PUBLICATION: Policy brief
The Serbian Orthodox Church and the Politics of Polarisation in Contemporary Serbia
An analysis of cultural wars, anti-scientific narratives and student protests
Since the political transformation that followed the fall of Milošević’s regime in October 2000, Serbia has been engaged in a prolonged battle over identity, sovereignty, and geopolitical orientation. Within this contested landscape, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) has emerged not only as a religious institution but also as a key player in shaping public discourse. The Church has repeatedly found itself at the heart of divisive national controversies, including debates over LGBT rights, the so-called ‘culture wars’, responses to the Covid-19 pandemic and reactions to student-led protests against corruption and authoritarian governance, following the tragedy in Novi Sad.
Rather than functioning as a neutral moral authority ‘above politics’, the SOC operates within a dense web of clientelist state relations and transnational Orthodox geopolitics. Its rhetoric often frames liberal reforms as foreign impositions, secular expertise as ideological aggression and civic mobilisation as externally orchestrated destabilisation. This pattern is indicative not only of domestic political dynamics, but also of the ideological alignment between the SOC and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), particularly in the context of geopolitical polarisation since 2014 and 2022.
This policy brief therefore addresses the following key question: does the SOC’s consistent alignment with the ROC render it an instrument of Russian influence, or is it an independent national church whose domestic agenda simply coincides with Moscow’s? The central argument put forward is that the evidence suggests the latter: not subordination, but convergence. This distinction is substantiated by the three case studies below and developed in full in the concluding section. It is important to establish this both analytically and in terms of policy, because treating the SOC merely as a Russian proxy misrepresents its polarising role and the leverage that stems from its domestic, Serbian roots.
Author: Richard Straka
Skip to PDF content
DETAILS
AUTHORS
SHARE
PDF PREVIEW
RELATED

Date: 21.07.2026.
Author: Dr Srđan Cvijić | Igor Bandović | Marko Drajić | Predrag Petrović |
In November 2025, the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy published the policy brief Political and Institutional Crisis in Serbia: Possible Scenarios. The brief outlined four scenarios and their corresponding outcomes.

New Extremist Trends in Serbia: Anti-System Extremism, Extremist Telegram Channels and Eco-Extremism
Date: 30.06.2026.
Author: Gorana Pebić | Isidora Stakić | Miloš Jovanović |
This report analyses recent and so far insufficiently explored forms of extremism in Serbia, with a particular focus on anti-system extremism, the role of the Telegram digital platform and the instrumentalisation of environmental issues.

Date: 26.06.2026.
Author: Gorana Pebić |
The analysis explores how far-right Telegram channels instrumentalise opposition to the Rio Tinto project and lithium mining in Serbia to amplify their pre-existing nationalist and anti-Western narratives.
