Macedonia In a Shattered Mirror: Referendum Challenges

Paradoxically, in the last 13 years, it almost seems as if Macedonia has been the victim of its own image success story on the Balkans. For 10 years it was a “peace oasis” and a host-country of a paradigmatic mission of preventive UN diplomacy (UNPREDEP). Directly after signing the Ohrid agreement in August 2000, it was declared the greatest/fastest success of international conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction. Success (even if illusory) was equally necessary for the domestic elites and also international elites in order to acquire/maintain legitimacy/credibility. The image of a “peace oasis” freed the Macedonian authorities of responsibility to deal with themselves and the potential of internal conflict. What was most important was that the country looked better than all the surrounding countries. From the point of view of the international community, Macedonia was supposed to serve as evidence that it was capable of doing one thing well, i.e. to prevent at least one conflict in the region of the former Yugoslavia. Post-Ohrid Macedonia was “sentenced” to success, as anything other than this would jeopardize the credibility of the big players. The international community signed the Ohrid Agreement and declared an end to the conflict (not realizing that peace on paper was easy to achieve, while the difficult task was still ahead).

Rapid interventions in conflict, mainly of cosmetic, formal and superficial nature, showed to be sufficient in buying negative peace for some time (i.e. eliminating or inhibiting elements of violence). When peace (in unresolved conflicts) is near (even if unfinished) no one dares to delve deeper into reform, into determining the causes of violence and eliminating its consequences. Domestic elites do not want this because they are aware of their weak capacity and the international community because they don’t have a vision for resolving a much bigger problem (regional, Balkan). That is why stability is shown as a success, and any agitation is interpreted as unnecessary disturbance of the public or creating problems. As elsewhere in the region, political-legal reform was undertaken (as a peace agreement, changes in the constitution and laws, amnesty, and even political reintegration of former military opponents), while society and citizens are left to deal with the consequences of conflict on their own (which aren’t always of a material nature). What is worse is that citizens live in a schizophrenic situation: on the one hand, reality is equally difficult for everyone, even for those who expected to live better, ever since their armed victory of human rights; leading figures took important positions in the government, but did not succeed in ensuring better economic conditions. They truly succeeded in setting up two universities in the Albanian language in Tetovo (funded by the state budget) but also in leaving graduates clueless about what to do with their diplomas. The state is paying the economic-social price for the conflict in 2001: the price for war profiteering, for endemic corruption, non-existent economy and foreign investments that aren’t arriving, several thousand displaced persons, houses that still have not been rebuilt in destroyed villages, 400 thousand people unemployed, and one third of the population that live below the poverty level. Contrary to facts that citizens are experiencing, the political elite and international community consistently advocate (in an almost communist way) great success, co-habitation, a future in Europe, etc… The government and citizens cannot hear each other: there are two security discourses, but each one has its own public, not considering the other! The government is concerned about global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (disregarding that small and light arms that there is plenty of in Macedonia can also become weapons of mass destruction), reform of the Army that would represent our country in NATO. On the other hand, the citizens are imprisoned in a vicious circle of human (un)certainty. In order to assure achievement of its great strategic aims more quickly (i.e. NATO’s aims), the government, without giving it much thought, signed a bilateral agreement with the US on the exemption of US soldiers from the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, indirectly participating in the illegal war against Iraq, becoming a part of the occupational forces – and in this way, in the name of the Macedonian citizens that elected it, actively contributed to the tragedy and humanitarian catastrophe of citizens in another country.

Macedonia was and has remained an unavoidably weak state, i.e. a state incapable of fulfilling the basic needs of its population, to keep economic promises made at the elections and to open the way to social development and the so-called positive peace (which would something more than the absence of direct violence). Long resistant traps of internal conflict (that internal and regional circumstances finally made unavoidable), when the open violence finally occurred, banally labelled the situation in Macedonia as an interethnic conflict. Internal actors did everything to hide that this was the most plotted conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (comparable only with Slovenia). On the other hand, the international community rushed to boast that it prevented (the alleged) civil conflict, although everything clearly indicated that the citizens did not involve themselves in the mutual conflict, even in the most critical moments of the crisis. Finally, the version of multi-ethnic conflict suited everyone (for the sake of their “dignity” and legitimacy) that had to be resolved by adequate measures – cementing ethnic divisions, their constutionalization and institutionalization. In this way, everyone was able to place the guilt for the conflict on those who actually were only observers of their own tragedy – on the citizens! All the same, the Macedonian and Albanian and international elite, could praise themselves out loud and present themselves as founders of peace, thus as guarantees of peace and stability in the country. The government, that does not know how to and is not capable of maintaining its legitimacy amongst those from which sovereignty originates, has turned towards foreign sponsors. In this way, a permanent alliance of domestic and international elites has been created in maintaining a status quo that suits everyone except the citizens.

In the last few months, however, in Macedonia something occurred that caused wonder on all sides – the Citizen occurred! He/she was given the possibility to vote on a Law at a referendum, which is binding even according to the post-Ohrid Constitution (it appears that the “founding fathers” forgot to leave out direct democracy from the political system that should have been founded on ethnic criterion). It is almost as if citizens, that went through tough times and have not overcome these tough times, have finally raised their voices – and to the surprise of many, articulated their dissatisfaction through a constitutional and non-violent mechanism. However, as the day of the referendum neared, the most frequently asked question was: will there be a conflict again? Macedonia already experienced how politics are (intentionally) ethnicified and criminalized, and how ethnicities and crime is politicized! What occurred in the pre-referendum period was the securitization of politics, i.e. presenting political problems and mechanisms for their management through institutions as a security risk. Of course, again, the potential culprits were supposed to be citizens that hindered the ethno-political elite to harmoniously govern as they wished, with the blessings of the international community. What is now happening is what Ole Weaver and others described through the theory of securitization and security as a speech act (security is a speech act; security is what power holders define as security)! How all of a sudden, was there such agreement that the referendum is an introduction into a new conflict? Who were the securitizing agents and why?

First of all, it was difficult for the ethno-political elites to accept that their own behaviour created the current political crisis: a) non-transparent negotiations on new municipal borders, b) violating provisions of the European Charter on local autonomy that Macedonia ratified, c) ignoring the stance of the citizens on the 41^st local referendum that rejected the Bills of the Government, though some ten municipalities where it was organised had dominantly Albanian population; d) total elimination of domestic expert circles and nongovernmental organizations, e) consultations with former KLA commanders on the field, which introduced outside institutional mechanisms of negotiation which have nothing to do with local democracy and citizens of any nationality; f) adopting a law on municipal borders which is not based upon criterion and methodology that is applied in these processes. Already from the first signs of civil disobedience, government representatives ran off to Brussels to complain that their nation was nationalistically oriented, which additionally frustrated the citizens. Even worse, the government itself imposed the ethnic discourse and rhetoric of fear. In this way, it began to manipulate with the fears of citizens of different nationalities and turned them against each other, which prevented (rather successfully, unfortunately) social cohesion on the basis of citizenship. Therefore, even Albanians that did not agree with the legal solutions were faced with the dilemma that appeared unbridgeable in the post conflict society that did nothing about communal spirit and reconciliation: whether to grow into self aware citizens and support Others, or remain loyal to ethnic leaders that, finally, succeeded in determining the borders of ethnic domination at the local level.

By fabricating stories on the ethno-nationalism of non-Albanians, the base to creating strong civil resistance to the government was efficiently destroyed, which came to be through the election engineering of Xavier Solana (even before the parliamentary elections in 2002). Unfortunately, such a simplified story can be easily construed and easily sold abroad. It is no wonder, as the public all over always looks for simple stories and it is easiest to understand that the ethnic Macedonians rebelled against the Ohrid Agreement and wanted to prevent Albanians from freely controlling local communities where they were in the majority. Rarely anyone, however, points out that it was all election geometry (gerrymandering), the most fantastic ways of combining rural and urban municipalities in order to achieve/change ethnic structures of the population (Struga, Kičevo, Skoplje), and lastly resolving language issues by law which has a completely different purpose.

It is almost as if the Macedonian citizens were left with Hamlet’s choice: peace or democracy? In other words, this imposed dilemma changes concepts around, where negative peace is then considered the highest form of democracy as every other form of practicing (participation) democracy would mean conflict and would bring violence. Finally, according to this interpretation, joining Europe would be in peace and not necessarily also with democracy. This is completely confusing for those that see democracy as a form of peaceful resolution of conflicts in society.

The international community missed the chance (as many times in the past) of intervening through mechanisms of early warning and prevention. It hoped that its disciples would come to some kind of legal solution (as a quality solution is not in the scope of the international community, which would like to see a rapid solution and stability – although it won’t have to live in these municipalities and with these solutions!). Upon the first sign of compromise within the Government, it hurried to acknowledge the law as an expression of successful implementation of the Ohrid agreement, despite the wide dissatisfaction within society. Keeping in mind that the citizens never before rebelled against the Ohrid agreement, systemic law on the decentralization and 30 additional laws, issues of revising municipal borders are intentionally equalized with the entire peace process in order to dramatize the entire situation. But when the Citizen (Macedonian) “occurred” to the international community, this was a direct attack on such a well imagined picture of “democracy without people”, based on the ethnic community (i.e. the elites that come to agreements that are only announced to the people). The international community also likes peace (however it may be appear) more than democracy which, by definition, means different alternatives, opposite opinions, tensions in institutions. The “occurrence” of Citizens is a crime against the plan to pacify part of the Balkans and maintain its stable until resolving the issue of the final status of Kosovo, above all. The “appearance” of the Citizen means re-examining the entire thesis on multiethnic conflicts in the country and the “fantastic success” of foreign crisis managers. And lastly, strengthening civil democracy would mean more problems in the region, as the method of management would then change with the help of servile, weak, and dependent political regimes.

Therefore, instead of helping disassemble the apocalyptic scenario, the international community tried to take advantage of it as a means of pressure on the citizens before the referendum. Firstly, the International Crisis Group began with its fatalistic report on Macedonia “Make or Break”, then Romano Prodi came to personally present the EU Questionnaire and to clearly say that a successful referendum would mean returning to the past and distancing from Europe; Donald Rumsfield hurried to reward soldiers that served in Iraq during a national holiday – and as a “well informed expert on issues of local autonomy”, of course, express his views on the referendum; NATO has finally “opened its heart” and gave flattering assessments on the new MAP (Membership Action Plan), etc…

Rarely to now, it appears as if the domestic and foreign elites joined together against one such legitimate democratic measure such as a referendum. The dilemma can be presented in the following way: either a referendum is not such a democratic means (or it is a privilege of only some nations) or Macedonia nevertheless isn’t such a success story that has been discussed for so long? Is it possible that the referendum is a casus belli? The answer is – yes! If the Constitution from 1991 (the one that was praised by the international community) could be this, why couldn’t this be repeated by other acts? It is interesting that the politicians in power claimed that the Law on the municipal borders from 1996 (adopted by its government!) had led to the armed conflict, and therefore the successful referendum and the Law remaining in effect for at least another year (which would be a legal outcome of a successful referendum) would mean that even a law can be casus belli.

Perhaps a successful referendum would slow down implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, but taking the arms would mean its complete failure, as its first principle is – abolition of violence as an instrument of political battle. Thus, if anyone were to fight for the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement using arms, then this would mean its own negation and transforming peace instruments into the cause of violence.  Issues regarding risks of new violent conflicts in Macedonia are more of an issue of the possible legitimacy of violence (and actors), and less on the true causes of violence. Though, there is a cause to the violence which isn’t related to the law on territorial organization, or to the referendum. The country is undoubtedly vulnerable and still in a post conflict trauma, but all analysis shows that violence manifests itself more within ethnic communities, than between them. At this moment, there is more dissatisfaction amongst the non-Albanian citizens on the how the government is managed and a desire to de-legitimize it, than it has to do with any interethnic intolerance. In order to preserve power and/or stability, some people risk antagonizing the situation to the extent where dissatisfaction will escalate. That is why the announcement of the Macedonian Helsinki Committee (MCH), rightfully, pointed out the possible risks that the political actors would worsen the situation and transform the political crisis into a security crisis. MHC at the same time warned that in the case there was a security escalation, the government would be held responsible for manipulating and scaring the citizens, or for having not undertaken the necessary measures to prevent an escalation (if domestic or foreign intelligence services have certain concrete indication that this could occur).

On the eve of the referendum, there was a turn of events that hardly anyone expected: the constitutional name of the country was recognized by the powerful mentor, the US! It appeared as if at least one member of the international community remembered to instead of using a “stick” (which gave a counterproductive effect, i.e. after each threat, the decisiveness of the citizens to support the referendum only strengthened) try to do something with a “carrot”. The government (un)expectedly had something to boast about, to organize “spontaneous” (with the help of some nongovernmental organizations headed by the Soros Foundation) national celebration before the pre-referendum silence period, where government representatives and the President of the Republic himself could make a public address.

On the day of the referendum, there was shockingly low turnout of citizens of only 26% and brought relief to the international community and government. At first glance it seems as if the people decided to listen to the government and boycott its own initiative, and even more so as if it showed the unity of the Macedonian and Albanian citizens. A few days after the referendum, which was presented as a threat to the peace and stability Macedonia again wore the aureole of a success story. Those well acquainted with the situation indicated many problematic points: firstly, the abstinence was a reflection of, not one’s true will, but the fear to take on (the imposed) responsibility for an eventual conflict; there were direct pressures on people that they could lose their jobs that they had come upon through party connections, even threats of losing social aid. In this atmosphere, the first condition for democratic expression was lost – secrecy. Anyone who was to appear at a polling station would already publicly show their views. Therefore, all citizens who gave unreserved support of the referendum at public polls (that guaranteed anonymity), all of a sudden lost interest for it on the day of the referendum. Even more striking was data from regions inhabited by Albanians, where turnout was almost zero percent. This is how party-ethnic discipline prevailed and the American “carrot” by recognizing its name.

Of course, the overall situation in the country is far from benign and pretty. The referendum did not bring conflict, but post-referendum Macedonia is still burdened by all pre-referendum security problems. The situation is as follow: weakened peace factors + weak factors of conflict = negative equilibrium/stagnation. It is evident that the situation is fragile and unstable.