Beyond Sputnik and RT: How Does Russian Soft Power in Serbia Really Work?

In 2022, as part of the public opinion survey, the Open Society Foundation (OSF) and Datapraxis collected data from 22 countries for the purpose of the report entitled “Fault Lines: Global Perspectives on a World in Crisis”. The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) had exclusive access to the said report and was able to analyse it. In autumn 2022, BCSP conducted its own public opinion survey on the Serbian citizens’ perception of the country’s major foreign and security policy issues. The “Fault Lines” survey established that Serbia is much different than any other country involved in the survey, including those that generally subscribe to the Russian narrative concerning the Russia-Ukraine war. The BCSP survey applied an even more granular approach to how Russian popularity in Serbia is manifested and how deeply it is entrenched.

Based on the research findings, it can be concluded that soft power is a major element of the Russian presence in Serbia. However, the catch is that Russia’s soft power in Serbia is not operating based on the traditional definition of the term, derived from the attractiveness of a political and social model, but rather on the fact that the majority of the public in Serbia sees Russia as an alternative to the West, by which it feels betrayed, abandoned and never fully accepted. This has resulted in the enormous popularity of Russia, which is now a major impediment for Serbia joining the EU sanctions against Moscow or any overt anti-Russian policies.

This publication was produced with the financial support of National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Responsibility for the content of this publication belongs solely to Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.