

**National Convention on the European Union**

**Working Groups for Chapters 23 and 24**

**Joint Comments on the Draft Law on Internal Affairs**  
**General remarks and overview of key deficiencies**

**Introduction**

The Draft Law on Internal Affairs prepared by the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia does not satisfy procedural requirements, ignores key problems identified in practice and, in some instances, even diminishes achieved standards. Moreover, the Draft Law fails to achieve envisaged objectives for the reform step 9.3.1.2. in Serbia's Reform Agenda, i.e. to effectively address the issue of police autonomy from the Ministry of Interior during pre-investigation and investigation phases and recommendations from the Committee for Prevention of Torture.

Nine members of the National Convention on the European Union (NCEU) participated in the public debate. Their general remarks and specific amendments to certain provisions have been compiled in the [Joint Commentary of NCEU Working Groups for Chapters 23 and 24 on the Draft Law on Internal Affairs](#) which is available only in Serbian.

In this document we will first provide a brief overview of procedural and material deficiencies of the Draft Law. Second, we will address in more detail the areas highlighted in the [Reform Agenda of 2024](#), [Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment \(CPT\)](#) from January 2024 and GRECO [Fifth round of evaluations](#) of 2022, as well as the other most problematic provisions.

## 1.1. Procedural Deficiencies: Unacceptable Manner of Conducting a Public Debate on an Important Law

The NCEU Working Groups for Chapters 23 and 24 assess the manner in which the public debate on the Draft Law on Internal Affairs has been conducted as unacceptable, both for the citizens of Serbia and for Serbia's European integration process.

The key objection concerns the manner in which public debates are organised. While formally aligned with minimum procedural requirements, the process substantially restricts public participation. The public was not adequately informed about the start of the debates, while roundtables were organised from the very first day, leaving interested stakeholders insufficient time to prepare and provide meaningful contributions.<sup>1</sup>

Another significant problem is the timeframe and organisational framework of the debates. Launching the debates at the end of the working week, while including public holidays, in practice shortens the time available for analysis, even though the formal deadline of 20 days has been met.<sup>2</sup> In addition, conducting public debates simultaneously on several complex and extensive laws<sup>3</sup>, particularly in the field of internal affairs, prevents a thorough consideration of the proposed solutions. The Draft Law on Internal Affairs alone contains just under 300 articles.

The third key objection concerns the broader context of the adoption of the law, which points to a lack of transparency and the instrumentalization of the process for the purpose of fulfilling obligations under the Reform Agenda in the one-year grace-period expiring in June 2026. The laws have been prepared for a long time without public involvement and then subjected to a short public debate, calling into question the quality and legitimacy of the process. Such practice renders public participation meaningless.

Furthermore, the Ministry never fully justified why a new Law is needed instead of amending the existing Law on Police. The public has still not been presented with an analysis of the implementation of this law, nor with an explanation of the shortcomings and problems that this Draft seeks to address. The explanatory note fails to provide the reasons for choosing specific normative solutions. Although this note claims that the Draft Law addresses recommendations of the European Commission, CPT and GRECO, it does not refer to specific recommendations or explain how they were implemented.

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<sup>1</sup> Three roundtables were organised – in Leskovac on 3 April, Belgrade on 7 April and Subotica on 17 April.

<sup>2</sup> Due to weekends and holidays (Orthodox Easter 10-13 April), there were only 14 working days during the formal public debate (3-24 April).

<sup>3</sup> The Law on Weapons and Ammunition, the Law on Internal Affairs, and the Law on the Processing of Personal Data in the Field of Internal Affairs.

The MoI published the [report](#) on the conducted public debate within the legal deadline, without publishing the revised Draft Law. In the small number of accepted interventions, it seems that the MoI only minimally compromised – by keeping more precise formulations from the Law on Police already in force.

#### Overview of the timeline

- **August-September 2021** – First version of the Draft Law on Internal Affairs published and withdrawn from procedure
- **December 2022** – Second version of the Draft Law on Internal Affairs published and withdrawn from procedure
- **January-April 2023** – Dialogue between MoI and NCEU Working Group for Chapter 24 on the Second version of the Draft Law and accompanying laws
- **October 2024** – Reform Agenda approved
- **November 2024** – Working Group for drafting the Third version of the Draft Law on Internal Affairs formed
- **June 2025** – Deadline for adoption of the Draft Law on Internal Affairs in the Reform Agenda
- **August 2025** – NCEU first approached for consultations on the third version of the Draft Law, invitation declined
- **3-24 April 2026** Formal public debate organised on the Third version of the Draft Law on Internal Affairs
- **12 May 2026** Report on the conducted public debate published

NCEU recalls that the two previous versions of the Draft Law (2021 and 2022) contained highly [controversial provisions](#) and were withdrawn from further procedure following public pressure. Public interest in this topic has remained high, especially having in mind the controversies regarding policing major public assemblies in the meantime. In the period January–April 2023 several meetings were held between representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and civil society representatives within the framework of Working Group 24 of the National Convention on the European Union. In November 2024, the MoI formed a [new working group](#), consisting only of MoI representatives, to draft the third version of the Draft Law until 31 January 2025. However, the Draft Law was published only in April 2026 without explaining the delay.

Furthermore, NCEU recalls that, in August 2025, it [declined](#) the invitation of the Ministry of the Interior to participate in consultations on the then-current version of the Draft Law on Internal Affairs, considering that, in the context of daily violations of the existing Law on Police, it was pointless to engage in dialogue on a new law. At the time, NCEU insisted on participating in the official public debate, on an equal footing with other interested stakeholders and citizens, which is why sufficient time must be ensured for that process. However, not only was this not done, but staffing changes and the conduct of the police in the meantime have further eroded citizens' trust in the police and in the good intentions behind the legislative amendments.

Finally, NCEU recalls that the adoption of a new Law on Internal Affairs is an obligation of the Republic of Serbia under the Reform Agenda, the adoption of which enables access to EU funds from the Growth Plan. This makes it clear that the intention is to fulfil the obligations by June 2026 in order to avoid the loss of funds. However, it is unacceptable for laws in the field of internal affairs to be prepared for a long time in a non-transparent manner and then subjected to a short public debate. The Reform Agenda assesses not only the adoption of measures, but also the manner in which they are adopted and the achievement of their objectives. In the case of the Law on Internal Affairs, those objectives include improving the operational independence of the police and the prevention of torture, although the Draft covers substantially broader content.

## 1.2. Overview of Material Deficiencies: The Draft Law ignores problems in practice and does not fully address international recommendations

### **Operational independence of the police is only declarative**

Although the Draft declaratively recognises the operational independence of the police, it does not provide adequate mechanisms for its implementation. The broad powers of the Minister of the Interior regarding the organisation of work, direction and staffing issues lead to an overlap between political and operational management. Such a solution leaves room for political influence over police work and is not in line with international standards. The lack of a clear division of competences between the Ministry and the police further undermines legal certainty and the professionalisation of the service.

### **Human rights and prevention of torture below the required standards**

The Draft contains several provisions that may lead to a lowering of human rights protection standards. Particularly problematic are the possibility of restricting freedom of movement and assembly for an extended period without adequate judicial oversight, as well as the expanded use of means of coercion, including in situations of passive resistance. In addition, procedural guarantees for citizens are being reduced, for example in the procedure for summoning persons for an informative interview, where the right to legal assistance is no longer clearly ensured.

The Draft does not provide sufficient mechanisms for the prevention of torture and ill-treatment, despite the recommendations of relevant international bodies. It fails to introduce mandatory audio and video recording of police interrogations, which is a key safeguard against abuses. It also does not prescribe the mandatory suspension of officers against whom proceedings for torture are pending, nor does it establish clear rules on medical examinations of persons in detention. Such shortcomings leave room for impunity and undermine public trust in institutions.

## **Internal and external control in decline**

Mechanisms for controlling police work remain insufficiently developed. The Internal Control Sector is not institutionally, and now not even declaratively, independent, as it is largely subordinated to the Minister, which limits its effectiveness. At the same time, the Draft Law narrows the role of Parliament in overseeing police work, reducing it mainly to the consideration of reports, without clearly prescribed oversight powers, as in the current Law on Police<sup>4</sup>. It does not address the problem observed in practice concerning the police's failure to act upon the orders of the competent public prosecutor. Such solutions represent a step backwards compared with the existing legal framework and weaken control and oversight of police work.

Although the Draft generally provides for the transparency of the work of the Ministry of the Interior, the specific reporting obligations are not regulated clearly or systematically enough. There is a tendency towards reduced availability of information, including fewer reports to be published and a broad possibility of classifying documents as secret, which may further limit public insight into the work of the Ministry of the Interior. In practice, excessive centralisation of the MoI's information-sharing and communication with citizens has been observed, while all suggestions to allow direct communication of local police units with their local communities have been declined.

## **Human resources between norms and reality**

The Draft Law does not adequately address problems in human resources management within the police. In practice, we observe the selective application of regulations, the appointment of controversial personnel to key positions and the marginalisation of professional police officers. The secrecy of the job classification act further hampers the protection of employees' labour rights and public oversight, while facilitating employment and assignment outside competitive procedures. In addition, certain solutions, such as disciplinary measures for public statements by police officers, may have a deterrent effect on whistleblowers.

In addition to the above, the Draft shows a tendency towards excessive delegation of powers to the Minister, particularly with regard to the further regulation of matters that should be governed by law, which may undermine the principle of separation of powers and legal certainty. There is also a perceived risk of the militarisation of the police through military ranks, as well as insufficient alignment with certain relevant regulations and international standards. Decentralisation has been neglected as an important segment of police reform. All the above points to the need for a thorough revision of the Draft in order to ensure greater legal certainty, transparency and compliance with the standards of a democratic society.

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<sup>4</sup> For example, oversight of the legality of spending budgetary and other funds, oversight of the use of certain powers and measures, and oversight of respect for political, ideological and interest neutrality in police work etc.

## 2. Review of Key Aspects of the Draft Law

### 2.1. Operational Autonomy of the Police

The Draft Law formally recognises the operational independence of the police, but does not contain sufficiently precise safeguards to ensure its effective implementation. This is particularly problematic given that the operational autonomy of the police from the Minister of the Interior in the investigative and pre-investigative phases is listed as one of the objectives of adopting the new law, in line with Measure 9.3.1.2 of Serbia's 2024 Reform Agenda. The excessively broad powers of the Minister, the unclear delineation between the Ministry and the police, the insufficient autonomy of the Internal Control Sector, and the poorly regulated relationship between the police and the public prosecution service are the key weaknesses of the proposed text. Unless these shortcomings are addressed, the operational independence of the police will remain merely a declaratory principle, with no real impact on the professionalisation, legality and depoliticisation of police work.

The key problem remains the excessively broad role of the Minister of the Interior. In more than 60 provisions, the Draft Law provides that the Minister shall prescribe, regulate, determine, adopt or decide on matters of essential importance for the functioning of the police and the exercise of police powers. This leaves room for political and operational management to overlap, which is contrary to the very purpose of the operational independence of the police.

This is particularly evident in Article 14, which regulates the powers of the Minister. Although the proposed wording represents a certain improvement compared with the previous versions of the Draft Law from 2021 and 2022 — especially by providing that the Minister directs work through internal general acts rather than individual orders, and that the Minister may not determine the manner of action in an individual legal matter — these safeguards are not sufficient. Article 14 should therefore be supplemented to clearly provide that the Minister may request special reports on measures and actions undertaken by the police and the Internal Control Sector in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code only for the purpose of acting upon a request from the public prosecutor or the court. At the same time, it should be expressly stipulated that the Minister's acts and requests for reports must not affect the operational independence of the police or the Internal Control Sector.

It should also be noted that genuine operational independence of the police is possible only if the police enjoy an appropriate degree of autonomy in planning, allocating and executing budgetary resources intended for operational police work, accompanied by clear oversight, control and audit of the legality of expenditure.

A particular weakness of the Draft Law lies in the position of the Internal Control Sector. Under Articles 176, 177 and 186, the Sector does not enjoy a sufficient degree of institutional and operational autonomy; indeed, such autonomy is not even guaranteed at the declaratory level. The Head of the Sector is accountable to the Minister for their work, the Minister prescribes the manner

in which internal control duties are performed, and at the same time establishes a special commission to oversee the work of police officers within the Sector. Such an arrangement leaves excessive room for executive influence over a body that should be responsible for investigating unlawful conduct, abuse and corruption within the Ministry itself.

Article 176 should therefore expressly provide that, in the performance of the duties falling within its competence, the Internal Control Sector is operationally independent from the Ministry, the police and other state administration bodies. When undertaking measures and actions in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code, the Sector should be required to act exclusively on the instructions of the competent public prosecutor and the court. This would reduce the risk of political influence and ensure more effective oversight of the conduct of police officers. Such a solution would be in line with international standards, which require internal control bodies to have sufficient powers, resources and independence from the executive. This is particularly important in cases involving serious abuses, corruption, conflicts of interest or senior police officials, where oversight should not be carried out by bodies that form part of the immediate chain of command.

The Draft Law does not sufficiently improve the relationship between the police and the public prosecutor. In practice, it has been shown that a police officer is often more likely to comply with an order from a superior who influences their career progression than with an instruction from a public prosecutor, even though in criminal proceedings the police should act precisely on the instructions of the prosecution service. For this reason, Article 212, which regulates the evaluation of police officers' performance, should be supplemented to provide that the competent public prosecutor participates in the evaluation of members of the Criminal Police Directorate. This would strengthen the authority of the prosecution service and ensure more consistent police compliance in the pre-investigative and investigative phases. At the same time, this represents a minimalist proposal for strengthening prosecutorial oversight of the police, particularly in light of the long-standing debates on the need to introduce a so-called [prosecutorial police](#). It should also be recalled that a comparable solution already exists, for example, in Article 6 of the current Law on the Organisation and Jurisdiction of State Authorities in Combating Organised Crime, Terrorism and Corruption, which provides that the Minister of the Interior appoints and dismisses the head of the police organisational unit responsible for combating organised crime after obtaining the opinion of the Chief Public Prosecutor.

In addition, Article 260, which regulates serious breaches of official duty, should be supplemented so that failure to comply with an instruction of the competent public prosecutor in criminal proceedings is expressly prescribed as a serious breach. In this regard, Article 262 should provide that the public prosecutor has standing to submit an initiative for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a police officer who fails to act upon the prosecutor's instruction. The MoI did not accept these comments, arguing that the relationship between the prosecution service and the police is regulated by Article 44 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and that performance evaluation is an internal matter for the Ministry. The Ministry also took the position that failure to

comply with a prosecutor's instruction could be subsumed under another serious breach of official duty.

## 2.2. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, including Prevention of Torture

Several provisions of the Draft Law on Internal Affairs raise serious concerns regarding compliance with constitutional guarantees and international human rights standards. Rather than strengthening safeguards, the Draft expands police powers while weakening procedural protections for individuals interacting with law enforcement. A number of proposed provisions rely on vague and overly broad legal formulations, grant extensive discretionary powers to the executive and fail to provide adequate judicial or independent control mechanisms. Below are only a few of the most concerning provisions of the Draft Law on Internal Affairs that illustrate the risks the proposed framework poses to fundamental rights and democratic oversight.

The proposed **Article 27** of the Draft Law on Internal Affairs risks undermining both transparency and freedom of expression within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The provision prohibiting employees and contractors from speaking publicly about Ministry affairs, without an exception for disclosures in the public interest, may discourage whistleblowing and conceal unlawful conduct or human rights violations. Despite the Ministry amending the Draft by adding that sanctioned public statements about the Ministry must be linked to expression causing damage to the Ministry's reputation, such conduct continues to be classified as a serious breach of official duty, and the proposed amendments still fail to provide adequate safeguards against arbitrary or disproportionate restrictions on freedom of expression. Moreover, the provision in **Article 21** prescribing in advance the confidentiality of almost the entire act on job classification and internal organisation of the MoI is contrary to the rules on the public interest test, prevents public and internal oversight of questionable changes to job classification and staff assignments, hampers the protection of employees' rights, and legalises the existing poor practice.

**Article 46** grants the Minister of Internal Affairs exceptionally broad powers to restrict movement, prohibit access to certain areas, impose evacuation measures and effectively limit public gatherings, based on vague and broadly defined criteria such as a "large-scale disturbance of public order." The provision creates a parallel legal regime despite the fact that Serbian legislation already regulates emergency situations, public health measures and public order through more specific laws containing clearer procedures and safeguards. The provision is particularly concerning for the right to peaceful assembly, as even isolated incidents during protests could be used to justify sweeping restrictions on movement and access to public spaces, potentially leading to the de facto dispersal or banning of assemblies. By concentrating extensive powers in the hands of the minister without adequate safeguards or independent review, the article creates a serious risk of disproportionate interference with constitutionally protected rights, including freedom of movement and peaceful assembly, contrary to democratic and human rights standards. The minor revisions made to the provision during the public consultation process still fail to address the negative consequences that this article poses for the freedom of assembly.

The Draft Law in **Article 81** lowers existing safeguards for individuals summoned by the police for so-called “informative interviews” by allowing oral and telecommunications-based summons as a general rule, without sufficient procedural guarantees or effective oversight. The proposed provisions do not require systematic recording or prompt written confirmation of such summons, creating space for informal and potentially coercive police practices that are difficult to review or challenge. The Draft also fails to clearly guarantee that individuals are informed of their right to the presence of a lawyer or a person of trust. In addition, the possibility of transporting individuals to police premises “with consent” is not accompanied by safeguards ensuring that such consent is genuinely voluntary, raising concerns about de facto deprivation of liberty outside formal legal procedures.

Although relevant international bodies – the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the Committee against Torture, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture – have repeatedly recommended the introduction of mandatory audio and video recording of police interrogations, the Draft Law does not contain such a safeguard, constituting a serious obstacle to the prevention of torture and ill-treatment. The Draft also fails to ensure that police officers subject to proceedings for acts of torture or ill-treatment will be mandatorily suspended during such proceedings, or dismissed if responsibility for torture or ill-treatment is established, despite these being requirements stemming from the long-standing case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Such solutions leave room for the already widespread impunity of officials for serious violations of citizens’ rights and undermine public trust in the police. Moreover, the Draft fails to adequately regulate medical examinations of persons held in police custody, including through a clear prohibition on the presence of police officers during examinations, except in exceptional circumstances at the request of a doctor. The Draft Law introduces in Article 66 a commission on standards of police conduct in the area of prevention of torture and ill-treatment only by name, without regulating its composition and tasks; these issues should be prescribed by the law itself, rather than left to a by-law adopted by the Minister.

The Draft Law does not provide for a system of technical control and certification of coercive means, despite a recommendation issued by the Protector of Citizens eight years ago.

**Article 134** introduces a new category of coercive tools described as “temporary incapacitation devices,” including sound, flash and smoke projectiles, without providing sufficiently clear safeguards governing their use. The provision is particularly problematic because it assumes that these devices “do not cause permanent harmful consequences,” despite the fact that such weapons can cause serious injuries and carry significant risks, especially in crowd-control situations. The article also fails to clearly distinguish between targeted individual use and collective use against assemblies (which is allowed in Article 139), creating a risk of disproportionate force against protesters and broader interference with the rights to physical integrity and peaceful assembly. In addition, the provision establishes a separate decision-making regime for the use of these devices without adequate safeguards.

Neither the Draft nor the currently applicable Law on Police regulates the manner in which police officers' service firearms should be stored outside working hours, despite this being a matter of exceptional public interest, particularly in light of tragic incidents in previous years and the risks arising from the inadequate storage of firearms.

The Draft Law is not aligned with criminal law regulations in the area of protecting the rights of victims, injured parties, juvenile offenders and juvenile victims. Particularly problematic is the practice of polygraph testing rape victims, including juvenile victims, as such treatment constitutes secondary victimisation and is contrary to the standards of a gender-sensitive and trauma-informed approach. This is also indicated by relevant international recommendations, including EU Directive 2024/1385 and the recommendations of the GREVIO Committee, which require that victims be treated with respect, protected from repeated victimisation, and provided with a trauma-informed response to sexual violence. Victims of severe traumatic events, especially sexual violence, often do not have a complete and chronological memory of the event, which makes polygraph testing inappropriate. The Autonomous Women's Centre therefore proposed that, in **Article 103**, polygraph testing be prohibited for juvenile injured parties and witnesses, juvenile suspects under the age of 16, as well as injured parties and witnesses who meet the conditions for the status of a particularly vulnerable witness. The MoI failed to provide adequate reasoning for declining this suggestion.

Many of these concerns were raised by civil society organisations during the public consultation process. But, the final consultation report failed to provide enough of the civil society explanations and substantive explanations as answers to why these comments and proposed safeguards were not accepted.

### 2.3. Anti-Corruption: Implementation of GRECO Recommendations

Even though the explanatory note to the Draft Law claims that one of its goals was to fulfil the recommendations from [GRECO's Fifth Evaluation Round](#), this is not elaborated further. Moreover, the recommendations allegedly addressed are not listed in the explanatory note. NCEU members requested that the public debate period be extended after the publication of additional information. However, the Ministry did not even include this comment in the report on the conducted public debate. Below is a brief overview of GRECO recommendations that were, or should have been, addressed in the Draft Law.

As regards GRECO Recommendation XVII, the Draft does not contain any provision that would help establish mandatory training related to the Code of Ethics.

When it comes to GRECO Recommendation XVIII, the provisions of Article 33 do not fully address what was recommended. There is not even an attempt to provide measures that would prevent political influence in the appointment of senior police officials other than the Director. Contrary to the recommendation, the possibility of appointing the Director for a second term without a public competition was retained. The provisions of Article 33 are not fully satisfactory

either, as they fail to address numerous problems that occur in practice, for example the possibility that none of the candidates following a public call is proposed, the appointment of an acting director, and similar issues. Several NCEU members proposed more transparency in the process of appointing the police director, such as publishing candidates' professional biographies and priorities, while Belgrade Centre for Security Policy proposed similar regulation of appointments of the heads of local police administrations, based on the findings of a [citizen assembly](#) they organised. These suggestions were rejected.

Regarding GRECO Recommendation XIX, the Draft Law does not provide a guarantee that integrity tests will be conducted throughout a police officer's career, as the system envisages such control on the basis of decisions and plans adopted by the Head of the Internal Control Sector.

Regarding GRECO Recommendation XX, no provision of the Draft addresses the issue of periodic "institutional rotation" of police officers whose positions are exposed to a high risk of corruption.

GRECO Recommendation XXI addresses the issue of secondary employment of police officers. On the one hand, Article 257 of the Draft Law introduces a time limit for granting approval (paragraph 2) and provides for keeping records of the approvals issued (paragraph 9). On the other hand, it fails to regulate the issue of control. As a result of this failure, it is to be expected — as has been the case so far — that secondary employment will be recorded and controlled only if a police officer informs their superiors of their intention to engage in it. Furthermore, no mechanism is envisaged to ensure the enforcement of these provisions. Finally, it would be better if the Law lists, or provides for the adoption of a list or more precise criteria for, activities incompatible with police duties.

As for GRECO Recommendation XXII, on gift-receiving, the Draft Law does not mention the Committee for Recording Gifts, which, according to the Ministry, was established in November 2021 on the basis of an internal act of the Minister. None of the acts regulating gift-receiving has been published. The implementation of the recommendation could be strengthened by additional provisions in Article 151.

As regards GRECO Recommendation XXIII, Article 175 could be improved by adding a deadline for the preparation and publication of an annual report on complaints, as well as by removing other risks, such as unclear formulations.

*For more details, please see Transparency Serbia analyses of GRECO recommendations and their implementation in [2024](#) and [2025](#) (full report in [Serbian](#), summaries in English). Reports were submitted to the competent authorities, including Ministry of the Interior, whose representatives also participated at report promotions.*

Apart from the GRECO recommendations, in the anti-corruption area, instances have been identified of abuse of the possibility to classify certain public procurements of the Ministry as confidential, including the most [documented case](#) of vehicle procurement in 2017 and several others.

In order to reduce the risk of rigging confidential procurement procedures, Transparency Serbia proposed an amendment to Article 189 aimed at making it mandatory for the Ministry to submit an annual report on such procurements to the competent parliamentary committee. The proposal was rejected, with the “explanation” that the parliamentary committee may, in any case, request any additional information it needs beyond the Annual Report. While this is correct, there is a substantial difference: making it mandatory for the Ministry to inform the Committee about confidential procurements would make that information available at least to Members of Parliament. On the other hand, it is not realistic to expect that the majority of committee members, controlled by the ruling parties, would vote to request such a report if it is not mandatory.

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