Macedonian Army of peace in times of conflicts and war

Strange jubilees are marked and still stranger decorations conferred in the Macedonian state. For instance, at the recent celebration of the Army Day (August 18) everybody spoke about the 13th anniversary of the army of the independent Republic of Macedonia, and hardly anyone recalled the fact that the date commemorated the events of 1943. But, of greater importance to all of them was the more recent history of the state and the army. Just as in all other formerly Yugoslav republics, historical dates are used as proof of tradition and statehood. Another absurd will be created if the proposal of Ali Ahmeti’s Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) to proclaim August 13 (the date of the Ohrid Agreement concluded after the 2001 conflict) the Day of Peace is adopted: within a span of merely five days Macedonia will make an Orwellian attempt to prove that the 2001 defeat was actually a victory, and that its Army bravely defends the country against all threats, and is moreover capable of spreading peace elsewhere in the world (in Afghanistan, Iraq and even Iran, if need may be).

Many say that on its 13th anniversary the Macedonian Army reached the stage of “puberty” in its (difficult and painful) maturing. In all fairness, the past years were not easy either for the state or its army. However, precious few are willing to face the reality and admit that the Macedonian army, typically for an adolescent, is still confused and grapples with the dilemmas which are occasionally attributable more to the country’s leadership than to its own doing. In effect, in a democracy the army is always a “minor” of a kind, because the principle of civil supremacy requires its submission to the decisions and policy of the state authority. On the occasion of this particular anniversary, no one, it seems, forgot to congratulate the state and military top ranks, but very few drew the attention of the politicians and the public to a number of issues bound to become extremely important in the coming period, whether or not Macedonia is invited to join the NATO membership. Instead of fanning overall elation, dates of this kind should provide the opportunity for the confrontation of views and a debate on the most important issues of national and military strategy and development.

The creation of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) did not follow the pattern dominant in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Macedonia was the last to proclaim its independence and in the following couple of months (until February 1992) it even tolerated the presence of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) on its territory. It thus appeared that it had a dual military and security structure, and its formal-legal situation was absurd. Still, the state leadership of that time, believed it far more opportune to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of the JNA forces from the Macedonian territory, then to demonstrate its statehood at all costs and risk possible casualties. At that time, Macedonia earned itself the tag of the “oasis of peace”, which it often, and without much of a justification, flaunted all over the world. At any rate, despite the dramatic events in the region, the creation of its own army was not a priority of the Macedonian state. Public euphoria about forming a Macedonian army was neither displayed nor encouraged, and no one was concerned with creating its heroic image or public reputation. In brief, Macedonia did not join the wars and conflicts on the territory of the former state and advocated a peaceful policy, thus earning its Army the attribute of the “army of peace”. From the vantage point of the present day, numerous disappointed critics of the Macedonian politics and reality believe that it was the critical moment which affected the state-creative and patriotic capacity of the new state. In other words, things won without a fight or spilled blood are not cherished. Analysts of this kind say the Army’s was a mere state ornament, and has never obtained its deserved position in the society and state. Others, in contrast, think that this denouement of the Yugoslav story enabled Macedonia to avoid the trap of militant ethno-nationalism and the Slovenian and Croatian model of state building (where the army was the first institution of a future state). Still the course of events, especially during 2001, places the truth somewhere in between.

It is true that Macedonia started its life of an independent country in a form declaratively supported already by the so-called Slovenian spring, i.e. as a de facto demilitarized state. The “Slovenian spring” project of a unique demilitarized state came true. But, in the creation of this unique state in Macedonia the country’s elites lacked the power to develop its project (notwithstanding their responsibility to do so), and the JNA, on its part, did not hesitate to take with it everything it could carry (destroying whatever could not be moved, such as the barracks flooring, plumbing, etc.). The demilitarized Macedonia did not have the strength to turn this situation to its advantage on the international and regional level, and create a national strategy and policy of a neutral state. Initially, it was wise to request international assistance in the form of a UN preventive mission to fill the dangerous vacuum, especially on the northern and western borders. It took a few more years for the authorities to seek incorporation into the global security courses and look for the lasting solution for the country’s status in this respect. The first step was its entry into the Partnership for Peace program and the signing of the SOFA agreement. Despite the small external advances the Army was, internally, faced with major problems. Everybody thought that in an “oasis of peace” investments into the army were not exactly required, although the fragility of the “oasis” soon increased the awareness of the internal conflict with ethnic elements smoldering underneath the outward peace. As a result the police was given increasing importance and financing, while the reforms in the defense sphere were merely cosmetic. Foreign donations in the form of disused weaponry – other countries were bound to dispose of as soon as possible under their international obligations – provided the only replenishment to the empty barracks. On the other hand, the education of officers was influenced by impromptu acceptance of foreign fellowships and offers, and they acquired all sorts of knowledge and skills, but from different military and political milieus and traditions. These contrasts were fully revealed once the well-trained officers returned to their barracks to work with obsolete equipment and inadequate armaments. Worst of all was the fact that the army somehow could not manage to become a national institution, for at least two reasons. First, the boycott of the military obligation by an entire ethnic (Albanian) body was tolerated by the authorities wary not to “rock the boat”. The parallel, Albanian attempt to organize para-military units was allegedly prevented by the arrest of several state officials of Albanian origin working in the Defense Ministry. However, no one prevented the Albanians to join the struggle of their brothers in Kosovo and Metohija in 1998-99. The second reason for unsatisfactory recruitment could be reduced to corruption and nepotism. Namely, the military service was done mainly by the conscripts from the rural and lower social strata, while “daddy’s boys” proved their patriotism clamoring in cafes or in front of TV screens.

In brief, in 2001 the army of the “oasis of peace” had its baptism of fire in a perverse way – the state of war was not proclaimed, nor did the army find out who it should fight, how or why. At that time, the military experienced another shock – the arsenals were empty and the essential ammunition had to be purchased urgently. Naturally, military profiteers started to peddle arms unsuitable for the type of the threat or the way to fight it (e.g. the purchase of “Suhoi” military aircraft from Ukraine) and then, still during the conflict, there came a scandal directly implicating the Defense Minister of the time Ljuben Paunovski. The 2001 conflict is still something of a mystery. It remains unknown what was the exact strength of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) military units the Macedonian security forces fought, how many of them came from Kosmet or from the local milieu, what was the number of their casualties, etc. The situation is best illustrated by the participants who speak about the conditions of their struggle against the phantom internal-external enemy, the quantity and quality of food provisions, etc., not to mention the contradictory orders of the stop-go type, or commands to withdraw with the goal close at hand. The army was frustrated for two reasons at least. Many testify that the treatment of the policemen and soldiers was different, and that a clear strategy and tactics of confronting the enemy were missing. Anyway, it seems that the largest disagreement in the nonfunctional government of “national salvation” comprising the representatives of the four largest parties from both ethnic camps, was between the defense minister and current Prime Minister Bučkovski and the Minister of the Interior, presently ICTY indictee Ljube Boškovski (i.e. between the representatives of two largest Macedonian ethnic parties SDSM and VMRO). That was the main reason for the lack of coordination, and even conflicts between the members of the two armed structures – the military and the police. In other words, the old functional rivals in the security system of the country (at least in terms of their share in the state budget) were led by politicians who (had already) politicized and confronted them in line with their own political interests. The whole thing became still more complicated by the direct involvement of the so-called international community which kept changing its attitude towards the conflicting parties on hourly basis. Lord Robertson (NATO Secretary General at the time) who referred to the KLA as bandits and hoodlums, very soon (i.e. when the Macedonian state failed to find its bearings) changed his view and started to qualify them as rebels, and finally, fighters for human rights. Pragmatic and selfish, the international community was primarily concerned about establishing a ceasefire of a kind and stabilizing the situation, guided mostly by the balance of powers in the field. And as the KLA (with overt US assistance) gained increasing advantage in the military sphere, its political power grew accordingly. Its members did not participate in the negotiations and neither were they the signatories of the Ohrid Agreement, but the outcome was the obvious reflection of this group’s wishes and initiatives. The Army, which – true – had a rather decent professional staff, waged its war without a clearly defined enemy and objective, and its orders kept changing on the hour. One coalition partner in the government of that time persistently spoke about peaceful political means to resolve the internal conflict, while the other steadily argued for a resolute military response to external aggressors from Kosmet and their abettors in the country. A state of war, or even emergency, has never been proclaimed and the only thing the parliament did was to pass a bizarre declaration denouncing the “extremists’” use of violence. The casualties from the ranks of the Macedonian security forces were, again, mostly the members of lower social strata, while the reserve units comprised the largest number of bankrupt company workers and young men without previous employment. The army inevitably faced internal problems since many officers of Albanian nationality “changed sides” and uniforms.

On one occasion, delivering a lecture on the concept of democratic control of the army and the need for its depoliticization to high officers attending a command-staff course, I found myself in a very embarrassing situation – literally at a loss for an answer. Namely, explaining the position of the army in a democratic society, I said that its loyalty was to the constitution alone, that the politicians could change “team jerseys” easily, but that a soldier had only one uniform he wore under the standard of his country. The audience responded: “It may be so in theory, but in our situation, dear professors, uniforms are easily changeable even in the Army!” A number of those who (proudly?!) wore the ARM uniform went over to the enemy and donned the battledress of the para-military with the two-headed eagle as their symbol, only to return to the ARM with higher ranks to take superior positions. For instance, the current Deputy to the Defense Minister Talat Xhaferi was the KLA commander for the Gostivar region. From the perspective of the present day the army is about to face new challenges, because the ruling (Ali Ahmeti’s) party – DUI, demands the introduction of the Albanian as the command language in the army and the police. Another reminder of Slovenia of the 1980s…

That notwithstanding, Macedonia is today considered to be a stabilized post-conflict society, and many things are deliberately left aside lest they interfered with the country’s course towards NATO/EU. Still, the question is whether everything has really been forgotten and what kind of a corporate spirit the Macedonian army actually has. Related to that is the matter of whether this corporative spirit and ethos could be implanted by talk about the membership of this or that coalition or alliance. Instead of responding to these substantial questions, the political elite has decided to throw the ball into another court, far from home. According to such views the world peace is apparently so strongly endangered (by the, incidentally, non-existent means of mass destruction) that it was necessary to participate in international missions, even when they contravened with the international law. When the USA called upon all “banana republics” to join the so-called Alliance of the Willing in its war on Iraq, the Macedonian authorities did not hesitate to support their main lobbyist for entry into NATO. Naturally, they kept this a secret from one another so that the (late) President Boris Trajkovski offered the country’s military forces, while his Prime Minister Crvenkovski learned about it from the media. In the end, the view prevailed that Macedonia can only benefit from this political move. Thus, those same guys, with unacknowledged military merits and achievements in the Macedonian “small war” went off into the wide world to defend global peace. And lo and behold: they proved their worth to the last one! They were decorated by the Americans, as well as the Macedonian authorities on the Army Day. It turns out that a man can fight for his country or against it, without much of a difference, because in the end he remains unknown and unacknowledged (even in the KLA, because the plush seats are for the top ranks alone), but then when he fights for the American interests in the world, he immediately receives recognition and medals for valor. Who now thinks that he is risking his neck for (financial) peanuts or a miserable life insurance policy?! The Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski has this year finally decorated the members of the forces in the Iraqi contingent, with a special medal explaining that they contributed to the peace in the world (Iraq) and thus affirmed their country and its loyalty to the global coalition in the struggle against terrorism.

Still, in view of the global situation and the fact that no one can be amnestied for the tragic situation in Iraq especially if they have already assumed responsibility with their direct (however small and pathetic) participation, one particular fact needs to be emphasized. Namely, on August 18 this year, on the day of the ARM and theconferring of decorations for peace in the world and fighting global terrorism in Iraq, terrible things were happening in that same country. All the world media informed about the outrage and cries in a horror-struck Baghdad. TV stations showed the images of Iraqis chanting “Iraq’s become a bloodbath!” The “Independent’s” Robert Fisk wrote about the disfigured and dismembered bodies of women and children stacked up in the Baghdad morgue. In effect, it was just an “ordinary” day in the Iraq’s inferno.

It is difficult to say how the ARM members cope with all these absurdities. Still, the sharpest domestic analysts speak of a two-faced policy which does not manage to grow out of its puberty syndrome, and has the habit of covering up its insecurity and inferiority by bragging and inventing stories of its great “manly” exploits all over the world.

* Translated by Ljiljana Nikolić