Civil-Military Features of the FRY

The direction of the profiling of civilian military relations in Serbia/FR Yugoslavia¹ is determined by the situational circumstances and policies of the participants of different backgrounds and uneven strength. The present processes however, are the direct product of consequence of the disparate action of parties from the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition, which have ruled the local political scene since the ousting of Milošević. It was their mediation that introduced the war and authoritarian heritage to the political scene, making it an obstacle for changing the encountered civil-military relations. The ongoing disputes within the DOS decrease, but also conceal the fundamental reasons for the lack of pro-democratic intervention of the new authorities in the civil-military domain. Numerous military and police incidents and affairs that have marked the post-October period in Serbia testify to this account.²

The incidents were used for political confrontation within the DOS instead as reasons for reform. This is why disputes regarding the statues of the military, police and secret services, as well as control of them have been reduced to the personal and/or political conflict between FRY President Vojislav Koštunica and Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjić.³ However, the analysis of the “personal equation” of the most powerful DOS leaders may reveal only differences in their political shade and intonation, but cannot reveal the fundamental reasons why Serbia has remained on the foundations of Milošević’s system. This is why the achievements of the changes started on 5 October 2000 (Hadžić, 2001a) should be reassessed. This however requires a brief reflection of the political background and being of the DOS, i.e. the parties gathered in it, until recently.⁴

The opposition parties in Serbia were created in the 1980s on the ruins of self-management socialism. Anti-communism was thus their first basis and characteristic. As soon as the fundamental crisis of the second Yugoslavia was placed in the ethnic-religious frame by the will of the then national-republic elites (Banac, 1998), most of these parties sided with the fighters for the unification of all the Serbs in one state, even by force if necessary. This was the crucial reason for their interest-directed, ideological and war cooperation with Milošević’s regime (Stojanović, 2000). Since it supported all of Milošević’s wars, the opposition became the permanent prisoner of his daily needs. This is why they could not autonomously force changes in Milošević’s politics, let alone oust him. On the other hand Milošević yielded only under the pressure of the defeats of Serb armies or his poor political judgments.⁵ In the meantime the leaders of the opposition struggled more among themselves than they aspired to oust Milošević. It is no surprise that the DOS became operative only two months before the elections, even though the coalition was founded in January 2000.

The pre-election tactics of the DOS clearly implied limits of the announced future reforms. The main goal was, quite justified, to depose Milošević. However, the offered program for changing the system suffered from generalization and easily given promises. Since the military and police generals had announced ahead of the elections that they would defend the regime by force, in the name of defending the constitutional order, the DOS engaged in preventing a possible internal war. This is why it strived to widen the anti-regime front with the help of Otpor and non-government organizations. The dispersion of civic resistance was aimed at preventing the concentration of the army and police in Belgrade. At the same time the DOS leaders tried to win over the special police and military units, sensing dissatisfaction of most of the soldiers and policemen, or at least convince them to remain neutral in the event that Milošević refuses to hand over his authority peacefully.

After Milošević was ousted key DOS deficiencies in the civil-military sphere became apparent. It was immediately confirmed that they did not have a program, but also not enough political will for the reform of the security sector and armed forces. The postponement of this reform was originally justified using the need for the DOS to make its authority official in Serbia through elections (December 2000), and later in preventing the KLA from spilling over into southern Serbia. Another reason was the need to first redefine the state union of Serbia and Montenegro. The hidden reasons for the DOS lack of commitment can only be assumed. It remains unknown whether and to what extent some of the DOS leaders became captives of secret agreements arranged with generals in the even of Milošević’s ousting.⁶ All these reasons however, become secondary when placed in the context of the changes in the political system that have (not) been carried out.

After almost two years it is apparent that Serbia/FRY has not achieved a radical change of order. The bearers of authority, political wording and symbols of legitimization have been replaced, but the ruling mechanisms of the old regime have remained. The constitutional and institutional arrangements have not been changed, and the old constitutions of the FRY, Serbia, Montenegro, even though mutually colliding, are still in effect. The principle of separation of powers is still only a constitutional proclamation, and all the power is in the hands of the supreme executive authority. Since political power is not returned to the federal and republic parliaments, they serve only for legalizing the decisions adopted outside the system – the cabinet of the FRY President, DOS Presidency, Milo Djukanović’s surroundings. The federal authority was also derogated during Milošević’s era with Montenegro unilaterally backing out of the constitutional order. The nominal sovereignty of the FRY was additionally narrowed by NATO’s protectorate in Kosovo. Not one government has full jurisdiction in its domain: the Federal Government is not competent in Montenegro and Kosovo, Kosovo is outside the jurisdiction of the Serbian Government, and the Montenegrin Government is restricted by the presence of the Yugoslav Army on its territory.

Therefore, the provisional state is in effect, which will not be quickly or easily abolished, because the conflicted parties have the maximal state demands in the play play. They are held together only by the desire of the US and EU striving to prevent the annulment of the results of their previous, poor handling of the Yu-crisis and wars (Hadzić, 2001b) and therefore trying to preserve any kind of state frame. Namely, it is their decisiveness to stop further export of the crisis to the region. This is why the FRY does not exist as a single security space nor does it have a complete and effective security system. This is supported by the fact that the new authorities have not defined the basis of a new national security policy, let alone security strategies that would derive the defense strategy and military doctrine.⁷ In line with this fact, there is no state plan for the reform of the inherited military. For the same reasons only personnel and organizational changes have taken place in the police and republic security services.

At the same time, there are different armed forces formations in the FRY existing in parallel and acting independently. The federal state has the army and its secret services at its disposal, but not a police force. Serbia has its own police and Security and Information Agency (BIA), as does Montenegro.⁸ There is no proof that the services have been demilitarized, since Milošević developed them as an internal army, and Djukanović developed them as the core of the future army for a possible secessionist war. The antiterrorist units exist in the military as well as in the police forces of both republics, and A new armed force has been created from it in Serbia – the gendarmerie. Let us mention that the federal authorities are not even authorized to coordinate the work of these formations. Also, the chain of civil command is not precisely prescribed, and the VJ is de facto in jurisdiction only of the FRY President, and not the Supreme Defense Council (VSO). This chain also excludes the Federal Ministry of Defense, which serves only as a logistics service for the VJ General Staff. The Ministry is actually a replica of the personnel of the General Staff, since key positions are held by generals and high-ranking officers. The new authorities have also not activated the constitutional mechanisms for establishing at least parliamentary control of the Army, police and secret services. This is why these formations are still under the control of the ruling parties and/or their leaders, thus retaining the client status. The Army and its secret services are nominally controlled by Koštunica, Djindjić controls the police and BIA in Serbia, and Djukanović controls the forces in Montenegro. The situation is additionally made more complicated by the fact that there is no public records of the status and fate of numerous paramilitary units that were created in the FRY during the Yu-wars.

The difficult beginning of transition in Serbia may be properly understood within the given socio-political environment. This is however, marked first by the war origin and second, by the socialist background of the state and armed forces. This is why Serbia must first step OUT from the war and socialism, understood as the means of producing a surplus of power (Puhovski, 1990), so that it may leave the Milošević era behind. This is even more urgent because the Yu-socialism was the foundation for the wartime destruction of Yugoslavia, and followed by the cloning of authoritarian systems in the newly-created stateS. And the DOS avoided the radical parting with the old regime precisely on the issue of war. It thus missed the opportunity to seize sufficient power, along with authority, to carry out the structural reform of society. This allowed for parts of the military and police and former political elites, as well as their criminal derivatives, to maintain most of their power and use it to hamper change. This is backed by the fact that the new government is not willing enough to prosecute those responsible for wars and war crimes. For this reason the different opponents of reform in Serbia/FRY are ultimately held together by the “Hague connection.”

The war channel brought and developed the authoritarian heritage of Serbia and the two previous Yugoslavias on the local level. Their applicability increased with the increase of Serb displeasure with their state status and the consequential attempts to achieve the maximal national (state) goals. The army and Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) were always the main executors in these desires (Bjelajac, 1994). Their political strength grew in line with this. This is why the Serbian armies returned to the Orthodox faith in the Yu-wars not only caused by the need to better motivate the troops for war, but also because of the desire of the generals and clerics to restore and/or improve their political strength.⁹ In return the generals were allowed to keep the old model of indoctrination in the subordinate armies, and now they replaced the socialist ideology by the national-religious one. In this “process”, the militarization of politics and public life was only a byproduct the war. Serious consequences were derived from the revival of the mythic status of the military and church, based on which its leaderships meddle in politics and social processes. Because of the enduring lack of democratic tradition and infrastructure this has always led to the military (and church) abuse of politics in Serbia, but also the political abuse of the military (and church, i.e. faith).¹⁰

The “Pavković” Affair

General Nebojša Pavković, VJ chief-of-staff, was retired by the decree issued by President Koštunica on 24 June, 2002.¹¹ The public perception of this event was determined by a number of facts. The VSO members, Djukanović from Montenegro and Milutinović from Serbia had previously twice refused Koštunica’s request to dismiss Pavković. Koštunica had then exercised his constitutional right, even though he had refused the same demands coming from the public and coalition partners.¹² The remaining DOS, led by the Democratic Party (DS), immediately rushed to take advantage by accusing Koštunica and his cabinet of abusing the VJ. Additional arguments were provided by Pavković who claimed that Koštunica had ordered the Army to raid the Serbian Government Information Bureau.¹³ The entire accusation rested on the claim that Koštunica had previously submitted the military security service to himself (and his cabinet). Since the Federal Parliament refused to form an Inquiring Committee that would verify these claims, the DOS formed a committee through the Serbian Parliament. Three retired generals confirmed Pavković’s statement, while Koštunica and his associates refused to appear before the Committee. Later the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) accused Pavković of financial and housing misuse.¹⁴ However, the entire affair was soon marginalized on account of the DSS mandates in the Serbian Parliament being revoked and the upcoming presidential elections.

Owing to the media the “Pavković Affair” was first interpreted as the consequence of the personal conflict between the FRY President and his subordinate general. Even though Koštunica avoided the personal tone in passing the decree¹⁵ Pavković backed this thesis in his later statements. At the same time he portrayed himself as a honorable officer who had fallen out of favor with Koštunica because of resisting the abuse of the Army. Pavković even tried, unsuccessfully, to challenge the legality of the decree before the FRY Constitutional Court and Supreme Military Court.

The entire affair definitely had a personal dimension. Pavković was motivated to maintain his position for a number of reasons. It gave him discretionary power in the army, which seems to be the reason for his personal wealth. He also used the position to “launder” his biography, and thus courted the public, but also publicly courted Koštunica.¹⁶ The aim was to simultaneously repress his wartime and political service to Milošević, and express full loyalty to the new authorities.¹⁷ This might be the explanation for his verbal agility in reorganizing the VJ, which Koštunica had presented to the public as its structural reform.¹⁸ Above all Pavković had perhaps secretly hoped that his position would protect him from possible criminal prosecution for the political abuse of the Army, i.e. the suspicion that war crimes were committed under its protection in Kosovo.

The personal motives of President Koštunica are only speculated. Since the reform of the military was not his priority it seems that he looked upon Pavković as a compulsory and interim solution. He probably expected him to provide the army’s obedience to the new authorities. It is not excluded that the President soon discovered the Army’s potential as an instrument. Even more so, since it seems that he had realized too late that in the post-October distribution of power he received a decorative role,¹⁹ while Djindjić had seized the central levers of power through the Serbian Government. However, it is difficult to determine when Koštunica absorbed the role of sovereign military commander, and that he had started to get annoyed with any Pavković’s possible disobedience, i.e. when Koštunica had sought support in the military security department and its head, General Aco Tomić.²⁰

Actions by the DOS factions soon placed the “Pavkovi榔 affair on the political scene, where it belongs. This affair is a common point, but also the point of crystallization of the achievements and mishaps of the new authorities. It reveals the basic program and political shortcomings of the DOS. On this occasion it was confirmed that the Serbian reform has been postponed on account of the struggles of the DOS factions for the redistribution of power. At the same time a doubt was cast on the innate classification of legalists (Koštunica and the DSS) and pragmatic reformists (Djindjić and DS). The affair also revealed the reformist limitations of the other political players in Serbia and Montenegro.

Even though they portrayed themselves as legalists, the DSS and Koštunica have so far not objected the “constitutional holes” that are occupied by the VJ and VSO (Hadžić, 2001c). This is showN by the fact that they have never initiated the procedure in the Federal or Serbian Parliament for the democratic reorganization of the status of the military and civil-military sphere. They have also failed to place the VSO and FRY President under the control of the Federal Parliament. The President has so far not even found it appropriate to submit a report to the Parliament on his work or the situation in the VJ. On the contrary, it seems that HE has passed part of his authority over the Army over to his advisors, which he is not authorised to do.

There is also no evidence that Koštunica was bothered by the lack of security and defense strategy, as well as military doctrine without which the reform of the VJ is impossible. Instead the “clericalization” was started, with his approval or his tacit consent,²¹ contrary to the Constitution and without the approval of Parliament. This is why at the recent Ascension-day procession (14 June, Belgrade’s feast day), as well as during the transfer of the remains of knez Lazar (Lazarica church, Kruševac, 28 June – St. Vitus’ Day) cadets and young officers carried the remains, icons, gonfalons and crosses, even though this is not listed as their legal obligation.²²

Additionally the President successfully kept Army away from the public, and the citizens of the FRY still do not know how large it is, how well it is armed and whom it serves. Primarily the public, as well as the DOS partners have been and still are prohibited from entering the zone of personnel. In any case, discretionary right regarding personnel is the essence of every authority, including Koštunica’s. He regularly dictated lists of promoted and dismissed generals/admirals, but avoided stating what criterion was being applied in deciding which general to place on which list and when. In this respect General Pavković is a symbol which marks the beginning and the end of Koštunica’s achievements so far. This is why it is worth recalling why he has remained at the helm of the Army for such a long time.

Until the moment that he passed the decree Koštunica claimed that (1) Pavković’s dismissal would jeopardize the stability of the complex and sensitive military system, (2) Pavković is necessary because he is the creator, executor and guarantor of the VJ reforms, and that (3) Pavković’s dismissal would reflect poorly on the Army’s morale.

However, the first argument was dismissed by the notorious fact that because of its organization the army cannot and must not depend on any individual. Therefore the principle of substitutability is completely implemented; this implying that there is no one indispensable in the army. For example, if any commander is killed or retired, including the chief-of-staff, the chain of command always includes a sufficient number of those (deputy, department chief, operative, assistant) that are trained to immediately take over his duties.

The second argument failed because the VJ cannot be reformed without a clear national security strategy, but also without a state plan for its transformation, which sets the goals, costs, executors and means of control. Both these preconditions are in the jurisdiction of the Federal Parliament and Federal Government. Since these documents have not been adopted, it is not plain which program Pavković was using in allegedly reforming the Army.

It serves no purpose to discuss the third reason, since no one, not even Koštunica had assessed how poorly Pavković’s lingering influenced the Army’s morale, i.e. one would have equal rights to claim that after October 5 most of the officers awaited changes, and that they were not pleased to see Milošević’s generals remain in key position.

President Koštunica and his DSS would have definitely not achieved this without immense aid of their partners and competitors. This list of most deserving is topped by the cofounders of the DOS.

Up until the “Perišić Affair” this part of the DOS, led by the DS and Djindjić was silent in public and in Parliament on the topic of the necessity for VJ reforms.²³ It was only this affair that urged them to organize the urgent drafting and adoption of the Law on FRY Security Services, through which they primarily wanted to place the military services under parliamentary control.²⁴ They also did not try to urge the Serbian or Federal parliament to place the VJ under their control, despite these facts that only Serbia was financing the army, and that only the (reduced) Serbia was in the actual domain of the Army. Even with the justified preoccupation of the Government with the difficult socio-economic restructuring of the Serbian society, it seems that its reluctance towards reforms of the Army was politically motivated. The impression is that the remaining DOS took the ‘high stand’ after October 5, and left Koštunica to ‘wade in’ regarding the Army, hoping that sooner or later DOS would have political (and electoral) benefits.

A similar position on the Army was assumed by the Montenegrin authorities and President Djukanović following October 5. This is all the more strange, since they had previously wailed that the VJ was threatening democracy, which was a false pretense for gaining state independence. Djukanović’s abstinence, through which he apparently tried to avoid a conflict with the DOS and the Army during the local games regarding the independence referendum, could be interpreted as tactics. The true reason for the silence of the Montenegrin leadership seems to be derived from the fear that their demand for the VJ reform could raise the issue in Montenegro of demilitarization of the local police and security service. This in turn could lead to the reform and democratic civilian control of these forces, which would jeopardize the monopoly of the DPS and Djukanović over them.

There is not enough evidence that the Army was within the field of view of the expert (economic) part of the Federal and Serbian government. Despite the fact that it is the greatest beneficiary from the federal budget, which is created exclusively from funds collected in Serbia. The experts have so far been satisfied with trimming the part of the budget allocated for the defense and Army. However, there is no information that they have started controlling the way in which it is spent. It is difficult to claim, but this should not be dismissed, that their restraint has also been motivated by the desire to avoid a (premature) conflict with the DSS leadership, the remaining DOS and VJ. This is more so since most of the experts are from the G17 Plus circle, which even though it is a non-government organization has announced that it would transform into a political party in order to join the electoral struggle for power.²⁵

Milošević’s epigones, assembled in the Together for Yugoslavia coalition have drawn direct gain from the DOS’ understatements. The victory in the Federal parliamentary elections in Montenegro, which only they participated in, placed them on important federal positions, from which they can only exercise their power over Serbia and its citizens.²⁶ This has in return helped them improve their standings in their home republic. By trading in the ‘control package’ of votes in the Federal Parliament they were able to prevent, postpone and/or dilute the DOS efforts to break with the old regime.²⁷ This then wholeheartedly took advantage of the DOS fragmentation and became a crucial partner to both sides – whoever gives more. This is why the people of the FRY and VJ officers have so far not had any benefit of the Socialist People’s Party (SNP) apparatchik as Federal Defense Minister.

Thus the achievements of the DOS and its partners is a short list of mostly secondary regarding the Army and its environment:

• military service has been reduced to 9 months, and civilian service to 13 months, and only under pressure by civilian society;²⁸
• an internal VSO decision changed the organization-formation structure of the Army: the commands of the armies, Navy, Air Force and Air Defense were abolished, and nine corpses were formed, directly controlled by the VJ General Staff;
• in the spring of 2002 the General Staff announced the reduction of the VJ troops, in the first phase from 105,000 to 80,000, and 65,000 in the second phase. It is most likely a move that is to prove that the General Staff is prepared for reforms, because it seems that the reduction was achieved by eliminating units that only existed in wartime and mobilization plans, as well as eliminating vacant formation posts. This is supported by the fact that there was no explanation to what happened to 25,000 people, that were allegedly left without a job (duties);
• the abolishing of the branch military academies, and founding a single military academy;
• in late 2000 and 2001 the Federal Parliament adopted the reduction of the military budget,²⁹ but there is still no evidence that the competent parliamentary committees have checked the manner of their utilization;
• the General Staff accounting center has been transferred to the Ministry of Defense, therefore it nominally allocates and controls the military budget;³⁰
• the General Staff publicly stated that it has created a list of surplus military facilities that are for sale;³¹
• the Army Inspector is subordinate to the Supreme Defense Council and renamed the Defense inspection;³²
• a number of generals was retired and promoted by decrees of the FRY President between 2000 and 2002, gradually the staff of the high commands and departments was replaced, but no the General Staff leadership;³³
• after October 5 it has become customary for the Defense Minister to be a civilian;³⁴
• the heads of the Ministry of Defense have on a number of occasions publicly showed their devotion to the democratic control of the military.³⁵ The General Staff was also not far behind, USING EXCESSIVELY the syntagma “civilian control of military.”³⁶
• The Federal Government officially initiated the procedure for FRY membership in the Partnership for Peace;³⁷
• General Pavković was retired by presidential decree, deputy chief-of-staff General Branko Krga is appointed acting chief-of staff;³⁸ and
• the federal Parliament adopted the Law on FRY Security Services³⁹, placing the Military Security Department, Military Intelligence Service, Federal Foreign Ministry Information and Documentation Service and the Federal Foreign Ministry Security Service under the control of the Federal Parliament and Federal Government.⁴⁰

The first beneficiaries of the confusion of the new authorities were General Pavković and his associates. Having avoided being replaced, by Koštunica’s will, they consolidated their positions. Everything was directed towards suppressing the fact that they were prepared to use force against the people on October 5.⁴¹ Pavković has given a number of statements to the media for his purpose, without refraining from political intonation. There is no proof that Koštunica had prohibited Pavković and the other generals then, or later from speaking