The EU Should React to the Capture of Security Services in the Western Balkans

The European Union should respond to the signals of abuse of the security-intelligence services highlighted by civil society in Serbia and Montenegro before a big-scale affair arises like in North Macedonia in 2015, it was concluded at the event organized by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) on 4 June 2019 in Belgrade.

The European Commission has recognized that the countries of the Western Balkans increasingly face state capture, in which security-intelligence services play a significant role. Due to participation in this negative process, the work of the security-intelligence services should not be a taboo topic for public discussion, said BCSP Researcher Jelena Pejic, who moderated the discussion.

Signs of capturing security-intelligence services in Serbia

BCSP Executive Director Predrag Petrovic pointed to the negative trend of politicization of security-intelligence services in Serbia. The illegitimate influence of politics on the work of the security-intelligence services was present before, but in recent years there has been considerable deterioration and more severe misuse of services by politicians. Petrovic pointed out that the EU must pay more attention to the reform of security-intelligence services in the process of negotiations with Serbia without which there will be no progress in the rule of law.

On the other hand, police inspector Nebojsa Blagotic, who investigated the oil mafia and pointed to links between security-intelligence services, political parties and organized crime, was retired early. The court ruled in his favour, but nothing happened. The case he brought out remained completely unexplored, Petrovic reminded.

Petrovic pointed out that these examples can look like isolated cases, but there are enough of them to be able to connect in a wider picture.

Functional oversight of the security-intelligence services would diminish the suspicions of their involvement with organized crime and political power, but it no longer exists. In Serbia there was a good practice of controlling the security-intelligence services that was established by the previous Ombudsman who did several thorough controls, explained Petrovic. However, today the Ombudsman does not deal with security-intelligence services, and there is no data available on the number of employees who work on supervision of security-intelligence services in this institution nor how many of them have security certificates that allow a deeper control over the services. The Parliamentary Security Services Control Committee has made some progress in the past, but this trend has been discontinued, Petrovic concluded.

The EU Did Not Respond to Early Warnings of Civil Society in North Macedonia

The most drastic example of the abuse of security-intelligence services occurred in North Macedonia when the Administration for Security and Counter Intelligence illegally wiretapped thousands of citizens since 2008 until the end of 2015. However, before this scandal surfaced there were signals that the civil society warned of, Magdalena Lembovska from the Center for European Strategies – EUROTHINK explained.

Priebe Report as the Decisive Impulse for Security-Intelligence Services Reform

Because of the scandal, European Commission sent a group of experts led by Reinhard Priebe, which revealed systemic problems and published a public report about them. They produced a new report two years later, which showed that only a few recommendations were implemented.

Following the second report, the security-intelligence services reform process was inclusive and involved representatives of civil society, which was a step in the right direction. However, the reform process should encompass other parts of the security sector too, said Lembovska.

Jelena Pejic reminded of BCSP’s proposal that a report modelled after the Priebe report, that analyses state capture, should be conducted in every Western Balkans state. The suggestion was met with support from colleagues from Serbia and the region.

Closing-Off Of Security-Intelligence Services before the Eyes of the EU and the Public

Montenegro's accession to NATO implied a security sector reform, which is one of the reasons why the reform of the security-intelligence services was not covered by the previous EU integration requirements. However, the EU should become interested in the work of the security-intelligence services before a radical crisis happens, as in North Macedonia, Dina Bajramspahic of the Institute Alternative explained.

Secure data sharing was the most important for NATO, while issues of transparency and accountability, which are the most important to citizens, were not included. Ten years ago, statistical data on the implementation of secret surveillance was publicly available, while today it’s claimed that this practice would jeopardize national security, Bajramspahic pointed out.

The National Security Agency of Montenegro has disappeared from the public discourse because representatives don’t aim to bring the work of the Agency closer to citizens, and there are no whistleblowers in this sector either, Bajramspahic warned.

However, responsibility for the work of the security-intelligence services is also shared by the supervisory bodies. In Montenegro, a Security and Defence Committee exists, but their representatives didn’t enter the National Security Agency after 2010. The Ombudsman was never there either, although he has the authority and unlimited access to documents.

Effective democratic and civilian oversight of security-intelligence services is necessary in order to establish trust, panellists concluded.

This discussion is supported by European Fund for the Balkans within the regional program Think and Link, through the project “Watching the Watchers: Towards Accountable Intelligence Services in the Western Balkans”, which is jointly implemented by Belgrade Centre for Security Policy from Serbia, Center for European Strategies – EUROTHINK from North Macedonia and Institute Alternative from Montenegro.