


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FOR SECURITY POLICY

WESTERN BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER



THIS ISSUE'S THEME:

Different Dimensions of European Security

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At the time when the prospect of the Western Balkans' countries (with the exception of Croatia) to become integrated into the EU is seemingly getting vaguer and further away (partly because of the internal problems in the region but also due to the inability of the Balkan states to comply with increasingly stricter requirements for the membership), we need to stop for a while and wonder how much we really know about the Union, about the considerations of the group of 27, their internal problems, Brussels' perception of the Balkans, etc. In an attempt to start a debate on some of these questions, the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy has dedicated this issue of its magazine to the EU in general, but with a special focus on the EU security policies, i.e., its stand regarding the multitude of the security-related questions.

The issue opens with the text written by Jelena Babic, in which she explains the changes in the institutional structure of the EU in the field of the Common Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (CFSP) brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. The text by Dragana Djurasinovic focuses on "the most democratic" of all EU institutions – the European Parliament. The author analyses, on the example of the EP's oversight over 6 military operations undertaken under the CFSP, whether the Lisbon Treaty has actually granted this institution with the authorities and powers necessary for such operations. This is followed by the text written by Marko Savkovic, which looks at the very sensitive issue of the (possible) development of a joint defence industry (armament and military equipment) at the EU level. Are the member states ready for joint actions in this field? Why does the US still invest six times more money in the research and development of the defence industry than the EU does? What is the role of the European Defence Agency in all this? – these are some of the key questions to which the author provides the answers. At the end of this part of the magazine, Sasa Djordjevic looks at the dilemmas that exist about the EU internal security concept and its application in the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

The second part of this issue is dedicated to some of contemporary dilemmas that Europe, or the EU, is faced with and which inevitably influence the perception of the EU security policies, though not necessarily related to them. In her article, Elena

EDITOR'S WORD

Kulinska analyses the success of the extreme right in several EU states and tries to predict their future. Igor Novakovic focuses on Bulgaria as a case-study and demonstrates how unnatural the coalition of one extreme right party and the ruling party of the right centre really is. The editor of this issue looks at the current issue of the Turkish public opinion regarding the EU membership, i.e., the problems this issue might entail in the future. This issue ends with two book reviews: Nikola Lakic wrote about Iver Neumann's book, *"The Meaning, Materiality, Power: Introduction to Discourse Analysis"*, and Luka Glusac closes the issue with the review of *"Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors and Issues"*. The authors of the book answer the questions: who to lobby, how and when, in order to represent the interests of your country, region or a company in Brussels in the best possible manner.

Adel Abusara



The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union After the Lisbon Treaty

Jelena Babić

Jelena Babić, a coordinator of the Centre for European Integrations at the Belgrade Open School project

Review article

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Abstract: *This article analyses the key changes, resulting from the Lisbon Treaty, in the institutional structure of the EU in the area of its common foreign and security policy, their impact on the effectiveness of the EU foreign relations, as well as the position of the EU as a global actor in international relations. The article specifically looks at the redefined role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the newly-established role of the President of the European Council. The new Treaty, on which the EU is based, encourages further and deeper process of political integration in Europe as well as the role of the EU in the new, changed circumstances. For this reason, the article offers an overview of alterations in the field of security that the Lisboa Treaty entails.*

Key words: *European Union, Lisbon Treaty, common foreign and security policy, institutional changes, The High Representative of the Union, The President of the European Council*

* * *

Since the mid-50s of the last century, continuous efforts have been made to raise foreign and security policy and cooperation among the European countries to the highest possible level, that is, to make Europe address the rest of the world "in one voice". Each step further in the European integration process has been, at the same time,

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the strengthening of mechanisms of cooperation in this area of policy.

After the Maastricht Treaty had been signed, this area of cooperation finally got its institutional framework, as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was then serving as its "second pillar" in the structure of the EU temple and it was reserved for the area of inter-governmental cooperation. The demands for a "strong Union that will act as such in all external relations" (Paul, 2008:11) were particularly gaining momentum in the early 90s of the last century, when the end of the Cold War and the birth of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe brought about the changes in the political and security landscape of the international system.

The altered international environment required that united Europe express more clearly its views on certain questions that were becoming of top priority in international relations. On the other hand, united Europe was also expected to deal with a newly-established security environment¹ and to find adequate responses to some of these security challenges and problems.

With the establishment of the function of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty, the Europe of the fifteen finally got "a face and a voice" in foreign affairs. This function, which was combined with the position of the Secretary General of the Council (Ilić-Gasmi, 2004:47), was designated to add to the political significance and continuity of the CFSP.

The failure of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was followed by a "period of reflection" which preceded the harmonisation of the Reform Treaty text at the meeting of European leaders in Lisbon. The Lisbon Treaty² (Treaty in further text) comes in place of the Treaty of Nice and is comprised of two Treaties:

- Treaty on the European Union
- Treaty on the Functioning of the EU

The two Treaties are accompanied by 37 protocols and 65 Declarations, while the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU is also a part of this Treaty.

The Treaty introduces significant institutional changes in the field of CFSP and enables a greater coherence in the activities of the Union related to foreign affairs. A more efficient and better organised functioning of the EU in changed international environment with the aim of dealing with crucial and topical issues in the

¹ Some of the issues that the EU was faced with at the time included: opening up of the borders towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the Fall of Berlin Wall, asylum issues, immigration and visa regime, fight against organised crime, corruption, trafficking in human organs.

² Came into effect on December 1, 2009.



world arena – climate change, exploitation of energy resources and its alternatives, humanitarian issues and responding to the consequences of natural or man-made disasters – leads to a strengthened identity of the EU, not only in terms of politics or economy, but security as well. The common foreign affairs and security policy of the EU was far too often labeled as inefficient, due to the absence of a clearly defined common direction of development. Often limited by the prevalent method of decision-making – unanimity – and by a continual harmonisation of political interests of each of the member states in this area of cooperation³, the CFSP EU has been, since its beginnings, an object of criticism by the academia and the public in Europe and elsewhere.

Bearing all this in mind, and because of the changed environment in which the EU operates, institutional changes implied in the Treaty are actually the product of a greater awareness in the EU that its importance in the international relations can be strengthened only by the coordinated and inter-connected actions in all areas of cooperation.

The rejection of the concept of the three pillars of cooperation and the Union's full legal status made room for a more coherent action and improved effectiveness of the EU in the area of foreign affairs. Consistency and coherence of the Union's foreign affairs should be achieved both on the horizontal level – the harmonisation of coordination of all EU policies with international label – and the vertical – the level of harmonisation of the member states' foreign policies with the defined goals and actions of the EU foreign affairs.

The greatest changes that the Treaty entails, and which refer to the institutional changes in the area of CFSP, are as follows: the permanent President of the European Council (EC), the introduction of the High Representative for CFSP with changed competencies compared to those stipulated by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the establishment of the European Union External Action Service.

Nonetheless, the Treaty also contributes to and introduces significant strategic guidelines for the development and actions of the common security and defence EU policy, which are reflected mostly in the mechanisms for the introduction of the "continuous structural cooperation". For the first time, however, the terms "common defence", "common solidarity" and issues related to data protection, have been introduced.

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³ Different reactions of the member states to different international problems and issues – the support to the USA for the war in Iraq in 2003, is the best example of the opposing views among the member states regarding certain foreign policy issues.

The President of the European Council

The first "permanent" President of the EC is elected by the qualified majority for a term of 2,5 years, renewable once. In case of an impediment or a serious misconduct, the EC can end his/her term of office in accordance with the same procedure. While holding this position, the President of the EC cannot perform any other function on the national level. In November 2009, in Brussels, Herman Van Rompuy was elected the first permanent President of the EC. Rompuy is a former Prime Minister of Belgium and his personal credibility and negotiation skills granted him trust of other European leaders who voted for him unanimously.

The president of the EC:

- a) Chairs and drives forward the work of the EC;
- b) Ensures the preparation and continuity of the work of the EC, in cooperation with the President of the Commission and based on the proposal of the General Affairs Council;
- c) Endeavours to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the ECA;
- d) Presents a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the EC.

The president of the EC shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Article 15. Treaty on the EU (Janjevic, 2009:35)

When the duties of the President of the EC are compared to those of the High Representative, it becomes obvious that the duties of the former are more vague, though there are considerable overlaps. On one hand, the President should endeavour to reach a compromise among the heads of states and governments in the EC, while on the other, he should be above the interests of any individual state to ensure the completion of the Union's objectives, to which all member states have committed themselves (Wessels and Bopp, 2008:19). In addition, it remains unclear in the Treaty to



what extent are the competencies separated in the area of "external representation of the Union" with regard to these two functions. The advocates of the reforms proclaimed in the Treaty of Lisbon claim that a "certain competition" between these two functions within the foreign-policy dimension of the EU only make the (double) voice of Europe louder in the international arena.

The function of the President of the EC particularly becomes important in the light of ensuring the continuity of the work of the EC and an improved communication with the European Commission and the member states presiding over the Union over a six-month period. In addition, the President facilitates the establishment of the "institutional equilibrium" as he/she, apart from a continuous communication with the European Commission, also is in contact with the General Affairs Council, tasked with the "preparation of the EC sessions and their monitoring (Janjević, 2009:36). After each session of the EC, the President of the EC must present a report on its work to the European Parliament.

How and to what extent will the President of the EC manage to balance his "internal duties" (presiding over and managing the work of the EC, reaching compromises and ensuring the continuity) with the role in the international arena remains to be seen. However, the overlap between the duties of the President and the High Commissioner for CFSP is, for the time being, a less important issue. It is much more important that the two bodies reach a clear and joint position on the international policy issues in order to represent the Union with more confidence on the international level.

The High Commissioner of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Together with the permanent President of the EC, The High Commissioner of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HC CFSP) is a central institutional novelty brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. The establishment of the strengthened function of the HC is the last in the series of changes that ensures and strengthens an efficient coordination and cooperation among the member states in order to "ensure the consistency of the Union's external actions" (Wessels and Bopp, 2008:19). Before the Treaty took effect, the function of the HC was overlapping with the role of the

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Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and the role of representing the Union externally was mostly performed by a country that was presiding over the Union at the time. In order to overcome the rivalry among the member states, but also among the representatives of the Commission whose highest goal was to represent the interests of the Union as a whole, the function of the HC for CFSP is two-fold, even three-fold: apart from the function of the HC of the Union for CFSP, other two functions try to reflect the institutional balance on which the Lisbon Treaty is based – he/she is at the same time the Vice President of the European Commission and presides over the Foreign Affairs Council at the Council of EU.⁴

Since November 2009, Catherine Ashton, who was a Commissioner for Trade in the previous mandate of the EC, has been the HC for CFSP. The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, and with the agreement of the President of the Commission, appoints the High Commissioner for CFSP. The concentration of functions in one person will require a high level of skills and efficiency in order to reconcile frequently opposed interests in the area of foreign policy between the member states that are represented in the Council and the representatives of the Commission.

1. The High Commissioner for CFSP, who presides over the Foreign Affairs Council, offers proposals for dealing with issues related to foreign affairs and common security and ensures that the decisions made by the European Council and the Council are carried out.
2. The HC represents the Union in foreign affairs and common security matters. On behalf of the Union, he/she conducts political talks with third countries and expresses the position of the Union in international organisations and at international conferences.

Article 27 of the Treaty on the European Union
(Janjevic, 2009:43)

⁴ Established by previous Treaties, the permanent formation of the Council of Ministers – General and Foreign Affairs Council – after the Lisbon Treaty becomes the General Affairs Council presided by the same country that presides over the EU in the six-month period and the Foreign Affairs Council, presided by the HC for CFSP.

The HC of the Union for CFSP can also represent the position of the Union at the UN Security Council (UN SC), pro-



vided that the Union has clearly defined its position about an issue on the agenda and that he/she was asked to do so by the EU member states represented in the UN SC. Among the important functions of the HC is certainly the one that includes him/her in the coordination of other policies related to the Union's external actions – the HC, together with the Commission, puts a proposal on the termination of economic or financial relations with third countries, but also gives recommendations to the Council regarding the international agreements, if the agreement in question relates entirely or in part to the CFSP.

As the Vice President of the Commission, the HC is responsible for its actions in the area of foreign policy, and for the coordination of other aspects of the Union's external actions. In all actions within the Commission "he/she is bound by Commission procedures" (Janjević, 2009:38).

As in the area of foreign policy, the HC shares with the member states the right to submit proposals and initiatives related to the cooperation in the security policy. One of the key functions of the HC is the establishment of the EU Missions, to an extent that "the HC, in accordance with the Council's authority and in a close cooperation with the Political and Security Committee, ensures the harmonisation of civil and military aspects of the mission"(Janjević, 2009:50).

The HC will be assisted in his/her work by the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is, in the broadest sense, a diplomatic service of the EU. It will work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the member states and will consist of the representatives of the Commission, the Council's General Secretariat and the staff appointed by the national diplomatic services.

The Treaty envisages that the organisation and functioning of the EEAS will be determined by the Council's ruling, upon the proposal of the HC, after the consultations in the Parliament and upon the Commission's approval.⁵ The involvement of so many actors made the HC's task more complicated from the start. In her inauguration speech, she stressed that one of her top priorities is the formation "and determination of the EEAS priorities" (EuroActiv:2010).⁶

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⁵ Despite the fact that both Spanish chair of the Union and the High Representative were announcing the start of the EEAS by April this year, the information coming from Brussels in the past couple of weeks have given room for the expectation that the EEAS will be finally established. The European Council will have the final say on this at its session after the summer break.

⁶ According to: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/ashton-eases-parliament-hearing/article-188757>. Look also in <http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/ashton-readies-sketchy-proposal-eeas-news-368189> i <http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/parliament-raises-pressure-eu-diplomatic-service-news-467697>

In order to obtain general approval and accomplish a consensus among different actors and institutions, the High Representative will have to conduct a policy of consideration, especially in times of crises or conflicts in which the involved actors or institutions have mutually opposed interests.

Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy

The Lisbon Treaty introduced significant changes in the field of security and defence. One of the first changes was related to terminology: the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)⁷ was renamed - the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

According to the Treaty, the CDSP includes the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy (Janjević, 2008:49) that will lead to a common defence as soon as the European Council adopts the decision unanimously.

The member states shall undertake progressive steps to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research and armament (European Defence Agency) will identify the operational requirements, undertake measures to meet these requirements, contribute to the identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector.⁸

One of the greatest novelties in the CSDP is defined in the Article 42 (7) of the Treaty and refers to the "mutual assistance" provision: when a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance. The Treaty specifically enlarges the cooperation among the states and the potential of the EU in performing tasks related to the the fight against terrorism, peace-keeping missions, conflict prevention and strengthening international security that are undertaken outside the Union's borders. This provision is similar to the Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty⁹, however, it doesn't mention the use of armament in cases of assisting another member state within the EU on the basis of the "mutual assistance" provision.

⁷ Decision was made at the meeting of the EC in Koln, in 1999, that the West-European Union should be dissolved and that the EU would take over some of its competencies. The official term European Security and Defence Policy was also adopted at this meeting.

⁸ For more info on the European Defence Agency look in Janjević, M. (2009) „Consolidated Treaty on the EU – from Rome to Lisbon” Belgrade, Official Gazette

⁹ Article 5 clearly stipulates that in the case of an armed attack on one or more states, parties to the Treaty, all other member states will aid this state or states, exercising the right to individual or collective defence. The aid may include an immediate action deemed necessary, including the use of armed forces. More at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/nato-live/official_texts_17120.htm



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The most interesting innovation is the element of "permanent structural cooperation" among the member states on the defence policy issues. The criteria were set in advance and refer to the military capabilities of the member states. This type of cooperation is intended for the member states that wish to become a part of the European military armament programme and are willing to put their combat units for immediate action at the Union's disposal.

The title VII of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU brings yet another innovation: each member state should aid and assist another member state which is hit by a catastrophe, either natural or man-made. This element of the Treaty, also known as the "provision on solidarity" implies mutual assistance in the case of terrorist attacks. The need for common solidarity was repeated also in the European Defence Strategy¹⁰, which emphasises again the significance of one of the fundamental EU objectives, stressed in the Treaty of Lisbon once more – the contribution to the global security and the building of a safer and better world.

CONCLUSION:

The Lisbon Treaty, though a result of great compromises among individual demands of 27 member states after the failure of the Treaty on the Constitution of Europe, can be rightly considered as the greatest achievement with regard to the enhancement of European integrational processes. The proposals contained in the Treaty, and the efforts towards their realisation in the months following its adoption, are a serious indicator of the member states' intention to see the work on the transformation of Europe into one "real political community"(Prolović, 2010:73) completed in the nearest possible future. It is in a common interest of all actors gathered around the idea of a United Europe to see that foreign and security policy actions are undertaken with more clarity and consistency. This gives the Union itself a special dynamics and direction.

Further progress of the CFSP should certainly remain a topic for consideration in the future. However, until another occasion for its evaluation arises, all efforts should be put into realisation of the adopted and existing institutional solutions so that they could bring the desired results.

¹⁰ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/r00004_en.htm

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The European Parliament – ‘Europe’s democratic conscience’¹

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original scientific article

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*‘The long-term aim is the establishment of
a European army
under full parliamentary control’*

(German Foreign Minister Guido
Westerwelle at the Munich Security
Conference, 6 February 2010)

Abstract: *The European Union’s institutional deficit stems from the transfer of executive powers from the national to the Union level, but with no similar transfer of parliamentary powers or mechanisms of responsibility, from national parliaments to the European Parliament. This paper examines the manner in which the European Parliament exercised oversight of six military operations within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as well as whether the Lisbon Treaty has conferred on this institution the required formal powers with respect to both authorisation for carrying out such operations and their funding and control. It will also cover the possible model of future cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments encouraged by the Lisbon Treaty, especially as regards the CSDP.*

Keywords: *European Parliament, parliamentary oversight, democratic deficit, Common Security and Defence Policy, armed forces, European Union*

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¹ The author wishes to thank the staff of the European Parliament for additional and comprehensive information provided through the European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation.

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In democratic systems, parliaments play a key role in the oversight and legitimisation of decisions made by the executive branch, as in the vast majority of countries they are the only institutions directly elected by the public. In the European Union system, the European Parliament is the only institution that derives its legitimacy in this manner. However, the absence of democratic control, or the democratic legitimacy of political decisions, is especially associated with international associations such as the European Union, the hallmark of which is the transfer of powers from the national to the supranational level. With respect to this, the dominant point of view in literature is that the EU is facing a democratic deficit,² while a minority of authors contend that this is actually a pseudo-problem based on mistaken analogies.³

The term 'democratic deficit' was first coined by David Marquand in 1979 in reference to institutions of what was then the European Economic Community, or to be exact, the European Parliament.⁴ Since then, this phrase has often been used to describe 'the EU's democratic flaw'. However, it seems to us that democratic deficit can be defined with the greatest precision as a partial or total lack of legislative powers of European citizens arising as a consequence of the transfer of powers from national legislative bodies to decision-making mechanisms at the Union level made up of representatives of national executive bodies.⁵ Stavridis believes that the EU's institutional deficit stems from the transfer of executive powers from the national to the Union level that is, however, not accompanied by a similar transfer of parliamentary powers or mechanisms of responsibility from national parliaments to the European Parliament (EP).⁶

The democratic deficit of the EU is also termed structural, as it is inherent in the construction of the Union as a supranational organisation that is neither a true inter-governmental organisation nor a true federal state. Lopandić claims that democratic deficit arises as a consequence of a structural problem in the organisation of the decision-making process within the EU, which is particularly burdensome for the relationship between the Council of Ministers (the Council) and the

² See Boyce, B 1993. The Democratic Deficit of the European Community. *Parliamentary Affairs* 46/04: 458-477; Chrysoschoou, D. 2000. *Democracy in the European Union*. London: I.B. Tauris; Schmitter, P. 2000. *How to Democratize the European Union... And Why Bother?* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield; Warleigh, A. 2003. *Democracy in the European Union*. London: Sage Publications; Sakellariou, J., and T. Keating. 2003. Safeguarding Multilateralism: The Urgency of European Defense. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9 (2): 83-94; Mittag, J. 2006. *Escaping Legitimacy – Accountability Trap? – Perspectives of Parliamentary Participation in LSPD*. Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies; Born, H., A. Dowling, T. Fuior, and S. Gavrilescu. 2007. *Parliamentary Oversight of Civilian and Military ESDP Missions: The European and National Levels*. Brussels: European Parliament.

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⁴ Marquand, D. 1979. *Parliament for Europe*. London: Jonathan Cape, pp. 64-6.

⁵ Górski, M. 2008. *The democratic deficit in the EU* <http://www.wpiia.uni.lodz.pl/zeupi/pilki/mgorski.pdf>.

⁶ Stavridis, S. 2006. Why the EU's constitutionalization and parliamentarization are worsening the existing democratic deficit in European foreign and defence policies. *Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics* n° 59, p. 4.



European Parliament.⁷ The Council is made up of representatives of executive bodies of EU member nations; however, when this body is in session in Brussels, these representatives assume the role of the legislative, even though they lack explicit mandates from their national parliaments. Moreover, representatives of governments of member states in the Council are even superior to their national parliaments. This is possible, according to Lopandić, due to the mode of operation of European law, or rather since the EU legal system is structured in such a way as to enjoy precedence over national legal systems.

The most notable proponents of the second point of view on the EU’s democratic deficit are Moravcsik and Majone. Moravcsik believes that the EU has made national governments even more responsible to their citizens, as activities of government ministers are not controlled only within member states, but also in a broader European context. He also contends that elections for the EP are not the only form of democratic responsibility the EU is subjected to, but that an even more important source of it is found in democratically-elected governments of member states.⁸

Majone claims that the EU’s problem is not the democratic deficit but rather a crisis of credibility, and that a solution should therefore be procedural rather than substantive in nature. He believes that, for as long as most voters and their elected representatives oppose the idea of a European federation, but at the same time are in favour of economic integration, we cannot expect ‘parliamentary democracy to flourish’ in the EU.⁹

A particular cause for concern with respect to the democratic legitimacy of the EU relates to decisions in the field of security and defence policy, including those on military commitments abroad, which are not subject to efficient democratic oversight even at the national level.¹⁰ The complexity of the architecture of parliamentary oversight in the EU is evidenced by the fact that there is no single parliament acting in conjunction with a single government or executive body; rather, there are parliamentary institutions both at the level of member states and at the European level. Thus the exercise of parliamentary control of security and defence policy within the

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⁷ Lopandić, D. 2005. Parlament EU, Savjet ministara, Evropski savjet. In: *Priručnik za školu evropskih integracija*, ed. by M. Radulović, 61-74. Podgorica: Centar za građansko obrazovanje, Centar za razvoj nevladinih organizacija, Evropski pokret u CG, p. 65.

⁸ Follesdal, A., and S. Hix. 2006. Why there is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44 (3): 533-62, p. 9.

⁹ Majone, G. 2002. Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards. *Brussels: European Law Journal* 4 (1): 5-28.

¹⁰ Great Britain. Parliament House of Lords Select Committee on Constitution. 2005. *Waging War: Parliament’s Role and Responsibility*. London: TSO Ltd.

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¹¹ See Lodge, J. 1994. The European Parliament and the Authority-Democracy Crises. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 531 (1): 69-83; Laschet, A. 2002. Parliamentarisation of the European Security and Defence Policy. Geneva: DCAF; Mittag, J., and W. Wessels. 2002. The Parliamentary Dimension of CFSP/ESDP - Options for the European Convention. Study submitted for the European Parliament, Brussels, <http://doc.utwente.nl/44911/1/wessel3.pdf>; Kalligas, K. 2006. A Historical Institutional Analysis of the Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. MA thesis, University of Warwick; Wagner, W. 2007. Problems of Democratic Control in European Security and Defense Politics – a View from Peace and Conflict Research. UC Berkeley: Institute of European Studies; Rosen, G. 2008. Parliamentary Control of European Security Policy: Why, Who and How? *CFSP Forum* 6 (2): 9-12.

¹² Greco, E. 2005. *Democratic Accountability of CFSP and the Role of the European Parliament*. Third Plenary Meeting of FORNET, Brussels, p. 10.

¹³ Diedrichs, U. 2004. *The European Parliament in CFSP: More than a Marginal Player?* Revised version of a paper presented at the conference "The European Union's ESDP and the role of the European Parliament", Parma, p. 45.

¹⁴ Born, H. 2002. *Between efficiency and legitimacy: democratic accountability of the military in the US, France, Sweden and Switzerland*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), p. 10.

¹⁵ For the most part, the analysis deals with military operations, of which four have been completed – Operation Concordia in Macedonia (March – December 2003), Operation Artemis in the Congo (June – September 2003), EUFOR RD Congo (July – November 2006) and EUFOR Tchad (January 2008 – March 2009). Another two operations are ongoing – EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (commenced on 2 December 2004) and Naval Operation Atalanta in Somali territorial waters (commenced on 13 December 2008).

¹⁶ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. 2010. *Official Journal of the European Union* C 83.

European Union is a complex process, and one that poses additional challenges to legislators. At the supra-national level, the European Parliament should play a key role in ensuring that political decisions involving the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have democratic legitimacy, but it does not enjoy any formal powers with respect to legislative oversight of military operations performed within the framework of this policy.¹¹

Wagner contends that the European Parliament cannot compensate for the lack of national parliaments' powers in this respect. Greco pessimistically predicts that the gap between commitments undertaken by the EU in the field of foreign policy, and the limited powers of both the EP and national parliaments, is only set to widen.¹² Diedrichs sees the European Parliament as a marginal player with the potential to improve its position.¹³ Born, however, offers three possible scenarios for the future role of the EP, depending on whether the EU remains a collection of sovereign nations cooperating in the field of security of defence, or whether it grows into a federal state. One of the Parliament's possible roles is 'rubber-stamping', without substantial involvement in CSDP decision-making; a second scenario involves the Parliament as an arena that can contribute to the legitimacy of the CSDP even in the absence of broad formal powers for exercising oversight; while the third scenario is one of a transformational parliament that may transform its ideas into political decisions, legislation and practice.¹⁴

It is therefore important to consider which powers and oversight mechanisms the European Parliament has at its disposal with respect to military operations pursued within the framework of the CSDP, especially after the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty.¹⁵

European Parliament and the CSDP – after the Lisbon Treaty

The European Parliament's formal powers with respect to oversight of activities pursued within the framework of the CSDP are governed by Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union (ex Article 21).¹⁶ This Article introduces the require-



ment for the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (formerly the EU Presidency) to regularly consult and inform the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the CSDP, whereby he is to ‘ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration’.¹⁷ Article 36 also grants the European Parliament the power to address questions and make recommendations to the Council and the High Representative. In addition, instead of once yearly, the Parliament is now required to debate the progress in implementation of the CFSP-CSDP twice a year. By way of a reminder, this Article of the Treaty does not explicitly state that the Parliament is to be informed before the commencement of a civilian or military mission within the framework of the CSDP, nor does it require the Parliament’s prior approval for this type of decision, except unless additional assets are required from the budget earmarked for the CFSP – and this only for civilian crisis management operations.

According to Art. 41(2) of the Treaty on EU (ex Art. 28(3)), no operations having military or defence implications may be charged to the Union budget, i.e. the CFSP budget. In accordance with this provision of the Treaty, and pursuant to a Council decision of 23 February 2004, it was resolved that common costs of Union military operations would be financed by EU member states through the Athena mechanism. These costs are set individually for each member state on the basis of its gross domestic product.¹⁸ Common costs of military operations, depending on the phase of a particular operation, generally comprise funds for planning, common equipment and operating expenses, local and international civilian staff, etc.¹⁹

By way of an example, the planned Athena budget for 2008 amounted to about 120 million.²⁰ However, common costs of military operations financed through the Athena mechanism make up less than ten per cent of the military operations budget, so this also needs to include additional expenses paid by each member state with forces committed to military operations under the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle. This method of financing was used in four military operations – EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Tchad and Atalanta, as it had been financial problems in implementing

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¹⁷ The European Parliament has been given a certain degree of democratic control over the position of the High Representative, as the Parliament’s consent is required for his appointment (Art. 17(7)(3) of the Treaty on European Union).

¹⁸ Denmark does not take part in preparing or implementing EU operations with defence implications.

¹⁹ The Athena mechanism is overseen and managed by a Special Committee, whose members decide, by unanimous decision, to approve or amend budgets, which need to be revised at least once every three years. Membership in this body varies depending on the agenda at hand. Meetings considering general issues are attended by representatives of all member states (except Denmark); where a particular operation is discussed, only representatives of member states taking part in its financing attend. The Special Committee also appoints a six-member College of Auditors charged with financial oversight.

²⁰ WEU Assembly Defence Committee. 2008. *The European Union mission in Chad: EUFOR Tchad/RCA*. Paris: WEU Assembly, p. 9.

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military operations Concordia and Artemis that uncovered the need for the establishment of a legal framework that would provide for a permanent mechanism of financing such operations.²¹

No operations, therefore, having defence or military implications may be financed from the CFSP budget or the Union budget, but are rather financed by member states through the Athena mechanism. As national parliaments may oversee only individual expenses of their particular country, and as the EP has no jurisdiction in oversight of common costs of military operations, overall expenses of the Athena mechanism are not subject to comprehensive parliamentary oversight. The European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence has endeavoured to collect more information on how military operations are financed, but this issue was deemed 'rather sensitive'. The situation becomes even more complicated when one considers civil-military operations. The Council may, in joint consultation meetings, notify the EP of the implementation of the Athena mechanism, but is not formally required to do so.²² The EP has already proposed changes to the Interinstitutional Agreement aiming to integrate this mechanism into the overall EU budget and thus subject it to European Parliament oversight.²³

Parliamentary oversight mechanisms

The Treaty on EU, therefore, does not grant any formal powers to the EP with respect to authorising missions within the framework of the CSDP, nor does it require consultation in any phase of decision-making on EU military operations. Further, the Interinstitutional Agreement does not call for expenses of military operations within the framework of the CSDP to be audited. However, the European Parliament has at its disposal several mechanisms and means with which to affect decisions in this field.

The procedure for *adopting recommendations* sent by the European Parliament to the Council, as set out in Rules 90 and 114 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, foresees that a draft recommendation may be drawn up by the committee responsible for CFSP matters after receiving

²¹ WEU Assembly. 2009. *Financial aspects of EU crisis management: the ATHENA mechanism*. Paris: WEU Assembly Press and Information Office, p. 2.

²² The Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management requires joint consultation meetings between the EP and the Council, at least five times per year, aimed at notifying the Parliament of financial plans and CSDP expenses, including costs of operations within the framework of the ESDP (Art. 43).

²³ European Parliament. 2005. *Brok Report on the annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities – 2004*. Brussels: EP, paras. 45–46.



approval from the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament, or by a political group comprised of at least forty members. In emergencies, the approval for drawing up a draft recommendation may be given by the President of the EP, who is to instruct the appropriate committee to convene urgently and consider the proposed recommendation. Nonetheless, the Parliament has yet to utilise this mechanism with respect to a military operation under the CSDP framework.

Any member of the EP (MEP) may *initiate a resolution*. The draft resolution is then forwarded to the appropriate committee and the Conference of Presidents of the EP for approval.²⁴ As a rule, resolutions are forwarded to the Council, the Commission, and other interested institutions or organisations (e.g. UN, NATO, national parliaments etc). These resolutions are not binding, and their influence is limited, since the Council is not required to respond to them. Their adoption, however, is an expression of the desire for greater political impact by the EP on decisions involving the CSDP. By way of an example, the European Parliament has adopted four resolutions that preceded military missions Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Tchad, as well as Operation Atalanta in Somalia.²⁵

The resolution on Operation Althea was adopted two weeks before the mission was scheduled to begin, or six months after the adoption of the Council Joint Action. In the resolution regarding the Congo operation, MEPs described the mission as complex and potentially risky (the resolution was passed with 455 votes in favour, 139 against, and 15 abstentions).²⁶ They presented several demands to the Council –developing a clear concept for the deployment of armed or police forces, limiting the operation to the duration of the Congolese elections, preparing a clear exit strategy, and requiring the involvement of third countries. The resolution on the Chad mission (passed with 453 votes in favour, 104 against, and 15 abstentions) posed multiple conditions that were to be met if the operation were to count on continued MEP support;²⁷ these involved avoiding being drawn into the conflict between the government and rebel forces or tasks carried out by non-government organisations in the region, providing sufficient numbers of troops and adequate equipment, setting a

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²⁴ The Conference of Presidents is the chief decision-making body of the European Parliament and is made up of the President of the EP, chairpersons of political groups, and a representative of non-attached members.

²⁵ European Parliament. 2004. Resolution on the European Union military operation 'Althea' in Bosnia and Herzegovina, P6_TA(2004)0059. Brussels: EP; European Parliament. 2006. *Resolution on the criteria for EU peace-keeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, P6_TA(2006)0111. Brussels: EP; European Parliament. 2007. *Resolution of 27 September 2007 on the ESDP operation in Chad and the Central African Republic*, P6_TA(2007)0419. Brussels: EP.

²⁶ European Parliament. 2006. Procedure RSP/2006/2539. Brussels: EP.

²⁷ European Parliament. 2007. Procedure 2007/2627 (RSP). Brussels: EP.

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clear mandate and a precise exit strategy, ensuring efficient coordination with the UN, and the like.

The very formulation of the European Parliament 'approving a mission', and the Parliament's setting of conditions to be met if MEP support is to be expected, indicate political will for the EP to become as involved as possible in decision-making on EU military operations. With regard to this, it is important to stress that MEPs proposed this resolution through the political group of the chairman of the Subcommittee, rather than through the Committee on Foreign Affairs, in order for it to get on the agenda as soon as possible – before the Council Joint Action was adopted. This was important in demonstrating that MEPs, if necessary, could react at very short notice before an operation was due to be implemented.²⁸

In the resolution concerning the suppression of piracy in Somalia, MEPs asked the Council for information on the scope and tasks of Operation Atalanta, expressing their disapproval at not being consulted in due time of the decision for this mission to go ahead. In addition, they called on the Council to differentiate between the tasks of Operation Atalanta and those of anti-piracy operations off the coast of the Horn of Africa, as well as to cooperate with the International Maritime Organisation.

In addition, *reports of the committee* tasked with monitoring activities within the CSDP framework are also an important instrument for discussing this topic. The usual procedure for drafting reports in connection with the CSDP is that coordinators of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence first have to consent to the subject of the report, as do the coordinators of its parent Committee on Foreign Affairs.²⁹ The proposed report is then submitted to the Conference of Committee Chairs (to avoid any overlap) and the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament for final approval. If the report is approved, the Committee on Foreign Affairs appoints a rapporteur to draw up the document in cooperation with the Committee Secretariat. While the draft report is being considered by the Subcommittee, the Committee sets a deadline for any amendments to be proposed and for a discussion to be held prior to voting. The Subcommittee on Security and Defence has so far prepared no reports dealing specifically

²⁸ Peters, D., W. Wagner, and N. Deitellhoff, eds. 2008. *The Parliamentary Control of European Security Policy*. Oslo: Center for European Studies, p. 91.

²⁹ These coordinators are the heads of political groups in the Committee and the Subcommittee.



with any military operation within the framework of the CSDP. However, these were covered in the report on the European Security Strategy adopted in January 2009, as well as in the annual report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy and the CSDP adopted on 15 May 2008.

* * *

Additional oversight mechanisms include setting up specialised bodies, such as the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, inviting Council or Commission officials to appear and speak at sessions of the European Parliament, arranging meetings with officials of other EU institutions, asking MEP questions, and organising parliamentary hearings or visits to EU forces in the field.³⁰

Of particular importance are *meetings and contacts* with officials of other European Union institutions. A gentleman's agreement is in force between the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, whereby Subcommittee members may meet member states' envoys in the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the EU, mission heads, the chair of the EU Military Committee, directors at the EU Military Staff, as well as directors of the EU Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies.³¹

On the other hand, Committee members meet cabinet ministers,³² the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy,³³ the President of the European Commission and the NATO Secretary General. In addition, twice-yearly meetings between chairs of foreign affairs and defence committees of national parliaments and MEPs are organised by the EU presiding country.³⁴ The ten-member EP Standing Delegation also enjoys special status in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and maintains regular contacts with this international organisation. So extensive and frequent are these contacts that they cause tension between the Parliament's plenary assembly and other committees on the one hand, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the other, as the Committee is seen as attempting to monopolise relations with the Council and the Commission in the field of the CFSP and the CSDP.³⁵

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³⁰ For more on this, see Đurašinić-Radojević, D. 2008. Parlamentarni nadzor Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike, in: *Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana* (11): 64-75.

³¹ The Subcommittee meets the chair of the Political and Security Committee twice a year; Subcommittee members also meet, at least once a year, the chair of the Military Committee, the Director-General of the EU Military Staff, Javier Solana's Personal Representative on non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency.

³² For instance, from 1999 to 2004 the Commissioner appeared before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 22 times, while foreign and defence ministers of EU member states appeared a total of 54 times (Mittag, J. 2006. *Escaping Legitimacy – Accountability Trap? – Perspectives of Parliamentary Participation in LS DP*, op. cit., p. 14).

³³ On 29 January 2007, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy appointed a Personal Representative for Parliamentary Affairs, who cooperates closely with the European Parliament.

³⁴ Every six months the chair of the Subcommittee is invited to attend the Conference of Presidents of national parliaments of EU countries, the European Parliament and candidate countries.

³⁵ Lehmann, W., and R. Pabst. 2005. *The Role of the European Parliament and National Parliaments in Foreign and Security Policy*. Brussels: European Parliament, p. 18.

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As for *posing MEP questions*, it is important to note that the Rules of Procedure of the EP differentiate between posing questions to which an oral answer is expected and asking questions that call for a written reply. Rule 108 of the Rules of Procedure states that any Committee, political group, or group of at least forty MEPs may put a question to any Council or Commission representative, who is to respond orally during debate in the European Parliament. The Rules of Procedure, however, call for a rather strict procedure for the use of this mechanism. On the other hand, any MEP may put a question to the Council and the Commission requiring a reply in writing. Some 15 MEP questions have so far been posed, both in writing and orally, with respect to military operations within the CSDP framework.

The option of *organising parliamentary hearings* on developments in the field of the CSDP is an instrument used frequently by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, or rather by its Subcommittee on Security and Defence. In these cases attendance is not confined to Commission and Council representatives; academics and other experts are also invited to take part. For instance, in March 2006 the Subcommittee held a hearing on the operation in DR Congo, which raised several other issues – what justifies the use of EU armed forces outside its borders, what are the criteria for intervention, and what is the role of parliament in this respect. On this occasion MEPs also brought up the matter of democratic oversight of interventions, where the Subcommittee chair criticised current provisions of the Treaty with regard to parliamentary participation in decision-making on Union operations. Another interesting hearing was the one held on 9 October 2006 on lessons learned from operations held within the framework of the CSDP.³⁶ Of the total of thirteen parliamentary hearings, only one was devoted to the operations referred to above – Lessons learned from CSDP operations, in October 2006.

Members of the Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence often took the option of organising parliamentary *visits to forces in the field*. Reports on these are archived by the institution and not made public, but MEPs may use them when posing questions and drafting reports.³⁷ EU police and armed forces deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina were visited by

³⁶ On 28 June 2007 the Subcommittee held a hearing on US plans to construct radar stations in Poland and the Czech Republic. A hearing on the Subcommittee's report on the future of CSDP was held on 13 July 2006.

³⁷ Peters, D., W. Wagner, and N. Deitelhoff. eds. 2008. *The Parliamentary Control of European Security Policy*, op. cit., p. 91.



MEPs in 2005 and 2007 (April 2005 – visit to Sarajevo HQ and Mostar Regional Command Centre; November 2007 – visit to Sarajevo HQ and Goražde). On 10 and 11 July 2006 Subcommittee members paid a visit to the EUFOR RD Congo Operational HQ in Potsdam, while an ad hoc EP delegation visited troops deployed to the Congo in Kinshasa. In addition, a Subcommittee delegation visited troops taking part in the Chad Operation from 24 to 27 August 2007 and again from 24 to 27 November 2008, also visiting this operation’s HQ in France on 4 July 2008. Finally, MEPs visited the Atalanta Operational HQ in Northwood, UK on 10 January 2009.

Conclusion

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has not given the European Parliament the requisite formal authority with respect to either approving (military) operations within the framework of the CSDP or financing and overseeing such deployments (as opposed to powers of national parliaments). We can therefore conclude that this was a missed opportunity to grant the European Parliament the powers it needs to be the true ‘democratic conscience of the EU’ in the field of security and defence policy; the Parliament’s role remains a marginalised one. Although the EP’s political oversight role is not negligible, none of the mechanisms and means used by MEPs to affect, to a greater or a lesser degree, decision-making on CSDP military deployments is binding on the Council. On the other hand, we can also conclude that the European Parliament, and particularly its Subcommittee on Security and Defence, uses its powers to the fullest, although they are limited not only by the authority of the EP, but also by the body’s status of Subcommittee. To this they are also bound by their mandate, as they represent the only EU institution directly elected by popular vote.

The paradox of parliamentary oversight of the CSDP stems from the fact that national parliaments of EU member states decide on military deployments and financial and other assets required for implementing the CSDP, but at the same time lack the institutional structure and information required to efficiently oversee executive branch activities at the supranational

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level. On the other hand, EU-level information is available to MEPs, but they lack formal powers to oversee the Council and may neither vote on the budget for military operations nor call to accountability or sanction representatives of member states' governments. This leads to the conclusion that parliamentary oversight of the CSDP, within the current structure of the EU, cannot be the task of just one parliamentary institution. The European Parliament and national parliaments of member states, therefore, must have powers that enable them to act in a complementary fashion.

The Lisbon Treaty's protocol on the role of national parliaments states that the European Parliament and national parliaments should together determine the organisation and promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the Union (Art. 9).³⁸ The Protocol also provides for the possibility of holding a conference of parliamentary committees for EU affairs that may submit contributions to the European Parliament, Council and Commission (Art. 10). Interparliamentary conferences may also be organised; this type of exchange is particularly encouraged to debate matters of common foreign and security policy, including common security and defence policy.

We believe that any future cooperation between these bodies will greatly resemble the work of the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the EU (COSAC).³⁹ Under a motion proposed by the French Senate, each state and the European Parliament should delegate at most six members to take part in this flexible form of cooperation, with meetings being held twice a year. The role of the secretariat would be assumed by national parliaments on a rotating basis. As participation in the interparliamentary conference is voluntary, this forum would serve as a venue for parliaments that are the most motivated to take part.⁴⁰ Although conclusions adopted at these conferences will not be binding on national parliaments, this nonetheless represents an important innovation for the EU parliamentary community. At any rate, we expect additional clarification as to the mode of work of this group soon, after the COSAC meeting scheduled for late May 2010 in Madrid.

³⁸ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. 2010. Protocol (No 1) on the role of National Parliaments in the European Union. *Official Journal of the European Union* C 83.

³⁹ Background Note: The Future Role of COSAC. 2010. Stockholm: Sveriges Riksdag.

⁴⁰ French Senate. 2010. Resolution about the parliamentary control of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). http://www.riksdagen.se/templates/R_Page_21910.aspx.



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Beyond Integration: the EU Defence Industry

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***Abstract:** Defence budgets are no longer a priority in the modern security environment. More and more money is being spent on the organised crime prevention as the biggest threat to the security of modern society. The global economic crisis gives more momentum to the growing requests for the rationalisation of human and material resources. On the other hand, the stand of the EU, with regard to these trends, still remains unclear. This paper looks at the possible answers to the question – what are the instruments that the EU should apply in order to remain competitive in the global market game?*

***Key words:** defence, the EU, CSDP, CFSP, EDA, the market, integration*

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By using the resources which the member states put at its disposal, the EU has undertaken nearly thirty civilian and military operations since 2003. In terms of participants, these operations have been of a much smaller scope, compared to the ones undertaken by NATO or the UN. Despite this, it turned out that the number of soldiers and the money spent were not crucial for the success of the operations. The first EU military operation, CONCORDIA, is a good example. Carried out in Macedonia in 2003, as a result of the NATO mandate, this operation was finalised successfully at the price of 6,3 mil-



lion euros – a small amount of money, compared to 4,3 billion euros spent on the NATO-led air strikes on Kosovo in 1999 (Keohane 2009, p. 2). In the meantime, the EU undertook a number of complex operations, including the deployment of 300 observers in Georgia, nearly 2000 police officers, prosecutors, judges and customs officers in Kosovo, as well as 3 700 soldiers in Chad.

However, the difficulties that the soldiers and civilian officers were faced with under the EU flag are also significant. The lack of available staff is a typical problem. The governments of the EU countries managed to send only 225, out of promised 400, police officers to Afghanistan, in order to carry out the police training. The reason for this was that they represent both a direct “cost”, as they expect an adequate payment for their work abroad, and an indirect one, as very few countries can afford the leave of absence of highly-trained and experienced police officers. It took 6 months for the governments of the EU countries to find and assign available helicopters (16 were sent in the end) and cargo planes needed for the operation in Chad, the fact which demonstrates that the resources of the military-wise most potent countries are rather strained, that is, that the priorities are elsewhere.

It is a paradox that, while the member states have highly developed and competent armed forces and the demand for an international intervention is higher than ever, they are also faced with unprecedented material restrictions. The defence of a country, maybe for the first time in the history of an organised society, is not considered a priority in the internal political struggles. As the forms of the cross-border (organised) crime are the factors generating the biggest threats to the security of the modern societies, the money mostly “fills the pockets” of the interior security services, that is, security and intelligence services. The numbers of the available staff are being reduced constantly and astronomical contracts reviewed. The global economic crisis has urged even such “consumers” as the USA is to give up on some (but not all) development programmes.

We will try to determine if the EU is unanimous on the issue of armament market and the accompanying military equipment. If it is, we will show what instruments the EU uses to remain competitive on the global market.

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An overview of the EU (CSDP) needs for contemporary resources

The reason why the USA took upon itself the biggest burden of deploying the NATO forces in Kosovo in 1999 was that, at the time, the EU countries did not have adequate transport capacities at their disposal (Keohane 2009b, p. 1). Consequently, the governments of the EU countries committed themselves at the Summit in Helsinki to reforms primarily aimed at the development of the equipment necessary for the participation in multinational operations (MNO). The adoption of the Headline Goal for 2010 was an endeavour to encourage the reform processes which will gradually turn the armed forces of the member states into highly efficient formations.

The EU member-states have approximately 1700 helicopters at their disposal, however, many of them are almost unusable. The crews are either not trained for flights in the extreme weather conditions that the involvement in MNOs requires, or the aircraft themselves are limited in their performance. Strategic air transport represents a specific problem. Even if there had been a political will for the investment in the development of the armament and military equipment (AME), the global economic crisis that hit in the second half of 2008 slowed down the completion of many strategic projects. Moreover, in the past several years, the costs of the equipment maintenance have risen from 6% to 8% on a yearly level, while the defence budgets mostly remained the same (Keohane and de Vacourbeil 2008, p. 1). In addition, the number of MNOs that required necessary resources has also risen.

The deadline (2010), set in the Headline Goal, is too ambitious and represents a problem in itself. The fact that, once a new technology is adopted, it takes five to ten years before it can yield first results in the defence system was neglected (Weiss 2009, p. 107). For this reason, the European Defence Agency (EDA) developed in 2006 an “Long-term Vision of the European Defence needs and capacities” as a special addition and correction of the Headline Goal.

In the introduction to this needs analysis we read that the operations of the joint EU security and defence policy will



include both civilian and military capacities, that they will be expeditionary and focused more on the reaching of general state of security (stability) than on the “(military) victory” (European Defence Agency 2006, p. 2). The control of information will be crucial, and it will manifest either in the “war of ideas” in the virtual space or in the acceleration of the decision-making process (on a tactical level). Consequently, the term “asymmetry” will not refer to the enemy’s tactics only, but will also apply to his goals and values. In such circumstances, the military power will be just one of the instruments for reaching the goal.

Contemporary security environment is analysed further in the text and the challenges to investments in the AME are identified as follows: pension funds, the ageing of the population which results in a smaller human resources’ pool, the societies “sensitive” to military interventions abroad, “concerned” about the justification for the use of force and more willing to spend money on the “security” than “defence” (European Defence Agency 2006, p. 2-3). The defence system will have to accept and adapt to the fact that the force cannot be resorted to without limitations anymore, with the only goal of destroying the enemy, that there are also new actors (such as the global media) and an (ongoing) technological revolution which is manifested in informational, logistic and other innovations.

The role of the European Defence Agency in the establishment of the unified European AME market

Established in 2004, the *European Defence Agency* (EDA) has a task to:

- “determine the needs of the CSDP [...],
- promote research and development activities with the aim of supporting the building of a technological and industrial basis of the AME for the needs of CSDP [...],
- promote the cooperation among the members in the development of AME, which will, in turn, influence the process of the defence industry restructuring,
- To take, in cooperation with the Commission, the first steps in the development of a unified market for the defence industry products in Europe.” (European Defence Agency 2010).

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Apart from the above mentioned, the role of EDA is also to encourage the adjustment of the AME procurement procedures among the member states. For this reason, in June 2006, EDA introduced the Code of Conduct for the procurement in the defence sector, the aim of which was to “open” the European market, still divided by ethnic borders. The underlying idea is to make the market of every member state available to any company wishing to place its AME, regardless of nationality (and provided that it is a legal entity registered in one of the member states), with the exception of a specially sensitive equipment (such as decoding equipment). The principle on which the Code is based is very simple. Every EU member state which participates in CSDP is obliged to “open” all contracts in the defence domain, the total amount of which exceeds 1 million euros, to foreign bidders as well.¹

However, the member states are not obliged to agree with the Code. Moreover, most of them (if not all) have not shown willingness to grant a single contract to foreign bidders: 15 member states, during the first year of the existence of the database, opened tenders for services worth 10 billion euros, and only 2 contracts (out of 26) were signed with bidders from other countries (De Vacourbeil 2008, p. 7).

The next step in building up a unified European market was the design of the Capability Development Plan (CDP), based on the cooperation between EDA and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). The Plan consisted of four “lines”. The EUMC was authorised to control the outcomes of the implementation of the Headline Goal 2010, that is, to develop of a plan for dealing with the identified shortcomings of the capacities within a time span determined in the Headline Goal 2010. The long-term goals of CSDP were the underlying rationale for the activities planned in the line B, which was led by EDA, as well as line C, which envisaged the establishment of a database that would contain information about the long-term development plans of the member states. Line D referred to the synthesis of the “experience gained” in CSDP operations and it was “governed” by the EUMC. The lines were completed in 18 months and the findings grouped into one document which was approved by the EDA Board of Directors in July 2008.

¹ The Internet presentation of EDA at the link <http://eda.europa.eu/ebbweb/> contains a database with all public procurement tenders opened by the member states, as well as the ads with NVO services.



CDP is not a plan in a real sense, the one that would, say, define the number of units or systems of armament. It is rather an attempt at predicting the needs of CSDP until 2025, while member states are expected to follow the guidelines given in CDP in setting up their own priorities. (European Union 2008, p. 1-2).

The reasons for the integration of the European AME market

As far as the research and development in the defence industry are concerned, the USA spends six times more resources than the EU. Statistics show that the US market is mostly closed for the EU companies. That explains a huge discrepancy between the contracts granted to American suppliers (65 billion dollars in 2005) and the ones granted to the EU suppliers (1 billion in 2005). In 2005, only 2% of the total US defence budget went on supplies of AME equipment of EU origin.

Another globally visible trend is the relocation of the production of components. European manufacturers need more and more the money of the “newcomers” on the big scene, such as Brazil, India, China, Malaysia. This trend can result in a greater cooperation between the EU and the USA in the future, which could enable them to be less dependent on the potential imports (de Vacourbeil 2008, p. 89-90). A greater cooperation would also lead to a larger-scale production, which (in theory) would result in the reduced prices, even for the advanced technology products. Ministries of the Defence would be able to buy AME from a manufacturer who offers the best price and general conditions, regardless of the origin of goods. On the other hand, the EU manufacturers could freely participate in tenders under conditions equal to those that local manufacturers have.

It is also indicative that the defence costs as a part of the total GDP of the European countries have been on the decline in the last 10 years, from the average 2.1% in 1997, to 1.7% in 2007. The figures for the defence budget itself, which should not be confused with total costs, are even lower: they dropped from 1.8% GDP in 1998, to 1.4% of GDP in 2008.

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The costs for the defence always surpass the assets allotted in the budget, due to the rising operative costs (Keohane 2009b, p. 3). The EU member states are careful not to increase public costs and specifically the defence ones. France (2,32%), Great Britain (2,32% BDP) and Greece (2,55%) are the only EU countries that exceed the agreed 2%, according to EDA data for 2008. In their 2007 report, the EC experts concluded that, in the previous 20 years, from the mid-80s, the defence funds had dropped from 3,5% GDP to 1,75%.

In the meantime, the EU governments have been searching for new markets to place their products out of NATO. The fact is that new powers in international relations wish to become a part of the “global procurement chain” and they accept European arrangements readily. Malaysia and Republic of South Africa, which became a part of the A400M program, constitute an example to this trend.² European defence industry is competing with the USA in the areas where the consolidation of production has been carried out, such as the production of jet and turboprop plane engines (that is, where a dominant “European” firm has bought smaller, but competitive, manufacturers from the EU territory).

The European manufacturers have no other alternative but to enter the US market, as it is the biggest consumer, but they can do this only if united. The chances for small manufacturers are meagre at the market where purchases are made through direct deals (which are still predominant), unless they become a part of a larger consortium of bidders. Only a consortium will be able to offer a competitive price and the product of the quality that will meet a minimum of specifications, especially in the areas where the US resources are underdeveloped. The control over the technology transfer will be in the hands of Americans (Neuman 2006, p. 14). Abandoning one type of AME entails a decision that armed forces will be engaged only within coalitions in the future, which is in line with the US global ambitions. Maintaining an industry that produces a small number of types of AME for armed forces is not rational.

On the other hand, the more the EU countries wish to intervene, the more equipment they will need. A total number of EU soldiers deployed in 2006 reached 80 000. In 2008, the

² Frankly, in the meantime, South African Republic has stepped out of the A400M program, as it exceeded the delivery deadlines unexpectedly and also due to increased costs.



House of Commons in the UK issued a statement that the costs of maintaining the forces in Iraq and Afghanistan had reached a yearly level of 3 billion pounds (4,5 billion euros). The costs of maintaining the troops are rising because the price of AME is on the rise as well (de Vacourbeil 2008, p. 91). At the same time, defence funds are stagnating.

The regime of AME exports-imports is very strict both in the USA and Europe, which gave a window of opportunity for other countries (suppliers) on the “rise”, primarily China and India. They are not limited by the remnants of the cold-war way of thinking, characterised by the existence of export licences (de Vacourbeil 2008, p. 93).

The response of American companies to these challenges was the establishment of overseas partnerships, as demonstrated by the *Joint Strike Fighter* (JSF) program of joint development of the multi-purpose, fifth generation bomber (Lockheed Martin F35 *Lightning II*). The scope of technology transfer has been set by economic and political parameters, that is, what is measured is how much a country has invested and how important it is for the US external political interests. In the case of JSF programme, only Great Britain is a “second tier” partner, meaning that the majority of advanced technological solutions will be applied to the version of the aircraft delivered by the experts from this country.

Further prospects for the integration of the AME European market

The EC would be in charge of the regulation of the unified market. As stipulated by the Article 296 of the Agreement on the EU, the EC is not included in the process of regulating the trade “of goods of the highest priority for the safety”. However, it does have an insight in the trade of double-purpose products which can be used for both civilian and military purposes. In reality, the EC will substitute the existing system of individual licences (each transaction requires a separate licence) with a system of issuing general licences for trading inside a common market and where the risk of exporting technology to the third world countries is reduced to a minimum.

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A step further in that direction was made by adopting a set of EC guidelines in the form of the regulation No. 81/2009 in August 2009. It set the rules for the Community in terms of arms procurement, ammunition, and military equipment for defence purposes, but also the procurement of the “sensitive equipment” for non-military purposes.

In the next five years, the member states will solve the problem of the missing capacities. Despite a considerable delay of the test-flight, the strategic-transport plane A400M will become the part of the armed forces of France and Germany in 2013 and 2014. In the meantime, in November 2008, the ministers of 12 European countries signed the “Letter of Intent”, as the first step in setting up a “European Air-Transport Fleet” (EATF). In the future, EATF should put under the same umbrella all the aircraft of the type (“Airbus”) A400M and (“Lockheed Martin”) C130 that belong to the member states. There are also considerations about the most profitable form of cooperation: should the existing or ordered aircraft be offered to other users, or, by means of the exchange of training and maintenance services? The fighter-bomber planes of the “fourth and a half” or “fifth” generation have either already become a part of the regular armament (*Eurofighter* and *Rafale*) in the process of procurement or will be procured (the mentioned F35). France and Great Britain are working on the development of a new generation of aircraft carriers. It is also planned that the EU defence ministers should have at their disposal a global positioning system, “Galileo”, in order to manage the operations in real time.

Meanwhile, after getting a closer insight into the GDP, in July 2008 the member states put the following activities on top of their priority list:

- A continued work on the development of the existing concepts of the CSDP capacity-building,
- The development of intelligence capacities which would enable the forces serving a mandate in the CSDP operations in a complex environment to act in a robust and decisive manner,
- The need for the establishment of inter-agency structures which would improve the coordination among the EU actors in the context of a modern approach to crisis management,



- Keeping the initiative in relation to the opponents that are at the level close to that of the EU member states in terms of technology,
- Development of the crisis management tools which would provide the EU with flexible and agile responses,
- The selection and training of the staff that corresponds to the challenges of engagement (EDA 2008, p. 6).

Given in general terms at first, the priorities were later turned into a "set" of 12 starting "actions", that is, types of AME that require an immediate investment (EDA 2008, p. 8). Naturally, most priority actions refer to the existing deficiencies, such as: the lack of helicopters, counter-measures for the improvised explosive devices, the capacity for network-centered conduct of conflicts and logistics. Other priority actions were formulated on the basis of a long-term analysis. For instance, a great attention was given to the development of technologies for diminishing the threat of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), that the authors of the CDP believe it will be the next most popular device used on masse by various "rebels" (Weiss 2009, p. 109).³

NATO and the EU have tried for decades – unsuccessfully – to improve their cooperation in the area of AME development. The reason for this lies in the fact that the defence represents an area that the member states rarely give access to to international organisations or other actors. The protectionist governments of the member states do not buy the AME from foreign companies, in order to protect the existing capacities, no matter how irrational and inefficient that may be. They can do so because the AME industry and market are still out of reach of integrations. However, expensive and technologically out-dated arms affect the combat readiness in two ways – first, they "consume" material resources that could have been used for a better purpose, and second, by the fact that the insistence on their use makes research and development meaningless. Others, able to offer the final product at a lower price, regardless of quality, will fill the market niche. This is a lesson on the current difficulties of defence market integration that both the planners and decision-makers in Serbia can learn from.

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³ A complete list of 12 priority actions is available in English at <http://eda.europa.eu/gener-icitem.aspx?id=386>, EDA Internet. (2008) Background Note on Capabilities Development Plan. (accessed on June 9, 2010.)

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Internal Security of the European Union: Dilemmas, Strategic Framework and Scope

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Abstract:

The building and implementation of European security policies depend mostly on the interests of the EU member states. They decide on the course of the cooperation among the member states, both "internal" and "external", and to what extent the elements of human security will be represented in the implementation of these policies. This paper aims at showing a strategic approach to the building of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, with a special emphasis on the proposal for the Internal Security Strategy. First, we will look at the theoretical dilemmas around the issue of the internal security of the EU, considering its "non-state" nature. The human security concept is one of the constants in the EU's strategic approach, present throughout the process of improving the cooperation in the judiciary and internal affairs. However, this concept is not typical of the internal, but also of external domain of the EU security. In that case, the human security concept can be used as a value for humanitarian activities or in crisis management, civil-military coordination and conflict prevention.

Key words: Internal security, strategic approach, human security, security cooperation, human rights, European security architecture.

* * *

„Not a single agreement should be considered a peace agreement if it was made containing a secret seed of a future war“

(Immanuel Kant in "Eternal Peace")

„Fear was my only passion in life“

(Thomas Hobbes in "Leviathan")¹

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¹ Quoted from: Svensen, L. (2008) *Philosophy of Fear*: Belgrade. Geopoetika, p.10.

Introduction

Was it fear that made Robert Schumann sign, on May 9, 1950, the European peace agreement that would last for 60 years? And made him say that world peace would be preserved only if the creative powers were equal to the threats to it? Or was it just a vision?

The absence of fear would certainly not make the hostility between France and Germany disappear. The lack of vision would slow down the integration process or make it impossible. We wouldn't be able to say that the Union is strongest at the times of crisis. We can only speculate what the answers to these questions could be. However, Schumann's words have "preserved" peace in Europe for 60 years. And he was right when he said that Europe could not be created in one night and as a whole. Europe will emerge from concrete achievements that will, most of all, make a sincere solidarity possible. European security architecture, which is in the making, represents one of these achievements, the scope of which remains undefined.

For 50 years, as the EU Internal Security Strategy stresses, Europe has guaranteed such solidarity. It has become one of the fundamental principles for building the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, (AFSJ). For the time being, the member states meet only the first condition expressed in Kant's "Eternal Peace", and it seems that the existing peace is not just the postponement of hostility.

This paper will try to provide an answer to the question about the existence of the EU internal security and whether the implementation of the priorities set forth in the strategic plans is enough for maintaining security of the EU citizens. In doing so, we will touch upon the human security concept which is "traceable" in both internal and external dimension of the EU security. Nevertheless, there is a dilemma among the EU decision-makers about the order of priorities. Is the increasing security of the citizens going to affect the human rights protection?



Internal Security Dilemma

The existence and possibility of building the EU internal security, given the supra-national and international nature of the EU, is the fundamental question here. Can the EU, as such, maintain its internal security, can it be an "equilibrist"? As we use the term "maintenance", the conclusion could be drawn that it already possesses the elements of internal security. It is limited and quite different from the internal security of a single state. The internal security of the EU applies only to the present, to the current social circumstances influenced by the consequences of contemporary trends in the society and the development of the EU institutional framework, especially in the area of improving the cooperation between the police and judiciary in criminal matters. The internal dimension of the security of European communities during the Cold War era could not be discussed. At that time, there was only the national security (and its internal component) of France, Germany and some other member states.

The concept of the internal security of the EU does not exist if only a classic-traditional-realistic view of security is taken into account. There are several reasons for this. Internal security, the goal of which is to secure the freedom of the state and the society - the safety of the citizens, is an integral part of the national security. The key to national security, which implies the preservation and control of the state territory and the protection of its sovereignty, is the national interest, as Hans Morgenthau, one of the founders of the realistic approach in the international relations theory, pointed out (Morgenthau, 1985: 3-17). Now we have hit the "dead end", as the EU cannot be viewed through the perception of the national security and interests in the narrow realistic theoretical framework and in terms of force as the cornerstone of the state politics. The EU emerged as a result of different national interests, with the aim to "foster a harmonious and permanent economic and social development" (Lopandić, 2003: 12) and it does not have a monopoly over the use of power – it is solely in the hands of the member states. Similarly, the EU is not a state, though there are voices claiming that the EU is heading towards a federal state system.² However, this is still unrealis-

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² Look in: Spinelli, A. (1941) *The Ventotene Manifesto: Towards a Free and United Europe*. [Online] Available: <http://www.federalunion.org.uk/archives/ventotene.shtml> [12 April 2010]; Fischer, J. (2000) *From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration*. [Online] Available: <http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/00/symp.html> [13 April 2010]; Burgess, M. (2000) *Federalism and European Union: the Building of Europe, 1950-2000*. London and New York: Routledge.

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tic, as the failure in adopting the EU constitution and the consensus on the still limited Lisbon Treaty clearly show, bearing in mind the federal political system. The realisation of the “United States of Europe” concept is not in sight for the time being as member states still firmly “guard” their sovereignty.

The creation of the EU, after the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1993, introduced a change called “supra-nationality”. The European Commission and the European Parliament, as supra-national bodies of the EU, were granted even greater authority in the next revision of the Treaty in Amsterdam in 1997.³ The traditional concept of the “enemy” changed considerably after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This resulted in a sort of “upgrading” of the theoretical framework and appearance of new “non-state” security actors through social constructivism theories and the concept of societal security. A different logical framework emerged, in which the survival in an environment of anarchy was not identified as the only problem, but political interests as well. The force, as realists claim, remains one of the main elements in the international relations, however, other elements are added to it – the protection of human rights, the rule of law. This is how the EU, in theoretical terms, obtained its status of an actor, though it had already become that earlier (at the end of the 50s). In the context of all these events, the distinction between “hard” and “soft” security threats was made in theory, as a result of swift globalisation changes. The internal security framework of the EU got its purpose due to this distinction.

On the basis of the “Revolution in security relations” (Lindley-French, 2005: 1-16) and due to the soft security threats – illegal migrations, trafficking in human beings and illegal narcotics, cross-border organised crime and, maybe most importantly, terrorism – the EU became a “coordinator” of the exchange of criminal-intelligence data and, as such, has been building and preserving its internal security for more than 10 years. Successful combatting of security threats coming from organised crime or terrorism requires cooperation among the law-enforcement governmental bodies and this is an undeniable fact (Lindley-French, 2005: 15).

³ The Amsterdam Treaty led to the “communitarisation” of certain areas from the Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty (freedom of movement, visas, immigration, asylum and judiciary cooperation in the civil suits) and Schengen Convention was added as well.



The goal to “secure a high level of the protection of citizens” within the AFSJ framework has granted the EU authority to develop its internal security within the AFSJ framework (Monar, 2009: 2).⁴ According to Jorg Monar, professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, The EU managed to develop the domain of internal security through four areas:

- 1) Information exchange and joint assessment of internal security threats;
- 2) Finding ways to facilitate cross-border cooperation;
- 3) Partial harmonisation of national systems of internal security;
- 4) Undertaking joint actions (Monar, 2009: 2-4).

Internal security, regardless of all limitations in theoretical or practical terms, does exist in the EU and is continually developing. It is limited to dealing with “soft” security threats and is based on the principle of inter-governmental negotiations and not on the supra-nationality principle. Nonetheless, supra-nationality, which is reflected in the work of the Parliament of Europe and the European Commission, has become a more serious factor in the implementation of the internal security after the Lisbon Treaty was signed and took effect in December 2009. However, that level of importance is still insufficient and the principle of supra-nationality has not been fully implemented in the judiciary and internal affairs yet.⁵

Strategic Approach to Internal Security

The process of building and preserving the AFSJ is based on a strategic approach which is carried out in three steps: 1) creation of five-year plans that precisely determine the aims and priorities of the cooperation among the member states in the areas of the judiciary and internal affairs; 2) creation of action plans and their implementation; 3) evaluation of the reached level of cooperation (Đorđević, 2010: 69).

The first strategic plan for the establishment of AFSJ was put together two years after the “starting point” and first communitarisation of the provisions on the cooperation between the police and the judiciary. When Finland was chair-

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⁴ Article 29 of the Amsterdam Treaty stresses: “the aim of the Union is to secure a high level of citizens’ protection within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, through development of joined activities of the member states in the area of police cooperation and judiciary cooperation on criminal matters, preventing racism and xenophobia, as well as by suppressing them (Lopandić, 2003: 27).

⁵ To learn more about the changes in the judiciary and internal affairs after the Lisbon Treaty, look in Mitsilegas, V. (2009) *EU Criminal Law*. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing.

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⁶ The principle of mutual recognition calls for the execution of an actual (foreign) court ruling within the legal framework of cooperation in the criminal matters and civil suits in the EU countries. If a state, due to some circumstances, is unable to carry out the ruling, other state will help, without a prior review of the details of the that ruling (Gallagher, 2009: 498-505).

⁷ Ten top priorities of the Hague Programme were: 1) protection of human rights; 2) fight against terrorism; 3) migration management; 4) border management, protection of external borders, visas; 5) common standards in the asylum seeking policy; 6) positive migration; 7) data protection and information exchange; 8) fight against organised crime; 9) the creation of the European judiciary area; 10) joint responsibility and solidarity in developing AFSJ (The Hague Programme, 2004).

⁸ The Stockholm Programme states that "the current priority is the placing the citizens in the center of the AFSJ". The building of the "Europe of Citizens" requires that all future actions and plans are citizen-oriented. Four sets of priorities were stressed: 1) protection of human rights, freedom of movement, development of mechanisms for the protection of more vulnerable groups, protection of children's rights, protection of personal data and privacy; 2) easier access to justice, availability of all opportunities that a common market offers, improvement of the cooperation among the judiciary of different member states; 3) the formulation of a strategy for guaranteeing citizens a safe life, a better cooperation among the police forces; 4) adhering to the principle of solidarity and formulation of a new immigration and asylum policy which will ensure that everybody, in every member state, has equal status and will create a precise legal framework for legal immigrants (The Stockholm Programme, 2009).

⁹ The list probably cannot be altered due to the consequences of globalisation, however, the order of priorities is different.

ing the EU in 1999, Tampere Programme was adopted as the first five-year plan, along with the guidelines and priorities for the improvement of the police-judiciary cooperation in the EU. The main objective was the harmonisation of the legislative framework for the implementation of the principles of mutual recognition and setting up of common minimal standards for the protection of individual human rights (Buono, 2010: 333).⁶ The next five-year plan, entitled the Hague Programme, was adopted in 2004⁷, and was followed by the Implementation Action Plan. The Strategic Plan for the 2010-2014 period was adopted in Stockholm.⁸ After the initial phase of implementation of the Stockholm Programme in January 2010, the chair of the EU (Spain) defined the development of the Internal Security Strategy as a priority. The ministers of the interior, at the meeting of the Judiciary and Internal Affairs Council in February 2010, adopted the Strategy Draft.

European Defence Strategy from 2003 should also be mentioned and it contains the guidelines for actions towards the "outside". The jargon used in this Strategy is different from that of the so-called "inside" strategies. The shift from the "soft" to "hard" power is evident only in this Strategy, despite the fact that the EU (its officials) always tried to represent itself as a civilian power. The term "risk" was substituted with a much stronger "threat", which gives rise to speculations about the EU as a peace-keeping project (Nakarada, 2006: 549-572). The common denominator for both types of strategies is the list of challenges, risks and threats.⁹ It is reflected in the definition of terrorism, organised crime and the possibility of using the weapons of mass destructions by various terrorist groups as the biggest security threats. The strategies that have a shared vision of the AFSJ building also try to balance the concept of EU as a civilian or military power, in order to avoid the hypothesis that more security creates the environment in which human rights are less protected.

Although both types of strategies try to respond effectively to "soft", that is, "hard" security threats, there are two fundamental characteristics that link them together. The response to security threats, no matter if it is organised crime



or a regional conflict, is more efficient if conducted on a global level, and both state and non-state actors are included through their cooperation. "Absolute winners" do not exist in dealing with any type of security threats (Aldis and Herd, 2005: 186). Both sides suffer from a "collateral damage".

Since Tampere programme, up to the latest Internal Security Strategy, the EU has used a holistic approach to the security, with a special focus on the "soft security". This approach is understandable, considering the fact that the EU does not have military capacities that the USA has. The concept of "tough America – soft Europe", developed by Lyndley-French, supports this view. According to him, the holistic approach to security which the EU is developing represents a strategic illusion, born out of the EU frustration of not being able to become a security actor in international relations and presents itself on a par with the USA (Lyndley-French, 2002: 789-811). Even this attitude could be taken with a grain of salt. It definitely contains true facts, given the disharmony expressed within the EU with regard to the "outside", especially in terms of security, for instance in the case of Iraq.

While observing the debate about the adoption of the Stockholm Treaty, the civil society organisations and various European think-tanks concluded that the AFSJ prioritises security over the protection of human rights. The debate over the signing of the SWIFT Agreement in the fight against terrorism and the role of the European Parliament, since the beginning of this year, has shown that there will be many "steps" in the development of the European security model.¹⁰ In addition, the EU has been trying to develop, up to a point, its own defence policy.

What is undeniable is the fact that the EU officials use the judiciary-internal affairs cooperation as an additional means in the further development of the European identity, the process that begun in the 50s. This is logical, as this area has a direct influence on the citizens of Europe and has been one of the areas of integration with biggest results in the past 10 years. The Internal Security Strategy was not presented as a separate strategic document (like Stockholm Programme), but

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¹⁰ According to this Treaty, the USA can trace financial records of persons under suspicion of terrorism, through their bank data gathered by the Belgian company SWIFT (which is used by over 8000 financial institutions). The EU Parliament, in expressing its objections to this Treaty, expressed its concern regarding the possible invasion of privacy of citizens' data.

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as a part of a well-rounded whole which encompasses the already adopted documents such as the European Security Strategy from 2003 and the Strategy of the Outer Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice from 2005. This was emphasised in the Draft as well.

The objective of the Strategy is to enable a joint action of the existing policies for combatting cross-border security challenges, risks and threats and to create an “integrated (holistic) approach” to security that will deal with both the causes and effects of the “non-security”. The integrated approach to security should become a recognisable characteristic of the European security model, compared to the approaches of other security actors in the world. This approach implies joint actions of cooperation among the law enforcement bodies, judiciary cooperation, border management and civil protection in line with the common European values, such as the protection of human rights. The Internal Strategy Draft prioritises the EU as a “civil power” actor. This is reflected in the identification of security challenges that affect the citizens most directly in their everyday lives and in the selection of responses to these challenges. The “list of challenges” includes, apart from terrorism and various forms of serious, organised, advanced-technology or cross-border crime, violence, protection and rescue of people and material resources from natural disasters, as well as protection from traffic accidents. In line with this definition of threats, adequate responses include repressive actions, prevention, development of criminal-intelligence activities and crisis management. The use of force has been reduced to a minimum.

The Strategy stresses that, in the development of the EU security model, it is necessary to continue with the development of analyses which provide predictions and efficient responses to security challenges which will include the important EU actors (agencies) such as EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, Coordinator for the Fight Against Terrorism. Further development of joint actions and investigations is also necessary, as well as an improved exchange of information between the law enforcement agencies of the member states and the mechanisms for the assessment of the activities.



At first glance, the Internal Security Strategy may seem to be just “another EU strategy”, however, it was obviously written in the spirit of changes that came about after the Lisboa Treaty had taken effect, which made the integration of security policies possible (by means of the abolishment of the Pillars) and by giving more importance to the supra-national bodies of the EU. The Standing Committee for Internal Security, which operates within the Council, will have a leading role in the development and implementation of the Strategy.

The citizen-oriented security is visible in the new legal framework of EUROPOL which made it a law-enforcement agency of the EU, starting from January 1, 2010. The rhetoric has been changed, which the new focus on the EU police cooperation clearly demonstrates. Nicholas Dorn, a professor at the University of Cardiff, claims that “organised crime in the EU has come to an end” (Dorn, 2009: 283-295). The change of the rhetoric is reflected in the shift of the objective of the police cooperation from organised to serious crime, while EUROPOL priorities can be defined on the basis of the seriousness of crime and harm caused to an individual or the community (Dorn, 2009: 284).

The “inner” and “outer” presence of the human security concept

The change of the language (in the strategic documents or the above-mentioned new legal framework for EUROPOL) is a proof that the concept of human security is present in the EU and its internal security, as it implies the security of an individual and the community, which is expressed as “the freedom from fear” and “freedom from (Kaldor, Martin, Selchov, 2007: 273). Sometimes, human security is given priority, as in the Internal Security Strategy, or balance is required between the protection of human rights and the security which affects it, as in the Stockholm Programme.¹¹ The presence or a gradual “step by step” introduction of the human security concept is definitely an improvement but it also shows that the EU is not on a par with the USA. The Europeans are still searching for a definitive security concept. Internal and external dimension are equally important.

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¹¹ Look in; Table 1 – The presence of human security in the EU strategic documents.

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Table 1: The presence of human security concept in the EU strategic documents

Strategic document	The key concept of the strategic document	The level of representation of the elements of the human security concept	Elements of human security
Tampere programme from 1999	On the road to the Union of freedom, security and justice	Starter	The security of the EU citizens, but others as well, is viewed as a new challenge in line with the accomplishments of the EU as a unique market, economical and monetary union, as well as a new space for the free movement of people
European Security Strategy from 2003	Safe Europe in a better world	Minimal	Security of the member states is a priority. Indirectly, through the central role of a state to protect its citizens, the elements of the human security concept can be found. The protection of human rights is considered within the context of dealing with regional conflicts as one of the main security threats.
The Hague Programme from 2004	Strengthening of freedom, security and justice in the EU	Developmental	The expectations of the EU citizens are growing, particularly after terrorist attacks in New York in 2001 and Madrid, 2004. Citizens' security should be increased and their human rights protected. "Soft" security threats are included in the list of 10 top priorities.
Strategy of the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 2005	Strengthening of freedom, security and justice in the EU	Developmental	EU policies in the areas of the judiciary and internal affairs have improved in order to meet the needs of the EU citizens. The stress is on the progress made in the new legislative framework which regulates migrations, asylum, border management, visas, fight against organised crime and terrorism. The focus is again on "Soft" security threats.
Stockholm Programme from 2009	Open and safe Europe that protects its citizens	Advanced	The citizen is mentioned for the first time in this document. The main objective is creation of Europe for its citizens in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Internal Strategy Draft from 2010	Towards a European security model	Advanced	A continuation of the Stockholm Programme with a stronger emphasis on the protection of human rights, rule of law and the principle of solidarity. New security challenges are mentioned, as violence and natural disasters, that directly threaten security



On the basis of the Table 1 the participation of the human security concept in the EU can be analysed. It is on an advanced level, particularly in the internal domain, the development of the AFSJ. The individual is a reference point of the security in the human security concept and this is reflected in physical security and the person's integrity. Tampere Programme, and partly the Hague Programme, treat the safety of citizens as a challenge that arose from the EU achievements, where combatting soft security threats represents a key motivator of the EU. This is the way its security is built. Both Stockholm Programme and the Internal Security Strategy stress the progress of the EU in developing the AFSJ through the activities of European bodies and agencies in the areas of the judiciary and internal affairs, though balance is maintained between the protection of human rights and the increasing citizens' security.

Some authors maintain (Glassius, Kaldor, Martin, Selchow, Sira, Grans, Matlary) that the human security concept is a new EU "story" that it has to promote in its security architecture.¹² This applies not only to internal, but external security domain as well. European security policy should be an "addition" to the member states' national defence policies, particularly the key players such as France, Germany, Great Britain. Human security concept can be a candidate for value in humanitarian activities and peace-building, but not in the fight against terrorism (Matlary, 2008: 131-143). It may have some similarities with the thesis that one should never negotiate with the terrorists. There are three areas in the development of the EU security and defence policy where the human security concept can be applied: crisis management, civil-military coordination and conflict prevention. (Kaldor, Martin, Selchow, 2007: 273-288).

In conclusion, the Human Security Doctrine for Europe from 2004 should be mentioned, as it represents European security strategy from the human security perspective. This is the first comprehensive document for developing a policy which envisages intervention by the Human Security Response Force, based on the security of an individual, and that not only within the legal framework, but also through civil-military integration. (Matlary, 2008: 139).

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¹² Look in: Glassius, M., Kaldor, M. (eds.) (2006) *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, principles, practicalities*. London and New York. Routledge; Martin, M., Owen. T. (2010) „The second generation of human security: lessons from the UN and EU experience.“ In: *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 211–224; Sira, H., Grans, J. (2010) „The Promotion of Human Security in EU Security Policies.“ In: INEX Policy Brief, No. 7; Matlary, J. (2008) „Much ado about little: the EU and human security.“ In *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 131–143.

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The European Extreme Right in 2010: A New Phenomenon or the Same Pattern?

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Abstract

In 2010, the extreme right phenomenon reminded us of its existence through a series of stunning successes in different EU member states. The present paper searches for the reasons for the intensification of its activities, examines its profile and tries to predict its role in the future. Firstly, an extreme right pattern is drawn, and the parties active in 2010 are analysed against it, on the basis of a set of common features. Then, external factors that have furthered the extreme right performances are observed. And finally, the paper focuses on the relation between right-wing extremism and nationalism, and their impact on the future political scenarios.

Keywords: *extreme right parties, nationalism, elections, Hungary, Austria, Flanders*

Introduction

Since the beginning of 2010, we have been witnesses of the spectacular breakthrough of the extreme right parties all over Europe in the elections at all levels: regional, parliamentary, presidential. Firstly, in March, Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National (FN) re-emerged by gaining 12% support at the regional elections. In April, at the general elections in Hungary, the extreme-right party Jobbik was supported by 16.7% of the voters, which was the strongest ever support for a radical party since the fall of the communist regime in 1990. The same month, in Austria's presidential vote, the candidate for the extreme right Freedom Party (FPÖ), Barbara



Rosenkranz, netted 15.6% which made her the second strongest candidate after the President Fischer.¹ The greatest shock came from the Netherlands, where after the parliamentary elections in June, the extreme right Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders, grew from 9 to 24 seats in the 150-seat parliament, thus becoming the third party in the Dutch parliament.²

These alarming facts were largely discussed in the European press. Political observers from different countries tried to raise public awareness on the perturbing movement in the far right spectrum and to give a warning of the revival of the extremist ideologies. Their main concern was that the success of the extreme right was not an isolated case of one country but rather a trend, a feature of the political landscape of many EU member states. In this sense, several questions arise:

Firstly, precisely what kind of political actors are these parties that have recently had a soaring electoral success? Are they actors of a new type, or do they apply a particular “extreme right pattern” that had already been set up by their predecessors?

Secondly, to what extent is it relevant to speak of a new wave of the rise of the extreme right? Is this actually a new phenomenon, or is it a repetition of the scenario that we have repeatedly witnessed in Europe before?

Thirdly, what is the future of the extreme right parties? Are they a serious threat for the democracy in Europe, or are they just short-lived players that will disappear as quickly as they have emerged?

These are the questions to which we will try to find an answer in the present paper.

1. The Extreme Right Pattern

First of all, in order to explain the current processes in the extreme right spectrum and the recent intensification of the political activities there we need to determine what kind of parties we are dealing with. How can they be defined, and can they be united through a common denominator of threat to European democracy?

¹Barbara Rosenkranz was even disappointed by her “poor performance”, and claimed that the lower results were due to the “unfair election campaign” and to the “witch hunt” organized against her and her family.

²Although third power, Geert Wilder’s Party for Freedom actually stands very close to the other two political parties: the centre-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and centre-left Labour Party (PvdA) that obtained 31 and 30 seats respectively.

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In the field of theory, a unanimous definition of the extreme right – both as a political concept and as political actors – does not exist yet. In fact, little consensus has emerged even about labeling the phenomenon itself. “Extreme right”, “radical right”, “far right”, “populist right”, “new right”, “neo-fascism”, etc., are all concepts that tend to name the same idea but with a focus on a particular aspect. And although in everyday communication and in the media these terms are interchangeable, political scientists delimit them and give preferences in favour of one or another. The “**far right**” is the most frequently used term as it could be considered a more general and neutral one. The concept of “**radical right**”, firstly introduced by Daniel Bell in 1963, is accepted by the American scholars and also largely used by a lot of European analysts as Hans-Georg Betz³ and Pippa Norris⁴, for example. Piero Ignazi focuses on the “**extreme right**” formulation and develops the concept by setting a three-dimensional criteria-set (spatial-ideological-attitudinal) for a more precise classification⁵. The “**Populist right**” emphasises the populist rhetoric, whilst the “**new right**”, as used by Noël O’Sullivan, belongs to the cultural aspects of the neo-conservatist discourse⁶. In case of the parties that shook the political reality in 2010, the most frequently used term is the “far right parties”. However, this mostly emphasises the spatial localisation on the political spectrum, and to a large extent “softens” the extremist ideas (anti-immigrant, anti-Jewish, anti-Roma, anti-EU) the proponents of which these parties actually are. That is the reason why in the present paper we opt for the name “extreme right”, thus trying to reach a balance between the proper verbalisation of the phenomenon and the moderate degree of its estimation.

As seen, the large variety of opinions about even just labeling the extreme right displays the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon. However, there is a very clear common ground on which all the parties of this type are built. In that sense a definition can be formulated on the basis of a set of characteristics of the extreme right parties. This set is actually a theoretical concept, the **lowest common denominator** through which all the representatives of the extreme right could be united. Then, the extreme right parties are these

³ Betz, Hans-Georg, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, Macmillan, 1994.

⁴ Norris, Pippa, *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

⁵ Ignazi, Piero, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, 2003.

⁶ O’Sullivan, Noël, *The New Right: The Quest for a Civil Philosophy in Europe and America, in The Nature of the Right: European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789*, Eatwell, Roger and O’Sullivan, Noël (eds.), London, 1989, p.189



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actors that stand at the most rightward side of the political spectrum and have the following key features:

- political radicalism;
- extreme nationalism;
- anti-systemness, more ANTI than PRO parties;
- catch-all parties;
- rigidity of ideology;
- populist rhetoric.

Furthermore, the above-mentioned core concepts of the extreme right profile are applied in practice in several directions. They can be tracked out in:

- genesis of the extreme right parties;
- immigration policy, proposed solutions to criminality and unemployment;
- views about the role of the state and the European Union;
- leadership style, etc.

Thus, the set of features implemented in practice forms a specific framework – an extreme right pattern that is common to all parties of that type. This pattern was followed by the oldest parties like the FP?, the French Front National, the British National Front, Vlaams Blok. And not a lot was changed when newcomers like the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn (founded 2002), the Greater Romania Party (founded 1991), the Bulgarian Ataka (founded in 2005) appeared on the political scene. So, the parties whose alarming success we have witnessed in 2010 have neither changed this pattern (in case of the FP? and FN that were existing for decades), nor established a new one (in case of Jobbik and the PVV that were founded after the year 2000). This means that the extreme right actors, even the ones that were recently created, did not alter the primary model. They did not intend to adjust to the new conditions, they just waited for the suitable moment when they could emerge and be successful the way they are. This specificity of their behaviour is indicative of two things: firstly, of a high level of **rigidity** in terms of doctrine, and secondly, of the perception of political and social processes as **finality**. The extreme right parties do not want to reshape their concepts, and that is why they exclude the exchange of political ideas with any possible opponents. They are excessively firm in their

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positions, and thereby cannot develop ideologically. The extreme right parties do not enter into interaction with other political actors, thus closing themselves in a shell. Opposition or dialogue is unacceptable for them, which cuts off all channels for political communication.

Speaking of the extreme right pattern, there are a few points showing the identical profile of the parties successful in the 2010 elections. We will examine just the most illustrative of them. The strongest indicator that shows the link between the extreme right parties is their **political radicalism**. Their radical proposals for sweeping changes in various aspects of social and political life are perceived by some as a social pain-killers and by others – as democracy killers. The most controversial issue in these terms is the **minorities/immigration** problem. All the parties that had such electoral success in the first half of 2010 go to extremes in regulating these issues. Two out of five main points in the FPÖ's platform are the restriction of the Austrian citizenship law and putting a stop on the abuse of the asylum system in the country⁷. The FN advocates putting an end to the non-European immigration and the establishment of *jus sanguinis*. The PVV proposes ethnic registration (p.11), active repatriation of Dutch nationals originated from the Antilles (p.11), the removal of resources from immigration services, Dutch language proficiency as a requirement for welfare assistance (p.15)⁸. The Hungarian Jobbik has, maybe, the most radical ideas of all. Firstly, it identifies the co-existence of Magyars and the Roma as “one of the severest problems facing Hungarian society”⁹. In these terms the most important aim is tackling the Roma crime, and for that reason Jobbik states that “the foundation of a dedicated rural police service, or Gendarmerie¹⁰, is required.”¹¹ The justification of this is formulated in a style strongly reminiscent of the Nazi phraseology: “What is however simply beyond dispute, is that certain specific criminological phenomena are predominantly and overwhelmingly associated with this minority, and that as a result such phenomena require the application of fitting and appropriate remedies.”¹² Of course, nowhere in the party's programme is mentioned that the very same “appropriate remedies” will include policing the Roma minority through terror, in which the group was later accused. The Human

⁷ <http://www.fpoe.at>

⁸ http://www.pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf

⁹ <http://jobbik.com/temp/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf>, p.11

¹⁰ The gendarmerie, Magyar Garda, is a banned paramilitary group with insignia modeled on the Arrow Cross of Hungary's wartime Nazis. During the WW2 the Magyar Garda was in charge for Jews' and Roma's deportation to concentration camps.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.



Rights Report 2009 of the U.S. Department of State, published in March 2010, raises the awareness of human rights problems in Hungary including “the police use of excessive force against suspects, particularly the Roma”. The Report points out: “Other problems worsened, such as extremist violence and a harsh rhetoric against ethnic and religious minority groups. The extremists increasingly targeted Roma, resulting in the deaths of four Roma and multiple injuries to others.”¹³

Such actions in the extreme right ideology are justified with the belief that the immigration/minorities are the cause of all social problems. Thus, turning **certain social groups into a scapegoat** is one of the key concepts of the extreme right. Branding the immigration or an ethnic group as a common enemy proved to be a strategy that still manages to increase political mobilisation and electoral support. This approach which was the core of the extreme right parties *par excellence* (Mussolini’s and Hitler’s parties) obviously continues to have the same effect on the electorate, given just the presence of the appropriate conditions (economic crisis, social tensions, etc.). And that is the main reason why the extreme right parties nowadays are still considered as **undermining the fundamentals of the contemporary democracy**.

For the extreme right phenomenon such an understanding is far from being a single idea. The concept of restricting and isolating all the “foreign elements” of the society are just a part of a bigger goal: to make a strong nation-state where diversity in terms of residents, culture, religion and language will not be a value. For instance, the PVV openly advocates the “Constitutional protection of the dominance of the Judeo-Christian and humanistic culture of the Netherlands.”¹⁴ Jobbik states it will fight “the last decades’ intentional Liberal destruction of our national consciousness¹⁵” through the “strengthening of Hungarian national self-knowledge, acceptance by the state of a greater responsibility in the dissemination of culture, abolition of the Liberal cultural-dictatorship, (...)”¹⁶ The older parties appeal for return to traditional values (in a pretty broad sense though): the FN proposes to make access to abortion more difficult or illegal; to give income to mothers who do not work; and to promote local traditional culture. FP?’s candidate in the 2010 presidential elections,

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¹³ <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136035.htm>

¹⁴ http://www.pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf, p.35

¹⁵ <http://jobbik.com/temp/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf>, p.14

¹⁶ Ibid.

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Barbara Rosenkranz, openly defends traditional values especially regarding family. She is critical of feminism and openly argues that gender mainstreaming aims to create sexless human beings.

One of the most typical features of the extreme right is **ultra-nationalism** which goes hand in hand with **strong anti-EU attitudes**. This was a core point in the platforms of all the extreme right parties that we saw in the European political arena in 2010. FP's three basic programme points are: no intrusion of the EU policies in Austria, no increase of the Austrian contribution to the EU and no accession of Turkey into the EU. The FN has always been advocating greater independence not only from the EU but from other international organisations, too. Jobbik's president Gábor Vona named the Lisbon Treaty a "disgrace for Europe"¹⁷ and the day when it comes into effect the "most disgraceful day in the history of European integration."¹⁸ The PVV is highly Euro-skeptical as well.

Apart from their political programmes where the pattern of the extreme right ideas is obvious, the parties in question have a series of other similarities. For example, the **situation in which they gain electoral support**: all four parties that were observed used the difficult economic situation and the lack of successful tackling of the problems it brought by the governing parties. The extreme right profited from the fact that the traditional parties were discredited in the people's eyes and took the initiative by proposing quick and radical solutions. Even more - the extreme right alternative was presented as the only healer of the crisis, the savior of the country. This populist style expressed through **simplistic formulae was creating** plain emotional messages, which however, have strong effect on the voters: they awake the people's deepest feelings of fear and suspicions towards the foreigners, and this finally opens the floodgates to xenophobia. The most eloquent example in this sense was in Hungary, where Jobbik rose by using the country's deep economic crisis to revive traditional Hungarian scape-goating of the Jewish and Roma communities. We can argue then that the extreme right parties emerged as a spontaneous reaction to a concrete situation (economical, political or social), which makes the existence of the extreme right parties

¹⁷ <http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik-announcements/3128.html>

¹⁸ Ibid.



dependent on external actors or events. They do not have self-sufficient reasons for their own political existence and in compensation they search for already existing actors or ideas which they can oppose. That is how they become “ANTI-parties” based on the contestation of the other political projects.

Another distinguishing feature is that the extreme right parties are united around the strong personality of their leader. Haider was charismatic leader, but so are Geert Wilders and Gábor Vona – leaders of the new extreme right parties in Europe. And lastly, we can mention the **large social base** from which their electorate comes. The leaders through demagogic means manage to attract large and heterogeneous parts of the society.

2. The extreme right wav

As we have seen *supra*, the parties which have shifted the political paradigm of many EU countries in such a short period do not just display a series of similarities between each other. They actually follow a certain extreme right pattern that has been shaped by their extreme right predecessors. In that case we cannot speak of the rise of a new generation of extreme right parties but rather of a new wave of intensification of the well-known extreme right phenomenon. But then, what is the reason that has triggered the breakthrough of so many similar parties precisely in that moment?

The first and major cause of the push on of the extreme right ideas was undoubtedly the **global economic crisis**. Its impact was two-fold: On the one hand, it was a reason by itself for a consolidation of radical political attitudes as the worsened economical situation of many countries and the inability of the parties in office to assure financial stability has pushed many voters to search solutions in sterner political visions that promise not only rigid economies but also alleged fairer allocation of the resources. On the other hand, the crisis became a catalyst for the emergence of a chain of additional social and political problems as the unemployment, crime, immigration, etc. In both cases the extreme right parties managed to come up with fast and want-to-be adequate solutions which gained the support of a non-negligible part of certain

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societies. Thereby the extreme right parties had the perfect timing and the perfect strategy which assured them such a good performance at the elections.

Another factor that facilitated the success of the extreme right parties was the **lack of a serious alternative** by the traditional parties in terms of tackling such sensitive problems for Europe as the immigration or Muslim minorities. The traditional approach of the main parties obviously did not have the expected result. The problems deepened, and at certain point the accumulated negative sentiments in the society just burst out. Thus, the extreme right fulfilled the vacuum left by the traditional political actors.

The third important factor that favoured the success of the extreme right formations was **the growing nationalistic tendencies**. Although such ideas have never disappeared from the domestic political agenda, they were somehow marginalised on the European scene. At the European Parliament, the Euro-skeptic parties neither were accepted by the biggest party groups (the Conservatives, the Socialists and the Liberals), nor were able to form a really strong group of their own that could influence the decision-making process. The nationalistic attitudes could not have a strong voice in European institutions but they preserved their political potential at the national level. At the very moment when the countries were experiencing serious problems (like the current economic downturn) the nationalistic feelings revived, and the extreme right parties profited from this opportunity.

Additionally, there are countries like France, Belgium and Austria where the right-wing extremism is a phenomenon existing for decades which proves the fact that in certain European countries (mainly in the old EU member states) the **extreme right ideology has traditionally been supported** by some parts of the society. For instance, the French Front National has existed since 1972 and not once showed a remarkable electoral performance. The “political earthquake” (as characterised by the then Prime Minister of France, Lionel Jospin) was caused when Jean-Marie le Pen obtained 16.9% in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections and became the main rival of the President Jacques Chirac. Another example is Austria: The FPÖ, which was created in 1956 (but its



predecessor VDU was founded even earlier, in 1949), in 2004 won 44% of the votes in Carinthia and entered the governing coalition. The Flemish Vlaams Blok made its appearance in the 1978 general elections and still participates in Flemish political life through its successor Vlaams Belang. At the regional elections in 2003 Vlaams Belang won 33% of the votes in Antwerp, the biggest Flemish city, and became second biggest party in the Flemish parliament.

To conclude, the combination of the above-mentioned factors (without presenting an exhaustive list) creates a specific environment that favours extreme right ideologies. Nevertheless, no matter how logical these conditions seem for furthering right-wing extremism, there are new questions arising: What does this phenomenon show us and how can we interpret it? Are the Europeans “fed up” with the mediocre phraseology and policies of the traditional political parties, or have they gone one step back, denying Europe an effort to build a cohesive and tolerant society? What is the future of the extreme right parties?

3. The Future of the Extreme Right Parties

Having the woeful experience of the WW2, Europe often sees the extreme right phenomenon as a serious threat to its political health and core values. And it really is so. However, we often tend to demonise it, thus giving even more life to it, instead of trying to get to the crux of the matter. We consider the extreme right the political illness of Europe, but we have not thought that it might be a symptom of a deeper problem. And the main problem could be found in the fact that there are certain tendencies in all EU member states of mistrust of the European idea and of strengthening the attitudes of putting a stress on the state. These Euro-skeptic and nationalistic feelings are additionally fueled by the economic instability as the one that the whole globe is suffering from now. In such a fragile situation, a reliable political project is needed in order to catch these public attitudes, to stream them and to assure a democratic transfer of such ideas onto the political stage. The traditional parties, however, did not manage to present such a project and left a political vacuum which was quickly covered

by different extreme right formations with disputable affiliation to democratic values. At European level, the Euro-skeptic and nationalistic ideas were covered up or just neglected, and the idea of the European unity and identity was fostered. But these attempts had apparently the reverse effect to what was intended: what emerged was the European fatigue.

We can argue that, although extremist ideas do find support in certain societies in the EU, the prevailing part of the voters is not blindly guided by a xenophobic and anti-human motivation. The vote for the extreme right is very often a protest vote against the ruling parties and a sign of the lack of political ideas reflecting nationalistic beliefs. And at the moment when a serious political alternative presented by a traditional party, and comprising real feelings of the electorate is formed, the voters would give their preference to exactly this party and not to an extremist one. A good example for this is the case with this year's general election in Belgium. In Flanders, where traditionally the extreme right Vlaams Belang enjoys a high support, the Flemish preferred the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), a centre-right and separatist party that strives for the peaceful secession of Belgium. N-VA received some 30% of the votes in Flanders and won 27 seats in the 150-seat Chamber of Representatives, whilst the VB won more than twice less - 12. This shows that the separatist tendencies that have existed for quite a long time in the Northern part of Belgium can be caught by a centre-right party and not necessarily by an extremist one.

Conclusion

In 2010, just within a couple of months, several extreme-right parties showed an amazing success in the elections in different countries. This wave of strengthening the presence of extremist ideologies perturbed Europe that found itself in a position to start considering such non-traditional players as a non-negligible political factor. As we have seen in the paper, the rise of the extreme right was not due to a change of the extreme right ideology or behaviour – on the contrary, these parties continued to follow the same pattern as their predecessors did. So, the rise was provoked by the external factors:



firstly, the economic hardships, and secondly, the latent problems that accumulate tension over time, such as an unsuccessful integration of the minorities, the lack of a European legal framework in regulating these issues, nationalistic feelings, an undermined credibility of traditional parties, etc.

The extreme right does not adjust to the new social and political environment, it just waits for the suitable moment when it could come up and be successful the way it is. This is actually one of the reasons why the presence of the extreme right parties on the political scene is not so consistent. There are long periods during which these parties have a latent existence and are almost invisible on the political scene. But once they have the appropriate conditions, they quickly revive and gather a large support among voters. And when there is a factor that influences many countries, there is a wave of activation of these parties. This was precisely the case with the new extreme right wave in Europe. The initial reason (but not the only one) was the global financial crisis which had provoked a chain reaction of more socio-economic complications. The financial downturn fueled nationalistic feelings which had latently existed even before. George Friedman from STRATFOR shows how such feelings reached even the level of political elites. That is how he analyses the Greek-German relations in the light of the recent economic problems: "During the generation of prosperity between the early 1990s and 2008, the question of European identity and national identity really did not arise. Being a European was completely compatible with being a Greek. Prosperity meant there was no choice to make. Economic crisis meant that choices had to be made, between the interests of Europe, the interests of Germany and the interests of Greece, as they were no longer the same. What happened was not a European solution, but a series of national calculations on self-interest; it was a negotiation between foreign countries, not a European solution growing organically from the recognition of a single, shared fate."¹⁹

So, will these tensions mount even more, or will they be overcome through a feasible political project that does not go beyond the established democratic rules of the contemporary politics? This is up to the political elites and the voters to decide.

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¹⁹http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100510_europe_nationalism_and_shared_fate?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=100511&utm_content=readmore&elq=5776fa3ad8994a8f920b6d01d88a8cef

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“European” and “Extreme” Populists in the Same Row – the New Government of the Republic of Bulgaria

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Abstract: *The current (minority) government consists of the representatives of the political parties Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) led by the former Mayor of Sofia, Boyko Borisov. What makes this right-centre government especially interesting is that it is supported in the Parliament by the extremist party of a symbolic name - Ataka. This party, since its appearance in 2005, has done everything to present itself as an uncompromising opponent to all major tendencies in the European and Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, its sole creation has led to the quakes on the European political level, since it enabled the creation of the extremist group in the European parliament (EP), along with the parties of the similar provenience from other Member States. In the following text the author will try to explain how this paradox came about, that an extremist party, officially very sceptical of the European Union (EU), openly supported a centre-right party which bases its own identity on this supranational creation. For that purpose, we will explain the phenomenon of the rise of populism in Bulgaria in the last decade, which is a key factor for understanding the ways of cooperation and closeness of GERB and Ataka. We will also examine their programmatic and ideological differences and similarities, as well as the basic motives for their cooperation. Finally, we will try to answer the question that logically follows: what is the reason for this seemingly unnatural coalition and what is its scope.*

Keywords: *Bulgaria, Ataka, GERB, the European Union, populism, coalition.*

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2009 Parliamentary Elections

Parliamentary elections in July 2009, as it was expected earlier, radically changed the political scene of Bulgaria. The main favourite, the party of, at the time, Mayor of Sofia, Boyko Borisov – GERB won 39.72% of the votes, which enabled them to obtain 117 out of 240 seats in the Parliament¹. Since this success at the elections was not enough to form a government by themselves, they were forced to search for support among the smaller right-wing parties that managed to enter the Parliament². The parties from the previous government – Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) – had no chance to form another cabinet. Hence, the possible partners were both the *Blue Coalition* (formed by the *Alliance of Democratic Forces* (SDS) and *Democrats for Strong Bulgaria* (DSB) of the former Prime Minister Ivan Kostov) with 15 seats, the new party *Order, Law and Justice* (RZS) with 10 seats, as well as the extremist party *Ataka* with 21 seats. Viewed from aside, as a coalition of “sister” right-centered parties from the *European People Party* (EPP), only the *Blue Coalition* should have been an acceptable partner for GERB, since the other two potential candidates showed clear tendencies towards political extremism. This possibility was mentioned several times during the pre-election campaign, especially from the *Blue Coalition* side³. Nevertheless, Boyko Borisov openly rejected any possibility of creating pre-election coalitions, presuming that GERB would obtain enough seats to form the government alone. Since it did not happen, he pledged for the creation of the minority government which would be supported by one of the three parties/coalitions. Right after the results of the elections were made public, both *Ataka* and RZS gave their unconditional support, while the representatives of the *Blue Coalition* wanted a deal on the economic programme to fight recession, still assuming they were the only relevant partner for GERB⁴.

Borisov offered to his potential partners some sort of a contract to establish the principles for support of the minority government: a quick revision of the work of the previous cabinet of Sergey Stanishev, revision of the work of the previous governments and issuing indictments against those who broke the law, the implementation of urgent anti-crisis measures, adop-

¹ Bulgaria has a combined electoral system, under majority rule GERB won 26 seats, which completed the number of 117 seats in the Parliament

² Since Borisov opted out in advance from any kind of coalition with the parties forming the previous government, Bulgarian Socialist Party and Movement for Rights and Freedoms <http://www.dnes.bg/izbori2009/2009/07/05/pyrvoto-obeshtanie-na-GERB-nov-izbiratelen-kodeks.73813>

³ GERB http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/07/03/748476_borissov-rejects-expert-cabinet, Blue Coalition – Kostov and Dimitrov on the right-center government http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/07/05/750188_kostov-and-dimitrov-centre-right-coalition-is-best-solution

⁴ http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/07/12/753775_borissov-pledges-to-cut-down-on-parliament-committees



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tion of the new law on political parties and a new law on referendum, enforcing new measures that would help unfreezing of the EU structural funds⁵, reform of the parliamentary services and the rules of functioning of the parliament in order to regain the citizens' trust in this institution, reform of the government administration and the number of the members of the government, in order to adjust it to the financial crisis, the implementation of the cabinet's programme for cooperation with political parties and citizens' associations. In return for the support, GERB offered a political partnership that would include a joint legislative initiative, through the parliamentary bodies, cooperation in the committees, leading positions in most of the committees for the opposition, etc.⁶

The Blue Coalition and RZS refused to sign this document, pointing out different reasons for their decision. The *Blue Coalition* called this memorandum “purposeless” and unnecessary, maybe because of the official reaction of the sister parties from the EPP to the possibility of signing such a document jointly with *Ataka*⁷. Still, they announced they would provide the cabinet with its support even without signing the memorandum. On the other hand, the RZS leader Jane Janev refused to sign it with a pretty banal explanation that he did not like Borisov's “royal” approach to him⁸. Most probably, the members of the *Blue Coalition* did not want to diminish their own significance by becoming just one of the signatories of the memorandum, while the RZS was probably making its own political calculations.

The only party that did sign this memorandum and continued to give (officially) an unconditional support was *Ataka*. Since that moment, an essential partner relationship between GERB and *Ataka* has been confirmed, while the *Blue Coalition* and RZS (whose parliamentary group fell apart soon after) gave government their support only occasionally, when it was in line with their own interests. Later developments confirmed that *Ataka* was really the only unconditional support for Borisov's cabinet, regardless of the fact that this coalition was ideologically incompatible. Borisov's party, a member of the EPP, which includes in its very name and programme a “European” definition, forms an unofficial coalition with a party that bases its discourse on the attack on the fundamentals of the European Union itself. We will therefore analyse the

⁵ Since the conditions to lower the level of corruption and organized crime in Bulgaria were not met, the help of EU structural funds is temporarily frozen.

⁶ http://sofiaecho.com/2009/07/15/755933_GERBs-memorandum-to-right-wing-parties

⁷ http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/07/19/757819_yanevs-order-law-and-justice-party-will-not-sign-gerbs-memorandum

⁸ *Ibid.*

complementarities of the two parties on the programmatic level and then move onto the practical level by examining their essential similarities and interests.

(Non)Consent on the Conceptual Level – Political Programmes of GERB and *Ataka*

Political party *Ataka* has very few programme documents. Up to now, it has offered two documents to the public – the *20 Points* and a *Programme Scheme*⁹ which could be considered more as drafts on *Ataka*'s main goals, than as a coherent and meaningful programme. Both documents can be summarised into the following objectives of the party:

- Preventing all “traitors of the nation” from threatening the existence of the Bulgarian state (which chiefly includes the Bulgarian Turks and their political representatives, as well as various political parties which are not pro-nationalistic oriented – BSP, SDS, DSB, etc.) So, despite the formally advocated maximum respect for the *Bulgarian ethnic model*¹⁰, in reality it is orientated towards ethnic Bulgarians.
- Social care – the strengthening of the state social and health care funds, which would eliminate negative effects of the transition, caused by foreign factors (IMF and others) and the “domestic traitors”.
- Anti-corruption measures – reducing the administration and improvement of its functioning. They also advocate a revision of privatisation that was conducted before and bringing to trial the politicians and the so-called “friendly circles” that allegedly got rich during the privatisation process.
- Fight against crime by strengthening the informational capabilities of the army and strengthening the judicial system.
- Economic measures – they advocate the so-called “Social Capitalism”, meaning: the protection of Bulgarian economy (increase of trade barriers) and a growing involvement of the state in it, aid to domestic business, re-nationalisation of the private companies that went into bankruptcy after privatisation.

⁹ http://www.ataka.bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=5, http://www.ataka.bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=5

¹⁰ *Bulgarian ethnic model* was formally established with the 1990 Constitution and its Article 11.4 which forbids any political work based on ethnic, cultural and similar differences. Therefore, Bulgarian nation is defined as primarily civil, while at the same time guaranteeing individual right to manifestation of ethnic and cultural peculiarities. More on this Yantsislav Yanakiev, *The Bulgarian ethnic model – a factor of stability in the Balkans*, https://intra.css.ethz.ch/milsoc/ev_prague_02_vlachova_yanakiev.pdf



- Foreign policy – *Ataka* is severely opposed to Bulgaria's participation in NATO and the IMF. It also criticises the EU as it is now, advocating the creation of a more equal Europe of nations, without any space for Turkey in it. They strongly disagree with the foreign policies of the USA, Israel, as well as with strengthening Turkey's influence especially vis-à-vis Bulgaria.
- Change of the democratic system in the state towards some form of “direct democracy”- something close to the presidential system with frequent referenda, with a clear aim to mitigate the influence of political parties. Finally, they also advocate the clearly defined role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the country's politics, by forming some sort of advisory body that would assist the government.

On the other hand, GERB has offered much more coherent, meaningful and precise basic document – the *Programme for European Development of Bulgaria*¹¹. The document offers a set of concrete aims that should be achieved, or at least started, during the next government that was assumed to be a GERB-led one. The programme is clearly divided into several parts:

- Ensuring the respect for the law and the state system – fight against corruption and organised crime, overall security improvement, reform of the judicial system directed at faster and more efficient verdicts, smaller and more efficient administration.
- Increasing the quality of life – a quick way out from the financial crisis through appropriate measures (a dialogue between the trade unions, the government and businessmen with additional fiscal and stimulation measures), quick unfreezing of the access to the EU Structural Funds, better energy management, improvement of the conditions of rural economy, tourism, transport and infrastructure policies.¹²
- Improvement of life conditions – better social and health policies, better and more efficient decentralisation and an increase of the importance of the regions, greater environmental protection.
- Human resources development – improvement of education and science, intensified promotion of Bulgarian culture, giving priority to the development of information and telecommunication technologies.¹³

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¹¹ This programme is basically an upgrade of their first programme from 2007 – *New Right Agreement for Bulgaria* http://www.GERB.bg/uf/documents/Programma_za_evropeisko_razvitiie_na_Bulgaria.pdf

¹² This is the weakest formulated part of the program, without any concrete measures – relatively short compared to the previous chapter.

¹³ The document envisages the Bulgarian culture not in ethnic/traditional sense but in civil one – the emphasis is very much on the citizens.

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- Foreign policy and defence – mainly a full support for the EU and NATO with an accent on the field where Bulgaria could have an influence: the Balkans and the Black Sea region. The document especially emphasises the idea that the EU and NATO are not alternatives for each other.¹⁴

What is particularly indicative here is that the whole document, in each point, relies on the programme and practical policies of the EU, thus declaring in practice that the main policy which will be conducted will be in line with the EU standards and proclaimed goals.

Here is also evident the main difference between these two parties which should be essential and practically insurmountable. *Ataka* presented a xenophobic, catch-all document, designed for all kinds of extremists¹⁵ that should attract by proclaiming a set of alternately extreme right and extreme left policies (to a much lesser extent). However, these principles are not clearly and precisely defined, which makes it much easier for the party to change its attitudes or even to neglect them if necessary. In terms of its programme, *Ataka* is a party which, according to the definition of Neven Cvetićanin, is positioned between the margin and the post-civil political field (Cvetićanin, 2008:600). Therefore, this party does not cause a completely new order, but strongly opposes its typical policies: European and Euro-Atlantic integration, guaranteed human rights and liberties, open market and so on. The strongest criticism is directly targeted at the West, mainly at the USA and its foreign policy, and at Turkey as an open and direct enemy of Bulgaria.

On the contrary, GERB declares its commitment to the EU and NATO, and to the civil concept of the state. For GERB, ethnic issues are not of crucial importance (at least according to their programme), and the elaboration of a topic which refers more to the 19th century is within the area of competence of the historians and not the politicians. Besides, GERB opens a whole series of questions which do not have any significance for *Ataka*'s political concept: sustainable development, ecology, better communication with the EU, etc.

Both programmes have some similarities though, mainly in the field of the fight against systematic corruption and organised crime which is defined by both parties as the biggest problem in the country. This common goal transferred to the politics in practice will be observed in detail later in the text.

¹⁴ http://www.GERB.bg/uf/documents/Programa_za_evropeisko_razvitiie_na_Bulgaria.pdf p. 71

¹⁵ In the beginning such an electoral body reflected on the *Ataka*'s structure itself – however, over time through various divisions in the period 2005-2009 the party was reduced exclusively to the circle around Siderov.



What Unites and What Divides. Self-Identification at European Level

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From a practical point of view, there are many things that unite Boyko Borisov and Volen Siderov than we could conclude at first glance. First of all, they have both gathered their parties around their own charisma and access to the electronic media: the one through its own TV show¹⁶, and the other – on the basis of TV shootings of police actions in which he himself participated. Besides, both parties and both leaders are connected by a populist logic. The phenomenon of populism has been one of the features of the Bulgarian political scene since 2001 when the party/coalition of Simeon II Saxe-Coburg-Gotha won the parliamentary elections. The populist parties form their position mainly on the basis of the opposition “us” vs. “them” which stands in the foreground, where “us” stands for the whole (underprivileged) nation “represented” by the leader and the party, whilst “them” is usually understood as a “target” that can be embodied in some adversary (even enemy) leader, political elite, ethnic group, etc.¹⁷ Another characteristic are the unreal promises about the results which will be achieved once they come to power. Simeon shifted his populist platform around the promises of a fast improvement after the 800 days of his government, and around the critics of the former “corrupted” Bulgarian government led by Ivan Kostov and the SDS.

Siderov and Borisov have similar approaches to politics but the contents with which they manipulate in public are different, that is, how they manage to mobilise the electorate of diverse background. The “enemy” is here as well: For GERB, these are, first of all, the corrupted political elites personalized by BSP, and problems with crime and corruption. In addition, a significant part of the GERB’s rhetoric was connected with the opposition to the BSP’s participation in the DPS in the government. This part of the GERB’s public discourse was formally without any allusions of ethnical hatred: what was emphasised was the role of DPS in corruption affairs mainly associated with the EU funds.¹⁸ For *Ataka* and Siderov, the spectrum of potential enemies is always apparent – in this sense, efforts are focused in three directions: ethnical distance vis-à-vis the Bulgarian Turks; fight against corruption and crime; and revision of the former period, respectively investigative procedure against the repre-

¹⁶ The TV programme *Ataka* on the SKAT cable television through which Siderov has reached wide popularity. In these presentations he has formed the core of his future party’s identity. This television was the main “spokesperson” and promoter of *Ataka* until the breakup with Siderov in November 2009. More at http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=109830

¹⁷ More on the phenomenon of populism in E. Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, Verso, London, 2006

¹⁸ Borisov about DPS and the role of its leader Ahmed Dogan : <http://news.bpost.bg/story-read-14523.php>; Borisov about the MRF and the Muslims in Bulgaria right after the elections: <http://news.bpost.bg/story-read-14523.php>

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sentative of the BSP. Other “enemies” were left aside for the time being.

So, in public discourse, Borisov and Siderov found the “lowest common denominator”: fight against the DPS¹⁹, fight against corruption and crime, as well as bringing to trial the preceding governing political constellation. Putting the emphasis exclusively on these issues and at the same time by-passing and concealing the subjects where they have different views, set the ground on which the two parties could form an alliance.

GERB is a party member of the EPP and as such it supports policies which it jointly adopts with its sister-parties. It is a centre-right party, moderately conservative, that respects the civil compromise reached after WW2. Therefore, according to its self-identification at European level, it would be most natural for that party to form a coalition, as far as it can, with a sister party and to carry out coherent and ideologically close policies. By the way, Borisov and GERB made an actual alliance with an extreme right party, which is strongly opposing the majority of the policies that they represent. Moreover, this party had not only achieved an impact of its discourse on the domestic level, but in 2007 it influenced the European political scene as well. Then, the parliamentary group *Identity, Sovereignty, Tradition* was formed in the European parliament. It gathered the majority of the extremists in the European parliament: Le Pen’s National Front (FN), the Austrian Freedom Party (FP?), the Flemish Interest party (VB) from Belgium, Greater Romania Party, Alessandra Mussolini’s Social Alliance and others.

On the other hand, the alliance with Siderov is very desirable for other reasons. Firstly, *Ataka* is not a party that has been in office, hence GERB can freely bring to trial the former governing parties. Secondly, Ivan Kostov and the *Blue coalition* lost power in 2001 in an extremely humiliating way which would bring Borisov to the position of making a pact with losers. Thirdly, the representatives of the *Blue coalition* are politicians that are backed up with a concrete and coherent set of political objectives, and specific compromises which are demanded by the Borisov’s ruling system would be much harder to achieve. Fourthly, the electorates of the GERB and *Ataka* almost overlap as Siderov gathers extreme protest vote while Borisov mainly pleads for moderate right electorate. And finally, by signing the Memorandum, Siderov proved to be a pragmatic politician whose goal is first of all to reach power and not

¹⁹ The prominent Bulgarian political analyst Ivan Krastev even considered that the essence of these elections was the elimination of DPS from the government as all the parties in opposition that had entered the parliament accepted this attitude.



to implement concrete policies. He has justified his unreserved support through the fight for the interests of Bulgaria, namely by eliminating the biggest “internal enemy” for the government: Ahmed Dogan and his party DPS. To what extent this transfer was painless is clearly illustrated by the fact that during the 2007 local elections in Sofia, *Ataka*’s main target was Borisov and his administration. In the next election *Ataka* did not have any problem to support GERB’s candidate for the mayor, Jordanka Fandukova, justifying its decision by the necessity to win convincingly against the socialist candidate.²⁰ And if we examine more attentively the Memorandum which GERB offered other parties about the post-election support for a minority government, we will see that by its signing *Ataka* actually agreed to the pro-European foreign policy, which is in conflict with its earlier aspirations.

The recent events revealed that there is a much higher degree of mutual consent between the partners, which goes beyond technical co-operation, that should reach the implementation of the above-mentioned objective. One of the principal initiatives of *Ataka* since its very foundation has been the removal of the short newscast in Turkish language which is broadcast on the National Television on working days as an unconstitutional right acquired thanks to the influence of Ahmed Dogan.²¹ Absolutely surprisingly,²² Boyko Borisov endorsed this proposal and wanted a referendum on the issue to be held, which resulted in the reaction of the official Ankara and the European parliament.²³

Common Practical Policies – Non-European for Europe

The parliamentary support which GERB gets from *Ataka* is extremely important for the implementation of the essential promise on the basis of which this party has received its mandate: tackling corruption and organised crime. And as *Ataka* very declaratively advocates a radical fight against crime, it was easy for Borisov to find support for introducing a series of restrictive procedures and laws which would empower the police and secret services, and make courts work more efficiently. The new Minister of the Interior in the Boyko Borisov’s cabinet, Tsvetan Tsvetanov, demonstrated decisiveness to launch

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²⁰ http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/10/13/798858_right-wingers-to-back-GERBs-fandukova-to-be-mayor-of-sofia

²¹ According to *Ataka* the newscasts should be prohibited since the Constitution states that Bulgarian is the official language in the country, and that is why no foreign language should present in any public media. This news is broadcast once a day and has duration of 10 minutes.

²² See the news from December 2009 about this initiative of *Ataka* http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/10/16/800810_is-siderovs-party-becoming-ataka-lite

²³ http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/12/17/832018_european-parliament-to-debate-bulgarias-proposed-referendum-on-turkish-newscasts

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the reforms as soon as possible, having in mind mainly the frozen EU Structural Funds. Their mandate started with the announcements of dealing with corrupt politicians from the preceding governments.²⁴ Therefore, the focus was put on the EU demands for a decrease in the corruption level, and the fight against organised crime. However, what turned out to be primary criticism was that the problem was not tackled from the standpoint of the creation of a systematic and democratic capacity for fighting corruption and crime, but was rather dealt with by means of using larger powers, which often leads to the violation of human rights and liberties. And here we face the final paradox of the present government: in its striving to promote a commitment to the pro-European principles, Borisov indirectly, every now and then, violates the fundamental tenets on which the EU itself is built.

The first important measure, which nonetheless caused worries among the public, was the amendment to the Electronic Communications Act. According to the proposal, the police would have unlimited access to information that is at disposal of the internet database and mobile telephone providers. After the pressure exerted by the opposition, mainly by the representatives of the *Blue coalition*²⁵, and by the NGOs as well, in January 2010, the most controversial provisions were rejected, and more precise definitions of the conditions in which such drastic measures could be applied were suggested.²⁶

Then, the reforms of the National Security Agency (DANS) started, in order to allow for smaller and mobile groups to gain more authorities. For the purpose of fighting organised crime and corruption at the high levels of the former cabinet, the police operations *Octopus* and *the Impudent* were launched and initially supported by the EU representatives.²⁷ The results of these actions were the arrests of several people closely connected to the cabinet of Sergey Stanishev.

A reform of the judiciary itself is envisaged in accordance with the long-standing EU requirements. The problem lies in the fact that justice is too slow and inefficient and lawsuit procedures often end up with the majority of the accused being set free. The reform itself, which is carried out through the amendments to the Penal Procedure Code, contains three controversial items that were criticised by the opposition: the introduction of the institution of a “reserve lawyer” in cases when the lawyer of the accused is absent at the hearings without a seri-

²⁴ This statement was presented even before the government was formed: http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/09/03/778855_bulgaria-says-former-cabinet-ministers-to-be-indicted-in-next-few-days

²⁵ The only party that unreservedly supported GERB was Ataka http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/12/22/834248_electronic-communication-act-amendments-for-first-reading-in-parliament

Martin Dimitrov, the President of SDS, said that instead of enjoying freedom and security, Bulgarians are forced to choose between the one or the other: http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/12/22/834817_electronic-eavesdropping-amendments-passed-at-first-reading

²⁶ http://www.sofiaecho.com/2010/01/26/848150_GERB-proposals-on-electronic-eavesdropping-act

²⁷ <http://dnes.dir.bg/news.php?id=5887759>



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ous reason (the opposition criticised this decision as a Stalinist one, as it deprives the accused of the right to choose his or her defender); then another introduction of an unlimited custody for persons suspected of being involved in criminal activities (the unlimited custody was abolished in 2006 because of the great number of rulings of the European Court for Human Rights against Bulgaria); introduction of the institution of a secret or anonymous witness (who can be someone from the police or the secret service), as well as the possibility of a conviction just on the basis of information collected by the police and secret service.²⁸

Furthermore, the greatest novelty, in the light of the previously discussed legal changes planned by the government and together with the amendments to the Law on the Judiciary, is the introduction of specialised courts that would deal exclusively with the cases of the high-level organised crime and corruption.²⁹

All these measures will most probably contribute to the achievement of certain positive changes, chiefly in relation to the criticism coming from the EU, but also in connection with the level and influence of organised crime and corruption. On the other hand, they should be time-framed and should have a clear goal. Moreover, the implementation of the measures has not given any specific results up to now, whilst the ruling circles constantly concentrate more and more instruments of power in their hands, without any guarantees that they would be used in case of a real need.

The implementation of the actions up to now has revealed that the authorities have not launched the essential fight against crime yet. The analysts criticise the government that the problem is still far from being dealt with, which stems from the fact that the indicted are mostly either members of the former regime or small criminals (with the presence of the media, of course).³⁰

Conclusion

The actions undertaken by GERB with *Ataka*'s support are the evidence of a consolidation of a strong alliance that must edge out all other rivals from the political scene. However, this alliance does not indicate a coherence of ideas

²⁸ http://www.sofiaecho.com/2010/04/02/881907_radical-justice

²⁹ http://www.sofiaecho.com/2010/05/04/896444_bulgaria-will-have-special-courts-for-serious-crimes-interior-minister-says

³⁰ <http://waz.euobserver.com/887/30318>

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that could be implemented through concrete policies and increase the standard of living of the Bulgarians. According to Professor Tatyana Burudzieva from the New Bulgarian University, all successes of this government, since it was formed, have been based on the actions of the Ministry of the Interior, and this fact by itself does not prove that this is a successful and capable cabinet.³¹ Therefore, Borisov, in a typically populist manner, has put all the stakes on the very same approach by which he had been gaining Bulgarian citizens' support up to that moment, namely the fight against crime and corruption. But he could not mobilise the strength that is necessary for the country's real way out of the economic crisis, nor could he implement any point of GERB's own programme concerning economic development. The dialogue between the government, business and trade union on the creation of a new economic model has not started. Thus, in a strange way, this period reminds one of the years 1992-1993 when the first SDS government reduced its activities to the processing of its political opponents.

In fact, not a single government from 2001 up to now, could fulfil the (populist) promises that had brought them to power. Each of them continued in the manner that was paved by the 1997 SDS-cabinet, led by Ivan Kostov. It remains to be seen if the reforms and the fight against crime, undertaken by the biggest "Europeans" in Bulgaria with the support of the biggest opponents of such Europe, will manage to really change something.

On the other hand, the lack of a normal reaction to such a government and the EU's support for it are quite puzzling. Two examples from the past are illustrative enough that such reaction could be very sharp if there were a will for it – the first is the case when the Austrian Freedom Party (FP?) entered the government in 2000, and the second one is when Tomislav Nikolić became President of the National Assembly of Serbia in 2007. It turns out that, while waiting for the cabinet to cope with organised crime and corruption, the EU leaders are willing to tolerate *Ataka*, without a regard to the real consequences of such support for the present government, namely *Ataka*'s discourse to become gradually legitimised at the national level.

³¹ <http://www.desant.net/show-news/20373/>



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Public Opinion in Turkey on EU Accession – an (Un)desirable Marriage?

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Abstract

The essay deals with the issue that is rarely present in the mainstream literature on EU enlargement: Turkish public attitude on the (possible) EU accession. As shown in the paper, Turks are mostly Euro-sceptics and for various reasons: some of them overlapping with Euro-sceptics in the CEE countries before their accession, and some of them do not: the lack of knowledge, the problems of the so-called “sensitive issues”, the hope of the minorities to get necessary protection etc. The EU itself is not helpful at all – dealing mostly with its own problems, and using the “Turkish issue” for domestic purposes, it is helping Euro-scepticism to flourish among the Turks.

Key words: Turkey, the EU, Euro-scepticism, enlargement, public opinion.

* * *

“Among the multitude of factors that shape Turkey’s association with EU, the public opinion about the membership gives form, intensity and legitimacy to the direction of the relations.”¹

Complexity of Relations

Several days ago, the EU started the dialogue with Turkey on the very sensitive issue of food safety. If Istanbul were a regular candidate country for the EU accession, nothing would be strange or

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¹ Çarkoglu A. “Societal perceptions of Turkey’s EU membership – Causes and consequences of support for EU membership” in Ugur M, and Canefe N (ed.): “Turkey and European Integration – Accession prospects and issues”, Routledge London, 2003, p. 21

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problematic with this news. Still, since Turkey is everything but a “regular” candidate, a heated debate was raised in the biggest and, by far, the most important EU country – Germany. The Coalition party in the German government, the Christian-Socialist Union (CSU) asked from the German chancellor Merkel to solve, once and for all, the “Turkish issue”, being afraid that Brussels will keep on opening negotiation Chapters, while the German government remains neutral to the “hot topic”.

At the same time, the US president Obama has stated in an interview that if the EU remains hesitant regarding Turkish accession, “...this will inevitably influence the way Turkish people see Europe. If they do not feel themselves as part of the European family, it is natural that they [Turks] will search for other partners and allies”².

It is very likely that the most controversial issue in the European Union and among the citizens of its Member States after the “Eastern”, or “Big Bang” enlargement is the possible accession of Turkey. The fundamental questions have been raised especially after the country formally declared its candidate status at the end of 2004. For some, that date, 17th December, 2004. (or even more so 3rd October the following year³) was a turning point, the moment when, after almost 40 years, it became clear that Turkey would eventually become part of the “European family”: “Turkey gained what it wanted. Its full membership perspective is clear. Another alternative is out of the question... I believe that Turkey will become a full member of the EU in the end. Then those who have some hesitations about Turkey will have totally different views”⁴. At the same time, others did not share this enthusiasm, on the contrary: “...we have no reason to celebrate. I am worried that there will be very serious problems both between the EU and Turkey and within Turkey itself”. The events that followed showed that nothing is still clear when Turkey is in question, that even the “well – known truth” of the accession to the EU (that once you become a candidate, you find yourself at the point-of-no-return) simply doesn’t fit this country. It is a *sui generis* case in this term, which is best shown by almost fifty years of troublesome relations with the EU (then ECC), since the first application in 1959.

“What is European identity?”, “What are the limits for Europe?”, “Can Europe ‘digest’ a country like Turkey?”, “Can a Muslim country become part of Europe?”, and “Is Turkey a European country at all?” were only some of the questions raised during the public debate in the different countries of the European Union in regard to this issue. Some questions are relevant, some not

² Interview to Italian journal “*Corriere della Serra*”, cited in <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Turska-bi-mogla-da-se-okrene-Istoku-ako-je-EU-odbije.sr.html>

³ At that date, accession talks with Turkey were symbolically opened

⁴ Abdullah Güll, at the time Turkish Foreign Minister and present President of the State, cited in Balytska, N. “Public opinion in Turkey and EU Member States on the Turkish EU Membership” *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Cross-Regional Conference for AFP Fellows in Political Science/International Relations/History*, TBA, Sinaia, Romania, Feb 23, 2006, http://www.allacademic.com/met/a/p124257_index.html



at all, but what they show is that the debate is mostly not based on rational issues and, moreover, that it does not embrace only the issue of Turkey – it is the debate with two very important questions for the EU citizens and the elite (this time, neither can be excluded): “Who are we really?” and “Where are we going?”

Why these questions are being asked particularly and with such intensity and passion in the case of Turkish accession will be briefly explained later in the essay, but the aim of this short work is not to deal with the perception of the Europeans of their own identity or differences or similarities with the Turks. We would like to use the opportunity to examine the other side’s opinion on the issue: How do Turks perceive the EU and continuing efforts of their elite to join it? What is shaping their opinion, how are they influenced by the length of the process? To what extent do the Turks understand the processes that will significantly shape their, or the future of their children?

In order to analyse these issues, we will first explain the theoretical framework. Then, we will focus on the empirical data about the feelings towards the EU. We will try to examine why Turks think the way they do, what is shaping their opinion, and moreover, how is it being changed, or how can it be changed. The significant number of Turks in diaspora, especially in Germany, can also play an important role in shaping their compatriots’ opinion. Can they? Also, we will try to see what the important rifts in the society on this issue are, and finally, how present events affect these sentiments.

Theoretical Framework vs. Empirical Data

The analysis will be carried out in accordance with Marks and Hooghe’s theory of the three dimensions of the public opinion (Hooghe, Marks, 2005)⁵. It explains that public opinion on the EU integration is built on three different dimensions: the first one is a cost – benefit analysis of every citizen regarding the economic integration. At this point, the sentiment toward integration is created both on the individual and collective levels (within the country). That, for instance, explains the firm opposition of “transition losers” in the CEE countries towards the European integration. The second level of influence is the exclusiveness/inclusiveness of the national identity. The EU integration may reinforce the national

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⁵ Cited in Masters thesis of Taraktas B, “Euro-Scepticism in Turkey – an atypical case”, College of Europe, 2005 – 2006.

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identity, as it did with the regions in Europe that already had strong identification, or it can weaken it, which is the argument of the Euro-sceptics. The last level of influence is through ideological preferences, positioning of the elites and political parties. Of course, the empirical events do not blindly follow this pattern, as will be clearly shown on the example of the public opinion in Turkey.

Despite the fact that Turkey has had the relations with the EU from 1959, there has been little academic discussion and surveys about the mass support for this relationship. The data from 1996 to the present day show a high commitment of Turks to European agenda – between 50 and 75% of the respondents support the EU membership (Çarkodlu, 2003:22). Of course, the change of 25% is huge and is the result of the events related to this issue in the last few years. It will be explained later that since we are facing the lowest support for the membership in the last 14 years, the present moment has to be examined and analysed. But, do the numbers give us a clear picture of the sentiments of Turkish citizens toward Europe? It seems that this is not the case. The surveys show that people's knowledge on the issues concerning the EU membership and other related topics is very limited. More than 50% of the respondents acknowledge that they have the lowest possible level of knowledge on these issues (Çarkodlu, 2003:25). According to Eurobarometer, the “never heard of” answer to the questions “What are the EP, the Commission, the ECB, the ECJ and the Council?” are respectively: 28%, 34%, 43%, 48% and 34% (Taraktas, 2006:35). The same survey shows that only 2% of Turkish people know the exact number of EU members, that the EU has an anthem, that EP is directly elected by the citizens, etc. (Taraktas, 2006:43). That explains why their preferences on these issues are very much context-dependent.

The numbers change significantly when the Copenhagen criteria are confronting the so-called “sensitive issues” of the Turkish society: the Kurdish minority problem, the abolition of the death penalty (highly connected to the imprisonment and conviction of the leader of Kurdish PKK, Abdullah Ocalan), the role of the army through the National Security Council (NSC) and the conflict with Greece about Cyprus. The majority of Turks disagree on the fulfilment of certain preconditions imposed by the European Union: “...a citizen who would vote yes in a referendum on Turkey's membership in the EU can also oppose the democratic and liberal reforms imposed by the EU. He can also be a ‘Euro-sceptic’ because of his perception of the EU as a Christian club, the Cyprus issue,



etc.”⁶ It seems that the prospect of EU membership does not provide an incentive good enough for the citizens to change their policy preferences on these issues yet. Turkish political elite, aware of this striking data, has tried to diminish the growing dissatisfaction with the attitude of the EU Member States by pointing out that “Turkey has to undergo sweeping reforms for its own sake, not just to ‘please Brussels’”⁷, but as the numbers show, without much success.

Euro-scepticism and the Roots of Turkish Sentiments

Rising Euro-scepticism⁸ is easy to explain. At the beginning of the 21st century only around 1 percent of Turkish electorate considered the EU and related foreign policy issues as the most important problem in their minds or preferences (Çarkodlu, 2003:33). The EU issues have climbed high on the agenda at the moment of crisis in relations of the two parties. A constant hesitation of the EU to grant Turkey the status of a candidate (due to various reasons) significantly shaped public opinion. Although the foundations of the Turkish Republic lie on the “Westernisation” that Kemal Atatürk conducted and that is preserved without mercy first by the army and lately by the judicial system (!), Turks are very aware of the persistence of negative sentiments with regard to their country. They feel that the so-called “Crusader Spirit” that lasted for centuries has not fully disappeared today. In the words of Atatürk: “The West has always been prejudiced against the Turks, but we Turks have always consistently moved toward the West” (Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, 2004:15). This notion that Turkey is being used as the “Others”, sometimes even as a means for the creation of some kind of “European identity”, raises frustration over the whole process and gives room for the view that the European Union is indeed a “Christian club”. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that, although Atatürk’s modernisation project had the objective of “reaching the level of modern (Western) civilization”, the sole Kemalist revolution was aimed at saving the “fatherland” from the invasion of the Western Great Powers. “Thus, the West had a hybrid connotation in the people’s mind: a model and a historical enemy” (Taraktas, 2006:40) This ambivalent notion would have dimin-

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⁶ Yilmaz, H. „Europeanization and Its discontents: Evidence from Turkey“, Paper to be presented at the Annual Meeting of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) 18 – 21 September 2003, Marburg, Germany, <http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/marburg/papers/26/3/Yilmaz.pdf>, 24.03.2006, p.3, cited in Taraktas B, Master thesis “Euroscepticism in Turkey – an atypical case”, College of Europe, 2005 – 2006, p. 35

⁷ Erdogan, R. T., Prime Minister of Turkey, cited in Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey: „Turkey in Europe, more than a promise?”, September 2004, p. 19

⁸ The word has firstly been used in Britain in the 1980’s to describe the policies of then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was trying to defend national sovereignty and slow down the process of creation of some sort of European federation. After the Maastricht Treaty ratification process, it is commonly used in different countries.

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ished long ago if it had not been for the controversial approach of the EU towards Turkey. But, notorious remarks of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, stating that Muslim Turkey is not and cannot be part of Europe, as well as French President Sarkozy's idea of "*comité des sages*"⁹ on the future of Europe and obligatory referendum in France on Turkish accession sheds new light on the idea of the EU as a Christian club in the minds of most of the Turks.

As the Eurobarometer surveys have clearly shown, the mistrust in the European Union have not decreased after Turkey obtained the candidacy status. The explanation is that this is due to the imposed conditionality which requires some very painful reforms on economic liberalisation, minorities and human rights, the "sensitive issues".

On the other hand, the frustration is growing especially among the intellectual elite who claims that there is no viable replacement for the European agenda. "Turkish foreign policy has always followed the Western perspective, in that Turkey always sided with Europe" (Taraktas, 2006:40) or "The alternatives to the EU? Of course, they exist. A big country with such geostrategic importance as Turkey does not lack the horizons. Turkey can, in time, become a regional force in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East and can also play a key role in the region called Eurasia. However, one should be realistic. In the ongoing process of globalisation, the world is turning toward the big blocks constituted by the United States, the EU, China and Japan. We cannot neglect this reality and stay out of these blocks. And it is the EU that we have closest relations with. We have more than a half of our trade with the Union. That is why the EU remains our objective, but the Union has to treat us with the same level of equality as other candidate countries."¹⁰ Therefore, anxiety and discomfort with constant delay of real negotiations are rising, since these delays are considered and perceived as stopping the progress of Turkey in general.

Bearing in mind that the support to the EU accession is declining, it is good to analyse where the discrepancies in this particular issue are. In every candidate country there is more than just a debate on pros and cons of becoming a member, there is a debate that embraces all the important issues of the society as a whole. At the Turkish party scene, which is number one "shaper" of the public opinion, despite the severe debates and (again) the rising clash between Islamisation and preserva-

⁹ "wise-men committee"

¹⁰ Interview with B. Yahnici, Vice – President of MHP (The Nationalist Movement Party) cited in Yaman Y. "*Le débat national en Turquie sur l'adhésion à l'union Européenne*", Master Thesis at the College of Europe, 2000 – 2001, p. 28



tion of the heritage of secularisation, all big, mainstream parties accept the idea of the EU membership, or are not strongly and publicly opposed to it. After the shift of the “EU debate” from foreign policy to “national sovereignty/territorial integrity versus liberalisation axis” (Taraktas, 2006:55) (as a result of the fact that the EU conditionality policy touched the so called “sensitive issues”), the main theme became the “cost of accession”. Even the parties that are opposed to the EU in general and raise the “national sovereignty” argument, are not tough Euro-sceptics. They mainly oppose the way the accession process is being done, but not the membership as such. So, their Euro-scepticism is policy-oriented and mainly concentrates on opposing the harmonisation of the laws on sensitive issues and not all of them (Taraktas, 2006:60). More interesting, though, is the position of the parties with strong Islamic affiliation. They are very firm in the case of “sensitive issues” and in holding anti – Western positions, but are mostly soft Euro-sceptics, not being strongly opposed to the membership as such, but to some policies. Although this approach might look a bit striking at first, there are reasons for it, and very pragmatic ones. Turkish legal system (the army and the Republican cleavage) had put a pressure on Islamists, taking the ground off their feet because of the everlasting conflict between laicism and Islamism. The strict understanding of secularisation by the Kemalists, according to which Islam has no place in the public sphere, has led to the banning of several pro-Islamist parties by the Constitutional Court in order to “protect laicism and state order”. The EU could provide those parties with the legal protection they need, and thus help overcome the exclusion of Islam from the public sphere.

At the very end of the party spectrum in Turkey are small parties who are the only ones taking up hard Euro-scepticism. The reason for embracing this line is the small cost for these parties and the possibility of self – differentiation (Taraktas, 2006:61). The special case is, of course, the pro-Kurdish party Hak Par (the Rights and Freedoms Party) whose interest in Kurdish problem is a clear reason to be very supportive of the EU accession. They believe the EU perspective can help preserve Kurdish identity and culture, “...enhance Kurdish rights and freedoms and transform regional authorities into regional parliaments”¹¹.

Apart from the political parties, the public opinion is highly influenced by the media. Various issues concerning the EU are

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¹¹ Party Manifesto of Hak Par, 2002, <http://www.hakpar.org.tr/program.htm>, cited in Taraktas, *op. cit.* p. 38.

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present in all Turkish media. A general concept of all the media is a mistrust in the EU, even in the pro-EU press. “Even academicians, who are known to be the EU supporters, publish articles which show mistrust in the EU” (Taraktas, 2006:43). Systematic attacks in the Euro-sceptic media are encouraged and supported by the negative stances existing even in the pro-EU media, especially in the case of important events with negative outcomes, such as the EU Council meetings, negative assessments of the achievements of Turkish government, etc. It is interesting that the media expressing different political points of view have a similar vocabulary, with differentiations being shown only in the sharpness of their criticism¹². If we are to offer an overall assessment of the Turkish media or, rather, of their influence, it is obvious that they are instigating Euro-scepticism.

The common analysis of the impact on the public opinion would, apart from the parties and the media, include the civil society as well. However, it is hard to identify any significant impact of it on the shape of Turkish public opinion. Turkey has gradually (after the 1923 revolution) changed and transformed into the institutionally strong democracy; still, democratic consolidation did not go as far as to create a flourishing civil society. Its impact is rather limited, since the modernising elite is still in control of the majority of institutional structures. The small number of civil society organisations, in comparison to the number of citizens, is a clear indication of this limitation of Turkish society. That is why any attempt to determine the impact on the public opinion is destined to fail. There is no impact of the civil society on the views about the EU membership (La Gro, 2007:185).

In conclusion to the analysis of the average Turkish citizen's opinion towards the EU accession, let's put it in the framework of the Marks and Hooghe's theory on the three dimensions of the public opinion. The case of an average Turkish citizen fulfils all three dimensions: Turkish voters who resist the EU membership are “rather poorly educated, right – wing supporters; they belong to a low or middle income group and are potential losers of the accession.” (Taraktas, 2006:38). They have very religious and anti-democratic attitudes, and usually come from the poor, rural region of Turkey. Their profile is somewhat similar to the profile of Euro-sceptics in Western Europe, or of a transition loser in Eastern Europe. Also, the exclusiveness of national

¹² Taraktas B., “*Les discours anti – européennes dans les médias turques*”, IFEA, <http://www.ifea-istanbul.net/>, 2005



identity in the self-identification process is, according to Eurobarometer, the highest in EU28 (74% of Turks define themselves only with national identity, and 68% of them do not see themselves as Europeans), which means that the third dimension exists as well.

“Europeans of Turkish Descent”

An important issue in Turkish case is also a huge number of Turks in the EU. Around 3 million are permanent residents or citizens of Western European countries, mainly Germany. The impact of their presence on the perception of European citizens on the future enlargement of the Union (not only on Turkey, but on the Western Balkans as well) is well known. Their homogeneity and concentrated presence has often been an example of mal-integration into the European society and was triggering Euro-sceptic voices to be raised against further enlargement and especially against the accession of Turkey to the EU. The real question is if these “gastarbeiters”¹³ who eventually became residents of the West European countries have any influence on the opinion of their compatriots towards the EU, and if they do, what kind of impact it is?

The events that occurred two years ago can give us a glimpse of the plans that the Turkish government has with regard to the Turks in the EU, and what the possibilities for their influence on the societies within the EU countries are. In February 2008, nine Turks tragically lost their lives in Germany in a fire that occurred in a building inhabited exclusively by this population. It raised a lot of fear among the Turks in Germany and suspicions in the Turkish press, particularly that German state wants to get rid of the Turks in Germany by all means, and that this was an arson attack. This kind of behaviour, especially the way the event was portrayed in the Turkish press¹⁴, was a sign of deep mistrust in good intentions of the EU Member States towards the Turkish residents. However, the “fire” that was caused by the fire and the tragic events was suddenly put down by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, in his, already famous, speech and “performance” in Cologne. 20 000 people had not been gathered in Germany for a long time, and were addressed in Germany by the Turkish Prime Minister for the very first time. “Europeans of Turkish descent” is the way Erdogan called them, clearly in an effort to make them a link between Turkish society

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¹³ Literally “guest worker”, meaning foreign workers in Germany who came there during the 60’s and 70’s and stayed, mostly from Turkey and Yugoslavia.

¹⁴ Turkish Hürriyet wrote: “Now, they can no longer cover things up”, cited in Ataman, F. “Erdogan’s one man show”, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,534519,00.html>

that is slipping into Euro-scepticism, and European, mostly German society, that has been sceptical about Turkish accession for a long time. This is the most important contribution of the “European Turks” to their homeland in a symbolic sense (avoiding to elaborate on the issue of remittances) – they should and, to some extent, they already represent a bridge between the suspicious nations and contrasted cultures. These two contrasted points of view explain to some extent all the controversy of the EU (should we say “Europe”) – the relations in Turkey and the uncertainty of their future.

Prospects

Finally, before we conclude, it is worth mentioning that the support toward accession to the EU in Turkey has again fallen under 50 % (it is 49%, according to Eubarometer)¹⁵. This result is clearly connected to the newest delay in the negotiations, the conditionality issue and again, as perceived, a rigid and unfriendly attitude of the EU towards Turkey. On the other hand, it is also due to domestic problems. The events from two years ago, a dangerous attempt of the judiciary to replace the army as the guardian of the “Kemalist heritage of laicism” by banning the country’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) with the accusation of anti-secular activities - shows that Turkey is still not a mature democracy, and despite the efforts, will not be for some time. This political crisis (as well as the issue of Cypriot goods in Turkish ports) inevitably caused a new delay in negotiations and helped the opponents of the accession both in Turkey and in Europe to gain more strength.

The prospects of Turkey in the future are not the aim of this short paper to discover. But the impact of this question and various paths that can lead to its answer are going to influence the public opinion considerably, both in the EU and Turkey. Unless something significant happens, it is very likely that Turkey is going to slip into even greater Euro-scepticism. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations may be, one thing is clear – the question of accession is going to be, as it always was all around Europe, a purely political and not technical issue. Only this time, the Europeans will have to be very persuasive not just towards their own citizens – they will have to show to the Turkish citizens as well that they are really wanted and welcome to become a part of the “family”.

¹⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_t_r_exec.pdf



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Meaning, Materiality, Power: Introduction to Discourse Analysis

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Iver Neumann, *Meaning, Materiality, Power: Introduction to Discourse Analysis*, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 234 p.

Book review

Discourse analysis is a methodological approach that has been increasingly used in the social sciences in the past couple of decades. The purpose of Iver Neumann's work "Meaning, Materiality, Power: Introduction to Discourse Analysis" is not only to shed more light on this approach but also to offer practical instructions to anyone who wishes to apply it in their research. Apart from an extensive research of scientific problems and a rich publication, this book, which its author and a well-known theoretician of international relations, Iver Neumann, compares to a "cookbook", is an attempt at explaining an approach which is not intended solely for international relations researchers, but also for all social scientists. The source of Neumann's inspiration is the "language orientation" in social sciences. The context that Neumann draws upon in this work is a growing tendency of some theoretical orientations to question the views of empirism and positivism in traditional science as well as the adoption of an agnostic world-view. Language plays a key role, while the belief in its performative power and an approach to language as an apodictic fact makes possible the discourse analysis as a means of discovering more about the social situation in which language is the key element. Comprised of seven chapters, with an array of interesting examples and the presentation of the notional apparatus of language, this book is an invaluable asset to those who are inclined towards untraditional views in social sciences.

In the first Chapter, the author analyses the origins of discourse analysis and describes historical conditions which engendered this approach. The traditions which, in author's opinion, exerted a



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strong influence on the discourse analysis were: Structuralism, the Annales School and the Frankfurt School. The author also warns that the book does not deal with a contextual analysis and that discourse is not going to be used as a synonym for a discussion or conversation. What is, then, discourse? The author offers many definitions, but highlights this one as the most important: "Discourse is a system for the production of a set of statements and practices which, gaining momentum by means of institutional usage, can be considered more or less normal" (p. 23).

The position of discourse analysis in social sciences is described in Chapter 2. References are made to ontology and epistemology. Neumann opposes the traditional scientific claim that all approaches that are not based on a direct sensory observation are inferior. On the contrary, the author asserts that science does not develop in a linear manner and criticises the reliance on the senses as the starting point of science. To prove his point, the author finds inspiration in phenomenology, the paradigm that favours the epistemological to the ontological. Consequently, the world cannot be experienced directly, without models, which means that impressions of the senses are presented to the observer through models. The perception of the world and reality is determined by modes, the application of which is a social issue. In Neumann's words: "Perception is not direct – between reality and our perception of it there lies our representation of reality" (p. 42). Representations and models are presented as similar; they are socially reduced facts. Things do not appear to us *per se*, but as representations, filtered by some medium that exists between us and the world. The term 'representation' is introduced in this chapter for the first time and later it is used to denote a "set of reality requirements that comprise a discourse". Therefore, a theological definition of discourse analysis would be as follows: "To show how representations are constituted and how they become widespread, as well as what set of different representations is included in the creation of a discourse at any given time" (p. 43). From the epistemological point of view, Neumann defines discourse analysis as a post-positivist method. This is in line with Foucault's relational-linguistic concept, that is, the definition of language as a foundation of all social relations.

Chapter 3 describes how to start a discourse analysis. The author pinpoints three steps necessary to start with an analysis of a discourse: the selection and limitation of a discourse, identification of discourse representations and division of discourse into layers. "Cultural competence" is believed to be the key pre-condition for an

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efficient commencement of discourse analysis, which means having a good insight into the circumstances and social environment which is analysed.

Chapter 4 deals with the materiality of discourse. If a discourse analysis focuses too much on a spoken and written word and the importance of materiality is neglected, the quality of the discourse analyses may be at risk. According to Neumann, apart from the fact that social relations are observed where they occur –in language– the language itself has a material expression. He also offers an additional explanation of discourse analysis: "The creation of a method that can analyse both the linguistic and material as a whole. This can be accomplished if discourse is viewed as both a linguistic and a material phenomenon [...]. The goal of discourse analysis is to determine that there are numerous conditions for something that has been said or done; how one statement can activate or "introduce into a game" a series of social practices and how a statement can confirm or deny such practices" (p.99). Considering the above-mentioned conditions for actions, Neumann, in line with Foucault, determines them as an archive, a set of defined rules for a certain society.

Chapter 5 offers starting points for discourse analysis. The starting points can be events or series of inter-connected events (processes), an object, a subject position, an institution. Discourse analysis of events makes the process of mobilising various discourses, with the aim of manifesting certain events, more obvious. To support his view, Neumann offers an example of the "regional field of South-East Norway", which clearly demonstrates the struggle of different discourses (environmental, religious, economic) over the imposition of a reality framework in order to prevent military manouvres. The author introduces the concept of subject position as a possible starting point. As the roles are inter-connected for institutions, and it has been said that the imminent characteristic of discourse is to give meaning to reality, subject position is linked to the discourse and has a more general role.

Institution can also be the starting point for a discourse analysis. Institution can be analysed as a pattern of actions or as a physical infrastructure. There are discourse analyses of firms, the purpose of which is to identify the ways in which they create subject positions. The author provides an example of a trans-national, high-tech American company which reflects the transition from industrial to post-industrial society, therefore a shift from bureaucratic rationality to designer-capitalism. The consequence is that one set of subject positions is disappearing while others are becoming dominant.



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The effects of discourse are considered in the Chapter 6. The author chose the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the framework for the observation of this question. Neumann ascertains that every discourse has an inherent inertia which consists of a "set of rules which are self-establishing up to a point, as they reject the practices that can establish them, and a set of effects influencing the circumstances that are out of the current discourse" (p. 155). In this manner, the author wishes to emphasise that inertia gives invariability to a discourse, a resistance to change. On the basis of his own experience during his work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Neumann supports the thesis of the inertia of discourse, saying how difficult it was to part with the old ways in the Ministry, that is, that the rhetoric remains the same and the influence of foreign elements is rejected.

The last Chapter reveals that power is the strongest underlying impulse of the previous chapters. The resource of power always lies behind the struggle for the domination of a certain discourse. The reception of certain representations in a discourse will always depend on the element of power. As the author says: "Power always permeates the social." (p.190). Of one-, two- or three- dimensional analysis of power, the author is especially interested in the four-dimensional one. Its usefulness is particularly evident in the cases of an intertwined discourse. On the basis of the analysis of power and dimensions of power, two relationships are particularly important. The first one is the issue of dominance and subordination, and the second a relationship representing the struggle of a discourse to become accepted in a certain thematic area.

The book "Meaning, Materiality, Power: Introduction to Discourse Analysis" is a real gem for the readers who are ready to question traditional views of the social sciences. By using epistemology and ontology as a "resonant steam", the author distinguishes discourse analysis from other approaches present in social sciences and shows its qualitative specificity. He expresses his Prometheus-like ambition by rejecting the *sensus communis* views of the world as unquestionable and also by his reception of perspectivism. The true value of his approach is in the insistence on the non-homogenous approach to language, on the inter-disciplinarity, comprehensiveness and holism. What only remains unclear is whether discourse analysis is a theory, method, methodology or, even, a "research approach". This can be the greatest flaw of this work. It leaves us more confused and leaves room for the possibility of an epistemological anarchism.

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Lobbying the European Union

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Coen D. and Richardson J. (eds.) (2009), *Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors and Issues*. Oxford University Press.

Book Review

Over the past twenty years a rather complex and intricate system of interest groups has developed in the European Union. The book reviewed in this article comes as the natural successor to *Lobbying in the European Community*, edited by Sonya Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, a study, although published as long ago as 1993, that remains essential reading for anyone interested in understanding the essence and development of lobbying in Europe.

The European Union decision-making process is among the most complicated in existence; EU decisions affect not only the territory of the Union, but also nations cooperating economically and politically with it. If lobbying is understood as organised promotion of interests, or exerting, in a planned and organised manner, influence on a decision-making process, it becomes apparent that this practice is of essential importance in understanding the functioning of the European Union.

Lobbying the European Union: institutions, actors and issues, edited by David Coen and Jeremy Richardson, was published in 2009 and quickly garnered positive reviews. We will attempt to show why in the following pages.

The 373-page book is written in English and comprises sixteen chapters divided into five parts, with the first and last part serving as introduction and conclusion, respectively.

In the first chapter (introduction), the editors underline the aims of the book, describe the evolution of interest representation¹ and cite the institutions that are lobbied in the European Union.

Part II of the book, entitled 'Institutional Demands', is made up of six chapters and describes the roles of key EU institutions in the

¹ Several terms are used in literature to describe what interest groups do, including 'lobbying', 'representation' and 'mobilisation'. The expression 'interest representation' is considered the most appropriate, as it carries neither any of the negative connotations of 'lobbying' nor the numerous limitations of 'mobilisation'. (For more detail see: Charrad K., *Lobbying the European Union*, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Nachwuchsgruppe „Europäische Zivilgesellschaft und Multilevel Governance“, available at http://nez.uni-muenster.de/download/Charrad_Literaturbericht_Lobbying_mit_Deckblatt.pdf)



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lobbying process. This section is headed by Pieter Bouwen's detailed overview of the role of the European Commission in lobbying, clarifying its position as both a lobbied institution and an active player in lobbying that regulates interest representation in the EU. The author states that the European Commission has at its disposal three mechanisms for doing so: financial resources, the ability to impose rules, and a style of governance characterised by the frequent establishment and use of committees (p. 26). Let us here point out that the Commission is traditionally seen in literature as the most important target of lobbying in the European Union.

The book's third chapter, the second chapter of Part II, is devoted to a study by Wilhelm Lehmann of lobbying the European Parliament. The author describes recent changes to the EU decision-making mechanism involving the increased role of parliament and the implications of these developments for interest groups. Finally, Lehmann – a staff member of the European Parliament – shows a perfect grasp of his subject in providing a very interesting analysis of the current situation and the Parliament's response to lobbying. The conclusion is that the European Parliament is today more integrated than ever in the EU decision-making process, that it has finally acquired true legislative powers, and that it is yet to become a real target for interest groups (p. 65).

The next chapter deals with the Council and the European Council. Fiona Hayes-Renshaw discusses the traditional view of these two bodies as the least accessible to lobbyists, or even being out of their reach. She claims that the two are often neglected, even in academic debate, in favour of the innovative Commission, the ever more important Parliament and the mysterious Council (p. 71). The author goes on to describe the Council, being an inter-governmental body, as rather unrewarding for a lobbyist, and declares that interest representation can most often and most easily be done at the national level. The role of the presiding country is particularly stressed. Finally, Hayes-Renshaw underlines that, for best results, the Council should be lobbied as early as possible in the decision-making process (p. 86).

The fifth chapter of *Lobbying the European Union* deals with the relationship between interest groups and the European Court of Justice. Strategies pursued by interest groups to lobby the Court are explained using the example of corporate taxes. The author, Margaret McCown, concludes that litigation by interest groups has grown into a powerful weapon in the lobbyists' arsenal, as well as

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that such litigation now play an important role in the creation of today's European Union law (p. 101).

The role of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and national authorities are dealt with in the following chapter, which is divided into three parts. The first part describes national authorities as the 'point of entry' for lobbying; in second they are seen as 'the lobbyist lobbied', while the last presents them as mediators. Sabine Saurugger engages the reader by explaining the development, theoretical foundations and practical importance of the 'national route' in lobbying. In concluding, the author notes that lobbying at the national level is primarily reserved for interest groups not powerful enough to lobby at the 'European' level (p. 123).

The last chapter of Part II of the book is devoted to the role of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). The chapter is divided into five parts. It describes the creation and development of the Committee and its structure and membership, followed by its methods of work and modernisation processes taking place within the Committee. The chapter is closed by a discussion of how and why lobbyists should use the EESC more in furthering their interests. The author, Martin Westlake, concludes that the EESC does not enjoy any 'hard' power, but that it does have a number of advantages that should be used (five are mentioned).

This chapter concludes Part II of *Lobbying the European Union*, in our view essential for understanding interest representation mechanisms in the European Union.

Part III of the book opens with two studies dealing with business lobbying in the EU and the role and position of non-governmental organisations (especially in the field of environmental protection). This section is a natural introduction to Part IV, 'Sectoral Studies', which provides an overview of the mode of operation of interest groups in five fields: health, tobacco industry (or rather tobacco advertising), agro-industry, and social and trade policy. A detailed description is given of the lobbying process in each of these areas. We believe that these chapters will be of especial interest for lobbying practitioners, as the interest representation process is explained using specific examples.

The last chapter of Part IV is devoted to the regulation of lobbying in the European Union. The aim of this chapter, according to its author, Daniela Obradovic, is to showcase the evolution of rules governing lobbying in the Commission and to describe the main characteristics of the newly introduced register of lobbyists (p. 298).



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Although the registration system is quite flawed and unlikely to restrict lobbyist access to the European Commission, its usefulness and practicality are undeniable.

The sixteenth and last chapter sees editors Jeremy Richardson and David Coen sum up conclusions drawn in the preceding chapters and underline that the European Union has to date developed a compact and productive decision-making system. Nonetheless, there are no coherent regulations governing lobbying in itself in the European Union. While the European Parliament had introduced a registry of lobbyists as early as 2005, the Commission ruled to introduce lobbyist registration only in 2007 and 2008 as a step towards regulating lobbyists more closely and strictly – mainly because some estimates put the number of people engaged in interest representation in Brussels at 15,000, with a combined budget of approximately between 60 and 90 billion euros (p. 51).

The last two decades have seen a major increase in the number of lobbyists engaged in furthering their interests. Nevertheless, there is as yet no performance assessment regarding the lobbying of the European Union, or an estimate of how effective this type of interest representation is.

In conclusion, *Lobbying the European Union* is, in our view, a successful study, explaining as it does in a comprehensive fashion the process of lobbying the European Union through a number of informative articles written by distinguished authors.

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INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE AUTHORS

Instructions for the authors

Western Balkans Security Observer is a journal established by the academic community of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. The papers that we publish in this magazine deal with regional security issues, but they also focus on national and global security problems. The editors especially encourage papers which question the security transformations from an interdisciplinary perspective and which combine different theoretical starting points. A special column is dedicated to reviews of the newest sources from the fields of security studies, political sciences, international relations and other related scientific disciplines.

When writing the papers, the following criteria must be observed:

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Example: Adams, A.D. (1906) *Electric transmission of water power*. New York: McGraw.
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
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