminal Police Organization |
| JNA | Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav People's Army) |
| JSO | Jedinica za specijalne operacije (Special Operations Unit) |
| MUP | Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova (Ministry of the Interior) |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| OSCE | Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| PfP | Partnership for Peace programme |
| RDB | Resor državne bezbednosti (Directorate of State Security) |
| SAA | Stabilization and Association Agreement |
| SAP | Stabilisation and Association Process |
| SCG | Državna Zajednica Srbija i Crna Gora (State Union of Serbia and Montenegro) |
| SB | Služba bezbednosti (Security Service) |
| SDB | Služba državne bezbednost (State Security Service) |
| SID | Služba za dokumentaciju i istraživanje (eng. Service for inquiry and documentation) |
| SKS | Savez Komunista Srbija (Serbian Communist Party) |
| SRJ | Savezna Republika Jugoslavija (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| UN | United Nations |
| VBA | Vojnobezbednosna agencija (Military Security Agency) |
| VJ | Vojska Jugoslavije (Army of Yugoslavia) |
| VOA | Vojnoobaveštajna agencija (Military Intelligence Agency) |



Introduction

Serbia has passed a turbulent period in the past twenty years. This was the period of wars, economic breakdown, international sanctions, massive violations of basic human rights, and political assassinations. But this was also the period of democratic change, the period of return to the international scene, and most importantly, the period marking the beginning of social and political reforms. Together, the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century were also crucial for security sector reform in Serbia. This sector, in many ways, influenced the course of democratisation, but its actors were also instrumentalised by the political elites in the mentioned period. This is the reason why the reform of the security sector is one of the most important tasks but also one of the biggest challenges in the process of democratisation in Serbia.

In order to map and monitor the achievements and obstacles of security sector reform in Serbia, it is of utmost importance to understand the socio-political context within which this reform has been carried out. Therefore, it is our intention in this paper to analyse in an objective and systematic way, precisely the context that influenced the security sector and its reform, as well as the main course, obstacles, and the scope of security sector reform in Serbia during this period of time.

There are two almost equal periods that we will be analysing in this paper. The first is the period of Milošević's rule from 1989 till 2000, and the second is the period after democratic changes from 2000 till 2010. The reason for a division into two large periods of time is the diametrically different character of political order developing through time, from authoritarian to pro-democratic, and paving the road to a fully-consolidated democracy.

The first period is characterised by the breakup of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the bloody wars which were consequence of this breakup. Another important part of this period is the time just after the Dayton Agreement and the end of the war, when Milošević tried to improve relations with Western countries playing the role of peace-maker. This period, unfortunately, did not last long and it ends with the Kosovo conflict, which pushed the country into war with NATO Alliance and resulted in almost complete destruction of



the country's economy and infrastructure.

For the whole period of the first ten years of our analysis, the dominant context is authoritarian or if we want to define it more precisely – illiberal. Another constant of this period is the context of conflict, which only had a short break in the years after the Dayton agreement. The key actors in this period in Serbian socio-political life are ex-communist elites gathered around Milošević and his family, the state security forces, the gradually emerging opposition, and the international community. In the security sector, the military held the leading role, which it had to give back to secret services and police after a while. This period is also characterised by low public confidence in the security apparatus (except paradoxically in the military which always enjoyed great public confidence due to its connection to the people which resulted from the obligatory military service), state-centric concept of security, a weak state, infringement of human rights, pressure on the independent media, a weak opposition, and low levels of economic development, which put the population of Serbia on the brink of survival. All these factors resulted in the need for changes, which happened in 2000 - the starting year of our second period of analysis.

The period after the fall of Milošević is no less turbulent than the previous decade. It is characterised by the start of comprehensive reforms in Serbian society, the return of the country to international organisations after many years of isolation, and the proclamation of democratisation as the paramount goal of the new political elites. Unfortunately, some of the reforms were conducted inconsistently, since the battle for power among political actors dominated the political process. This led to the breakup of the ruling coalition that defeated Milošević. In 2003, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated by a coalition of members of organised crime and intelligence services, which may have looked unnatural, but represented the necessary outcome of the previous times of war. That resulted in a shift in the focus of reforms towards combating organised crime. In 2006, Serbia unwillingly renewed its sovereignty after the breakup of the State Union with Montenegro. The issue of European integration then got the highest priority among the political elite. In 2008, Kosovo proclaimed independence which put the preservation of territorial sovereignty into first place on the nation's priority list. The constant problem throughout this whole period is the cooperation with the International Crime Tribunal for Yugoslavia, and this issue became a condition for further European integration. The cooperation with the ICTY has also had a significant influence on security sector reform in Serbia. The reason for this is the constant accusation on the



side of the ICTY prosecutor that parts of the security sector in Serbia are involved in protection of persons wanted for war crimes.¹

It is very difficult to determine what the dominant context is in the period after Milošević. Although the post-authoritarian and post-conflict context can be said to be dominant, a decade of sanctions and wars, and the necessity of the recovery of Serbia's economy gave significant place for the developmental context as well. In addition, the context of European integration has highest importance since Serbian government proclaimed EU integration as the most important foreign policy goal. The key actors are political parties, underground intelligence – informal groups consisted of members of security services and criminals, tycoons who acquired vast sources in the Milošević period, and organised crime groups. In the security sector, the police play the leading role, civil society is much stronger in relation to earlier periods, private security companies are flourishing, and new oversight institutions and bodies are being formed. This period is also characterised by the lack of consensus among the political elites on the major strategic orientation of the country. Perhaps the most important consequence of security sector reform in Serbia in the mentioned period is the fact that a comprehensive security sector is being developed for the first time, and we can say that the first generation of security sector reform is finished.

¹ One of many statements given by the chief prosecutor of ICTY Carla Del Ponte in which she accuses Serbian military for protecting Mladić - http://www.b92.co.rs/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=10&dd=04&nav_category=64&nav_id=177832 (accessed on September 7, 2010.).



PERIOD 1: THE MILOSEVIC ERA (1989 – 2000)

Social-political context

For understanding the context within which the country can be located the period in question, it is necessary to analyse the main events in the political scene, the main political actors, and finally, the position of the security sector - which is the object of our analysis and which had one of the key roles in political life in Milošević's Serbia. In this part of the world, the security sector, and particularly the state apparatus of force, has always occupied a very important place in society, history, and people's minds. The interdependence between the key security actors and the state (ruling elites) is crucial for understanding the events that took place in the recent past and for understanding the difficulties which the reforms in this country are being faced with.

The main characteristic of this period is the personal rule of one man - Slobodan Milošević and a few people around him, especially his family. The character of his rule was constantly being questioned, since its guiding ideology changed diametrically from communist to nationalist. It even had some elements of peace-making in the period after the Dayton agreement, until the beginning of the Kosovo conflict. Having all this in mind, it is very difficult to explain how Milošević succeeded to preserve his power in spite of his many changes in ideology which resulted in changes to his brand of politics.

Milošević became the head of Serbian Communist Party (SKS) in 1986. In that period, the machinery of the Communist Party was starting to fall apart. He cultivated an image of a politician who could solve problems, making a clear break with the old communist elite by sending them into retirement, and presented himself as a modern politician to the public. He tried to establish a new identity for the Party by rejecting the old values that the previous leadership had cherished until that moment. He also tried to implement something that he considered to be a modern version of socialism – without old Bolshevik ideas and implementing some ideas of modern social democracy (Hadžić: 2001, 65-66). That was one of the crucial factors in his gaining popular support.

The Serbian people did not follow Milošević because of his ideology but because of his ability to come out of an internal political conflict as the winner.



This can maybe explain why the people continued to follow him even when he rejected communist ideology and exchanged it for nationalist one. Milošević's ability to defeat all his political rivals was stronger than both his communism and his nationalism, paving the road of his success and his popularity (Pavlović: 2001, 81-82). This is why we can say that Milošević only used ideology to confirm his ability to defeat his political opponents exploiting different roles in order to gain legitimacy for his personal rule.

When the role of the unbeatable leader started to fade after several lost wars and a destroyed economy, Milošević's popularity started to diminish. The Opposition movement, until then weak and divided, started to gain importance and strength. The culmination of this change happened in November 1996, when the Opposition coalition *Zajedno* won the local elections in the biggest Serbian cities and towns. The Milošević regime refused to accept the results of these elections, which led to three-month long public demonstrations. But this was not enough for Milošević to accept defeat. It was only after pressure from the international community that he was forced to withdraw and leave the cities to the opposition. This was his first political defeat within Serbia and it became obvious that he was not unbeatable any more, that he was not completely in control of political life, and that his popularity among the people was decreasing rapidly.

The same pattern with stolen elections was repeated in 2000, when Milošević also did not want to accept the results of the Presidential elections. He could not believe that he had lost an election that he himself had called for, under the impression that he was still a beloved leader. This led to another large scale set of demonstrations resulting in protesters taking over the Parliament building and the Serbian Broadcasting Company (RTS). Realising that he had lost support not only among the citizens but also within the security sector (when decision-makers decided not to defend the fallen regime), Milošević had to give the reins of power to the Opposition.

The authoritarian nature of Milošević's rule left many consequences in Serbia's social and economic life. Besides the devastation of war, the Serbian economy was ruined as a consequence of the economic policies of the regime. This policy was directed mainly to preservation of the *status quo*, which led to deterioration of the position of the working class. Unfortunately, Serbia during the nineties was the country dominated by symbolic and not distributive conflicts, which created difficulties for the workers to put socio-economic issues on the political agenda (Thomas: 1999, 1-10). Milošević's economic policy had



a great impact upon the period after his fall. Serious economic reforms started in 2001 with the first democratic government, and they last even today.

Security sector

The security sector, or state apparatus of force, had one of the biggest roles in the collapse of the Yugoslav state and the war that followed. It was one of the actors that could interfere and influence the way of resolving any crisis. As we can see today, that interference was totally wrong and it caused the most damaging consequences - destroying its own country and its own people. The reasons for such a position of the security sector can be found in its heritage from the Yugoslav period. The security sector in SFR Yugoslavia developed from the Partisan units after the Second World War, under the strong influence of the Communist Party and the great personal influence of Josip Broz Tito - the supreme commander of all armed forces and life-time president of Yugoslavia.

The Party's influence on the security sector could be seen through its total subordination to the political system. Political (communist) organisations existed in every sphere of the security sector. All strategic documents of the time were based on the ideas of the Communist Party and the Constitution, which was also created by the Party (Hadžić: 2001, 54-58). The strategic documents and doctrines were created under the assumption that the citizens of Yugoslavia had a positive relation towards this ideology. The communist ideologists were convinced that socialism was the highest form of social organisation and that all the people would stand up to defend it. This is one of the reasons why they were so amazed when the conflict started. They couldn't believe that someone wanted to destroy this perfect system and that not only were the people were failing to protect it, moreover the people actually took part in it. Another one of the political illusions of these documents was its judgment that the modern world is characterised by the strong division between socialist and capitalist forces. Its belief of the socialist victory over the capitalism in the world was ruthlessly destroyed by the breakup.

All security sector officials had to be Party members, they were educated in the Marxist and Leninist tradition, and they had to show their communist credentials before any kind of promotion. The possibility that someone was promoted without the recommendation of the Party didn't even exist. So when



the Party disappeared from the public scene, those people were left with nothing more to believe in.

The disappearance of the Party and the old SFR Yugoslavia was a crucial influential factor for the very beginning of the period we are writing in this analysis. Its consequence was maybe mostly felt in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) which was the guardian of this ideology and the state created upon it. The army leaders realised that they were losing power. They were afraid of losing their influence in the politics of the country. They could not imagine the position of the army as no longer being the pillar of the socialist system, but instead being reduced to the service of the state (Hadžić: 2001, 65-66).

Until the very beginning of the conflict, the army tried to preserve an anti-nationalist position. Not only was that an impossible task, but it also made some crucial mistakes which put it in an inferior position at the later stage of the war. The army did not want to give up socialism at any cost. The army leadership was not implementing the policy of the state but the policy of the Party. They were speaking about something that everybody else had rejected and in that sense it was a lost battle. When it became clear that the war was inevitable, they were dragged into the conflict totally unprepared, and naturally got out of it as the losing side. In addition, that made it possible for the Serbian leadership to find a scapegoat for all the defeats in the later stages of the war (Hadžić: 2001, 142-146).

When the Yugoslav state collapsed, the Yugoslav People's Army *de facto* became a Serbian army. The generals saw a Serbian leadership as an escape from the defeat they experienced in the conflict, and the Serbian leadership welcomed the new, well equipped army. But, the formation of the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) brought neither the necessary ideological catharsis nor a necessary removal of the military elite from the ruling political elite. The military leadership, used to securing cults for themselves and celebrating dubious leaders, quickly renounced the communist dogma and immediately accepted the national myth as a substitute. It was an unproductive change, but only on the surface. In the essence, such an army was formed on the basis of two illusions: the first was that the army would be the basis of the national state, and the second was that it was an opportunity to break with the old ideology (Stojadinović: 2004). The "new" Yugoslav army actually functioned without any kind of strategic or doctrinary framework, which created a conceptual vacuum. Milošević's political control was additionally secured through its constitutional and system status. The new Yugoslav constitution from 1992 onwards, kept the



obligation of the military to defend the constitutional order, which opened a window of opportunity for internal and political abuse (Hadžić: 2001, 26).

Although the military leadership turned completely to Milošević, who after being a communist bureaucrat became the leader of the Serbian nationalistic wave, they could not completely regain the position they enjoyed in the former SFR Yugoslavia. Milošević, being the president of Serbia, never trusted the military completely. One of the reasons for that was the fact that the military was a federal institution over which he did not have immediate control. Although he was the most powerful person in Yugoslavia, he did not want to allow any formal possibility which would endanger his power. He needed only a few generals to keep the military under his rule. But even they were often replaced.

When Milošević became president of Yugoslavia in July 1997 and gained official control over the military, his interest for it increased. He found among the generals some loyal and ready to confront the world not only because of the nationalistic ideology, but also because of personal motivations. Milošević needed the generals in order to conduct his plan of eternal rule, and the generals needed him to enable them to climb the hierarchy ladders. They would take part in political rallies, give political statements to the press, and sometimes they would even threaten not to allow the government to change. But when they saw that Milosevic had lost any kind of support among the people, they let him go, hoping that in that way they would preserve their positions.

Milošević had greater confidence in the police and secret services, so he gave them priority. He could perhaps buy the loyalty of the generals, but not the loyalty of the ordinary soldiers. As the consequence of that, the police and the state security service soon became better equipped and trained than the military. For the reasons already mentioned, Milošević had very little confidence in the military, so he needed an armed force that would be able to secure his personal power. He found the solution in changing the role of police. The police gradually got a military appearance, even with the external symbols, including mask-uniforms and military ranks. A typical military structure was introduced into police units, and that ended the existence of normal police in Serbia. Within the Ministry of the Interior (MUP), classical military units were formed which had nothing to do with police work. The final act of the militarisation was creation of the Police Academy, which was, according to its plan and programs, a classical military school that only had a different name (Dragišić: 2004).



The police in the Milošević period was a strong lever of the authoritarian regime. The Serbian police in that period practically became a gendarmerie, and was even equipped with armed vehicles and mortars. Some analyses stated that Serbia had the biggest police force in relation to number of citizens in Europe. The predictions were that in Serbia in that period were from 40,000 to 150,000 policemen (Pavlović, Antonić: 2007, 124-125).

However, after the fall of Milošević, it was evident that the real strong pillar of the regime was not the regular police, but the secret services and their underground structures. The State Security Service (SDB) had an especially important role in the preservation of the regime. This secret police was, until 2002, one of two sectors of the Ministry of Interior, headed by Special Assistant Ministers. They were only nominally attached to the Minister of Police, and in fact, only answered to the most powerful person in the country - Milošević himself. From 1945 till 2002, no law existed which would refer to certain security-intelligence services. In fact, the head persons of secret services decided themselves upon establishment of a service, its tasks, authorities, organisation, modus operandi, and accountability (Milosavljević: 2003, 98). This way of operation created a habit within the service to act independently from law and according to self-proclaimed rules.

Milošević brought this exemption of security service from other institutions and its full non-transparency to perfection. The service was totally exempted from any kind of democratic control. He controlled the service himself, no matter what his official position was, and the Parliament did not even bother to deal with anything that had to do with security services (Pavlović, Antonić: 2007, 126). Moreover, the Unit for Special Operations (JSO) or the Red Berets, a specially armed unit of 1,200 war veterans, was formed within the State Security Service. This unit was Milošević's Praetorian Guard whose financial sources were kept top secret, since they mostly came from crime. In the middle of the 1990s, Milošević actually started to develop a whole system of an underground criminal economy. This system was based on the interconnection between the government, economy, and crime, with the main link in this system being the State Security Service (Pavlović, Antonić: 2007, 127). The Service was the backbone of the organised crime and trafficking, and was involved in everything from trafficking oil, drugs, and cigarettes to the export of luxurious goods (Pavlović, Antonić: 2007, 127). Members of the Service were engaged not only in crime, but they also recruited criminals, giving them official badges of the Service providing them with protection from police and



prosecution (Pavlović, Antonić: 2007, 127).

In this period, the service was especially used for oversight over political opponent. A whole network of informers from the communist times and an archive of around 400,000 files were kept (Milosavljević: 2003, 97). In the last period of Milošević's rule, the Service was also used for political assassinations. The secret police was involved in two assassination attempts on Vuk Drašković, one of the opposition leaders in 1999 and 2000, the assassination of Slavko Ćuruvija (a prominent opposition journalist) in 1999, and they were also involved in assassination of the former Serbian president Ivan Stambolić, one of Milošević's rivals from communist times, in 2000.

It can be concluded that the dominant political context during the 1990s in Serbia was characterised by strong elements of authoritarian rule under Slobodan Milošević and the political elite around him, as well as by the break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars that broke out in the former Yugoslav republics as its consequence. The key political actors in this period in Serbia were ex-communist elite who exchanged their communist ideology with a new one – nationalism, and the state security apparatus which was omnipotent, indeed with the right question being whether it was under any kind of control at all. The opposition in Serbia was emerging and showed all the weaknesses characteristic to similar movements in all authoritarian societies. Its strength was rising throughout this period and it culminated in the year 2000, when they took over the power in the country.



PERIOD 2: THE BEGINNING OF REFORMS (2000 – 2009)

Democratic Changes – Point of no Return? (2000 – 2003)

Social-political context

After the change in power in October 2000, Serbia gained the opportunity to make the initial step away from the authoritarian order of the state, its quasi-market economic system (essentially of a command type), and patriarchal political culture, and to start a transition to a liberal-democratic society. One of the first reform tasks to be made was concerned with the normalisation of relations with Serbia's neighbouring countries, as well as with the West and international organisations. So, this period is marked by the return of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the world. Thus, FRY became a member of the UN² and Interpol³, and an OSCE mission in FRY was established⁴. Moreover, at the EU – Western Balkan Summit held in Zagreb (Croatia), the EU invited the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to join the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)⁵. The "Closing declaration" was adopted at the meeting, which presents one of the important turnovers for further development of political and economic relations of states included in SAP and the EU. Also, the FRY started normalising relations with NATO. Thus, the Federal government adopted the policy that FRY would join the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP)⁶ and an agreement between NATO and FRY was achieved, for the use of Yugoslav airspace for the needs of NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo⁷. In order to implement this, the NATO/FRY Technical Committee was founded. Finally, Serbia started fulfilling its obligations towards the Hague Tribunal, which

² November 1, 2000.

³ September 24, 2001.

⁴ January 11, 2001.

⁵ November 24, 2000.

⁶ April 23, 2002.

⁷ December 20, 2002.



is best exemplified by the extradition of many high-ranking officials.⁸

Due to the wars of the 1990s, and the nature of the previous regime, Serbia was brought into a developmental halt. The new political elite inherited a robbed and destroyed society and economy. Hence, another task on DOS' reform agenda was development. Indeed, in the field of the economy, successful initial reform steps had been achieved. The key reform tasks in this respect included transformation of state- and publicly-owned companies, decreasing inflation, improving tax collection, and combating gray economy. Initial reform successes in the economic sphere, supplemented by the termination of the 'outer wall'⁹ of sanctions had created a better investment environment for foreign companies, which started investing in Serbia. The most visible indicator of initial successes in economy was a better standard of living of common people, who could barely survive during the 1990s (Begović, Mijatović: 2005, Boarov: 2005).

But all of these initial reform successes had not been followed and sustained by reform in the security sector. The new political elite had not recognised the link between SSR and the overall development of society. In the period under discussion, instead of being the main arena of democratic transfor-

⁸ Following officials are good examples: *Slobodan Milošević*, former President of Serbia and FRY; *Milan Milutinović* then president of Republic of Serbia, *Nikola Šainović*, vice-president of Government of FRY; *Dragoljub Ojdanić* then Chief of General Staff, *Milan Mile Mrkšić*, Commander of 1st Motorized Guard Brigade, *Miodrag Jokić*, commander of 9th Navy Sector, *Vojislav Šešelj*, leader of then the biggest opposition party in Serbia, *Milan Martić*, during existence of Autonomous Region of Serbian Krajina served as Secretary of Internal Affairs and Minister of Defence.

⁹ In the US State Department 'USIA (United States Information Agency) Wireless File', issued on 23 November 1995, it was made public, for the first time, the 'outer wall' of sanctions concept. It contained the following message: "A resolution will be introduced in the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo against all of the states of former Yugoslavia. Trade sanctions against Serbia will be suspended, but may be re-imposed if Serbia or any other Serb authorities fail significantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement. An outer wall' of sanctions will remain in place until Serbia addresses a number of other areas of concern, including Kosovo and cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal." The 'outer wall' of sanctions concept affects, first and foremost, FRY's membership of international organisations and access to international financial institutions, the latter being a key source for financial assistance in economic reconstruction. Hasani, E., 1998. THE 'OUTER WALL' OF SANCTIONS AND THE KOSOVO ISSUE. *Perceptions - Journal of International Affairs* September - November 1998 Vol. III - No. 3. <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume3/September-November1998/hasani.PDF> accessed:23.11.2010.



mation, the security sector¹⁰ served as a playground not only for the dreaded power struggle between the DOS and the remnants of the old regime, but also between two main political factions within the DOS - Democratic Party (DS - Demokratska stranka) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS -Demokratska Stranka Srbije). The struggle for power opened the window of opportunity to many other players to take part in it. Other than political elites, the main actors in this power game were also individuals and parts of security sector, in particular intelligence, *nouveau riche*, and organised crime groups. Common and vested interests of different kinds bonded some actors into relatively firm groups, which consequently acted as autonomous and single actors. They were among the main spoilers of SSR, and at one moment, when Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated, they were even close to stopping and reversing the democratic changes in Serbia. The nature and role of this actor has made us to reclassify it as a separate actor and to dub this phenomenon as *underground intelligence*.

On the following pages, we will give the overview and explanations of the key political and social events, processes and actors, and their relations and interactions, which influenced the course and reach of SSR in Serbia. Special emphasis will be placed on intelligence services, since they played major role in power games. By applying this approach, we will be able to show to reader that the power struggle among political elites and underground intelligence structures and groups were the main factors that delayed and abated SSR in Serbia.

Security Sector

As we have already mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the urgent tasks of the new democratic authorities was the reform of the security sector, and in particular of intelligence services. They were rightly considered an open threat to the society's democratisation by the victorious DOS coalition and the democratic public, and were seen as a source of fear and mistrust in the security sector by the majority of citizens.

¹⁰ Some changes in security sector did happen, but they were symbolic. These changes are as follow: Military of Yugoslavia was reorganised - the new organisational scheme was introduced- Corps/Brigade type of organisation, giving the Yugoslav Army nine Army Corps commands. A new police unit - *Gendarmerie* was formed. Conscientious objection to military service was introduced and compulsory military service was shortened.



That is why the tasks of the new authorities in the reform of state institutions, proclaimed in the *Contract with the People* (DOS election platform)¹¹ include: to enable the competent Parliamentary Committees access to all secret police files within a period of 100 days and to form an independent expert commission to examine and publish all relevant documents, audio and video records related to Serbia and Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policy in the 1987-2000 period, kept secret by the former authorities. Other extremely important tasks were: to define national interests, to prepare and adopt key documents in the security sphere (National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy and Doctrine), and to adopt new laws governing the operation and organisation of the national security system and lustration.

But, the initial political will for reforms soon abated. That was the outcome of a series of factors that delayed the implementation of serious reform measures for a year and a half. In addition to the expected difficulties, otherwise characteristic for security sector reforms (resistance of security structures themselves and political forces of the former regime, as well as a part of the public inclined to look upon national security as the unquestionable category of alienated power), the postponement and politicisation of reforms were, in the case of Serbia, additionally influenced by a specific mixture of objective and subjective factors.

On the one hand, after the October change, the DOS coalition was in a position to start the reform of the Federal level-intelligence services within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹² and the Military Intelligence¹³, as well as in the Military of Yugoslavia itself, but needed to win the support of the Montenegrin political elite who were more concerned with securing independence for Montenegro than with improving the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's central institutions. A transitory government formed in Serbia operated until the Parliamentary elections of 23 December that year and the formation of the National Parliament and government in January the following year. However, that government did not have the capacity for reform. It so happened that on the basis of an agreement with the FRY president Vojislav Koštunica, Milošević's man Radomir

¹¹ Demokratska opozicija Srbije - Program za demokratsku Srbiju [Democratic Opposition of Serbia – Programme for Democratic Serbia]. *Vreme* [Onlajn]. Broj 502, 19. avgust 2000. internet: http://www.vreme.com/arhiva_html/502/index.html [accessed: 12. September 2009].

¹² Security Service (Služba bezbednosti) and Service for inquiry and documentation (Služba za dokumentaciju i istraživanje).

¹³ Counterintelligence Agency (Kontraobaveštajna služba) and Intelligence Directorate (Obaveštajna uprava)



Marković remained at the head of the RDB (ser. Resor državne bezbednosti, Directorate of State Security)¹⁴ for the next four months, which bought the RDB leaders time to destroy part of the service's files, and consolidate their positions with the new political decision-makers in Serbia. The DOS coalition, on its part, failed to make use of that time to prepare appropriate personnel and plans for the reform of security sector, or for that matter for the reform of the military and the police. Instead, the parties of the victorious DOS coalition manifested increasing discord concerning the course and pace of reforms in the society and state, and generated inter-party scandals and affairs involving the intelligence services.¹⁵ Actually, later events related to the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic would show that a mixture of individuals from intelligence, politicians, and organised crime groups were the actors who played the paramount role in power politics.

On the other side, the unfavourable security situation in the Ground Safety Zone towards Kosovo and Metohija and on the Serbian south, weakened the initial resolve for fast and thorough reforms of security sector, and in particular intelligence services. Notwithstanding the actual gravity of the situation, it was continuously used by the services and other security forces, as well as the highest authorities to argue against any measures for any substantial security sector reform. The same argument was employed to justify the postponement in the opening of files kept by the services for political or ideological motives (ostensibly not to endanger the network of the services' collaborators and thus negatively impact their effectiveness), as well as resistance to the lustration of the security apparatus' members who violated human rights, or for implementation of any other measure that would go deeper into the structure or personnel composition of the Armed Forces.

Another factor which, although of a different nature, had similar effects on the postponement and slowdown of security sector reforms, was the burden of the legacy of the war, and the resulting divisions in a large part of Serbian society on the issue of cooperation with the Hague tribunal for war crimes on the territories of the former Yugoslavia and extradition of the accused for those crimes. This is best exemplified when former president of Serbia and FRY Slo-

¹⁴ RDB was a civilian secret police that operated within the Ministry of Interior of Serbia. It existed until 2002, when newly elected democratic government transformed it into Security Information Agency. See more: <http://www.bia.gov.rs/istorijat3-eng.htm>, accessed: 12.6.2010.

¹⁵ Scandalous affairs will be listed further in the text.



bodan Milošević was extradited to the Hague tribunal (June 2001), which was interpreted by Vojislav Koštunica, leader of DSS (at the time the largest party of DOS), as a “grave violation of constitutional order of country”, adding that “co-operation with Hague Tribunal, although undoubtedly necessary, was nothing more than sheer extradition of indicted without any proper protection of citizens and, more importantly, the state.”¹⁶ Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal was a very important bone of contention between the two parties leading the two DOS factions.

The following paragraphs give examples of the effects of certain factors on the postponement of reforms. All of these events, in the first place, point out that the absence of a political consensus for the reform of the intelligence services among the key political actors was the main obstacle for their reform. Only in that context can we understand the fundamental controversy between the statement of Goran Petrović, the first RDB head appointed by the Serbian Government on 27 January 2001, who claimed that the situation in the RDB was “in mildest terms disastrous”¹⁷, and the fact that the badly needed reforms in that service, discounting minor personnel changes, actually had been missing throughout 2001 and the first half of the next year.

A good illustration of the initial reform inconsistency and the Serbian government’s unreadiness for substantial intelligence services’ reforms is the inadequate attempt to open the services’ secret files. Namely, under powerful public pressure to finally make good on its pre-election promises, the government passed an *Ordinance Declassifying Serbian Citizens’ Files Kept by the State Security Service*.¹⁸ Soon after (on its next session) the Government changed the title of this document into *Ordinance Allowing Insight into Certain Files on Serbian Citizens kept by the State Security Service*.¹⁹ The Ordinance obliged the RDB to identify the citizens with files categorised as “internal enemies”. Therefore, this list apparently does not include those classified as “cominformists”, “civil right wing”, “liberals”, “anarcho-liberals”, “opposition leaders”, and “supporters of change”. Also, files could be read by citizens only under the supervision of

¹⁶ Kako je uhapšen i izručen Milošević (How was Milosevic apprehended and extradited), B92, http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/insajder.php?yyyy=2005&mm=04&nav_id=166741, accessed: 21. 05. 2009.

¹⁷ “Interview with Goran Petrović,” *Nedeljni telegraf*, Aug. 1, 2001).

¹⁸ *Uredba o stavljanju na uvid određenih dosijea vođenih o građanima Republike Srbije u službi državne bezbednosti*, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 30/01.

¹⁹ *Uredba o stavljanju na uvid određenih dosijea vođenih o građanima Republike Srbije u službi državne bezbednosti*, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 31/01.



the security services officers. That is why the “ordinance gave the citizens incomplete insight into the SDB files” (Trkulja: 2003). The opening of secret services’ files should have marked the end of a non-democratic and dictatorial era, and the reason for the partial declassification of files should be sought in the fact that “this period (1945-2000) was neither dictatorial nor undemocratic for many within the DOS”.²⁰ In addition to being an inappropriate instrument for the attainment of the set objective, this Ordinance was legally deficient since its provisions contravened the Constitution, and it was, in 2003, proclaimed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.

Inconsistencies of the same kind were again manifested in late-2003, with the adoption of the long-awaited *Law on the Responsibility for Violation of Human Rights* (Lustration).²¹ Although Serbia is the only country in the region that has a law regulating this matter, the lustration has never been carried out, in the absence of the required parliamentary majority to select the members of the lustration commission and provide other conditions for its work. Implementation of this particular law also required insight into intelligence services’ files.

The best example of the politicisation of reforms are the numerous affairs implicating individual members and parts of intelligence services, e.g. “Gavrilović affair” (assassination of a high-ranking RDB member Momir Gavrilović), “Perišić affair” (arrest of the former chief of General Staff, then vice-president of the Serbian government Momčilo Perišić) and “Pavković affair” (an attempt to use Special Yugoslav Armed Forces Units for a raid on the Serbian Government Communications Bureau in June 2001, allegedly for wiretapping). In all these affairs, the two key DOS coalition parties - Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Serbia - exchanged accusations of abuse of the intelligence services for the attainment of their narrow party interests.

The third example is an event which drastically revealed the danger of postponing security sector reforms and the gravity of the inherited situation.

²⁰ “Uvid u dosijea SDB regulisati zakonom,” [Insight into SDB Files Requires Legal Regulation] *Danas*, Jul 5-6, 2003. On the need to open the secret files and the related dilemmas and problems, see Boguljub Milosavljević and Đorđe Pavićević, *Tajni dosijei: otvaranje dosijea službi državne bezbednosti* [Secret Files: Opening of State Security Service Files] (Beograd: Centar za antiratnu akciju, 2001).

²¹ *Zakon o odgovornosti za kršenje ljudskih prava*, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 58/03 and 61/03.



That was the rebellion of the Special Operations Unit²², whose members, armed and in full gear, blocked the traffic communications in Kula and the highway near the Sava Conference Centre in Belgrade, demanding the replacement of Police Minister Dušan Mihajlović and the RDB leaders. They also publicly manifested their disagreement with the arrest and extradition of the ICTY indictees. In a whole series of inter-party conflicts within the DOS, the FRY president Koštunica defined that event as no more than a “protest of workers”, people who instead of workers’ overalls wore uniforms and carried arms.

However, the situation was very grave. The rebels managed to force out the replacement of the RDB head Goran Petrović and his deputy Zoran Mijatović. In response to the situation so created, the Serbian Government set up a *State Security Council*. Its president was the Serbian Prime Minister Dr. Zoran Đinđić²³, and the Council was supposed to monitor RDB operations pending the establishment of parliamentary control.²⁴ The government, furthermore, verified the act²⁵ separating the JSO (Jedinica za specijalne operacije, Special Operations Unit) from the RDB, to become a unit of the Interior Ministry, whose purpose and use were decided by the Minister, subject to a previous agreement by the government. The Government thus sought to establish control over the JSO. At the same time, an attempt of the FRY President to establish a National Security Council at the federal level fell through, faced with the opposition of Serbian government members who considered him unauthorised to establish a body of that kind (Anastasijević: 2006).

Despite the highly politicised reforms and the sharp political conflict of the two ruling political parties, two laws were adopted in early summer 2002, one of which- *Law on the FRY Security Services*, regulated the operations of civilian and military services at the federal level, while the other – *Law on Security Information Agency*, transformed the Serbian RDB into a Security Information Agency. Thus, almost two years after the democratic change, in early June 2002, the *Law on the FRY Security Services* was adopted. The speed in preparing

²² Special Operations Unit (Jedinica za specijalne operacije) was rapid reaction armed force within the State Security Service.

²³ *Defense & Security*, Issue No. 043, January 24, 2002.

²⁴ This body was dissolved after the constitution of Vojislav Koštunica’s government in the spring of 2004.

²⁵ Pravilnik o unutrašnjoj organizaciji i sistematizaciji radnih mesta u Jedinici za specijalne operacije Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova [Rules on Internal Organization and Job Classification in the Special Operations Unit of the Interior Ministry] (DT 01 No. 255/2002, 15. 1. 2002).



this legislation was due to the “Perišić affair” which clearly revealed the absence of civilian control of military intelligence services and the armed forces. The law regulated the positions, functions, authorities, and control of intelligence services on the federal level: Military Security Service and Military Intelligence Service²⁶, as well as the Security Service, and Service for Research and Documentation attached to the Foreign Ministry. The most important changes instituted by this law were related to military intelligence services that were, for the first time, defined by one law and bound to obtain court approval for the use of special procedures and methods which temporarily limit the constitutionally and legally guaranteed human rights and freedoms. In addition, military police was separated from military intelligence services.

“The result is that the service that uses secret methods for the collection of data does not have the military police as its executive body, which is one of democratic standards.” (Horvat: 2007, 123)

An important contribution of this law was the establishment of the mechanism for democratic civilian control. Military services were subordinated to the Defence Minister and the Federal government – an important step leading towards the institution of civilian control of military services previously subordinated to the chief of the General Staff, or Unit Commanders on lower levels. The law introduced Parliamentary mechanisms for monitoring the services’ operations. A Parliamentary Commission for the Control of the FRY Intelligence Services was set up, but did not function due to the numerous difficulties in the work of the Federal Parliament.

The above-mentioned law was, merely two weeks later, followed by the adoption of the *Law on the Security Information Agency* in the Serbian National Assembly. This legislation separated the RDB from the Ministry of the Interior and transformed it into a Security Information Agency (BIA), directly subordinated to the Serbian Government and under its control. In terms of its functions, this service was of a “mixed type”, since it simultaneously had intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks, and functioned as a security service (protection of the constitutionally established order). However, although it welcomed the adoption of this long-awaited piece of legislation, the public sharply criticised both the Law as a whole and some of its provisions. The following are only the most important examples.

²⁶ These services were subsequently renamed VBA and VOA.



In the first place, the law has only 28 articles²⁷, which incompletely and imprecisely regulate the subject matter. The intelligence and counter-intelligence components have not been clearly divided, and the same goes for the security service functions (Milosavljević: 2004, 54). Furthermore, in contrast to the *Law on the FRY Security Services*, this legal act does not precisely list and define the methods of the Agency's work, saying that it, acting within its jurisdiction, applies "appropriate operational methods, measures and acts and uses appropriate operational-technical means"²⁸ but without specifying the methods, measures, acts, and means. In consequence, the control of procedures and methods for a temporary limitation of human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution and law (Art. 13) has not been sufficiently elaborated (Milosavljević: 2003, 102). Another disputable provision prescribes that the Agency members with specific jobs (fairly broadly defined) have the traditional police powers. Thus, Agency employees who are working within the organisational units designed for fighting organised crime, the worst forms of crimes against humanity and international law, domestic and international terrorism, as well as crimes against constitution and security of Republic of Serbia have all police competences (e.g. arrest rights).²⁹

A look at the basic solutions of these two laws inevitably makes us wonder how it could be possible that of the two laws, adopted almost at the same time, and with such widely different contents, one meets the essential standards of democratic control over the secret services, and the other does not. One could rightly assume that the decisive influence in this case was one of political developments. Namely, some members of the ruling elite who, at that moment, did not control military intelligence services, fearing the possibility of finding themselves within its compass, adopted a modern legislation (*Law on the FRY Security Services*) regulating the work of security services in the military and the foreign ministry. But, the same political elite also adopted the Law on BIA which does not meet modern standards for the regulation of security-intelligence services' operations. The reasons for that should be sought in the fact that the political elite (nominally) controlled the operations of the civilian intelligence service at the Republic level and did not wish to legally diminish the power of

²⁷ By comparison, the *Law on the Security-Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia* (2006) has 126 articles which comprehensively and in detail regulate all issues related to the operations of security services.

²⁸ *Zakon o Bezbednosnoj-informativnoj agenciji* [Law on Security Information Agency], čl. 9 [Article 9.], Službeni glasnik RS, br. 42/02 [Official Gazette RS, no. 42/02].

²⁹ *Ibid*,



that service, and thereby probably weaken its own grip on power.

The Sobering Truth

In spite of these reform steps pertaining to intelligence services, one event showed that it was still a far cry from the real reform of security sector. Namely, on 12 March 2003, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated. This tragic event showed that the creation of a legal framework for the functioning of intelligence services and organisational changes are insufficient for a successful reform. Namely, the assassination was carried out by a group consisting of certain members of the JSO and an organised criminal group known as the *Zemun clan*, even including a number of BIA members. It turned out that the first priority was to remove from the service all involved in serious violations of human rights or linked with criminal groups, i.e. to renew the cadre and undertake a series of other reforms that would enable the services to function in a way befitting a democratic society. In a word, it was clear that proper reforms had been lacking and that a genuine change should be devised and carried out, but the plans for such an effort, once again, were missing.

Beginning of the first generation of SSR (2003 – 2006)

Political instability, the uncertainty that surrounded the future of the Federal state and the absence of consensus among the Serbian political elite on their reform priorities resulted in reluctance and thus the slow pace of security sector reform in this period. Nevertheless, this period can be marked as the beginning of the first generation of SSR in Serbia³⁰. The civilian and democratic control of the armed forces was introduced for the first time, after the General Staff and military intelligence services were subordinated to the Ministry of Defense (Djurdjevic-Lukic: 2007, 179). Adoption of the new Law on the Police in 2005 brought changes in organisational structure, thus making possible its depoliticisation and professionalisation. Reform of the intelligence services

³⁰The first generation of SSR is marked with introduction of measures for establishing democratic and civilian control over the security sector and its depoliticisation. It also includes establishment of independent oversight institutions and professionalization of the security sector. See: Edmunds, T. (2002) Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation. DCAF: DCAF Working Paper No. 86



through adoption of laws and regulations continued, but there was a lack of political will to perform thorough reform. Through adoption of new laws, independent oversight bodies and institutions were created, but implementation of these laws was incomplete, resulting in a delay in the start of these institutions' work.³¹ Initial success in the process of EU integration resulted with the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) entering the first official round of the negotiations on Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in November 2005. Despite the fact that several police and army Generals, as well as other lower ranking officers, were sent to the Hague Tribunal during this period, the EU cancelled the negotiations on SAA with Serbia in May 2006, stating that Serbia was insufficiently cooperating with the ICTY. Two weeks later, a referendum on independence of Montenegro was held, resulting in the break-up of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.

Social-political context

The assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic on 12 March 2003 was immediately followed by the introduction of a state of emergency in Serbia, with the aim of finding and arresting the persons responsible for the assassination. The Ministry of Interior started the action "Saber", the largest and fiercest campaign against organised crime witnessed so far in any post-socialist country (Shentov, Todorov, Stoyanov: 2004, 61). The complexity and depth of connections between organised crime and the security sector were revealed. Police, judiciary, intelligence services, and the military were infiltrated and compromised by organised crime, and together with corrupt government officials, hindered efforts at reform. The fight against organised crime was strongly supported, both within the country and internationally. In order to give impetus to continuation of the reforms, the EU approved full membership of the SCG in the Council of Europe³², although the state of emergency was still active and the improvement in the reform scenario was limited. The impression was that Serbia is firmly set on its way to democratisation and genuine reforms (Shentov, Todorov, Stoyanov: 2004, 67).

³¹ The Law on the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest was passed in April 2004; the Law on Free Access to Information in November 2004; the Law on the State Auditing Institution, at the end of 2005; the Law on the Protection of Competition – the "Anti-Monopoly law," September 2005; while the Ombudsman Law, and the Anti-corruption Strategy were passed by Parliament in December 2005.

³² On 3 April 2003. http://www.coe.org.rs/eng/tdoc_sr/serbia_and_coe/?conid=26



Soon after the state of emergency ended, the public was overwhelmed with numerous scandals and accusations of corruption against the ruling DOS coalition, cooperating with “shadowy businessman” and organised crime groups. The government was forced to resign, and a new one was formed in March 2004, composed of nationalist parties and headed by the Democratic Party of Serbia, with Vojislav Kostunica as the Prime Minister. This newly formed minority government was supported by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), marking the return of old cadres from the SPS regime under Milošević to positions in government institutions. Political control of the police, intelligence service, and judiciary continued. The highest priority in the government policy was given to the future solution of the status of Kosovo, and the future of the Federal state. The reformist and pro-European policy orientation of the previous government started to decline notably. The tension between nationalist, self-proclaimed “patriots” and pro-European parties, often proclaimed as “traitors”, was the indicator of the deep ideological cleavage in Serbian society that slowed down the reforms (Pavlovic, Antonic: 2007).

Security sector

Other spoilers of the change were the intelligence services, primarily the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA), and tycoons who dominated the economy through monopoly and corruption, thus creating two “reserved domains”³³ that proved to be the most resistant to reforms. Instead of continuing the reform of BIA, the new government allowed the return of old cadres to the agency, who continued to abuse their positions in order to regain the power they once had over the political process. The agency continued to be resilient to reform and one of the biggest opponents of Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY, together with the military.³⁴

These tycoons, whose wealth was created during Milosevic era and increased during first few years of transition, were in search of new “partners”,

³³ These are domains in which certain groups want to stop and obstruct reforms in order to preserve their power and privileged position. This is one of the characteristic of “electoral democracy” that existed in Serbia in this period. See: Pavlovic, D., Antonic, S. (2007) *Konosli-dacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji posle 2000. godine*. Beograd: Službeni glasnik

³⁴ Vice-president of the Serbian Government resigned after SAA negotiations were cancelled. He blamed security services on obstruction of finding the accused war criminals and helping them in hiding. <http://www.vesti.rs/Politika/Labus-podneo-ostavku.html>



in exchange often offering politicians money, compromising information on their political opponents, and other services. This created the situation of a “captured state” in which political parties (ab)use state institutions to protect and promote interests of these groups, against the public good (Pešić: 2007, 1). This meant stalling and partial implementation of the political and economic reforms that allowed tycoons to keep their monopoly in certain areas of economy. This resulted in Serbia being one of the most corrupt countries in the region in this period.³⁵

Unlike the Security Intelligence Agency, the police showed less resistance to reform. Conditions for its professionalisation and putting it under civilian and democratic control were created in 2005 with the adoption of the Law on Police. An important step in this process was demilitarisation of the police, by abrogating military ranks and introducing standard police ranks. External and internal oversight of the police was also introduced, while the Chief of Police was to be civilian - elected by the Government on public competition, exclusively according to the criteria of competence. These efforts resulted in creation of a more efficient police force, capable of fighting organised crime. The fight against organised crime remained high on the list of proclaimed priorities of the new government. In reality, this fight lost the intensity it had after Djindjics’ assassination. Legality of the *Saber* action was questioned through several Supreme Court decisions stating that detention of the suspects was longer than what was legally allowed. This created a public perception that the judiciary was protecting organised crime groups. Additional confusion on the political background of Djindjic’s assassination was brought to public during the trial by the accused and certain political groups (which openly supported the former Milosevic regime and strongly opposed the reforms and cooperation with the ICTY). Organised crime didn’t regain the power it had before 2003, but the discovery of a “road mafia”, “customs mafia”, and “bankruptcy mafia” showed that the high level of corruption and links between representatives of state institutions and organised crime continued to exist.

The loose federal arrangement of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) and conflicting respective stances of Montenegro and Serbia on the future of the union resulted in a slow pace of military reform, since the military was under Federal authorities who showed little will for its reform, while the

³⁵ Annual reports of Transparency International ‘Global Corruption Perception Index’ for the years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. See: http://www.transparency.org/publications/annual_report



blockade of the Federal institutions slowed down the pace of reform additionally. Soon after the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was formed, military reform and membership in Partnership for Peace Program were announced as priorities. General Staff and military intelligence agencies were subordinated to the Ministry of Defence in 2003³⁶, thus introducing the civilian and democratic control of the armed forces. Several high ranking officers who were close to the Milosevic regime were either retired or arrested and sent to Hague. However, changes in federal arrangements were not followed with the adoption of strategic documents and laws that should have created conditions for systematic military reform³⁷. Moreover, the Constitutional Charter of SCG did not offer basic grounds for defence reform and left many strategic questions unanswered (Hadzic: 2003). Persistent polarisation and the politicisation of defence related issues among the political elite (such as the size of the Armed Forces, pro-NATO or anti-NATO stance, professional or conscripted army personnel, etc.) did not leave adequate room for a sound assessment of real national interests in the area of defence (Djurdjovic-Lukic: 2007, 181).

It can be concluded that this period was strongly marked with elements of the post-authoritarian context of security sector reform. The key actors that shaped the course of the reform were political parties. Tensions that existed on the Federal level, between the Serbian and Montenegrin elite, and within Serbia among nationalist and pro-European parties, often resulted in deficiencies in implementation of SSR. The new economic elite, namely the tycoons, shifted from their initial support for liberalisation of the economy and now advocated for status quo, aiming to preserve their monopoly. Widespread corruption among political parties and government institutions resulted in weak state institutions, incapable of performing democratisation and any broad reform of the society.

³⁶ The General Staff become subordinate to the Ministry of Defence and the Intelligence Administration was restructured into the Military Intelligence Agency and both agencies worked for the Ministry of Defence (Djurdjovic-Lukic:2007, 179).

³⁷ National Security Strategy did not exist, while the Defence Strategy (2004) and the White Paper of Defence (2005) were adopted.



Reforms vs. foreign policy shift? (2006 – 2009)

Social-political context

The context within which SSR in Serbia has taken place in the period 2006 – 2009 could be characterised as developmental since the main priority remained to be a transition towards a developed economy and consolidated democracy. Within that context, organised crime, corruption, and to less extent, lack of transparency in conduct of state affairs, are considered to be the main threats. At the same time, reforms are mostly being justified by compliance with international criteria, which in the case of Serbia are benchmarks set by the European Union. The self-declared independence of Kosovo threatened to be the turning point which could have shifted the discourse from integration towards protection of state territorial integrity and sovereignty which, after all, did not happen.

After Montenegro declared independence and withdrawal from the State Union in May 2006, Serbia was given an opportunity to define its own system of national security. The first prerequisite was the adaptation of core strategic documents which would outline the state's foreign policy orientation and define missions, tasks, and responsibilities of its security sector actors. The first and basic document adopted in Serbia was a new Constitution, which Parliament adopted in November 2006. The process of adaptation of a new Constitution certified a lack of a national consensus on the state's foreign policy orientation, which remained to be one of the basic determinants of a context within which security sector reform in Serbia has been conducted till today. Lack of consensus on state's foreign and a security policy is being reflected in the most recent strategic document that the Serbian Parliament adopted in April 2009 – the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy. Long-awaited documents, which were supposed to provide clear guidelines for conduct of affairs in the security domain have disappointed the Serbian public as well as experts involved in security issues, in terms of their vagueness and incoherence.³⁸ The vagueness of these documents are, officially and non-officially, explained by a need to reach a political consensus among ideologically diverse political par-

³⁸ CCMR organised round table on the draft of National Security Strategy and the draft of Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, <http://www.ccmr-bg.org/News/3123/CCMR+organised+round+table+on+the+draft+of+National+Security+Strategy+and+the+draft+of+Defence+Strategy+of+the+Republic+of+Serbia.shtml> (accessed on 3 September 2009).



ties, which were at the time forming a government. Government instability, caused by the distinctiveness of political parties in power, was a common feature of the two governments Serbia had in this three-year period. A need to reach political consensus is being reflected into how, and under what conditions, reforms in security sector are being agreed and executed.

The declaration of Montenegrin independence and the fact that Serbia regained independent statehood itself has not, surprisingly or not, significantly affected the political context and political processes in the state. Although the position towards continuation of the State Union was an unavoidable element of political parties' pre-election campaigns, dissolution of the State Union has not significantly affected the position of key political figures and political parties. Instead of that, political life in Serbia was, even immediately after the May referendum as well afterwards, much more affected by ongoing negotiations on the future status of Serbia's province, Kosovo and Metohija. Thus, the event which proved to be the most significant marker of Serbia's political life till today was the declaration of Kosovo's independence in February 2008. That event has threatened to bring in the prevalence of state-centric discourse within which emphasis is put on the protection of the territory and the state's capacities to respond to immediate external threats. Although a 'Kosovo discourse' threatened to consequently lead to 'militarisation' of the SSR discourse, this did not happen for two main reasons. First is the fact that the Serbian armed forces withdrew from the province after the Kumanovo Agreement in 1999 and that the UN was given a mandate to govern the province according to the 1244 Resolution. This diminished the role and significance of the Serbian Army in the context of Kosovo's separation, because only rare and marginal political forces advocated usage of the Armed Forces after Kosovo Assembly declared independence. Secondly, public attention was turned to southern Serbia and the municipalities mostly inhabited with Albanian population, where tensions among the Albanian population and Serbian police could be expected. In light of that situation, attention was paid to the actions of the Serbian police, especially Gendarmerie forces ("Gendarmes did good job, situation calm", B92, 29 August, 2009).

Security sector

The most important implication of Kosovo's independence is certainly the profound changes in the direction of Serbian foreign policy, and the rhetoric



used in the international arena. Since Kosovo's independence was soon recognised by the majority of the EU and NATO member states, Serbia withdrew its diplomatic representatives in respective states for a period of a few months. Even before the declaration of independence took place, since it was anticipated by domestic and international actors, Serbia's parliament adopted a resolution on 26 December 2007, which is commonly recognised as a declaration of military neutrality. That document declared that Serbia will refrain from joining any existing military Alliances in the future. Although not directly mentioned, the declaration is widely recognised as a rhetoric action aimed at removing the possibility of Serbia joining NATO for the foreseeable future. The document was adopted exactly one year after Serbia joined the Partnership for Peace programme. Although considered to be an entry point for full-fledged NATO membership, PfP membership proved not to have significant consequences neither for Serbia's security policy nor for the SSR process. Adaptation of the declaration of neutrality, although it does not have any legal obligatory power, is serving as an exit strategy for decision-makers if they are confronted with the need to explain Serbian security policies and the future of the state's relations with the Alliance. At the same time, the vagueness of the document, which has not defined what Serbian security policy is, is confronting decision-makers with a need to explain what kind of neutrality, under what terms and with what costs, Serbia is going to have. One of the main SSR-related issues arising from this neutrality discourse is the size of the armed forces Serbia will need in a case of opting for neutrality. Although the Serbian MoD denied that any significant organisational changes had been undertaken as a consequence of the declaration of neutrality, occasionally the Minister himself used neutrality as a proper explanation for an abandonment of plans on downsizing the number of civilian and military servants in the MoD which were stipulated in the Strategic Defence Review from June 2006, and were made according to NATO recommendations (Rose-Roth Seminar, Belgrade, Serbia, 25-27 October 2007).

Integration processes undergoing in this period of time put in the spotlight the capacities and capabilities of the Serbian police forces more than any other security sector institution. The Euro-Atlantic integration process related to the security sector, for the respective period of time, could be brought down to the issue of the Schengen process and visa liberalisation. The process of visa liberalisation, as one of the most palpable benefits Serbia could expect to gain in the near future in respect of the EU accession process, has confronted the MoI with a series of tasks, from the adoption of strategic documents, to signing and implementing documents on regional cooperation (Group 484, "Towards



White Schengen List: Serbia Progress Report on Visa Liberalisation Process”, 11 September 2009). The MoI thus was, and still is, the most visible element of the state administration and the most visible security institution in the process of EU integration. This could be explained by an emerging, but still inconsistent EU agenda for SSR which would involve a more comprehensive approach. Instead of that, cooperation in criminal and justice affairs is the most visible part of the SSR on the EU agenda.

The role of the Ministry of Interior but also of the Ministry of Justice, is in the focus of public attention, also owing to the process of securitisation³⁹ of organised crime and corruption which is constantly present in Serbian discourse on security since 2003. But this same discourse, within which organised crime and corruption are being prioritised, has turned the attention towards financial frauds and corruption within security institutions themselves. This is proved by numerous affairs, which were revealed and prosecuted, related to processes of public procurement in the MoD.⁴⁰

Intelligence, on the other hand, still remained in the focus of public attention. This is mainly due to the cooperation with the ICTY which is one of the basic requirements Serbia is being faced with by the EU. On account of its non-compliance with the Court Serbia is experiencing a form of silent sanctions, at least by a few of the EU member-states, Because of that the work of the Security Intelligence Agency more than the other security institutions is being questioned. But while commenting on the work of this agency, the EU and ICTY representatives usually make distinctions between the BIA's capacities to work efficiently, and political willingness of Serbian decision-makers to comply with the condition of Ratko Mladić being arrested. In other words, it is the lack of political willingness of the current Serbian establishment that is being blamed for inefficiency in cooperation with the ICTY, rather than the capability

³⁹ Securitization is the discourse driven process when securitizing actor makes effort to convince the auditorium in necessity of a adoption of special measures. It is a process through which an object or a value becomes signified as a threat and as such an issue of high importance for which defence is justifiable to use means that otherwise couldn't be legitimated had the securitization discourse not taken place. According to: Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap De Wild. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Pub 1997.

⁴⁰ On "Mile Dragić" affair: http://www.rtv.rs/sr/vesti/hronika/sudska_hronika/2009_09_03/vest_149518.jsp (accessed on 11 September 2009). On "Satelite" affair see: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=01&dd=12&nav_category=120&nav_id=338865 (accessed on 10 September 2009).



of the agencies which are supposed to deal with technical part of the task.⁴¹

The conclusion, which could be drawn from the previous comments on how particular security sector institutions appeared on the agenda, is that there is no systematic and comprehensive approach to SSR in Serbia in general, and that SSR as a policy has not been ranked high on the political agenda. Different institutions of Serbia's security sector are appearing on the political agenda on different occasions, provoked either by EU conditionality, which is a case of police- and intelligence-related issues, or purchase of new equipment, or affairs connected to public procurement or corruption, which was the case in the reform of the Armed Forces. Thus, we have no proof that SSR is understood in its complexity and inseparability nor that Serbian decision-makers are prioritising the reform of these institutions in the context of the overall reform process going on in the state. If we are thinking in terms of the 1st and 2nd generation of reforms, then certainly the 1st generation was taken forward in the 2006 – 2009 period, by adopting basic laws defining missions and tasks of the Armed Forces and a law on intelligence services, but reforms belonging to 2nd generation of reforms have not been profound. The context of SSR in Serbia in the 2006 – 2009 period has mostly been free from treats of the security establishment's involvement in political life. The exception to this general observation is an episode of a publicly-revealed dispute between Minister Dragan Šutanovac and Chief of the General Staff Zdravko Ponoš in January-February 2009 ("Miletić novi načelnik Generalštaba", B92, 13 June 2009). Although this episode, which was resolved by the President's decision to discharge the Chief of the General Staff, proved the supremacy of civilian decision makers and confirmed principles of civilian command, it also questioned transparency of decision-making and governance in the security sector, since general Ponoš pointed part of his critique to non-transparency and non-accountability of financial management within the MoD ("Tadić razrešio Ponoša funkcije načelnika Generalštaba", Politika, 3 September 2009).

⁴¹ The exact distinction between political will to act and capacity to act was officially made by the foreign representatives on the occasion of attacks on embassies' building during public protests against Kosovo independence on 21 February 2008 in Belgrade. Police was believed to be able to protect each building, but also was believed not to be given an order to protect them. "U.S. to evacuate embassy from Serbia", http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=22&nav_id=47906 (accessed on 9 September 2009).



Conclusion

The ten years of Milošević's rule during the 1990s were marked by wars, economic breakdown, isolation from the international community, massive violations of human rights, and political assassinations. Milošević's authoritarian regime held the security sector under tight political control, making the introduction of democratic and civilian control impossible. The police and security services were ab(used) for securing personal power of Milošević, as well as for a crackdown upon his political opponents. The opposition was at the time weak and divided, and only in the second half of the '90s did it start to consolidate. The police and security services were a strong lever of the regime, although in the first few years, the military had a leading role in the security sector, before being sidelined by the police. After the fall of Milošević, it became evident that the real strong pillar of the regime had been the State Security Service (SDB), which, in the final stage of Milošević's regime, was even used for political assassinations.

All this left a heavy 'heritage' to the new, democratically-elected government in the autumn of 2000. The priorities of the new government were to bring the country back from the isolation and to start reforms, with the goal of transforming Serbia into liberal-democratic society. Unfortunately, the initial success of the reforms, primarily in the area of the economy, was not followed with thorough and effective reforms in the security sector, and in particular of security services. Discord in the ruling coalition (DOS) hampered the reform process, while the pace of the reforms was additionally slowed down by several other factors. Firstly, the federal arrangement of the country that resulted in the competences over the military and military security services being in the hands of the Federal government, where the support for reforms from the Montenegrin political elite was lacking. Secondly, the security services (primarily the State Security Service) were strongly opposed to lustration and opening of secret files, seeking (and finding) support in the police, judiciary, intelligence services, military, and organised crime. The depth and strength of these connections became evident after the assassination of the Prime Minister Djindjic in the spring of 2003.

The assassination of Djindjic showed that that proper reforms had been lacking, leaving a significant part of the security sector unreformed and out of the reach of democratic and civilian control. Numerous scandals and accusations against the ruling DOS coalition, of being corrupt and cooperat-



ing with “shadowy businessmen” and organised crime groups, in the months that followed the assassination of Djindjic, resulted in the Government resigning. The new Government was formed in the spring of 2004, with the support of Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), marking the return of old cadres from the Milosevic regime to positions in government institutions. Priority of the Government policy was put on the future solution of Kosovo status, while the reforms lost their intensity. Nevertheless, the Police and the Military were put under the democratic and civilian control, marking the beginning of the first generation of security sector reform. Although the fight against organised crime was set as one of the state priorities, it actually lost the intensity it had shortly after the assassination of the Prime Minister. Corruption became widespread among political parties and government institutions, resulting in weak state institutions, incapable of attempting the democratisation and broad reform of the society.

The loose federal arrangement of the country ended in May 2006, when Montenegro declared independence and Serbia was given a chance to (re) define its own system of national security. Soon, it became evident that there was still a lack of consensus on the state’s foreign policy orientation, resulting in often-confusing policies and strategic documents. In 2007, in the light of a possible declaration of independence by Kosovo, a declaration on military neutrality was adopted. Declaration of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008 threatened for a while that a discourse emphasising the protection of the territory and state’s capacities to respond to immediate threats from the outside, would prevail over the ‘reforms’ discourse. The process of reforms, however, continued, resulting with the completion of the legal framework of the security sector in October 2009. This has marked the completion of the first generation of SSR in Serbia.



Annex 1: Analysis of key political actors in Serbia for the period 1990–2009

Key Political Actors

Key actors which defined paces and direction of SSR related issues in the respective period of time were parliamentary political parties and political establishment, while significant pressure from international actors, apart from above mentioned Schengen related processes, was absent. Demand for reforms was provided either by non – governmental institution dealing with security issues or good governance in general or by state's independent control institutions, such as Ombudsperson and Commissioner for Information of Public Importance, who have pointed to particular examples of either human rights violations or have provided inputs on security related legislature.⁴² Increased and more visible involvement of these actors in SSR is one of the qualitative changes compared to the previous periods.

⁴² On the example of Law on Data Confidentiality see: Expert Discussion on the Law on Data Confidentiality Held in Belgrade, <http://www.ccmr-bg.org/News/3482/Expert+Discussion+on+the+Law+on+Data+Confidentiality+Held+in+Belgrade.shtml> (accessed on: 10 September 2009).

| Type of actor | Interests | Strategies | Capabilities | Relations |
|--|--|---|--|--|
| <p>Ruling party during 1990s</p> <p>In ruling coalition in 2009.</p> | <p>Successor of the Communist Party. Socialist political orientation but also highly nationalistic</p> <p>Main motivation is preservation of power</p> | <p>SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA (SPS)</p> <p>Authoritative in political action. Highly oppressive to the opposition. Led by a strong leader.</p> <p>Total lack of respect of human rights during 1990s</p> <p>No democratic credentials, although it tried to maintain the appearance of democratic political life.</p> <p>After 2000, did not have broad popular support; oriented toward survival.</p> <p>Divided among different fractions</p> <p>Strong support in <i>ancient regime</i> elements within the state institutions</p> <p>Does not have influence on reforms after 2000.</p> | <p>High support within the citizens at the beginning which decreased with time.</p> <p>Highly cohesive, uniform party.</p> <p>Took over the material resources of the Communist Party.</p> <p>Decisive force for stopping and delaying reforms during 1990s.</p> | <p>Main allies during 1990s were Yugoslav Left (JUL) and Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in certain periods, also individuals from intelligence services Organised crime groups</p> <p>Main opponents during 1990s were Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Democratic Party (DS), Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) and later Coalition DOS.</p> |

| Type of actor | Interests | Strategies | Capabilities | Relations |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| YUGOSLAV LEFT (JUL) | | | | |
| Extremely leftist party, radical in its views. | Main coalition partner of SPS during 1990s. Main motivation: preservation of power and economic gain | Radical in political action. Highly oppressive to the opposition, sometimes even life-threatening. Total lack of respect of human rights. No democratic credentials. | Low support among the citizens but greater within the economic elite. Highly cohesive, uniform party. Unlimited state resources at its disposal. One of the decisive forces for stopping and delaying reforms during 1990s. | Main allies were Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in certain periods. Main opponents were Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Democratic Party (DS), Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) and later Coalition DOS. |
| SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY (SRS) | | | | |
| Extremely right-wing party, highly nationalistic and radical in its views. Coalition partner of SPS in certain periods during 1990s. | Main motivation is gaining popular support. Organizer of paramilitary units during the wars. | Radical in political action. Highly oppressive to the opposition. Total lack of respect of human rights. No democratic credentials. In 2003 – 2006 period anti-system oriented; aims to stop the process of reforms and Euro-Atlantic integrations. | High support within the citizens during 1990s, limited but rising popular support in 2000 – 2003. Highly cohesive, uniformed party with strong discipline, organisation and cohesion. Had some material support. (SMEs) Unknown material resources. One of the decisive forces for stopping and delaying reforms. In 2003-2006 period the strongest opposition party that gained popularity and support after the break-up of DOS coalition. Well developed organisational network and membership. | During 1990s main allies were Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Yugoslav Left (JUL). Main opponents were Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), Democratic Party (DS), Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) and later Coalition DOS. In 2003 – 2006 period main allies: ultra nationalist and conservatives, remnants of old regime in security sector and economy. Main opponents: all democratic parties, both in power and in opposition, media, civil society. |

| Type of actor | Interests | Strategies | Capabilities | Relations |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|--|---|
| SERBIAN RENEWAL MOVEMENT (SPO) | | | | |
| Party which was nationalistic at the beginning of the '90s and changed its political orientation toward liberal democratic approach. | Main motivation is gaining power. | <p>Leader of the opposition at the beginning of the '90s but also organiser of paramilitary units during the wars.</p> <p>Human rights becoming more important with time.</p> | <p>High support within the nationalistic opposition.</p> <p>Party with strong leader.</p> <p>Material resources from diasporas and later when they gained local power from corruption.</p> <p>Not very influential on reforms.</p> | <p>Main allies were Democratic Party (DS) and Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS).</p> <p>Main opponents were Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Yugoslav Left (JUL) and Serbian Radical Party (SRS).</p> |
| LIBERAL – DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP) | | | | |
| <p>Political orientation: Liberal- Democratic,</p> <p>Established in 2005 from fraction of Democratic Party (DS).</p> | Motivation: access to power | <p>Democratic and institutional means of politics; advocates more radical changes and reforms.</p> <p>Respects human rights.</p> <p>Clearly advocating membership in NATO and moderate attitude towards Kosovo issue</p> | <p>Supported by pro-European voters that were disappointed with slow pace of reforms that resulted with delayed integration in the EU.</p> | <p>Main allies: some civil society organisations and media, liberals.</p> <p>Main opponents: Democratic Party of Serbia, Democratic Party, Radical Party, anti-democratic parties.</p> <p>Recently, LDP is more cooperative with the DS, supporting government in critical situations</p> |

| Type of actor | Interests | Strategies | Capabilities | Relations |
|---|---|--|--|--|
| | | DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DS) | | |
| <p>Political orientation: social-democratic</p> | <p>Main motivation is gaining power / remaining in power.</p> | <p>Democratic and institutional means of politics.</p> <p>Respects human rights and democracy, advocates faster pace of reforms and EU membership as the primary strategic goal.</p> <p>Strategy: using anti – Milosevic image and achievements, Djindjic legacies, pro-EU rhetoric, from 2008 onwards building catch-all politics</p> | <p>Even though leading party in ruling coalition (DOS), did not have broad popular support in 2000 – 2003 period.</p> <p>DS was managing reforms but with strong opposition and obstruction within the ruling coalition.</p> <p>Significant material bases (SMEs, big businesses, foreign companies)</p> <p>The strongest party in DOS coalition; later became the strongest democratic opposition party to Government formed and led by Democratic Party of Serbia 2004-2007.</p> <p>Today wide social base of supporters (44%), charismatic president; key political figures in current establishment, governing experience, currently dominance in a government and local administrations</p> <p>From 2006 and onwards wide social base of supporters (44%), charismatic president, key political figures in current establishment; governing experience, currently dominance in a government and local administrations</p> | <p>Main allies: main allies during 1990s were Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS).</p> <p>In 2000 – 2003 period G17, Liberally-oriented and progressive forces of society CSOs</p> <p>They have been in coalition with the almost all relevant political parties, together with G17+ and minority parties going for elections</p> <p>Civil society, some private media, international actors.</p> <p>Main opponents:</p> <p>DSS</p> <p>Parts and individuals from Intelligence services</p> <p>Organised crime groups</p> <p>Radical Party Democratic Party of Serbia and their coalition partners</p> <p>From 2006 radical party and DSS.</p> |

| Type of actor | Interests | Strategies | Capabilities | Relations |
|---|--|--|--|-----------|
| SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (civilian and military) | | | | |
| <p>Political orientation: During 1990s and after 2000, affiliated to old regime and organised crime groups; opposing democratic reforms</p> <p>Motivation: preservation of power and influence on political process Close to the regime (power within the state).</p> | <p>Despite the personal changes that were conducted after the assassination of the Prime Minister Djindjic, some members that are supporting the old regime remained in the agency.</p> <p>Very radical in political action. Highly oppressive towards the opposition even life threatening.</p> <p>No respect of human rights.</p> <p>No democratic credentials. Seeks influence on political processes and reforms by demising the reputation of some politicians by launching unverified compromising stories on them in tabloids that are suspected to be financially supported by the agency itself.</p> <p>Limited respect of human rights due to illegal phone-tapping and other illegal use of special powers.</p> | <p>Well developed organisational structures and mechanisms of influence that were created during the 90s.</p> <p>No support within the citizens.</p> <p>Very cohesive.</p> <p>Material resources from organized crime and corruption.</p> <p>Decisive for stopping and delaying reforms.</p> <p>In 2000 – 2003 period it was one of the strongest opponents to cooperation with the ICTY, and was suspected to protect the indicted war criminals; part of the security sector that is being reformed most slowly.</p> | <p>Main allies: during 1990s Main allies were Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Yugoslav Left (JUL) and Serbian Radical Party (SRS).</p> <p>Main opponents are opposition and civil society. During 2000-2003 supporters of old regime inside the security sector; nationalist and ultra-nationalist groups and parties, "anti-Hague" groups.</p> <p>Main opponents: democratically oriented political parties and civil society.</p> | |

| Type of actor | Interests | Strategies | Capabilities | Relations |
|---------------|---|---|--|--|
| | <p>Political orientation: various, mostly financially supporting both the ruling parties and opposition</p> <p>Motivation: preservation of their privileges and monopoly, economic gain</p> <p>Political power (instrumental)</p> | <p>TYCOONS</p> <p>Corruption (bribing) and political corruption (influence on making laws)</p> <p>Lobbying</p> <p>Don't care for democratic and human rights values</p> <p>Financing political parties in order to promote their interests and get preferential position once the party gets on power.</p> | <p>Through corruption they demise the capacity of state institutions to perform reforms, and often slow them down.</p> <p>They have no popular support, but have a great material and financial resources.</p> <p>Tycoons are actually several groups which are in the nature clusters of nouveau riche/"new rich".</p> <p>Anti-Corruption Council of Serbia reported that tycoons had strong influence on the process of making anticorruption laws and the very content of these laws (after 2000)</p> | <p>Main allies: political parties and government officials, gatekeepers (high ranking bureaucrats)</p> <p>Main opponents: few civil society organisations, but no major opponent in political parties, other tycoons</p> |

| Type of actor | Interests | Strategies | Capabilities | Relations |
|---------------|---|---|---|--|
| | <p>Political orientation: promoting democracy, human rights protection and reforms that lead to EU membership. During 1990s opposition to the regime with pro-democratic orientation.</p> <p>Motivation: influence on political processes and public in order to promote the values they are advocating, reforms.</p> | <p>CIVIL SOCIETY</p> <p>Advocating certain issues through mobilisation of popular support; networking with other organisations.</p> <p>Action with peaceful means.</p> <p>Human rights on top of the agenda.</p> <p>Promoting democracy and human rights protection.</p> <p>Using almost the same list of methods: organisation of public events (conferences, discussions, round tables), conducting education activities (seminars, trainings), advocating certain solutions, keeping good relations with the occupants of the most relevant posts, providing advises and analyses</p> | <p>During 1990s lacking popular support.</p> <p>Material resources from foreign donors.</p> <p>Today, support base is located among the democratically oriented part of the population, while the conservative and nationalist oriented part of the population is sometimes opposing their work and existence.</p> <p>Financial resources are mainly coming from foreign donors; human and material resources vary.</p> <p>Some capacity to influence the pace of reforms, by influencing primarily public, less the state institutions.</p> <p>Recognised persons representing some of CSOs (recognised either for the expertise and professional and – or academic career or for political activism especially during Millosevic regime);</p> <p>Limited capabilities to act as agenda setter</p> | <p>Main allies: pro-European democratic political parties, media, academia, during 1990s opposition parties.</p> <p>Main opponents: Main opponents were ruling Parties and secret services during 1990s, after 2000 conservative and nationalist parties, old regime parties and parts of the security apparatus</p> <p>Some of the most prominent CSOs have good relations with the ruling parties; there are strong ties between some of the CSOs and certain party</p> <p>Usually not well perceived by the public</p> <p>Some of them good relations with the most prominent media</p> |

| Type of actor | Interests | Strategies | Capabilities | Relations |
|--|--|---|---|--|
| PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES | | | | |
| (physical and technical protection and security, detectives) Since 2000. Start gaining importance; impetus came from liberalisation of economy | Economic gain Political power (instrumental) | Legal and market means (competition on the open market) Corruption (bribing) and political corruption (influence on the process of making laws) | Have capacity to slow down reform. Due to intervention of one of the security manager of PSC Draft Law on Private Security was withdrawn from the procedure of adoption before Serbian parliament. They are not a coherent group of actors | Allies: Other PSC, Political parties, politicians, businesses Opponents: Other PSC, Political parties, politicians, |
| MEDIA | | | | |
| State Media (either owned by the state or the ones that are openly supporting the Government) Independent media (TV stations, daily and weekly newspapers) | Political orientation: depending on the ruling coalition in power; democratic but conservative. Motivation: Main motivation during 1990s was preservation of the regime, promotion of the Government's interest and gaining state funds. Political orientation: democratic Motivation: popular trust and economic gain | During the 1990s no human rights on the regime media agenda. Informing the public and spreading Government propaganda. Due to strong affiliation with ruling elites, democratic credentials are not high. Independent journalism, promotion of certain issues of public interest, investigating corruption and other affairs, democratic credentials. Criticising both the regime and opposition. | During 1990s had strong support of the regime. Public trust and influence varies, mostly they are trusted by conservative part of the population. During 1990s received material resources from the regime. Trusted by the pro-European oriented population, during 1990s received material resources from foreign donors. Market-oriented, aiming to gain as much as possible of the media market. | Main allies: during 1990s regime parties and secret services, from 2000 political parties, Government Main opponents: during 1990s; opposition parties and civil society. After 2000: opposition parties, private media Main allies: opposition parties (during 1990s) and civil society. Main opponents: nationalist and conservative groups and political parties. |

| Type of actor | Interests | Strategies | Capabilities | Relations |
|--|---|---|---|--|
| MILITARY | | | | |
| | <p>During 1990s very close to the regime.</p> <p>Main motivation was preservation of Yugoslavia and later preservation of power within the state.</p> | <p>During 1990s radical in its action but indecisive in critical moments.</p> <p>No respect of human rights.</p> <p>No democratic credentials.</p> | <p>During 1990s high support within the citizens.</p> <p>Very cohesive.</p> <p>Lack of material resources.</p> <p>Not important for stopping and delaying reforms.</p> | <p>During 1990s main allies were Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Yugoslav Left (JUL) and Serbian Radical Party (SRS).</p> <p>Main opponents are opposition and civil society.</p> |
| INTERNATIONAL ACTORS | | | | |
| <p>International organizations (European Union, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe)</p> | <p>Political orientation: supporting democratic parties that are promoting democracy, Euro-Atlantic integrations, protection of human rights...</p> <p>Motivation: democratisation and stabilisation of the political regime, consolidation of democracy;</p> <p>proving their capability to foster reforms and to contribute to stability and security</p> | <p>Conditionality and pressure on political parties.</p> <p>Promotion of democracy through cooperation and support of civil society organisations working in a field on specific targeted issues (OSCE), monitoring and providing reports</p> | <p>Most of these actors (EU, NATO, OSCE) have their missions in Belgrade, thus monitoring situation and having access to data on daily basis; though some of them lack staff with deep knowledge about the region and political history of the country;</p> <p>Also, some of these missions are too small to be able to monitor every particular issue thoroughly</p> | <p>Main allies: civil society, political parties oriented towards Euro-Atlantic integrations, some media</p> <p>Main opponents: supporters of the old regime, nationalist and conservatives, ultra-nationalist organisations and political parties</p> <p>They are perceived as relevant actor and their reports/ statements have broad media coverage, especially in a case of the EU (membership in it is Serbia's top political priority)</p> |



Annex 2: Analysis of key political actors in Serbia for the period 1990–2009

Private Security Companies in Serbia - Neglected Security Actor

Private security companies (PSCs) in Serbia have been active from early 1990s. During the wars of the 1990s, international sanctions, social and economic decline, high level of criminality and violence, and abolishment of the communist-era laws that regulated these services, influenced PSCs in a way that they did their job using a high level of violence and in an arbitrary manner. There is no systematised data about the number and type of PSCs during the period 1990 - 2000. But it was after October 5, 2000 that PSC flourished in Serbia. Democratic changes and the subsequent liberalisation of the Serbian economy opened the door for foreign investments. A large number of foreign companies were now coming to the Serbian market since they reckoned the investment risk to be much less than at the time of non-democratic rule. Most important for the development of PSCs, however, was the arrival of foreign banks in Serbia. The banks needed physical-technical protection (physical and technical security) and they were not willing to provide it from companies that had connections with paramilitary formations and criminal groups as it happened in the 1990s, but rather from lawfully operating entities, namely PSCs.

That fact contributed to the self-transformation of the private security sector. Thus, the Association of Companies for Physical-Technical Security within the Serbian Chamber of Commerce was set and many PSCs established training courses for their employees. Also, the Association made a law on PSCs in an effort to put their activities under strict legal framework. Positive transformation of PSCs was acknowledged by clients who were very sensitive and demanding in regard to security, especially embassies, who were no longer reluctant to contract out their services to local companies.

But these positive reform steps have not been met by state institutions, who are neglecting the importance of regulating private security



sector for (too) many years. Thus, the draft law on PSC, which was in parliamentary procedure, was withdrawn from the process of adoption without any official explanation. One explanation suggests that vested interests of different players are the main cause for that. Today, 3000 security companies which employ between 20 and 60 thousand people in Serbia, base their work on ten laws and regulations, the most important of which are the Law on Weapons and Ammunition, Labour Law, and Law on Fire Protection. These laws consider the PSCs to be economic operators, but the specific nature of their operations, such as the use of weapons, application of special investigative techniques, and control and oversight of these companies, are still not regulated. Basically, PSCs currently operate in some sort of legal limbo.



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